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Summary 
This thesis examines the contractual dimension of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications. In particular, it provides a comprehensive legal analysis of the transformations 
occurring in private law as a result of the impact of EU telecommunications regulation on private 
law relationships. While the main focus in the Europeanization of private law has been on the sale 
of goods, this thesis engages the (concealed) private law dimension accompanying the, almost, all-
encompassing sector-related framework that concerns the provision of a Service of General 
Economic Interest. This thesis scrutinizes the private law implications of the regulation of 
telecommunications services from cradle to grave; i.e. from its making to its enforcement. Hence, 
it does not only consider substance but also focuses on the institutional and procedural 
transformations taking place within the sector. Tested against empirical research, the thesis further 
assesses the self-sufficiency of sector-specific legislation as a separate regime of private law serving 
regulatory functions that operate independently of general contract rules. The thesis concludes by 
validating that self-sufficiency is actually occuring in view of the results yielded from the foregoing 
legal and empirical analysis and by providing a normative assessment of the transformation of 
private law which is taking place as a result of the shift in the focus of European private law from 
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PART I – SETTING THE SCENE 




1. Introduction  
This thesis examines the contractual dimension of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications. 1  Based on the assumption that the regulation of the regulation of the 
telecommunications sector constitutes a sector-specific legal regime, this research looks at the 
extent to which the EU rules in the field of telecommunications impact private relationships and, 
most importantly, how this influence contributes to a process of transformation of private law in 
Europe.   
The transformation of private law in Europe seems particularly evident in those areas 
belonging to the so-called European Regulatory Private Law, where the intervention of the 
European legislator is most obvious as, for example, in the case of Services of General Economic 
Interest, which constitute a composite of different “free-standing” sectorial regimes. More 
particularly, this dissertation looks at the extent to which the European legislator is involved in the 
shaping of a new European private legal order through the regulation of Services of General 
Economic Insterest, which can be viewed in its functioning as self-sufficient on account of its 
institutional, substantive and procedural design that operates under a sector-related rationale. 
Accordingly, this starting hypothesis is premised on the assumption that the transformation of 
private law does not take place in an isolated manner; rather it occurs at three different (and 
interlinked) levels, giving rise to three different layers of transformation that range from the cradle 
to the grave of private law. In this light, it implies that the transformation processes in private law 
take place at the level of decision-making, substantive law and enforcement.  
The purpose of the dissertation is, therefore, to illustrate the main features of these 
transformations and to demonstrate how the interplay between the different layers paves the way 
for the functioning of a sector-related regime that utilizes its own categories (self-contained) 
without the use of external resources (self-sufficient). In order to substantiate such assumptions, the 
research has focused on telecommunications regulation as a paradigmatic example. 
                                                          
1 The research leading to these Ph.D. thesis has received funding from the Ministry of Education of the Government of 
Spain under the Programme Salvador de Madariaga (Decision EDU/3476/2010) and adjudicated by Decision 
EDU/2085/2011, Official Gazette, 25.07.2011, n. 177, Sec. III, 82675- 82676 (BOE-A-2011-12835). 
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ERPL Project and the Self-sufficiency hypothesis in European Regulatory Private Law  
This research is framed within an overall research project that aims at reconstructing an unobserved 
tertium genus of (private) law: European Regulatory Private Law (ERPL). 2 The ERPL project was 
conceived with the aim of providing a systematic model for the emergence of a set of private law 
rules that transform the aims of European Private Law from autonomy to functionalism in 
competition and regulation under a new institutional and procedural design.  
European Regulatory Private Law does not fall within the traditional categories of private 
law. Rather, ERPL constitutes a “European version” of a diluted private law that serves the purpose 
of the “European Internal Market building project” under a process of Economisation and 
Politicisation. Under the Internal Market Programme, private law is no longer exclusively driven 
by private autonomy and freedom of contract, but used as a regulatory tool to build a competitive 
(internal) market (Economisation). This enterprise is being accomplished by new modes of 
governance that links private law to politics (Politicisation).3 Labor, consumer law and the sector-
specific legal regimes governing the so-called regulated markets (energy, transport, water supply, 
financial services, postal and telecommunications services) are the areas where these presumptions 
are most evident.4  
Against this background, ERPL is composed of three different layers: 1) the sectorial 
substance of ERPL, 2) the general principles –provisionally termed competitive contract law– and 
3) common principles of civil law.5 Based on socio-legal research, the ERPL Project is structured 
around four parameters that epitomize the interactions between the national legal orders and those 
regimes composing European Regulatory Private Law: (1) intrusion and substitution, (2) conflict 
and resistance, (3) hybridisation and (4) convergence. Moreover, the ERPL Project examines the 
developing new order of values upon which ERPL rests, deeply rooted in the concept of access 
justice (Zugangsgerechtigkeit).6 
Self-sufficiency hypothesis 
Self-sufficiency within European Regulatory Private Law means that the EU legislature is not only 
substantively but also institutionally and procedurally shaping its own system of private law. 7 
According to this notion of self-sufficiency, different sector-specific legal regimes have emerged 
concerning different economic sectors and following sector-specific rationales. These regimes 
                                                          
2 European Regulatory Private Law: The Transformation of European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in 
Competition and Regulation (ERPL project). Prof. Hans-W. Micklitz leads the research under a 60 months European 
Research Council (ERC) Grant under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007–2013) / ERC 
Grant Agreement n. [269722]. The Project started in October 2011.  
3 Micklitz, H.-W. (2009), “The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law - The Transformation of European 
Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation”, Yearbook of European Law, 28(1) 3-59. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Micklitz, H.-W. and Svetiev, Y. (2012), “A Self-Sufficient European Private Law – A Viable Concept?”, EUI Working 
Papers Law No. 2012/31. Project description available at https://blogs.eui.eu/erc-erpl/project-description.  
6 Ibid. On the concept of access justice see Micklitz, H.-W. (2011), “Social Justice and Access Justice in Private Law”. 
EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2011/02.  
7 “Self-sufficiency means the whole process of law-making up to law enforcement follows sector specific patterns”, 
Micklitz, H.-W. and Patterson, D. (2012), “From the Nation State to the Market: The Evolution of EU Private Law”, EUI 
Working Papers LAW no 2012/15., p. 14.  
 
  17 
comprise rules ranging from administrative rules to provisions focusing on the private law 
relationships aimed at accomplishing sector-related goals. Self-sufficiency is, therefore, understood 
as an all-inclusive discourse that encompasses and embraces an entire sector since its birth (law-
making) up to its enforcement according to a sector-specific logic. 
Furthermore, apart from operating according to the logic of the sector concerned, the self-
sufficient EU regulatory private law operates with minimal interaction from national private law 
systems. As such, there is a process of intrusion and substitution by which the different EU rules 
that shape the different sectors, originally aimed at opening former monopolistic industries, are 
implemented at the national level in isolation; i.e. keeping their legal sectoriality. By so doing, 
Member States do not integrate the contractual dimension of these rules into the systematised 
national private law regimes. 8  Thus, the sector-specific provisions concerning private law 
relationships remain outside the systematic national civil regimes –usually embodied in civil 
codes– and more general rules of private and consumer law.  
2. Thesis contextualization: Argument and scope 
The academic discussions revolving around the Europeanization of private law, and its legislative 
program, have largely focused on the sale and the supply of goods, whereas the regulation of 
services has not received much attention, even though the services industry represents more than 
the 70% GDP of the Union.9 In particular for the telecommunications industry, the development of 
digital technology is a crucial aspect for economic growth and employment in the EU. The 
information and communications technology (ICT) industry is directly responsible for the 5% of 
the European GDP, with a market value of around EUR 660 billion.10 Telecommunications services 
reach more than 90% of European homes.11 High-speed broadband Internet reaches 62% of the 
EU’s population. 12 This has a substantial impact on the Digital Economy and, most importantly, on 
the development of online shopping –and with it, cross-border shopping– and online markets.  
Given the relevance of the telecoms sector, much has been already written on 
Telecommunications law.13 However, as a matter of fact, the interplay between regulation and 
private law has been largely neglected. And, when it comes to private law, the academic 
responsiveness to the regulation of the supply of services within regulated markets is impaired as 
opposed to the attention paid to, and the position occupied by, the regulation of the supply of 
                                                          
8 Micklitz, H.-W. (2014), ‘The (un)-systematics of (private) law as an element of European legal culture’, in Helleringer, 
G. and Purnhagen, K. (eds.), Towards a European Legal Culture, Beck/Hart/Nomos, 81-115. 
9 Services contributed 73.5 % of the EU-28’s total gross value added in 2013. Source: Eurostat, Data from May 2014. 
10 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Agenda for Europe, COM(2010) 245 final/2.  
11 Digital Agenda Scoreboard 2014.  
12 Ibid.  
13 The most salient examples in European Regulation are: Long, C. (1995). Telecommunications law and practice. Sweet 
& Maxwell; Nihoul, P., & Rodford, P. (2004). EU Electronic Communications Law & Competition and Regulation on 
the European Telecommunications Market; Koenig, C. (Ed.). (2009). EC competition and telecommunications law (Vol. 
6). Kluwer Law International.Walden, I. (Ed.). (2012). Telecommunications law and regulation. Oxford University Press. 
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goods. In the field of European Private Law, the creation of a European Civil Code has been object 
of relevant treatment by the literature about European Private Law.14  
Only some scholars have pointed out already the relevance of regulated sectors for private 
law, as well as the significance of their regulatory and institutional framework.15 A comprehensive 
analysis of the interplay between sector-specific regulation and contract law has been already 
carried out in the field of Energy services, for instance.16 For the telecommunications sector, only a 
certain aspect of telecommunications, interconnection regulation, has been subject to a thorough 
scrutiny.17 Yet, while the latter contribution comprises and extensive treatment of the relationship 
between telecommunications interconnection regulation and contract law, the author does not 
assess the impact in the configuration of national private law regime under the influence of the 
telecommunications regime which ultimately stems from EU law. These issues, therefore, require 
greater attention. Accordingly, this dissertation aims at demonstrating the way in which the 
regulation of the supply of telecommunications services impinges on private law. Thus, this thesis 
aims at bridging the gap in the assessment of the interplay between national contract law and EU 
sector-related provisions concerning private law relationships. What it is innovative, as stated 
above, is the focus on of the transformations in the making, the substance and the enforcement of 
contract law provisions, which appear to reformulate private law as traditionally conceived; i.e. the 
private law contained in the 19th century codifications guided by private autonomy and freedom of 
contract. 
2.1 Thesis argument 
Private law in the EU serves a regulatory function.18 In accomplishing such a role, private law is 
going through a process of “re-generation”. By focusing on the contractual dimension of 
telecommunications regulation, this dissertation identifies and investigates how this regulatory 
function re-shuffles the traditional notion of private law. The main assumption is that the 
transformation of private law does not take place in an isolated manner; rather it occurs at three 
different (and interlinked) levels, giving rise to three different layers of transformation. These 
transformation processes in private law take place at the level of decision-making, substantive law 
and enforcement.  
The underpinning the argument of this thesis can be introduced in the following manner:  
                                                          
14 The most prominent examples Hartkamp, A. S., & Hondius, E. H. (Eds.). (2004). Towards a European civil code. 
Kluwer Law International.; Zimmermann, R. (1994). Civil Code and Civil Law-The Europeanization of Private Law 
within the European Community and the Re-emergence of a European Legal Science. Colum. J. Eur. L., 1, 63.Collins, H. 
(2008). The European civil code: the way forward. Cambridge University Press; Hesselink, M. W. (2004). The politics of 
a European civil code. European law journal, 10(6), 675-697; Legrand, P. (1997). Against a European civil code. The 
modern law review,60(1), 44-63; Von Bar, C. (2000). Die study group on a European civil code.  
15 Micklitz (2008), supra n 3; Micklitz, H. W. (2013), “Do Consumers and Businesses Need a New Architecture of 
Consumer Law? A Thought Provoking Impulse”. Yearbook of European Law, 32(1), 266-367; and Cafaggi, F. (2006). 
The Institutional framework of European private law, Oxford University Press and Cafaggi, F., & Watt, H. M. (Eds.). 
(2010). Making European private law: governance design. Edward Elgar Publishing.  
16 Bellantuono, G. (2009), Contratti e regolazione nei mercati dell'energia, Il mulino. 
17 Gijrath, S. (2006), Interconnection Regulation and Contract Law, dLex.  
18 Cafaggi, F. and Muir-Watt, H. (eds.) (2009), The  Regulatory Function of Private Law, Edward Elgar Publishing. 
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i. Law-making 
The law-making procedure is a decisive factor in the content and quality of the legal provisions to 
be produced.19 A potential transformation of private law, therefore, calls for the examination of the 
institutional choice and design, particularly where the process of rule-making is understood as “as a 
dynamic process, in which rules are not simply the result of a single legislative procedure but the 
outcome of continuing interaction between legal, political, and economic institutions”.20 This is 
particularly the case in the making of European Private Law.21 
From the perspective of law-making, the starting hypothesis is that telecommunications 
regulation has an impact on the creation of private law. The examination of such proposition 
requires answering the following questions: How does the law-making process of 
telecommunications generate law? How does the institutional structure of telecommunications 
regulation depart from that of (traditional) private law? To what extend does the institutional 
framework affects the role and function of the contract law provisions provided by 
telecommunications regulation? This thesis attempts to provide an answer to these questions by 
scrutinizing the regulatory strategies in the regulatory process at EU and at national levels, 
encompassing the analysis of the legislative and implementation procedures and the relevance of 
the actors involved in telecommunications rule-making.  
ii. Substantive law  
The private law rules contained within telecommunications regulation appear to pursue a broader 
set of functions vis-à-vis the traditional functions of private law.22 The assumption is that private 
law in the EU serves regulatory and competitive goals within the broader goal of (internal) market 
building. Thus, under telecommunications regulation there is an obligation to grant access and 
interconnection to the network infrastructure to alternative operators and to ensure access to all 
consumers who request it. Accordingly, sector-specific regulation provides for a set of regulatory 
obligations in wholesale markets, and consumer rights in retail markets that are only applicable to 
the contractual obligations arising in connection to the specific sector at issue. This claim calls for 
an examination of the particular sector-related rules concerning private law relationships as 
opposed to the traditional role and functions of general private law.  
In this light, this dissertation examines transformations at the substantial law level. Given 
that there is a tension between the objectives of private/contract law and the regulatory aims of 
ERPL, it is very important to assess the suitability of contract law to achieve the regulatory goals of 
telecommunications. To this end, this analysis shows what the aims of telecommunications 
regulation are, and if and how, it has contributed to the development of a “parallel” (or 
                                                          
19 Cafaggi, F. (2006). The Institutional framework of European private law, Collected Courses of the Academy of 
European Law, Oxford University Press.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Micklitz, H. W. (2013), ‘Monistic Ideology versus Pluralistic Reality–Towards a Normative Design for European 
Private Law’, in Niglia, L., Pluralism and European Private Law, 29-51.  
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“alternative”) private law for regulated markets. Against this background, this thesis also pays 
attention to the rationale and the implications of a dualist approach (general/sector-specific or 
horizontal/vertical) concerning the regulation of private relations in the EU.  
 
iii. Enforcement 
The successful application of substantive rules depends on the effectiveness of its enforcement 
system. Consequently, the analysis of substantive law needs to be accompanied by the scrutiny of 
its enforcement design. Regarding the enforcement of the sector-related provisions, this thesis starts 
from the premise that only a few disputes reach the courts.23 This is due to the fact that, at least in 
telecommunications, traditional private law adjudication of disputes is moving away from courts to 
extra-judicial enforcement, giving a significant role to Alternative Dispute Resolution and even 
administrative enforcement in the form of regulatory adjudication. This raises a question 
concerning the role (i.e. relative importance) of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in the 
enforcement of sector-related rights vis-à-vis judicial redress. This question is particularly relevant 
when it comes to the applicable legal regimes; i.e. are disputes solved under general 
contract/consumer law or under the applications (and interpretation) of sector-specific rules.  
This dissertation provides an answer to the most important questions arising from such an 
approach towards the enforcement of telecommunications regulation via sector-specific 
(extrajudicial) dispute settlement. In order to do so, this research shows the different actors and 
procedures related to the enforcement of the contractual aspects of telecommunications regulation. 
By so doing, it traces the different outcomes reached by different actors competent in the 
enforcement of telecoms rules and how the different jurisdictions impact on the role of more 
general contract law rules and principles vis-à-vis sector-related rules? 
Thus, this dissertation aims to display the main features of these transformations and to 
illustrate how the interplay between the relevant layers paves the way for the functioning of a 
sector-related system which runs according to its own categories (self-sufficient) and without 
relying on external rules (self-contained).24 In other words, this thesis tests the self-sufficiency 
hypothesis via the analysis of the European regulatory framework for telecommunications as 
evidence of the transformation(s) of private law.  
2.2 Scope of the thesis 
As a consequence of the high level of technical complexity in the electronic communications sector 
and its nature as a regulated sector of the economy, the telecommunications regulatory regime 
covers different legal disciplines ranging from administrative law to contract law; standing thereby 
halfway between public and private law. As a result, the regulation of telecommunications and the 
                                                          
23 Micklitz, H.‐W. and Svetiev, Y. (2014), “The Transformation(s) of Private Law”, in Micklitz, H.‐W. and Svetiev, Y. 
and Comparato, G. (eds.), European Regulatory Private Law – The Paradigms Tested, European Regulatory Private Law 
Project (ERC-ERPL - 07); EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2014/04, p. 69.  
24 Micklitz, H.-W. and Svetiev, Y. (eds.) (2012), “A Self-Sufficient European Private Law - A Viable Concept?”, EUI 
Working Papers Law No. 2012/31, 26-44.  
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efforts to achieve broad policy goals via sector-specific regulation has blurred the line between 
public and private law.25 
In preparing a PhD thesis that concerns telecommunications law, special attention has to be 
paid to the analysis of the most important issues concerning the telecommunications regulatory 
scheme. Nonetheless, this thesis leaves aside issues concerning the liberalization of the sector 
(competition law issues associated with networked industries). The relationship between 
competition law and other legal instruments is complex. EU Competition law applies across the 
board to all economic sectors, including electronic communications. Over time competition law 
and sector regulation converge towards each other such that the frontier between each legal field is 
becoming blurred. However, divergences remain such that competition law and sector-specific 
regulation do not fully coincide and should not be confused. Given that in networked industries 
competition entails that network providers facilitate access to their network to third parties 
(“regulatory obligations”), the EU legislator has thereby combined public with private law 
regulatory measures. In this light, the aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate the lex specialis 
character of sector-specific regulation with regard to private relationships. Accordingly, even 
though competition law provisions play a very significant role in the regulation of 
telecommunications services, the analysis of competition law has been left aside in the scope of this 
research.  
In addition to the foregoing, this dissertation deliberately excludes the treatment of the 
enforcement of competition rules. This particularly refers to commitment decisions. The reasons 
that led to this decision are grounded on the fact that commitment decisions are of a voluntary 
nature, whereas sector-specific legislation draws on the imposition of ex-ante regulatory 
obligations. As a matter of fact, a more general application of ex-ante competition law does not 
take place generically, but rather under a more case-by-case approach (e.g. mergers and 
acquisitions concerning telecommunications markets), as opposed to the role performed by sector-
specific national regulators on market analysis (Significant Market Power analysis) and the 
imposition of access and interconnection obligations. 26  This implies that the rationale behind 
National Regulatory Authorities and sector-specific regulation (in terms of accountability, 
understood as the justification for the existence of the sector-specific regulation instead of 
competition to take over) are different to those of competition law.27 The pursuit of different goals 
is what justifies the self-standing nature of sector-specific regimes vis-à-vis more cross-sectorial 
constructions; i.e. competition law.  
Even though telecommunications regulation is more likely to fall within the category of 
administrative law, it is of major importance to clarify that this dissertation concerns private law 
and its transformation and, therefore, it deliberately sets aside public law or administrative law 
                                                          
25 Bergkamp, L., (2003), European Community law for the new economy, Intersentia.  
26 Gijrath, 2006, supra n 17, at p. 9 
27 Freeman, J., and Rossi, J. (2012), “Agency coordination in shared regulatory space”, Harvard Law Review, 125. See 
also Larouche, P. (2004), “Legal issues concerning remedies in network industries”, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/soL3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=832025.  
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concerns from its scope beyond specific issues, which require a wider contextualization within 
administrative law regime as a whole.  
Instead, this research focuses only on the private law dimension, i.e. the contractual 
implications, of telecommunications regulation. Nor does the thesis address issues concerning the 
financing of universal services as part of the regime Services of General Economic Interest; rather, 
it focuses on how the EU legislation impacts private relationships through sector-specific 
legislation.  
3. Methodology 
This thesis provides an overview of the contractual relationships in telecommunications regulation 
in order to identify the impact of regulation in contractual relationships. Particularly, it tries to 
identify how the above-mentioned transformations differ from general regimes of private law from 
its formation to its enforcement. To this end, this research involved examining regulation with a 
private law focus. This approach, composed of not only a formalist but also a normative analysis, 
necessarily calls for institutional contextualization. 28  This means translating the law into the 
institutional context. On the basis of the aims of this dissertation, such an approach contributes to a 
better understanding not only of the main claims, but also of its underpinning dynamics: 
substantive and institutional. As a result, this dissertation follows a bottom-up approach; i.e. 
looking not only at the legal provisions, but complementing the legal analysis with an examination 
of different case-studies relevant to understand the functioning of the sector in practice. Essentially, 
the research conducted complements theoretical constructions with empirical findings. 29 
Accordingly, the analytical framework provided herein is coupled with empirical-based research, 
as a preferred methodological approach.   
After introducing the theoretical foundations of the research, three core chapters (law-
making, substantive law and enforcement) constitute the cornerstone of the main assumption: the 
transformation of private law through telecommunications regulation. Different rules have been 
provided for the private law relationships arising in wholesale markets (B2C) and retail markets 
(B2C). Different goals and purposes inform the legal provisions and, therefore, in conducting this 
research, a distinction has been made concerning the substantive rules applicable to B2B or B2C 
relationships. Such duality is also evident in the procedural system designed for the enforcement of 
telecommunications regulation. Accordingly, where appropriate, the analysis of the substantial and 
the procedural rules diverges according to the different market levels at issue.  Each of these 
chapters contains a descriptive aspect displaying the main features of the EU Regulatory 
Framework for Electronic Communications and two case-studies in both market levels, wholesale 
and retail, where these features can be perceived.  
                                                          
28 Shaffer, G. (2013), “Comparative Institutional Analysis and a New Legal Realism”, Wisconsin Law Review, (2), pp. 
607-628. 
29 Testing the self-sufficiency hypothesis requires empirical research. Hans-W. Micklitz & Yane Svetiev (eds.) (2012), 
supra n 24, and Svetiev, Y. (2013), “Dimensions of Self-sufficiency”, EUI Working Papers Law No. 2013/05 (ECR-
ERPL 05).  
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Empirical Research 
 
The original contribution of this research lies in the fact that it examines the telecommunications 
sector beyond the “law on the books”. Thus, on the basis of the legal provisions, the research 
displayed herein is a (re)construction based on factual evidence drawn from empirical observation. 
In particular, this dissertation has sought to reconstruct the role of the actors and the procedures 
involved in telecommunications practice also by way of qualitative empirical research.  
The design of the empirical research was built upon a holistic approach, meaning that it 
concerns the whole legal structure of telecommunications. Despite the empirical results have not 
yielded a fully systematic outcome, the evidence contributed to the argument of the research 
according to a process of heuristics and legal hermeneutics. The information gathered via the 
empirical observation has been subject to a process of socio-legal analysis. To obtain a deeper 
knowledge of legal hermeneutics, a German sociologist, Dr. Thomas Roethe, has assisted me in 
contextualizing and interpreting the information gathered via empirical research.  
Part of the empirical evidence derives from interviews with practitioners in the 
telecommunications market. The interviews were conducted with staff members from the National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), Head of Units from the European Commission, representatives of 
the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), dispute adjudicators, 
and practitioners, representatives from the national government and the telecommunications 
industry.30 The selection of the interviewees was made on the basis of their position as their role 
within the organization in the case of the NRAs, or the particular status that they hold within the 
organizations as main actors in the implementation and the application of the EU rules vis-à-vis 
national law, as well as their involvement in particular cases relevant for this research. The 
interviews were formal and recorded. All the interviews have been entirely transcribed and 
thoroughly analyzed and interpreted. As they were open-ended interviews, they have provided a 
very comprehensive understanding of the institutions analyzed, their character, role, functioning 
and their interaction with each other. Part of this research has been, thereby, shaped by the outcome 
of the interviews taking account of sensitive or fraught issues that account for where the practical 
problems reside.  
In addition to the interviews, a second source of empirical research comprises the analysis 
of particular national examples including Italy, Poland, Germany and the United Kingdom in the 
field of consumer-related dispute resolution. Methodologically, the selected countries were chosen 
as representative of the main differences that can be appreciated concerning the different 
approaches that may be taken when designing the national system of dispute resolution in Europe. 
Availability of accessible information for empirical research has also played an important role in 
the design process of the empirical research. Furthermore, this empirical research has involved the 
                                                          
30 In this regard, I would like to thank all the people that have been interviewed to make this research possible. All the 
participants have been very open and frank and they have provided me with an inestimable help and information. 
Nonetheless, the opinions expressed in this dissertation are the result of the personal opinion and interpretation of its 
author.   
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participation in real procedures for the settlement of disputes with consumers, which has provided a 
rich overview on the functioning of the hereby-displayed mechanisms.31 Given that this research is 
based on a bottom-up approach, the information concerning the different national mechanisms has 
been complemented via qualitative empirical research carried out through a process of interviews 
and panels with experts in dispute resolution in the telecommunications field coming from the 
regulatory agencies, consumer platforms, or the business themselves.32 The conference proceedings 
and the interviews were recorded, transcribed, analyzed and discussed in order to identify potential 
conflicts and commonalities. Interestingly enough, such a hermeneutic process yielded the 
identification of a kind of sector-related para-legal (or even meta-legal) jargon and customs 
concerning the functioning of the sector.33  
The information gathered as a result of the empirical research has been presented following 
an integrated approach; i.e. the text is a coupled combination of parts of the interviews and its 
interpretation with relation to the legal provisions of the EU Regulatory Framework. Thus, the 
body of this dissertation is based on both the provisions contained in the EU rules concerning 
telecommunications and the trends suggested by the empirical observations and the socio-legal 
analysis.34  
 
            Figure 1.1: Integrated approach 
                                                          
31 Participation as a listener at different procedures of compulsory conciliation attempt (tentativo de conciliazione) and 
hearings for the definition of the dispute (definizione delle controversia) by the Italian regulator (AGCOM, Autorità per 
le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, AGCOM) via the delegated Regional Authority for Telecommunications (Consiglio 
Regionale per le Comunicazione, Co.Re.Com), Co.Re.Com Toscana, Florence, April and May 2014.   
32 Workshop Private Law and the Telecommunications Sector: National Perspectives on EU Regulation held in European 
University Institute (Florence, 7-8 December 2012), organized by Prof. Hands-W. Micklitz (EUI) and Prof. Yane Svetiev  
(Bocconi/EUI) within the framework of the ERPL Project and funded by the ERC Grant Agreement n. [269722].  
33 This phenomenon has already been identifies in different economic sectors, see Bernstein, L. (1992), “Opting out of 
the legal system: Extralegal contractual relations in the diamond industry”. The Journal of Legal Studies, 115-157 and 
Bernstein, L. (2001), “Private commercial law in the cotton industry: Creating cooperation through rules, norms, and 
institutions” U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper, (133), Deakin, S. (2006), "The Return of the Guild?: 
Network Relations in Historical Perspective", Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper 
(322). 
34 This dissertation has sought to assemble the information gathered as a result of the interviews with legal provisions and 
relevant literature. Since this exercise follows an integrated approach where the analysis and interpretation prevails, the 
reader is kindly invited to pay particular attention to the footnotes, which largely contain pieces of the interviews.  
 
  25 
Under this approach, this thesis combines the legal analysis of the provisions contained in the 
regulatory framework together with the examination of particular case-studies from a socio-legal 
and empirical point of view. The analysis of case-studies along the different chapters helps to 
underscore the complexities of the sector. Accordingly, the legal analysis of such cases, combined 
with the more descriptive aspects, provide a comprehensive overview of the transformations of 
private law.  
4. Thesis structure 
The research design is organized in three parts. Part I sets the research and theoretical foundations 
of the thesis. Following the Introduction, the second chapter contains the theoretical spine of the 
dissertation. This chapter gives shape to the self-sufficiency hypothesis and further develops the 
theoretical grounds for each of the three layers of transformation: law–making, substantive law and 
legal enforcement. Accordingly, Chapter 2 signifies where the transformation is more evident. It 
also provides the normative yardstick against which the postulates of the self-sufficiency 
hypothesis are assessed.   
 Part II (Chapters 3 to 5) provides a more descriptive account of the three pillars upon which 
the transformation of private law is tested. Taking into account the duality of the approach of the 
legal framework (wholesale and retail), these chapters provide the legal and factual consequences 
of the regulatory approach, from a contractual point of view, in both market levels. In this regard, 
each of these chapters first introduce the analysis of the legal provisions and continues with 
representative case-studies that better contribute to illustrate the functioning of the sector in 
practice. This dualism (legal + empirical analysis) helps to bridge the gap between the formal 
regulatory framework and what is occurring in practice.  
Chapter 3 (law-making) explores the transformations operated in the making of private law 
as a result of role of the EU in the regulation of Services of General Economic Interest. As 
observed in the case of telecommunications regulation, under the New Governance approach, the 
EU legislator has opted for a system of co-regulation while, at the same time, the effectiveness of 
EU soft-law is increasing. The system has evolved through different interactional (network) levels 
aimed at a single purpose: harmonization of the Internal Market. It is already in the making of 
telecommunications regulation that private law is instrumentalized in order to serve to the desired 
regulatory functions. The analysis of the institutional design and the modes of governance become 
crucial. Accordingly, this chapter reconstructs, from an empirical perspective, the role of National 
Regulatory Authorities, the impact of the umbrella group (BEREC) and the supervisory tools of the 
European Commission granted by the sector-specific regulatory framework itself. Here, law-
making, implementation and enforcement of the legal provisions are heavily overlapping when it 
comes to decision-making. These “new” regulatory structures appear to contrast with those 
belonging to traditional spheres of private law (contract and tort). In addition, the normative design 
blurs the borders of private law and gives rise to a difficult in terms of defining what is private law 
and what is regulatory law within telecommunications regulation. Accordingly, this chapter seeks 
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to answer the question as to the extent to which this new model of decision-making implies a shift 
with regard to traditional methods of law-making in private law.  
The first case-study in chapter 3, related to the implementation of price setting in the 
wholesale market, deals with the implementation of a Commission Recommendation (soft law) on 
costing methodologies for termination rates. It illustrates a conflict between the national regulator, 
supported by the European Commission, and the national judiciary in the framework of a procedure 
for the supervision of the imposition of regulatory obligations in the national markets (so-called 
procedure of Article 7a Framework Directive). This case contributes to a better understanding of 
the role of new actors in law-making, the co-regulation procedure, and the interplay between the 
different actors underpinned by a multi-level governance structure where the EU and the national 
levels interact. A second case-study, concerns the establishment of retail price ceilings at EU level. 
Through the analysis of the Vodafone case, this chapter addresses the use of Article 114 TFEU, a 
controversial legal basis for the EU’s competence on which to harmonize the regulation of retail 
prices. 
The regulatory approach chosen shapes the substantive law. Hence, at the substantial law 
level (Chapter 4), this dissertation examines the substantial provisions concerning private law 
relationships flowing from the EU regulatory framework for telecommunications.  The contract law 
provisions contained in sector-specific regulation are aimed at achieving (sector-specific) 
regulatory goals, namely, promoting competition, the development of the Internal Market and 
consumer protection. Consequently, sector-related rights and remedies for private parties must be 
read in light of those regulatory goals. Against this background, this chapter displays the particular 
aims (economic and social) concerning private law relationships (access) and the different 
approaches used for this purpose. Furthermore, and most importantly, this chapter will try to 
ascertain whether there is a gradual introduction (intrusion and substitution) of new obligations, 
rights and remedies via sector-specific legislation and how they shape private law relationships 
beyond general contract or consumer law. In other words, this chapter addresses the implications 
that this shift at the level of substantive law has when it comes to contractual relationships. The 
analysis of the “regulatory obligations” to be imposed on relationships arising in wholesale markets 
(B2B) and the exploration of the two different sets of rights (universal and end-users rights) 
provided in the regulatory framework for telecommunications is followed by two case-studies that 
illustrate the interplay of the sector-related regime and general contract and consumer law.  
The first case-study addressed in Chapter 4 concerns a relationship arising in the context of 
the wholesale market; i.e. a relationship between two telecommunications operators. In particular, 
it is related to the obligation to negotiate interconnection agreements between undertakings that 
provide electronic communications services on the basis of good faith as required by the sector-
specific framework. The second case-study examines a consumer-related dispute where the breach 
of quality standards in the provision of services gives rise to the emergence of a remedy apparently 
endogenous to the telecommunications sector; in this case, the right to switch for free or contract 
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termination without incurring a penalty. Accordingly, the implications of the application of sector-
specific contract rules as opposed to civil or general consumer rules are brought into relief.  
The application and interpretation of the sectorial regime or, otherwise, more general rules 
will be determined by the institutions and procedures involved in their enforcement. Accordingly, 
the part of the dissertation in which these transformations are more easily visible is in the analysis 
of the enforcement of the legal provisions, which is contained in Chapter 5. Once the decision-
making process has been analyzed and the different problems identified, it is necessary to look at 
the way everything becomes materialized. As a matter of institutional choice, the 
telecommunications legal framework relies on extrajudicial structures for the resolution of sector-
related disputes. By analyzing the different enforcement structures utilized in different Member 
States, this chapter illustrates the relative weight of each one of the different layers that intervene in 
the enforcement of telecommunications regulation, despite evident national divergences. Such an 
analysis allows the evaluation of the role of the different extrajudicial mechanism vis-à-vis judicial 
enforcement and contributes to identify whether there is a shift from courts towards extrajudicial 
and sector-related means of dispute resolution. In addition, the examination of these aspects not 
only contributes to assess the application of sector-specific rules inside and outside the courts, but 
also to find out whether there is a process of differentiation in the approach towards enforcement of 
telecommunications rules as opposed to non sector-related general rules and, if it is so, to grasp –
normatively– what are the values transmitted via each of the existing layers for the enforcement of 
telecommunications regulation, and whether they differ from the “traditional” values of contract 
law.  
For this purpose, this chapter traces the actors involved in the enforcement of 
telecommunications regulation by examining the procedure for the resolution of a contractual-
related dispute in the wholesale market. This case provides an account of way in which the 
regulatory goals of telecommunications regulation “override” private autonomy. From the 
perspective of the retail market, the examined case-study (Alassini) seeks to balance the shift 
towards extrajudicial enforcement of consumer-related disputes against the safeguarding of 
procedural guarantees.  
To conclude, Part III gathers the conclusions drawn from the previous analysis and 
appraises them in view of the normative approach sketched out in chapter 2. Within this conclusive 
part, Chapter 6 recalls the different transformations. It summarizes and brings together the most 
salient aspects of the three different components that previously examined (making, substance and 
enforcement). Returning to the postulates of self-sufficiency, this chapter concludes by validating 
that self-sufficiency is actually occuring in view of the results yielded from the foregoing legal and 
empirical analysis. In so doing, this concluding chapter seeks to elucidate the (empirical and 
normative) drivers that lead to the self-sufficiency of the private law dimension of 
telecommunications regulation and, more broadly, how it relates to European Regulatory Private 
Law as a whole. 
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Chapter 2 – THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS. 






Fundamental freedoms are a new foundation for private relationships1 and the EU integration takes 
place via private law. In this evolution, the “private law society” has turned into a “market 
society”2 and so has the State, by turning into a Market-State.3 Accordingly, this research seeks to 
identify the transformation of the “law of the market society” 4 that comes from the Market-State, 
European integration understood as a part of a market-building (transformation) process.5  
Yet, in this discursive journey, we have to depart from the assumption that “European 
Union private law is different”.6 The EU is not (and it will not be) a State, but its ambitions reach 
all economically relevant sectors.7 In so doing, according to its nature as a non-state actor, the 
European Union organizes its action in networks.8 We find that the Internal Market rationale and 
the promotion and preservation of competition underpin economic (and social) regulation. By these 
lights, this process is “disintegrating” the classical core of private law and its systemic character 
undermining “the coherence of private law as a whole”.9 (Transformed) private law now serves 
“instrumentalist” purposes.10 This surrender to the achievement of the overarching objective of the 
                                                          
1 See Caruso, D. (2006) "Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization", New York University Journal 
ofInternational Law and Politics, 39, 1–74; and Davies, G. T. (2013), ‘Freedom of Contract and the Horizontal Effect of 
Free Movement Law’, in Leczykiewicz, D. And Weatherill, S. (eds), The Involvement of EU Law in Private Law 
Relationships (Studies of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law), Hart Publishing.  
2 Polanyi, K. (1944). The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time. Beacon Press. 
3 Micklitz, H.-W. and Patterson, D. (2012), “From the Nation State to the Market: The Evolution of EU Private Law”, 
EUI Working Papers LAW no 2012/15. 
4 Frerichs, S., & Juutilainen, T. (2014), ‘Rome Under Seven Hills? An Archaeology of European Private Law’, in Börner, 
S, and Eigmüller, M. (eds.), European Integration, Processes of Change and the National Experience. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Micklitz and Patterson, supra n 3, at 11. 
7 Ibid.  
8  Joerges, C. (2006). “Deliberative Political Processes’ Revisited: What Have we Learnt About the Legitimacy of 
Supranational Decision‐Making”, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(4), 779-802. 
9 Zimmermann, R. (2008) ‘Comparative Law and the Europeanization of Private Law’ in Reimann, M. and Zimmermann, 
R. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford University Press, 539–78.  
10 Michaels, R. (2011), ‘Of Islands and the Ocean: The Two Rationalities of European Private Law’ in R. Brownsword, 
H.-W. Micklitz, L. Niglia and S. Weatherill (eds.), The Foundations of European Private Law, Hart Publishing, 139–158. 
See also Davies, G.T. (2013), supra n 1; and Schmid, C. (2005), "The Instrumentalist Conception of the Acquis 
Communautaire in Consumer Law and its Implications on a European Contract Law Code", European Review of 
Contract Law, 1(2), 211-227. 
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market-building project results in the emergence of different legal frameworks (one for each 
sector), which encompass public and private law elements, weakening the clear-cut distinction 
public/private law.11 In the case of regulated markets, private law has not been constitutionalized;12 
rather, a reverse phenomenon has taken place. The liberalization of formerly public services has 
resulted in a privatization of public legal regimes embodied in an economic rationality that contains 
both (public and private elements) but that cannot be placed into one single categorical box. 
Against this background, private law has changed (transformed), but so has public law.  
In the interaction between the EU and its Member States, new forms of governance are 
evolving that replace traditional ones. Thus, through the promotion of new instruments of law-
making, Member States are gradually losing their traditional “pre-eminence” in the legislative 
development. For example, under the liberalization wave of former public services, the European 
Union is gaining a leading role in the law-making process. This intervention –mainly related to the 
harmonization of the Internal Market– also affects contract law to a certain extent. In this regard, 
Kelemen employs the expression “juris touch”, as a metaphor of the King Midas legend, to 
illustrate how the European Union transforms almost everything that it touches into law.13 By so 
doing, the European legislator regulates not only certain areas concerning the creation of the 
Internal Market, but interferes in the different national private legal regimes by providing certain 
rules under sector-specific legislation that concern private law relationships. Moreover, the 
European process of legalization (understood as a process of regulation supply) is increasingly 
carried out by approaches close to maximum harmonization, which implies less leeway at the 
national level. This “European preeminence” is also supported by the principle of supremacy of 
European Union Law, which guarantees the superiority of European law over national law.14 
Furthermore, it has been acknowledged that “Europeanization reduces the importance of the 
member states and their private law because they must yield sovereignty to the European Union”.15 
The Europeanization of the last decades has re-designed the institutional setting in which 
private law is framed16 giving rise to new regulatory strategies in the European Union.17 Under this 
new framework, private law no longer is found in codes, as it used to be the case with national civil 
codes. Nowadays, private law can be found everywhere; mostly embedded within the regulation of 
                                                          
11 If there was ever one, see Kennedy, D. (1981), “Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction”, University of 
Pennsylvania  Law Review, 130, p. 1982. 
12 As understood by Kumm in Kumm, M. (2006), “Who's Afraid of the Total Constitution-Constitutional Rights as 
Principles and the Constitutionalization of Private Law”, German Law Journal, 7, 341.  
13 Kelemen, R.D. (2011), Eurolegalism. The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European Union, Harvard 
University Press, at p. 19. 
14 This principle has been enshrined by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the case Costa v. Enel (C- 
6/64, [1964] ECR 585). In this case, the Court declared that the laws issued by European institutions are to be integrated 
into the legal systems of Member States, who are obliged to comply with them. 
15 Jansen, N., & Michaels, R. (2007), “Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization”. 
Duke Law School Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 137, at p. 21. 
16 For an analysis of the renewed institutional framework in which European private law unfolds see Cafaggi, F. (Ed.) 
(2006). The Institutional framework of European private law, Oxford University Press.  
17 Ibid. See also Micklitz, H.-W. (2008), “Regulatory Strategies on Services Contracts in EC Law”, EUI Working Paper 
Series LAW No. 2008/06. 
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certain fields of law. This mutation has implied less well-defined boundaries between public and 
private law regulation.18 
This chapter sets the scene for the analysis of the transformation of private law resting on 
the hypothesis of self-sufficiency of European Regulatory Private Law. There are many examples 
of legal hybrids today.19 Accordingly, given that transnational law is a central case, Community 
law or European Union Law is our greatest concern. Within European Union Law, the focus is on 
Private Law. This chapter develops the theoretical framework behind each of the transformations.  
 
2. The postulates of self-sufficiency 
The self-sufficiency of ERPL is simply a facet of the self-sufficiency to be conceptualized, 
examined and substantiated here; the self-sufficiency of sector-specific regulation.  
The market liberalization processes of formerly public services have given rise to a vast 
amount of rules concerning what we now as “regulated markets”. Besides the European regulatory 
“avalanche”, Services of General Economic Interest (SGEIs) have not been regulated horizontally. 
Instead, the regulation follows a sector-specific approach, resulting in different sectorial 
(fragmented) regulations. This verticalization is due to the functionalist approach pursued by the 
legislator, who “pigeonholes” legislation according to the service concerned “as to the result to be 
achieved”. 20  Thus, the different sectors (energy, financial services, telecoms, transport, postal 
services, etc.) are regulated in a differentiated way, functioning as watertight compartments. Under 
this approach, the regulation of each vertical regime comprises different issues, from the 
liberalization of the sector, to particular provisions affecting contractual matters. This interference 
in the private law dimension implies its virtual detachment from the national civil codes and the 
general European acquis of consumer law.  
Accordingly, the main assumption is that these different sectors might be considered free-
standing. They are no longer a mere set of rules established by the European legislator whose 
enforcement depends largely on the implementation by Member States. Instead, through the 
meticulous configuration of the Internal Market, the European Union is forging complete systems 
that do not allow national States much room for manoueuvre, insofar as the sectorial regimes 
themselves contain detailed instructions on how to implement and enforce their legal provisions.  
The autonomy of these regimes is also based on the assumption that they are all-inclusive 
legal orders,21 including provisions that range from the actors responsible for national regulation 
                                                          
18  Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, (2010) “Social Justice in European Contract Law: A 
Manifesto”, European Law Journal, 10, 653. 
19 Tuori, K. (2012), “On legal hybrids” in Micklitz, H.-W. and Svetiev, Y. (eds.) (2012), “A Self-Sufficient European 
Private Law - A Viable Concept?”, EUI Working Papers Law No. 2012/31, 26-44. See also Tuori, K. (2014), 'On legal 
hybrids and Perspectivism' in n Maduro, M., Tuori, K. and Sunkari, S. (eds.), Transnational Law: Rethinking European 
Law and Legal Thinking, Cambridge University Press. 
20 Article 288 TFEU.  
21  See Lindhal, H. (2010), “A-legality: Postnationalism and the Question of Legal Boundaries”, The Modern Law 
Review, 73(1), at p. 32. 
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and implementation, to enforcement issues, together with the regulation of a number of contractual 
aspects. Their regulation includes provisions from the decision-making procedure to follow, to 
particular mechanisms for its enforcement through extrajudicial mechanisms. Further, sector-
specific regulation provides for a system of “self-monitoring” by putting in place sector-related 
supervisory mechanisms in the implementation procedure of EU rules into the national legal 
systems. Hence, as this dissertation will argue, they are legal orders that are almost entirely 
developed by European law. As such, these legal regimes are designed in such a comprehensive 
way that they are potentially capable of “replacing” (and “displacing”) national private legal orders 
by by-passing the national structures of enforcement.  
To conclude, whilst lex mercatoria has been assessed as a “self-applying system beyond 
national law”,22 herein we try to describe self-sufficiency as a body of sector-related legal practices, 
capable of not only creating its own norms but also of providing the sufficient basis for decisions. 
Thus, by relying on its own regulatory (and enforcement) strategies, telecommunications regulation 
seeks the self-sufficiency of the sector, following an approach of functional differentiation under a 
sector-specific legal rationality.23 Such an approach in telecommunications would be best described 
according to the following features: i) closure of the system; ii) enforcement closes the gap from 
the perspective of market players; iii) from the perspective of rule and decision-makers, it would be 
evidence by the existence of (self-referential) sector-specific supervisory mechanisms.24 This thesis 
attempts to verify those assumptions in order to determine the self-sufficiency of the private law 
rules contained in sector-specific regulation to govern private law relationships arising in the 
context of the sector concerned.  
2.1 The Bicycle that the EU wants to ride 
The EU’s regulatory framework for electronic communications embodies not only substantive law 
provisions, but also provides guidance on their enforcement and it includes supervisory 
mechanisms for its implementation. Insofar as substantive law provisions alone do not guarantee 
effective enforcement,25 law-making and enforcement can no longer remain detached from each 
other.26  
A child who is learning to ride a bike might well illustrate this. The bike symbolizes the 
EU legal regime. Riding the bike means the functioning of the market at stake under such regime. 
The child is not, however, skilled (legally competent) yet to ride the bike by herself; i.e. to enforce 
the rules. She needs training wheels. In this metaphor, those training wheels are the Member States, 
which have to enforce the legislation according to the principle of national procedural autonomy.  
                                                          
22 Mertens, H.-J. (1997), "Lex Mercatoria: A Self-Applying System Beyond National Law?." in Teubner, G. (ed.) Global 
Law Without a State, Dartmouth.  
23 Inferring Teubner in Teubner, G. (1993), Law as an autopoietic system. Blackwell Publishers, at p. 66. See also 
Teubner, G., and Fischer-Lescano, A. (2004), “Regime-collisions: the vain search for legal unity in the fragmentation of 
global law”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 25(4), 999-1046. 
24 Translating Teubner’s autopoiesis, supra n 23.   
25 Dehousse, R. (2002) "Misfits: EU law and the transformation of European governance” in Joerges, C., & Dehousse, R. 
(Eds.). (2002). Good governance in Europe's integrated market (Vol. 11), Oxford University Press. 
26 De Visser, M. (2009). Network-based governance in EC law: the example of EC competition and EC communications 
law. Hart Publishing.  
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According to the bike metaphor, the EU is trying hard in its attempts to learn how to “ride 
the bike” with the minimum interference of the Member States or, at best, without resorting to 
“training wheels”. To this end, the EU focuses its efforts on monitoring the proper implementation 
of the EU regulatory framework for telecoms and introducing, by way of encouragment, an 
alternative structure for the enforcement of its provisions by surpassing traditional structures 
(national judiciaries).  
At the national level, the features of self-sufficiency become materialized in common 
standards of practice that are in-built in the sector. These values are embedded in the daily practices 
of the actors involved in the sector (regulators, adjudicators, practitioners, etc.). These actors 
operate within a (self-referential) sector-related common framework that, in turn, shapes an entire 
legal process from law-making to enforcement. Against this background, the underlying values of 
such a framework are distinct from those underpinning the private law contained in the nineteenth 
century civil law codifications. 
2.2 A new (commoditized) understanding of Justice: Economic (access and non-
discrimination), Competition (efficiency), and Social (distributive).  
The liberalization of former public services has proven insufficient to establish fully competitive 
markets. Economic regulation, according to Prosser, involves regulating monopolies by way of 
controlling prices and monopolies, and Regulation for competition is aimed at safeguarding 
competitiveness.27  At the same time, sector-specific regulation is a fundamental instrument to 
control market power and to achieve policy goals. 28  This has resulted in complex regulatory 
regimes. 
 
The regulation of telecommunications services focused, at a first stage, on opening 
(liberalization) the market to competition. Once competition was established, the aim has been to 
protect competition. In order for competition to take place in a market, several market players are 
required. The EU promoted the introduction of players into the market through the prioritization of 
the non-discriminatory access principle. This guiding principle has been embodied in both 
wholesale and retail markets. The commercial interactions taking place in wholesale (business-to-
business, B2B) and in retail (business-to-consumer, B2C) markets have curbed by the access idea. 
B2B commercial –i.e. contractual– exchanges are restricted by the obligation to grant access to the 
telecommunications infrastructure and the imposition of other regulatory obligations upon 
Significant Market Players (SMPs). At the retail level, the supply of the service to end-users is 
based on the assumption of universal access to basic telecommunications services (universal 
service).  
According to this approach, the underlying notion of justice depends on three different 
cornerstones: Economy, Competition and the Social. Each of these foundations, give rise to three 
                                                          
27 Prosser, T. (1997), Law and the Regulators. Oxford University Press. 
28 Geradin, D. (2000), "Institutional aspects of EU regulatory reforms in the telecommunications sector: an analysis of the 
role of national regulatory authorities", Journal of Network Industries, 1.  
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different notions of (market) justice. Economic justice is epitomized in the form of non-
discriminatory access to the service.29 This understanding of justice is based on the access to the 
market (access justice).30 Competition justice aims at preserving competition in the market by 
enabling “efficient” interactions among its players. Under a competition approach, justice aims at 
efficient participation in a fully competitive market. To this end, contract law functions as an 
enabling tool to put into motion such a market.31  The State acts as an enforcer of economic 
efficiency.32 Finally, Social justice pursues the achievement of distributive benefits to those market 
players “left behind” as a consequence of the liberalization of the market. 33  However, in the 
telecommunications sector, distributive justice, embodied in the form of universal access and 
universal service rights, is not provided directly by the State. Instead, the provision of universal 
service is delegated to telecoms operators designated a universal service providers, who must 
deliver the service under certain requirements of quality and affordability.34 Yet, the State also 
remains an important actor as the keeper or guardian of the so-called “social efficiency”, by 
ensuring that mandatory (universal) services are provided. 35  
The combination of these different dimensions of justice into one single sector, which is 
already a technologically complex one, results in a multifaceted and intricate regulatory regime that 
inevitably encompasses a sectorial (and functionally oriented) 36  approach that encompasses 
regulatory activity, from law-making to its enforcement.  
 
3. The layers of transformation 
As mentioned above, private law has undergone a transformation in many directions. One such 
transformation is provoked by the liberalization of formerly publicly provided utilities. In the 
telecoms sector, the transformation of private law is a function of the self-sufficiency of the sector.  
Telecommunications services are regulated at the EU level in a comprehensive way. This 
(more or less) inclusive approach covers, in addition, the private law relations that take place 
among participants of telecommunications markets. Particularly, overarching principles for the 
telecoms sector such as universal service and (non-discriminatory) access greatly impact not only 
on the nature of private law but, indeed, imply a transformation of the contractual relations arising 
from transactions within the (self-sufficient) sector. As a result of sectoral self-sufficiency, the 
generation and resolution of disputes and generation and application of substantive rules usually 
follows sector-related patterns.  
                                                          
29 See Chapter 4 of this Dissertation.  
30 Micklitz, H.-W. (2011), “Social Justice and Access Justice in Private Law”. EUI Working Paper Series LAW No. 
2011/02.  
31 Micklitz, H. W. (2005), "The Concept of Competitive Contract Law", Penn State International Law Review, 23, p. 549.  
32 Grande, E. (1994), “The new role of the state in telecommunications: An international comparison”, West European 
Politics, 17(3) 138-157.  
33 See Caruso, D. (2014), ‘(Qu'Ils mangent des contrats) Rethinking Justice in EU Contract Law’ in G. de Burca, D. 
Kochenov and A. Williams (eds.), Europe's Justice Deficit?, Hart Publishing.  
34 See Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
35 Grande supra n 32.  
36 Teubner, G. (1996), ‘Global Bukowina: Legal pluralism in the world-society’ in Teubner G. (ed.) Global law without a 
State, Dartsmouth, 3-28. 
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This section briefly sketches what the dissertation scrutinizes in a more thoroughly way; i.e. 
how regulatory law transforms private law. The manner in which regulatory law has encompassed 
private law has yielded three different layers of transformation altering the making, the substance 
and the enforcement of private law with regard to the private law contained in in the legal regimes 
of the so-called regulated sectors. This section aims to assess the impact over the three layers that 
underpin the self-sufficiency concept: law-making, substance and enforcement. These layers serve 
as parameters to evaluate the degree of the transformation(s) operating at each level.  
3.1. Transformation in the making of private law: Rule-making and sector-specific 
regulatory networks 
The displacement of service provision from the public to the private sphere of telecommunications 
as a result of the liberalization of the sector has entailed not only substantive but institutional 
transformations. Thus, the development of the telecoms sector has triggered a visible 
transformation that affects private law, contract law in particular, in such a way that it is also used 
as a tool to achieve policy goals, mainly the creation of a Digital Single Market (Connected 
Continent), promoting competition and protecting users. In so doing, the EU is following a 
functionalist approach (Internal Market as a finalité and as an objective) that impacts on 
contract/consumer law (integration through private law).37 This “makeover” has been noticeable in 
the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications, which has evolved over time. Thus 
far, there have been 3 different packages of rules. Its evolution is characterised by an initial 
liberalization goal, but later on, taking into account the legal basis employed for its regulation, the 
objectives were more focused on harmonization of the Internal Market and consumer protection. 38   
The incorporation of private law provisions in telecommunications has certainly implied a 
shift in the traditional approach of law-making in private law. On the one hand, the role of 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) has spread out to the field of private law. 39 The EU 
regulatory framework for telecoms has vested NRAs with competences that have an effect on 
private law, e.g. price setting in B2B relationships.40 On the other hand, the Nation-State has a 
more modest role in terms of law-making. The EU’s lack of specific competences in the field of 
private law is overcome via the incorporation of national supervisory actors (in this case, the 
NRAs). A more elaborated expertise to monitor telecoms market seems to be the appropriate 
institutional choice in terms of regulatory efficiency and effectiveness. Against this background, 
“(…) [t]o survive the judicial review of such reforms, agencies must often justify the markets 
values and results of deregulation as simply another form of regulation”.41 In this regard, empirical 
                                                          
37 In the field of consumer law see Schmid, supra n 10.  
38 For a deeper analysis on the different generations of EU telecoms rules, see Melody, W.H. (2012), “Viewpoint: The 
Closing of the Liberalization Era in European Telecommunication”, Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, 
13 (3) 218-235.  
39 Taggart, M. (2005), “From ‘Parliamentary Powers’ to Privatization: The Chequered History of Delegated Legislation 
in the Twentieth Century”, University of Toronto Law Journal, 55, pp. 575-627.  
40 For particular examples see Ottow, A. (2012), "Intrusion of public law into contract law: the case of network sectors", 
The Europa Institute Working Paper 03/12.  
41 Sassen, S. (2006), Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, Princeton University Press, at 
p. 176.  
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evidence appears to verify Niskanen’s theory of regulation, by which even though regulatory 
institutions are supposed to be of an ad interim nature until the market has been rolled out, the 
sector-related structures find no incentive to abolish them or to eradicate sector-specific approaches 
to regulation once markets are fully competitive. Rather, sector-specific approaches tend to 
perpetuate “or at best modified”.42  
There is no (formal) hierarchy between the EU and the national levels or any transfer of 
powers; rather, it is a type of “multilayered institutional structure”. 43  However, in order to 
guarantee that NRAS exert their powers in the EU interest, the Regulatory Framework sets up a 
system of supervision, giving the Commission policing powers to achieve the intended policy 
goals.44 Accordingly, this networked institutional setting aims to create a governance network that, 
by regulating certain aspects concerning private law relationships, becomes a new private law-
maker.  
The commissioning of NRAs responds to a strategy aimed at securing the liberalization 
process via institutional design. With a similar object, a process of network-building for 
cooperation in regulatory matters can be identified as part of the development of the mandate of 
NRAs. These new modes of governance in the EU are an example of legal transformation. 45 As 
pointed out by Majone, the delegated functions of rule-making leads to paradoxes of privatization, 
sub-delegation and issues and problems related to quasi-legislation.46 In a decentralized model, 
diagonal conflicts are inevitable as they are inherent to the EU Multi-level system of governance.47 
These diagonal conflicts, and the way they are resolved under the established regulatory structure 
suggest a significant erosion of national sovereignty.48  
3.2. Substantive transformation: Regulatory objectives and their impact on private 
relationships 
Conventional analyses of private law tend to disregard the transformation of private law beyond its 
traditional core; that is, contract and tort. At best, they look at the influence of the European acquis 
on national law, mainly via consumer law provisions. Beyond these transformations, sector-specific 
                                                          
42 Niskanen, W. A. (1975), “Bureaucrats and politicians”, Journal of law and economics, pp. 617-643. For an European 
account, see Möschel, W. (2009), “The Future Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications: General Competition 
Law instead of Sector-Specific Regulation – A German Perspective”, European Business Organization Law Review, 
10(01), pp. 149-163.  
43 Svetiev, Y. (2012), "W(h)ither Private Law in the face of the Regulatory Deluge", in Micklitz, H.-W. and Svetiev, Y. 
(eds.), A Self-Sufficient European Private Law - A Viable Concept?, EUI Working Papers Series Law No. 2012/31, 26-
44. See also Hancher, L. and Larouche, P., (2011), ‘The Coming of Age of EU Regulation of Network Industries and 
Services of General Economic Interest’, in G. de B. P. Craig, ed. The Evolution of EU Law. Oxford University Press, 
743-779.  
44 Ottow, A. (2012, "Europeanization of the Supervision of Competitive Markets", European Public Law, 18(1), 191–
221. 
45 Dawson, M. (2011), New Governance and the Transformation of European Law: Coordinating EU social law and 
policy. Studies in European law and policy. Cambridge University Press.  
46 See also Taggart supra n 39.  
47 Joerges, C. (2006). “‘Deliberative Political Processes’ Revisited: What Have we Learnt About the Legitimacy of 
Supranational Decision‐Making”. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(4), 779-802. For an empirical evidence 
of a diagonal conflict in telecommunications regulation see Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
48  Richardson, J., and Mazey, S. (Eds.). (2015), European Union: power and policy-making, Routledge. See also 
Dawson, supra n 45. 
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regulation has also altered the role and function of private law by introducing rules that concern 
relationships inter privatos.  
 The policy aims of the telecommunications regime in Europe are to foster competition and 
the achievement of a single electronic communications networks and services market in Europe. It 
strives to create and develop a genuine Internal Market for telecommunication in the European 
Union. The European Commission initiated this market approach in 198749, which continued with 
the adoption of the Green Paper on Telecommunications50, which led to the full liberalization of the 
sector in 1998.  
In opening the telecommunications market, the European legislator has opted for a 
comprehensive approach. This means that European telecommunications regulation touches 
contractual issues. The EU is shaping the content of contracts arising in the context of 
telecommunications regulation. From a substantive point of view, telecommunications regulation 
encompasses sector-related rules of contract law tailored to sector-specific problems. These sets of 
rules carry with them a different understanding of “justice”. Efficiency gains relevance at the 
expense of fairness. The major aim is to achieve the efficiency (competitiveness) of the market 
(inclusion/exclusion) together with the promotion, and the achievement, of an efficient 
performance of markets players, both businesses and consumers, with legal design and 
interventions aimed at remedying market failures. 
3.3. Enforcing telecommunications rules via Sector-specific dispute resolution  
The lack of effective EU’s competence in the enforcement of telecommunications regulation has 
not prevent the establishment of an alternative way for the enforcement of the EU rules in order to 
avoid, thereby, putting in place a crippled regulatory system. Accordingly, the EU has promoted 
the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution techniques as a mean to bridge the enforcement gap by 
way of developing (alternative) procedural principles.  
The EU rules concerning telecommunications have established an enforcement design 
based on the availability of extra-judicial means for the settlement of sector-related disputes, 
arising in the context of B2B or B2C relationships. Because the civil courts are slow, inflexible, 
partial, sometimes unreliable or too expensive, particularly when the disputes involve small 
claims,51 only few cases related to telecommunications private interactions reach the court. As a 
matter of fact, the vast majority of cases arising in the context of telecommunications are resolved 
via out-of-court dispute settlement or through regulatory adjudication. Against this background, 
                                                          
49 Communication from the European Commission of July 30, 1987, “Towards a dynamic European Economy: Green 
Paper on the development of the common market for telecommunications services and equipment”, COM (87) 290.  
50  Green Paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology sectors, and the 
implications for Regulation - Towards an information society approach, COM (97) 623 final. (Not published in the 
Official Journal). 
51  Calliess, G. (2011), ‘The Future of Commercial Law: Governing Cross-Border Commerce’ in S. Muller et al. (eds.), 
The Law of the Future and the Future of Law, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher.  
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disputes rarely reach the (civil) courts.52 It is only those cases in which there is uncertainty on a 
point of law, where the case becomes subject to judicial interpretation via judicial adjudication.53 
This implies a shift from the State court system to different means of private and regulatory 
“justice”. Against this background, and given that these alternative mechanisms are developed 
under their own (sector-specific) rules and rationales, it is reasonable to ask: what is the legal 
regime applied to sector-related problems, and most importantly, what kind of justice is dispensed 
under these structures and what are its underlying legal values?  
 
4. Liberalization and privatization: the changing role of the State 
Technological advances have enabled the rapid development of the way in which 
telecommunications function. The most important aspect is that the liberalization of 
telecommunications was not only the result of a policy aim, but also the consequence of 
technological innovations.54 Before privatization, the institutional structure in telecoms was based 
on two grounds.55 At a technical level, it worked under a clear-cut distinction between public and 
private functions. Secondly, in economic terms, the system was grounded on the mono-functional 
limited used of telecommunications. The technological development of the sector invalidated both 
assumptions.56 Technological advances have brought convergence –and inter-operatibility– to the 
telecommunications sector, eliminating the boundaries between fixed and mobile telephony and 
data provision. 57 
In Europe, the liberalization of telecommunications started in the UK. In the rest of the 
Continent, the European Community drove the liberalization of the sector in the 80s, following the 
success of deregulation in the UK and beyond Europe (Japan and the United States).58 Three 
different packages of telecommunications regulation later,59 liberalization is no longer top of the 
agenda and the creation of a Digital Single Market has become the priority in the EU policy for 
telecommunications.60  
The re-organization of the State in the achievement of competition, while maintaining 
social goals, signals the spread of powers among different institutions, special jurisdictions, and 
                                                          
52 Micklitz, H.‐W. and Svetiev, Y. (2014), “The Transformation(s) of Private Law”, in Micklitz, H.‐W. and Svetiev, Y. 
and Comparato, G. (eds.), European Regulatory Private Law – The Paradigms Tested, European Regulatory Private Law 
Project (ERC-ERPL - 07); EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2014/04, p. 69.  
53 Micklitz, H.-W., (2011), ‘Administrative enforcement of Private Law’, in Brownsword, R., Micklitz, H. W., Niglia, L., 
& Weatherill, S. (Eds.), The foundations of European private law. Hart Publishing. 
54 Grande supra n 32.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid.  
57 OECD, Convergence between Communications Technologies: Case studies from North America and Western Europe 
(Paris: OECD, 1992). 
58 Communication from the European Commission of July 30, 1987, “Towards a dynamic European Economy: Green 
Paper on the development of the common market for telecommunications services and equipment”, COM (87) 290.  
59 For an anlaysis of the different stages of the EU regulatory framework for telecommunications in Europe see Chapter 3 
of this dissertation.  
60 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe - COM(2015) 192 final. See 
also Melody (2012).  
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administrative authorities’ decisions, etc., rather than traditional civil courts and ordinary sources 
of law.61 Against this background, private law as a whole is diluted by fragmentary legislation.62 
This is related to the verticalization of regulated markets. The regulation of these markets form 
integral and comprehensive individual regimes. They not only include substantive law provisions, 
but also encompass certain rules concerning sector-specific law-making and sector-specific law 
enforcement procedures. Despite the fact that the substantive law core of such regulations concerns 
private law (contract law/consumer law), such sector-specific private law is disconnected from the 
hard core of private law (fragmentation). Thus, as a result of such fragmentation dominated by 
sector-specific understandings and the emergence of sector-related actors, verticalization has not 
only refurbished private law, but it is also an explanation of the transformation on the role of the 
State itself.  
The transformation of the State has taken place in different ways and at different levels. 
Sassen63 gives the key to understand these transformation process(es).64  The transformation of 
private law is closely linked to the transformation of the State. This is particularly visible in utilities 
regulation. Liberalization of former public services should have caused a re-orientation towards 
private autonomy. Yet, these services have been framed in the private market as regulated services 
given their nature as bottleneck facilities. Therefore, despite the “retreat” of the State from the 
provision of the service by designating universal service operators, the State still plays a 
considerable (but transformed) role in the institutional design of the telecommunications sector.65 
The need to meet the demands of the “New Social State” triggered this transformation.66 The 
inability of the State to be responsible for the market as a whole and to closely scrutinize 
liberalized markets has resulted in considerable (and inevitable) delegation.67 Whether directly or 
via delegated power, the “social re-shuffle” has extended the regulatory competence of the State.  
Deregulation, in particular, brought about the decline of role the State in 
telecommunications as the service as it is no longer publicly provided. Nonetheless, following the 
development of the sector, the State stands as a key actor in the institutional design of the telecoms 
industry.68 Within this design, the State still plays a significant role while State’s functions have 
been (politically) re-defined. Accordingly, there has been a transformation from a Corporate State 
                                                          
61 See Shleifer, A. (2012), “The Failure of Judges and the Rise of Regulators”, MIT Press (Walras-Pareto lectures).  
62 “Even today in these marginal areas where social law is encroaching, any sense that the law forms a whole has been 
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Germany., at p. 439. 
63 Sassen supra n 41.  
64 I deliberately speak in plural.  
65  At least in Europe, see Grande, supra n 32. See also Bauer, J. M. (2010), “Changing Roles of the State in 
Telecommunications”, International Telecommunications Policy Review, 17(1).  
66 Taggart supra n 39; at pp. 585-586. 
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at p. 615). 
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as a provider of goods and services to its citizens,69 towards the Regulatory State.70 Thus, the 
liberalization of formerly monopolized public industries together with the paradoxes of 
privatization, de-regulation and re-regulation transformed the “Corporate State” and has given rise 
to the Regulatory State71. The different aspects of the the Regulatory State has yielded different 
patterns that have been grouped in the Market State72 and the Post-Market State.73 Whilst the 
foundational feature of the Market State is very responsive (and subordinated) to global market 
dictates, in the interest of establishing and preserving markets, the Post-Market State aims at 
embedding politics in order to overcome the problems associated with the new decision-making 
structures; usually its so-called democratic deficit. 74  Yet, given that the EU has embraced 
liberalization, we should consider whether this is evidence of “post-nationalism”, understood as a 
term that reflects more what is happening in the EU and the transfer of sovereignty by its Member 
States instead of a global phenomenon.75 Accordingly, the next section looks at the implications of 
liberalization undertaken by a supranational entity –the EU– through a multi-level institutional 
model of governance.   
 
5. Multi-level institutional environment 
The “new” Regulatory State has triggered the transformation (redistribution) of powers within the 
State itself.76 The growing role of the State was already a consequence of the welfare State, which 
explains the increase of bureaucracy and hence the inevitable delegation of executive powers.77 
Complexity and technicality have also pushed the internal redistribution of powers within the 
State. 78  Thus, oversight functions have increasingly been displaced from the legislature to 
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specialized government agencies and to the private sector.79 In the case of telecommunications, this 
supervisory role has been entrusted to sector-specific National Regulatory Authorities as expertise 
agencies in order to implement liberalization policies and to perform regulatory functions; in other 
words, to administer European telecommunications regulations.80 
The emergence of specialized sector-specific bodies implies a sort of compartmentalization 
of the law according to the policy concerns and expertise. The “motorized legislator” is imbuing all 
branches of law with policy goals.81 “Everything is up for grabs politically”.82 The “law machine” 
(State) becomes an instrument to achieve policy aims. Regulatory intervention is giving rise to 
heavily regulated sectors. The telecommunications sector in the European Union is “over-
regulated” and it pursues different policy objectives ranging from liberalization, competition, 
harmonization of the Internal Market, or even consumer protection; i.e. it pursues economic and 
social goals. In addition, the telecommunications sector in the European Union is configured under 
a regulatory network-like approach of different sector-related National Regulatory Authorities. 
This, in turn, gives rise to a new set of relationships of interconnection and interaction among the 
actors involved in the legislative development.  
The complexity attached to a networked structure has required the emergence of new forms 
of decision-making by way of experimental governance. This experimental governance comes 
hand-in-hand with the sectorialization of legal regimes largely based on expertise and that has 
brought about «collegial formations». Within these formations, the decisive point is to 
institutionalize procedures of (in the sense of rational choice) non-rational norms that can be 
empirically identified therein.83 In other words, it has fostered the creation of a club-like behavior 
among those belonging to the sector-related regulatory structures. Specialized knowledge and 
expertise become decisive to “administrate” (create and enforce) the knowledge produced within 
the sector. Due to that specialized knowledge, this let us say –as a continuation of Ladeur’s 
taxonomy– society of networked (but fragmented) knowledge produces its own goods. In a market 
that has been opened to free trade (liberalized), the provision of standards (“club goods”),84 favors 
de facto monopolies of standard-making like that represented by a private association (in telecoms, 
ETSI). This gives raise to a differentiated (club-like) law-making.85  
Further, the development of the economy and the subsequent Globalization process has 
entailed a transformation of the role of the State. The emergence of global markets is the result, and 
also the origin, of a profound international engagement. In the European arena, this process of 
internationalization of markets has been cherished as the opportunity to enlarge national markets by 
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way of diversifying into a bigger and supranational market: the (EU) internal market. The 
management of a single market calls for an intervention aimed at market integration, be it via 
positive or negative integration. 86  The combination of positive and negative techniques of 
integration enlarges the array of regulatory options. This means that new regulatory techniques do 
not find accommodation within the traditional legal taxonomy. Thus, the emergence of new actors 
has deeply transformed the distribution of (legislative) powers within the State.87 
This redistribution of powers has entailed a shift of hierarchy. Delegation has yielded a 
new approach where there are many decision-making centres. Hierarchy is no longer paradigmatic 
and the “society of networks” is setting aside hierarchy, giving rise to an increasing set of 
relationships of heterarchical character (networks). In this new panorama, the legal structure of 
regulation has been heavily altered and the State is not its central actor anymore.88 It also has an 
impact in the way law is manifested. The code symbolized the unity (and sovereignty) of the 
State.89 The new configuration eschews any codification or systematization attempt. Law sprouts 
from many sources and practices that do not follow a particular pecking order; rather, law derives 
from different norms and practices where the domestic and the transnational domains intermingle.  
Within the process of European integration “[s]overeignty has shifted to the European 
organs”.90 But since the EU is not a fully-fledged State, does EU law follow the nation-state pattern 
of legal unity that once characterized the legal order of the Nation-State? Is EU law a legal order? 
Is EU law law at all? The institutional arrangement of the EU hinders the categorization of the EU 
legal order within our established historical taxonomy –public/private. Can we consider EU law as, 
in Savigny’s terms, an “organic whole”? Might it be considered a single legal order in an Austinian 
way given the absence of a single sovereign legislator? If we follow the Kelsenian vision, what 
would be, at the EU level, the basic norm? These questions trigger us to think not only of the role 
of the State, but also in terms of sovereignty, recognition, delegation of powers and, most 
importantly, in terms of validity: validity of the norms coming from the EU, validity of the EU 
system.  
The transformation of the State may be used as a precious chance to re-formulate and to re-
think the traditional understanding, to divest from the straitjackets of the previous conceptions and 
old paradigms when giving shape to the new legal species.91 What is required is to understand the 
new forms in which the law takes shape, and what kinds of relationships are coming therefrom and 
within. In this vein, Ladeur looks at the emergent trend from a historical perspective and, thus, not 
from a state-centered perspective, rather he looks at the transformation processes and the 
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embryonic transformation of power involving “entangled hierarchies” where the distinction 
between primary and secondary norms is blurred.92 In Ladeur’s vision, the role of the State in the 
“management-needed situation” remains relevant, especially in the field of private law, where 
somebody has to look after the “rules of the game”.93 However, in the telecommunications sector, 
this task has been devolved to the sector-specific regulator. Later, the multilevel governance 
structure was networked and, thereby, the yardstick is no longer national. Under the configuration 
of the “supranational multilayered network”, the standards used to assess, for instance, when to 
intervene or not to intervene and what values need to be balanced, might come from a source 
outside the State, but if this were the case then the State would be meaningless being simply an 
instrument subordinated to non-State mandates. Under such conditions, the State would remain a 
State, but simply because the network still needs to use its sovereignty (substantively and 
institutionally) for its own ends. The State is, in a way, instrumentalized to contribute to the 
functioning of the network and the achievement of its aspirations.  
To conclude, changes in regulatory approaches entail extensive transformations in the 
making and implementation of regulatory policies. This also calls for new institutional 
arrangements and the development of new conceptual approaches.94 In the field of private law, this 
might well be translated as the emergence of new regulatory structures that transfer the role of 
regulatory provider from the State to other entities under new forms of experimental governance. 
At the substantive level, it involves a transformation of the role of private law from autonomy to 
functionalism.  
 
6. Transforming private law: The new role of private law and its regulatory 
function  
While the creation of the Internal Market project has implied the extension of private autonomy 
beyond national markets, the role of the State as a law-maker has been undermined. Private law has 
been de-nationalised. Thus, alongside Globalization –in Europe, Europeanization–, the role of 
private law has decreased and it has been instrumentalized,95 giving rise to the less clear-cut of the 
distinction between public and private law. Not only has the role of the State been weakened, but 
also the role of the law itself.96 
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6.1. Regulatory role of private law 
Without attempting to develop a definition of Private law, it suffices to describe it in its traditional 
notion. Under the established understanding, the aim of private law is to provide a framework 
within which private parties interact. Hence, it is the governance mechanism for private 
transactions. This general notion of private law tends to evoke generalist rules contained in the 
different national civil codes. Yet, there are also certain rules belonging to specific sectors that 
govern relations inter privatos and still cohabitate with the rules contained in the codes.  
Usually, private law does not pursue the achievement of values beyond those aimed at 
facilitating private actors’ transactions. This is a distinctive feature as opposed to other branches of 
(public) law. However, rules emanating from the European Union, and particularly those enacted 
under the Internal Market’s legal basis (Article 114 TFEU), serve to approximate national rules and 
to create harmonized markets, but also contribute to a process of market-building. The 
encompassing, by sector-specific regimes, of what would have been traditionally classified as 
private law rules means that, now, private law serves these purposes as well. This introduction of 
rules governing private interactions within the different European directives providing the 
regulatory frameworks for regulated sectors does not only minimize the traditional idiosyncrasy of 
private law,97 but also its systematic character and coherence.98 Furthermore, European Private 
Law, which is nothing more than the private law rules contained in the European directives, does 
not follow any other methodology than to serve to further objectives laid down in those directives. 
It is functionally oriented.99 These private law rules contained in sectorial regulatory regimes are 
what constitute the core of European Regulatory Private Law. Hence, European Regulatory Private 
law, unlike traditional private law, seeks the achievement of certain policy goals beyond private 
interests. Private law now plays a regulatory function.  
Against this background, contract law has been transformed. The rationale of the contract 
law contained in EU rules is to achieve certain (policy and regulatory) aims, giving rise not to a 
systematized set of private law rules, but to the regulation of different sectorial regimes according 
to the (extra legal) objectives pursued.100 Accordingly, we cannot talk about a “general” contract 
law in EU law,101 despite the many initiatives to systematize a single corpus of contract law at 
European level.102 What is more, the distinctive feature of this renewed/makeover contract law is 
that it now pursues (market building) collective goals, exemplified by the guarantee of fundamental 
freedoms, competition, access to markets, non-discrimination, consumer protection and so on. 
According to this goal-oriented approach, European private law is based on regulation and 
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competition.103  Whereas regulation set the foundations for the Internal-market building project 
(enabling law), competition is the standard by which European private law unfolds. These purposes 
serve as the basis for EU private law.104 
Accordingly, contract law understood in EU law terms holds a clearly visible social 
function, and this instrumentalization, together with the changing (and pervasive) role of the 
“State” –whatever form it takes– implies an alteration of the classical understanding of the 
distinction between public and private law.  
6.2 Public/private law division. Ultimate cleavage or new partnership?  
If private law has been understood as the center of law and contract law as located at the heart of 
such center,105 European Private Law requires us to re-think our legal taxonomy. Private law in the 
European (internal) market cannot longer be considered, paradigmatically, as “by essence 
systematic, de-contextualized, (…)” enclosing “inter-individual relationships in a hermetic, private, 
and a-political sphere”.106 In the 21st Century we must understand private law as something else.  
Teubner attaches private law to “economic rationality” and “market co-ordination” 
whereas, for him, public law responds to “political rationality” and “hierarchical organization”.107 
By embedding private and contract law rules in sectorial regimes responding to political 
rationalities, (European) private law becomes also part of, and is attached to, political rationality. 
Therefore, public and private law are both part of a single project that is connected to the social in 
its pursuit of collective and public goals that, at the same time, enlarges the regulatory powers of 
the State.108  
Does it mean that private law no longer exists or that it now cannot longer survive unless it 
is integrated in a typically public regulatory structure? We should answer negatively such an 
assumption. The new features of the private law contained in the EU Directives and Regulations 
are the result of the (EU Internal) market-building project. Yet, the constitutive nature of the 
market does not entail that its foundation needs necessarily be private. Rather, the creation of the 
European private law society requires safeguarding against both private and public actors in the 
extension of private autonomy beyond national markets.109 Perhaps, in examining European rules, 
we should abandon the dualist thinking, which is no more than a vestige of 19th Century legal 
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thought that might not fit in the European (private law) context.110 We should not, as Schmitt, 
grieve for the politisation of private law, neither should we accept the idea that constitutional law 
must necessarily pervade private law within a system of “total constitution”.111 However, it cannot 
be disregarded that the underpinning “constitutional” ideas of the EU are present throughout its 
laws. For instance, it can be seen in the reinforcement of private rights via fundamental freedoms 
(Viking and Laval).  
This holds true in relation to the way EU law has taken over consumer protection, for 
instance.112 Private autonomy and freedom of contract, as two hard-core principles of private law, 
have been divested from the European consumer whose private will is submitted to the goals of the 
Internal Market.113 Hence, in EU law, contract law is labelled as contractual “only in name”.114 
That might be the reason why freedom of contract, despite its supposed position as one of the 
greatest values within of the European Union, it is not explicitly recognized either by the Primary 
Community Law, or by secondary Community Law.115  
In fields such as Labour Law and non-discrimination, etc., private law is (clearly) affected 
by social (political) goals. In the telecommunications sector, it is public law what has been 
impacted by private law. Because it is the transformation of the service (from public service to 
market liberalization) what has opened a new sphere where contract law has also found its place, as 
a necessary tool to put in motion the engine upon which telecoms functioning is built. Accordingly, 
the sources of this (pseudo) private law, the law-making (and the post legislative guidance) are 
different than those presiding in the traditional understanding of private law; so is its enforcement. 
But the question is: is this a “new” law or is it a manifestation of private law? Or rather is it a 
“privatization”/”marketization” of public law? The latter claim would come from the fact that the 
different fundamental freedoms “marketization” are central to private law as well (horizontal/direct 
effect). 116 
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7. Towards the self-sufficiency of European Regulatory Private Law? 
The transformation processes explained above give rise to a set of questions that re-define the 
boundaries of private law. In the first place, it is important to determine the nature of European 
Regulatory Private Law and its interaction with national private law. This section attempts to 
answer the following questions: How does the latter affect the former? Does this interaction 
downplay the role of national private law or rather do the supranational and national levels 
interact? According to this yardstick, we assess whether there is a process of intrusion and 
substitution and whether we can talk about the self-sufficiency of sector-specific regulation to 
regulate private law relationships via sector-related rules alone or, if instead, it is rather a 
complementarity between sector-related and more general rules.  
7.1. Functional differentiation: Contract law and Regulatory law  
The starting hypothesis is that the process of integration via private law is not grounded in a 
juridical rationality. Rather, it is embedded in an instrumentalist rationality that follows the logic 
of the market-building project, as the core of the European economic constitution.117 
This process unfolds as part of the bigger and overall process of Globalization as a 
“multidimensional phenomenon involving diverse domains of activity and interaction including the 
economic, political, technological, military, legal, cultural and environmental. Each of these 
spheres involves different patterns of relations and activity”.118 This result into an array of different 
and “independent” global spheres that feature “a dynamic of their own as autonomous functional 
areas which cannot be controlled though the outside”.119 Globalization occurs, thereby, according 
to a logic of functional differentiation.120  
Autonomy. Functionalism. Competition. Regulation 
Another important issue to take into account is how this “metamorphosed” private law affects 
private autonomy. Competition law approaches by means of private law automatically involve 
interference with private autonomy. The transformation of private and contract law affect its core: 
freedom of contract. Mandatory rules weaken parties’ autonomy. 121  Goal oriented private law 
transforms autonomy into functionalism.122 
In the process of emergence of new transnational legal orders, Globalization –as a “shift 
from territorial to functional differentiation on the world level”– does not mean the dominance of a 
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single worldwide legal order; but a new (fragmented) reality. 123  European Regulatory Private 
Law(s) might well function as an epitome of this, provided that it autonomously defines its 
boundaries according to different sectors. The State is no longer relevant as a factor of 
differentiation. 124  Accordingly, territorial jurisdiction “loses steam” in favor of functional 
differentiation in the definition of legal boundaries.125 
7.2. Intrusion & substitution 
External (to the State) efforts to regulate are usually a matter of resistance for national structures, 
especially when it comes to private law matters.126 This opposition can take different forms. To 
Shaffer, outside Europe, such resistance “can neutralize, hybridize, appropriate, and transform 
international and transnational law in distinct and unanticipated ways, which can lead recursively to 
new international and transnational lawmaking”.127 
By way of normative design, the self-sufficiency hypothesis is an attempt to accommodate 
the emergence of European Regulatory Private Law in the debate about legal pluralism. In the 
world of legal pluralism, the emergence of new legal categories does not imply the exclusion the 
existing ones. Rather, they coexist at different levels.128 The new legal categories are intermingled 
resulting in a plethora of rules of different origins (pluralism of legal sources), belonging to 
different legal practices (pluralism of legal orders) and shaping different legal systems (pluralism 
of legal systems).129 In the EU law, these three dimensions of legal pluralism occur. There is 
pluralism of legal sources (national legislator/European legislator), pluralism of legal systems and 
legal practices facilitated by the existence of an own institutional design. All of this is underpinned 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union advocating in the 60s for an independent EU legal 
order as a result of the direct effect and primacy principle (Costa v. Enel and Van Gend & Loos 
Judgments).130 
For Micklitz, and in Europe, the self-sufficiency of European Regulatory Private Law is 
embodied in Intrusion and Substitution, as a composite of three elements: “(1) the horizontal and 
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vertical sectoral rules; (2) the general principles enshrined in the horizontal and vertical sectoral 
rules; (3) the general principles of civil law”.131  
The center of gravity has been displaced from the Nation-State, setting aside, in turn, law 
and politics from the center of the globalization process. Rather, the leading role has been 
performed by the “autonomous sectors of society” in Mannheim’s terms.132 Such sectors represent 
(fragmented/sectorialized) global society. As a consequence, under this new paradigm where 
political law-making is losing significant in favor of self-regulatory settings, “political theories of 
law will be of little use in understanding legal globalization”; i.e. the traditional understanding of 
law and the State (with its usual separation of powers) becomes no longer suitable to explain the 
interactions within the New World Society. Against this background, global law will emerge from 
the periphery (living law) rather than from the core legal areas that emanate from State and political 
institutions.133 This being so, it is why, for instance, the EU has failed in its attempt to codify its 
own “European Private Law”, whereas, at the same time –and much more strongly– other branches 
of EU Law (telecommunications, energy, financial services, etc.); i.e. European Regulatory Private 
Law (ERPL)134 are growing in importance and have heavily impacted the arena constituting proper 
complete regimes that possesses its own features. In addition, these sector-specific legal regimes 
encompass their own institutional design and procedures with regard to law-making and 
enforcement, in parallel to the Parliament and the courts generally associated to private law.  
Such regimes undermine the unity of the existing systematization and erode (intrusion and 
substitution) the sovereignty of the Nation-State whose monopoly as the sole and exclusionary 
legislator in private law has been circumvented. Indeed, it happens that, at the same time, 
privatization (Marketization) has implied a re-alignment of the public-private divide where the 
legal and normative values of justice have mutated, giving rise to a functional justice.135  
7.3. Self-sufficiency or complementarity? 
As a result of the transformations mentioned above, theories of legal pluralism will have to focus 
on communicative networks rather than nation-states.136 In fact, that is what happens in the case of 
ERPL if we take it as an example of one of the social subsystems of the global society, as described 
by Teubner. 137  For instance, taking the telecommunications sector as an example to validate 
Teubner’s claims, one can agree that: 1) the telecommunication sector operates in a “networked 
borderless context”; i.e. it works as a sort of “club” which transcends territorial boundaries and that 
result in the emergence of genuine legal forms; 2) as to sources of law, in the telecoms regime, the 
national legislator (the Parliament) is losing its leading role being replaced by highly specialized 
and technical instances (National Regulatory Authorities, Standardization bodies, etc.); 3) the 
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telecoms sector will remain (by now) functioning independently –albeit closely parallel– to the 
different emerging sector-specific fields; and finally, 4) its rise linked to its “sector-related nature” 
rather than its attachment to any particular Nation-State or single identity, confirms the fact that 
unity will not be a paradigmatic feature of any global law, which in turn undermines the unity 
conventionally attached to private law systems.  
 Under the new circumstances, ERPL would function as one of the “social subsystems of 
the global society”, giving rise to a new genotype of law, which might be only observed as a “self-
organizing process that autonomously defines its boundaries”.138 And it can only be assessed by 
observing its legal practices (“second order observation” for Luhmann);139 that is the reason why 
ERPL and this dissertation follow a “bottom-up” approach. Accordingly, it would be in this 
empirical observation, where the variation or transformation process (as desired) finds its answers 
to questions related to law-making and enforcement powers; although it threatens the equilibrium 
of powers. Only after such observation, one would be able to perceive whether the 
telecommunications private law rules actually constitute a peripheral and asymmetric self-
reproductive legal process.  
  
                                                          
138 Ibid.  
139 Ibid. See also Luhmann, N. (1992), ‘The coding of the legal system’, in Febbrajo, A and Teubner, G. (eds), State, 
Law, and Economy as Autopoietic Systems: Regulation and Autonomy in a New Perspective, Giuffrè. 145-185.  
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PART II – DESCRIBING THE TRANSFORMATIONS 
Chapter 3 – THE TRANSFORMATION IN THE MAKING OF PRIVATE 
LAW VIA EU TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION 
 
 
1. Setting the Scene. General overview 
 
This chapter focuses on the transformations in the making of private law through the regulatory 
process of telecommunications law in Europe. Following the liberalization of formerly public 
monopolies in the field of utilities, telecommunications have been regulated at EU level in a 
comprehensive way. This inclusive approach reaches to the private law relations among 
participants of telecommunications markets. In particular, the overarching principles for the 
telecoms sector, such as non-discriminatory and universal access, impact heavily not only the 
nature of private law, but also imply a transformation in the contractual relations arising from 
transactions within the sector. 
The shift of telecommunications from the public to the private sphere as a result of the 
liberalization of the sector has entailed not only substantive but also institutional transformations. 
Internal Market harmonization has been the driver for the rise of “European supervisory powers” in 
order to ensure proper implementation of EU law in many fields covered by EU competences. In 
the telecommunications sector, the amplitude of these, largely European, control mechanisms 
overseeing compliance with sector-specific policy goals interferes with other spheres traditionally 
belonging to the Member States, such as private relationships. Against this background, this 
chapter focuses on the making of telecommunications regulation as the epitome of a transformation 
from parliamentary rule-making to specialized regulatory powers. Moreover, such powers formally 
function under a networked and decentralized structure while, in practice, –this chapter argues– the 
network works hierarchically under sector-specific supervisory mechanisms. 
More specifically, under the system shaped by the European Regulatory Framework for 
Electronic Communications, Member States have been required to set up National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs) to oversee the liberalization process. These regulatory bodies perform a key 
role in the implementation and enforcement of the European legal framework. In this setting, the 
European Union has shown an enforcement deficit as a result of the National Procedural Autonomy 
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principle.1 However, even though the implementation and enforcement of the EU rules depends on 
the Member States, there is a slow and growing influence by the European Union on the national 
regulatory activities.2 This chapter thereby focuses on how the supervisory powers of the EU, 
which are deeply rooted in the integration process and towards the construction of the Internal 
Market, are encroaching on national competences on the sly. To this end, this chapter aims at 
displaying the institutional design of the telecommunications sector in the decision-making process 
and the implementation of EU rules. 
The first part of this chapter addresses the evolution of the Regulatory Framework for 
Electronic Communications. This section shows how the primary aims of the Regulatory 
Framework are shifting from liberalization and competition to harmonization of the Internal Market 
and Consumer protection. The liberalization of the telecommunications sector should have led to its 
deregulation and to the system being governed by general competition and general contract law 
only.3 However, further liberalization measures are not (for the time being) envisaged and sector-
specific legislation is still being adopted via approximation legislation.  
Secondly, this chapter focuses on the institutional design of law-making in telecoms and 
the actors involved. That part seeks to reconstruct, on the basis of the conducted empirical research, 
the different institutions that participate in the regulation of telecommunications.  
Later, by exploring a real case on the implementation of the European legal framework in 
the field of telecommunications, the chapter provides an answer to the question of the extent to 
which the new model of decision-making implies a shift with regard to traditional methods of law-
making in private law. Here, the nature, role and impact of soft-law are brought forward. In 
addition, through the analysis of the Vodafone case, this chapter also addresses the controversial 
issue of the EU’s virtual competence to regulate retail prices.  
In summary, by scrutinizing the making process of telecommunications regulation in the 
EU, this chapter illustrates the new actors and the regulatory strategies that, tangentially, intervene 
in the shaping of European Regulatory Private Law in regulated market.  
 
 
                                                          
1 Nicolaides, P., Geveke, A., & Den Teuling, A. M. (2003), “Improving policy implementation in an enlarged European 
Union: The case of national regulatory authorities”. European Institute of Public Administration; and Nicolaides, P. 
(2004), “The Political Economy of Multi‐tiered Regulation in Europe”. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 42(3) 
599-618. 
2 Ottow, A. (2012) “Europeanization of the Supervision of Competitive Markets”, European Public Law, 18(1), pp. 191–
221. See also Cseres, K. (2013), “Integrate or Separate Institutional Design for the Enforcement of Competition Law and 
Consumer Law”, Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance Working Paper Series (2013-01). 
3Recital 5 of the Directive 2009/140/EC amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic 
communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications 
networks and services (OJ L 18.12.2009): “[T]he aim is progressively to reduce ex-ante sector specific rules as 
competition in the markets develops and, ultimately, for electronic communications to be governed by competition law 
only. […]”.  
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European Regulatory Framework: From liberalization to Internal Market harmonization 
(and consumer protection) 
In the regulation of Services of General Economic Interest (SGEIs) −gas, electricity, transport, 
financial services, telecommunications, etc.−, the European legislator has been engaged in a 
functional approach that has instigated regulated sectors to become functionally independent. Thus, 
although the different sectors have followed comparable paths, their regulation has been carried out 
through a sector-specific approach, resulting in different sectorial regulations.  
For the telecommunications sector in particular, liberalization, harmonization of the 
Internal Market and the application of competition rules have been the cornerstones underpinning 
the market-opening process and the reform of the sector in order to accomplish the general EU 
policy goals for telecommunications, being: “to develop the conditions for the market to provide 
European users with a greater variety of telecommunications services, of better quality and at a 
lower cost, affording Europe the full internal and external benefits of a strong telecommunications 
sector”.4 However, the de-regulation of the sector has not resulted in a decrease in the legislation 
concerned; rather, the creation of the Internal Market for telecommunications has entailed its re-
regulation and it has actually led to overregulation. 5  The vast number of rules encompasses 
different issues, ranging from the liberalization of the sector, to particular provisions concerning 
contractual matters. 
All the enacted rules contained in the different generations of rules (so-called telecom 
packages or generations) constitute what has been termed the EU Regulatory Framework for 
Electronic Communications, which provides the basis for the national legislation in the field. To 
date, three series of rules have come to light: 
The First package (1980s-2002) 
The European Commission initiated the process of liberalization in the telecommunications sector 
in 1987, with the adoption of the Green Paper on Telecommunications,6 which brought the full 
liberalization of the sector in 1998.7 At that time, the creation of a market was the top initiative of 
the liberalization aspirations.8 When telecommunications market was opened to competition under 
                                                          
4 Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM (87) 
290 final, page 3 (Introduction). For a deeper analysis see Queck, R., de Streel, A., Hou, L., Jost, J., &Kosta, E. (2010), 
‘The EU Regulatory Framework Applicable to Electronic Communications’, in L. Garzaniti and M. O’Regan (Eds.), 
Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Internet. EU Competition Law & Regulation (3rd ed.), Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 
3-262. 
5 Thus, for example, there are more than a hundred of different directives, decisions, regulations, recommendations and 
resolutions concerning telecommunications. Garzaniti, L. and O’Regan, M., supra n 4.  
6 Communication from the European Commission of July 30, 1987, “Towards a dynamic European Economy: Green 
Paper on the development of the common market for telecommunications services and equipment”, COM (87) 290.  
7 Green Paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology sectors, and the 
implications for Regulation - Towards an information society approach, COM (97) 623 final. (Not published in the 
Official Journal). 
8 Representative of the European Commission –DG Connect–, Speech at the Florence School of Regulation, October 
2012. 
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Article 86 EC Treaty (now Article 106 TFEU) the European legislator was mainly focused on 
liberalizing the sector and enhancing competition.  
According to the 1987 Green Paper, there were several reasons for commencing the review 
process:  the speed of technological diversification, an expanding range of new forms of access to 
sources of information, an explosive growth in communications requirements, and the major 
importance of scale effects through multinational participants. Further, the European Commission 
also declared that the measures taken by the US and Japan affected the authorities concerned and 
forced the review process as well.9 The main purpose of the regulatory adjustment was to create 
competition and, thus, more cost-efficient services. Additionally, it would stimulate investment and 
innovation. A final reason was that the Commission considered telecommunications as a sector of 
vital importance in economic activity and as “the most critical area for influencing the “nervous 
system” of modern society”.10 
At that stage, some European companies understood the opportunities provided by the 
global market and were eager to compete in international trade on an equal basis. The UK was the 
pioneer in the liberalization process and, in 1984, privatized British Telecommunications. 
However, not all Member States agreed with the liberalization policy, and the need to reach a 
consensus entailed a more than a decade of Directives and incentives to Member States to 
undertake the review process.11 
The separation of the regulatory and operational functions of the incumbent was a crucial 
aspect for the liberalization purpose. These functions were formerly performed by the same entity, 
the incumbent operator. Since this would hinder the introduction of competition, entailing a risk of 
distortion and discrimination for the new entrants, the EU rules envisaged the creation of bodies 
independent of the telecommunications organizations for regulatory functions.12 Thus, as a matter 
of institutional choice, the reforms included the establishment of what would later be called 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) in order to implement liberalization policies and to 
perform regulatory functions.13 
Subsequently, in 1997, the Independent Regulators Group (IRG) was created with the aim 
of co-operation between the different European regulators. The IRG was formed by NRAs with the 
purpose of serving as a meeting point or forum to share experiences and points of view amongst its 
members on issues concerning the development of the telecommunications market in Europe as a 
result of liberalization. 
 
                                                          
91987 Green Paper, supra n. 4, p. 2. 
10Ibid., p. 1. 
11  Melody, W.H. (2012), “Viewpoint: The Closing of the Liberalization Era in European Telecommunication”, 
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, (13) 3, 218-235, at 221. 
12 Article 7, Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services, OJ L 
192, 24.07.1990, pp. 10-16. 
13 National Regulatory Authorities and their role are analyzed more thoroughly below.  
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The Second package (2002-2009) 
The rapid development of the sector pressed the European Commission to review the first package 
shortly after its implementation. This new package (2002) was primarily aimed at the convergence 
of the Regulatory Framework in order to foster the industry’s development via technologically 
neutral and (more) flexible rules.14 The idea was to put an end to the vertical approach in the 
regulation of the different services and networks provided within the telecommunications market 
(for instance, all networks used for the transmission of radio and television programmes). Thus, 
due to the emergence of a broad range of communications services, the convergence of the ICT 
(Information and Communications Technology) sector was sought under a renewed common 
approach.15 Furthermore, once the liberalization machinery had been rolled-out, the second goal 
was the development of a common market for telecommunications across the European Union. 
Accordingly, the legal basis for the adoption of this second set of rules was Article 95 EC (now 114 
TFEU), aimed at the harmonization of the Internal Market, and consumer protection (Article 153 
EC, now Article 169 TFEU). Nonetheless, the second package did not led to the replacement of all 
the former rules from the first package. Consequently, this meant a basic dualism: harmonization, 
on the one hand, and liberalization, on the other.16 
The new package, consistent with the goal of harmonization and following the mandate of 
the Framework Directive17 to contribute to the development of the Internal Market by cooperating 
with each other and, unlike the IRG, also with the Commission,18  included the creation of a 
European body, the European Regulators Group (ERG).19 The idea of its creation was not only to 
advise the European Commission, but also to create a sort of European network of NRAs. The 
purpose was to bring together the regulators of electronic communications and to encourage them 
to take a European perspective when performing their regulatory activities. Shortly after, the ERG 
started to constitute its activity into study groups and began to issue binding guidelines that served 
as benchmark exercises on the different regulatory topics. As such, the ERG was created to 
enhance co-operation and co-ordination between the Commission and the different NRAs by 
ensuring the proper and uniform implementation of the EU rules in order to ensure a more 
consistent approach and even though the ERG operated in parallel with the IRG, its main role was 
to advise and assist the European Commission in consolidating the Internal Market for electronic 
communications networks and services.20 
 
                                                          
14Braun, J.-D. and Capito, R. (2009), ‘The emergence of EC Telecommunications Law as a new Self-standing field 
within Community Law’, in Koening, C.; Bartosh, A.; Braun, J.D and Romes, M., EC Competition and 
Telecommunications Law, 2nd edition, Wolters Kluwer, pp. 41-52 (see p. 48). 
15 For a further analysis see Melody (2012) supra n. 11, 223-226. 
16 Braun and Capito, op. cit. supra n. 14.  
17 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a Common Regulatory 
Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services (Framework Directive).  
18 Article 7(2) and Recital 36 of the Framework Directive as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC and Regulation 
544/2009.  
19Decision of the European Commission of July 29, 2002 establishing the European Regulators Group for Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services (OJ L 200, 30.7.2002, pp. 38-40). 
20Ibid. Article 3.  
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The Third package (2009-present) 
Around two decades after the first package was launched, some Member States had successfully 
developed competition in their telecommunications markets, whereas others were still more 
laggard. This situation, linked to the incorporation of new EU Member States, the Significant 
Market Power (SMP) of national incumbents and the restricted powers of NRAs, implied a 
deceleration in the implementation of the second package. The process flowed slower than 
expected and it required the rules to be amended and adapted to the new circumstances.  
The different directives from the 2002 package contained review clauses providing a 
procedure whereby the Commission would review their functioning no later than three years after 
its transposition. Thus, the 2006 Review gave rise to the 2009 package or “third generation”. 
According to the European Commission, the 2009 package was enacted to “substantially strengthen 
competition and consumer rights on Europe's telecoms markets, facilitate high-speed internet 
broadband connections to all Europeans”.21 Although competition had generally developed, this 
trend was fragmented and there were some countries and markets where competition was still 
lacking. Therefore, the revised rules were still (very much) based on ex-ante regulation.  
At the institutional level, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
(BEREC) replaced the ERG.22 This would provide a forum of discussion between the Commission 
and the NRAs in order to foster the Internal Market for telecommunications services. Roughly 
speaking, BEREC is currently the body in charge of ensuring a consistent application of the EU 
regulatory framework for electronic communications. 23  BEREC is, therefore, established as a 
meeting point for the co-operation of regulators and, in general, Member States must ensure that 
the regulators at the national level actively support the goals of BEREC of promoting greater 
regulatory coordination and coherence.24 
Current situation  
The 2009 Amendment to the Framework Directive (Recital 5) introduces a sunset rule. It provides 
that “the aim is progressively to reduce ex-ante sector specific rules as competition in the markets 
develops and, ultimately, for electronic communications to be governed by competition law only”. 
Yet, the evidence suggests that this does not seem to be the path that telecommunications 
regulation actually follows. In this regard, it has been pointed out that the new agenda did not 
include any new liberalization measure, any reference to the expansion of competition among 
providers, or to any orientation concerning the benefits of liberalization within its policy 
objectives.25 This means that competition is no longer at the top of the agenda and that further steps 
                                                          
21 Press Release, MEMO/09/491, Brussels, 5 November 2009. 
22 This Body was set up by the Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009 establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office, 
OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, pp. 1-10. The role of BEREC is analyzed more thoroughly below.  
23 Article 1 BEREC Regulation. 
24 Article 3(3b) Framework Directive. 
25Melody (2012), supra n.11, pp. 226-227. 
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in this regard are not (at this moment) foreseen.26 On the discussion about the phasing out of sector-
specific regulation, the tendency of regulation to persist provides evidence that competition law 
will not take over regulation in the long term.27  As to the harmonization goal, which provides the 
legal basis for the two last packages of telecommunications regulation, the different telecoms 
Directives are re-regulating the market, in an attempt by the EU legislator to bring closer the 
already existing national regimes.28  
Today there have been some developments but there are still persisting bottlenecks that 
competition law alone cannot address and artificial barriers to market integration. These factors are 
the reason why market regulation is still needed. In addition, as a matter of fact, as long as 
telecommunications develops, new markets emerge and they need to be included within the 
markets to be regulated, and these developments will need to be taken into account in future 
Recommendations on relevant markets susceptible to ex-ante regulation. This may entail that 
although competition is effectively achieved in some telecommunications markets, regulation will 
continue to be adopted even once markets are competitive because there exist greater policy 
aspirations.  
The policy aims in the telecommunications sector are found in the 101 actions grouped in 
the 7 pillars of the Digital Agenda. The Pillar I is the Digital Single Market. Single Market paves 
the way for the actions taken under the Digital Agenda’s initiatives. Yet, the harmonization project 
is not up till now yielding a sufficient outcome towards a Single Market for telecoms. It would 
require the effective unification of national markets in terms of “network availability and access, 
spectrum usage and competition rules”. 29  This might be one of the reasons why the 
telecommunications legal regime will remain subject to sector-specific regulation. Furthermore, 
due to the existence of deregulatory failures30 and despite its envisaged potential integration within 
competition law, the sectorial approach towards the regulation of telecommunications seems to 
prevail, it not being by now –in practice– part of a broader horizontal approach.  
As things stand, there is a fourth package being discussed in the European Parliament. On 
this occasion, the legal package does not however consist of Directives, but of a Regulation31 and a 
                                                          
26Ibid. Melody.  
27 On the “tendency of regulation to perpetuate itself”, see Larouche, P. (2004), “Legal issues concerning remedies in 
network industries”; available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soL3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=832025.  
28  As Weatherill has put it: “Directives harmonize national laws in the name of promoting the establishment or 
functioning of the market –or more pertinently to ‘re-regulate’ it‒, in the sense that the EU is not acting as a de novo 
regulator but rather is responding to the pre-existing diverse regulatory choices among the Member States”; Weatherill, 
S. (2011) Consumer Policy, in Craig, P. and De Búrca, G. (Eds). The Evolution of EU Law. New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 743-779. See also Bergkamp, L. (2003). European Community Law for the New Economy. 
Intersentia nv: p. 567.  
29 Parcu, P. L. and Silvestri, V., (2014), “Electronic Communications Regulation in Europe: An Overview of Past and 
Future Problems”, Utilities Policy, 31, pp. 246-255. 
30 Recently, a process of deregulation in Poland has failed (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-100_en.htm). The 
European Commission has called the Polish telecoms regulator (UKE) to withdraw its proposal to deregulate conditions 
under which other operators can access Polish telecom company Telekomunikacja Polska's (TP) broadband network in 11 
communes of Poland since –in the Commission’s view‒, it could have a negative effect on competition in Poland.  
31 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures concerning the European single 
market for electronic communications and to achieve a Connected Continent - COM(2013) 627.  
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Commission Recommendation.32 In taking up this new form, the EU is moving from regulation via 
Directives towards adopting legislation in the form of a directly applicable Regulation whose main 
aim is the removal of barriers and enabling the process of building a genuine Single Market for 
telecoms. Hence, the proposal takes Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for enacting this one-size-
fits-all solution. The viability of that project has stalled in the European Parliament and, 
accordingly, the European Commission has initiated a new strategy for the creation of a genuine 
Digital Single Market in Europe.33 This plan foresees the adoption of proposals by the European 
Commission in 2016 for an entire revision of the current regulatory framework for 
telecommunications including the particular focus on: “(i) a consistent single market approach to 
spectrum policy and management (ii) delivering the conditions for a true single market by tackling 
regulatory fragmentation to allow economies of scale for efficient network operators and service 
providers and effective protection of consumers, (iii) ensuring a level playing field for market 
players and consistent application of the rules, (iv) incentivising investment in high speed 
broadband networks (including a review of the Universal Service Directive) and (v) a more 
effective regulatory institutional framework”.34 
2. Legal basis. Internal Market approach 
Neither the EC Treaty nor the Lisbon Treaty creates specific competences with respect to private 
law. Nonetheless, this lack of constitutional backing has been compensated –and exploited‒35 by 
the use of the broad purposeful competence to harmonize and safeguard the values underpinning 
the provision of SGEIs services. In particular, Protocol n.26 of the Treaty provides that the values 
concerning Service of General Economic Interest include, inter alia: (…) “a high level of quality, 
safety and affordability, equal treatment and the promotion of universal access and of user rights”. 
This is required to be read within the meaning of Article 14 TFEU which establishes that the EU as 
well as the Member States, “each within their respective powers and within the scope of application 
of the Treaties, shall take care that such services operate on the basis of principles and conditions, 
particularly economic and financial conditions, which enable them to fulfill their missions”. To this 
end, it requires the European Parliament and the Council, under the ordinary legislative procedure, 
to establish those principles and conditions within the limits of the shared competences enshrined 
in Article 4 TFEU.  
By and large, like communications technologies, the Regulatory Framework for 
telecommunications services –as explained above− has evolved over time, which has resulted in 
different generations of EU rules in line with the −also changing− policy goals. Liberalization of 
                                                          
32 Commission Recommendation on consistent non-discrimination obligations and costing methodologies to promote 
competition and enhance the broadband investment environment - COM(2013) 5761. 
33 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, 6.5.2015. COM(2015) 192 
final.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Weatherill, S. (2006). ‘European Private Law and the Constitutional Dimension’ in Cafaggi, F. The Institutional 
Framework of Private Law, Oxford University Press. 
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the sector (Article 86 EC Treaty, now Article 106 TFEU) and consumer protection (Article 153 
TEC, now Article 169 TFEU) were invoked as the legal basis in past generations of EU 
telecommunications. Under the current legal framework, the harmonization aspiration in telecoms 
is intended to ensure equivalent regulatory systems and a consistent application of the European 
rules in all Member States. The underlying idea is that market players should compete on 
equivalent terms and for consumers to fully benefit from the liberalization of the market. For this 
purpose, the EU has recently resorted to Article 95 EC Treaty (now Article 114 TFEU), which 
enables the Council and the European Parliament, upon a proposal from the Commission, to adopt 
legislative measures aimed at the establishment and functioning of the Internal Market by 
harmonizing Member States’ laws. By going down this route, the EU legislation in the field of 
telecommunications services also reveals its reliance on the market. Hence, not only are all the 
relevant Directives contained in the regulatory framework for electronic communications are based 
on the Internal Market competence of Article 114 TFEU, but also their content confirms their clear 
market orientation.36 
Against this background, it can be surmised that while the primary goal of 
telecommunications regulation was to open up markets, the harmonization aim has become 
prominent and it is overshadowing the transition to competition. Accordingly, the legal regime for 
telecommunications seems to now be more committed to the creation of a single market for 
telecoms rather than liberalization. Hence, although regulatory convergence –i.e. the end of the ex-
ante/ex-post dichotomy because competition law takes over the regulation of the sector‒ was 
expected, the reality shows that the sector-related regime is increasingly deviating firstly from pure 
market regulation, to now also encompass social regulation (e.g. universal services), and secondly 
from general contract law when it comes to private law provisions, leading to the creation of 
specific rules aimed at promoting competition (e.g. access and interconnection) which govern 
private relationships in line with the EU’s mandates.  
 “Approximation legislation” - Goal oriented (purposive) competence? 
The amplitude of the Internal Market legal basis has been already “legitimized” by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the Tobacco saga.37 In the telecoms sector, the use of the 
Internal Market’s harmonization competence and the subsidiarity principle was addressed in the 
Vodafone Case.38 The Court has also upheld the suitability of Article 114 TFEU to enact provisions 
aimed at improving the conditions for the establishment  and functioning of the Internal Market and 
the creation of EU Bodies and the regulation of their competences (ENISA39 and ESMA40 cases). 
                                                          
36 See Rott, P. (2005), "A New Social Contract Law for Public services?–Consequences from Regulation of Services of 
General Economic Interest in the EC", European Review of Contract Law, 3, pp. 323–345.. 
37 Case C-376/98 Germany v. Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419; Case C- 66/04 United Kingdom v. Parliament 
and Council [2005] ECR I-10553; Case C-380/03 Germany v. Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-11573; Case C-
301/06, Ireland v. European Parliament, Council [2009] ECR I-00593.  
38Case C-58/08, The Queen, on the application of Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform [2010] ECR I-04999. See below, section 5.2.  
39 Case C‑ 217/04 United Kingdom v Parliament and Council  (ENISA) [2006] ECR I‑ 3771.  
40Case C-270/12, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union. Not yet reported.  
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The Internal Market harmonization thereby becomes a powerful tool for the design of the 
regulatory regime of the telecommunications market in a process of market confidence building.41  
In order to fulfill the policy expectations for the Internal Market’s in the telecoms field –the 
creation of a European Market for telecommunications–, this sort of approximation legislation has 
contributed to the development of sector-specific supervisory mechanisms via the shaping of an 
institutional architecture whose machinery is intended to harmonize the different national markets 
and, eventually, the creation of a Single Digital Market (i.e. integration). Under this harmonizing 
approach, every measure aimed at achieving the harmonization aim is caught under the 
approximation legislation umbrella; not only Directives and Regulations, but also EU 
Recommendations, Decisions and every sort of guidance document or procedure will fall within 
this category.  
Against this background, another matter of competence is the issue represented by the 
delegation of substantive competence to “specialized institutions”.42 The establishment of National 
Regulatory Authorities in the telecoms sector to monitor the liberalization of the 
telecommunications markets is a clear example of the partial integration or integration by sectors 
that Pescatore speaks of.43 But in order to get a clear understanding about this, it is necessary to 
look at the functional competence of such institutions as well as the interplay between the EU, the 
Member States and the established administrative structures. This might be the result of the nature 
of the prerogatives reserved to the European Commission with regard to control mechanisms which 
grant it certain powers aimed at the adjustment of national measures; e.g. via Consultation 
procedures.44 The rationale of such procedures responds to the political and legal imperatives set 
out at EU level.45  
3. Law (and decision)-making procedure and methods 
The law-making procedure is a decisive factor in the content and quality of the legal provisions to 
be produced.46 A potential transformation of private law, therefore calls for the examination of the 
institutional choice and design, particularly where the process of rulemaking is understood “as a 
dynamic process, in which rules are not simply the result of a single legislative procedure but the 
outcome of continuing interaction between legal, political, and economic institutions”.47 This is 
particularly the case in the making of European Private Law. 
 
                                                          
41 Weatherill, S. (2006). ‘European Private Law and the Constitutional Dimension’ in Cafaggi, F. The Institutional 
Framework of Private Law, Oxford University Press.  
42Pescatore, P. (1974), The Law of Integration. Emergence of a new phenomenon in international relations, based on the 
experience of the European Communities, p. 27. 
43Ibid. 
44Article 7 and 7a of the Framework Directive. In this regard, see also Curtin (2009), Executive Power of the European 
Union. Law, Practices and the Living Constitution, Oxford University Press.  
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Law-making is generally characterized by several features, inter alia, the aim pursued by 
the legislator, the administrative structure of the entity who is competent to create and enforce the 
law, the way in which the law-making process is carried out, the instruments employed, and the 
competence upon which the regulation is based. It is thus appropriate not only to address the 
procedural design at the level of law-making but also the implications related to the transposition of 
telecommunications regulation. Such analysis provides the foundation for understanding the 
transformation in the substance of private law. Accordingly, this section, without deepening into 
the EU governance debate, briefly sketches the procedural arrangements that are part of the legal 
framework in which the telecommunications sector unfolds. 
Multilevel Governance & National procedural autonomy 
The liberalization of the telecommunications via EU’s imperatives has impacted the economic and 
legal framework of the industry. In economic terms, the liberalization of the sector has implied the 
end of the monopoly regime and the establishment of market competition.48 For the legal world, 
liberalization of formerly publicly provided utilities has meant the de-regulation of the sector. 
Within this de-regulatory process, governments have been searching for modes of regulatory 
control which are “less onerous, more flexible and draw on the knowledge and experience of 
service providers”.49 In fact, in the law-making process relating to private law the European Union 
is making use of new regulatory devices as opposed to the traditional ones, e.g. legislative power in 
the hands of the Parliament. This new approach includes innovative instruments and procedures, 
such as co-regulation, co-operation or comitology.50 Co-regulation involves the combination of EU 
mandatory legislation and non-binding rules arising from private parties and organizations, such as 
codes of conduct or operating standards. 51 In this regard, Article 33(2) of the Universal Service 
Directive establishes that “[w]here appropriate, interested parties may develop, with the guidance 
of national regulatory authorities, mechanisms, involving consumers, user groups and service 
providers, to improve the general quality of service provision by, inter alia, developing and 
monitoring codes of conduct and operating standards”. Co-regulation is thereby characterized by a 
particular combination of State and non-State regulation. In the Commission’s view, co-regulation 
“combines binding legislative and regulatory action with measures taken by the actors most 
concerned”.52 As to telecommunications services, Recital 48 of the Universal Service Directive 
(2002) recognizes that co-regulation could be an “appropriate way of stimulating enhanced quality 
standards and improved service performance”. This has been regarded as part of the so-called new 
governance.53 Notwithstanding this, the approach chosen has been of a multi-level institutional 
                                                          
48  Commission Directive 96/191EC amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the implementation of full 
competition in telecommunications markets (1996 OJ L 74). See Taylor, S. M. (1994). Article 90 and 
Telecommunications Monopolies. European Competition Law Review, 15, pp. 322-322. 
49Ogus, A. (2009), ‘The regulation of services and the public-private divide’, in Cafaggi, F. and Muir Watt, H. (eds.) The 
Regulatory Function of European Private Law, Edward Elgar, pp. 3-15. 
50Micklitz, H.-W. (2008), “Regulatory Strategies on Services Contracts in EC Law”, EUI Working Paper Series LAW 
No. 2008/06. 
51Ibid. p.11. 
52White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001)428 final. 
53 Eberlein, B., and Kerwer, d. (2004). “New Governance in the European Union: A Theoretical Perspective”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 42(1) 121–142.  
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design where co-regulation is not actually widely used beyond the participation of stakeholders as 
interested parties. For telecoms regulation, regulatory powers are allocated at EU level leaving a 
certain degree of regulatory scope to the Member States via the national regulators.   
In the European telecommunications panorama, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) 
play a key role in the law-making process. Harmonization at European level requires detailed 
regulatory interventions and the national regulators are, among many other competences, 
responsible for the implementation of the principles contained within the harmonization measures. 
NRAs were introduced in the EU legislation with the full liberalization.54 But that time, legislation 
only required Member States to ensure the availability of an independent body to perform the 
allocation of frequencies and surveillance of usage conditions. 55  In order to carry out their 
obligations, they have been given broad regulatory powers and instruments to intervene in the 
market. However, NRAs shall be independent from market players and separate from the rest of the 
national administration.56  
As to private law concerns, NRAs can intervene, for instance, in the contractual 
relationships between undertakings for the use of the network (wholesale contracts) or in the 
provision of the service to end-users (retail market) in the telecommunications sector. Particularly 
at the wholesale level, the legislative framework gives way to decision-making on a case-by-case 
basis as opposed to general (ready-made) solutions, especially when it comes to the imposition of 
regulatory obligations.57 In short, under the current regulatory design NRAs may impose regulatory 
remedies in those cases where: i) there are high and non-transitory entry barriers; ii) there is a lack 
of effective completion; and iii) competition law alone is not enough to palliate such situation.58 
The national telecoms regulator may then choose from the provided menu of remedies the most 
suitable for the case at stake. The described system calls for the principle of national procedural 
autonomy. Yet, this scheme is monitored by the European Commission, which may review the 
imposition of those remedies by the NRA via a consultation procedure in the interest of a uniform 
application of the European Regulatory Framework.59 
Therefore, telecommunications regulation takes places as a two-level system; the EU-and 
the Member States. The hitherto three regulatory packages for electronic communications have 
mainly consisted in Directives, which means a certain degree of procedural autonomy for the 
Member States and the national regulators. However, European regulation has gradually intervened 
                                                          
54 Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services, OJ 
L 192, 24.07.1990, pp. 0-16.  
55 Directive 97/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending Council Directives 
90/387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the purpose of adaptation to a competitive environment in telecommunications , OJ L 
295 , 29.10.1997, pp. 23-34. However, they were not called National Regulatory Authorities as such; this name was 
allocated only later 
56 Framework Directive establishes in its Article 3(2) that “Member States shall guarantee the independence of national 
regulatory authorities by ensuring that they are legally distinct from and functionally independent of all organizations 
providing electronic communications networks, equipment or services. Member States that retain ownership or control of 
undertakings providing electronic communications networks and/or services shall ensure effective structural separation of 
the regulatory function from activities associated with ownership or control”.  
57 For an extensive analysis of the available regulatory obligations, see Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
58 This is the so-called Three-criteria test, further analysed in Chapter 4.  
59 Article 7a of the Framework Directive. For a deeper analysis see Section 4.2 of this Chapter.  
 
  63 
in national market regulation, curtailing the leeway of the national regulator. The deviation from 
the European legal framework is somehow corrected. Hence, supervisory and monitoring 
mechanisms by the European Commission can strongly influence the discretion of the national 
regulator.60 Under this configuration, the principle of national procedural autonomy plays little (if 
any) role given that the Commission enjoys significant influence in the national decision-making 
process and therefore the autonomy principle “can no longer be automatically assumed”.61 This 
small shift of hierarchy has already been endorsed by the CJEU by claiming that even though 
NRAs are independent from state control, they are still subordinated to the policy objectives of the 
EU regulatory framework.62 
In addition to this, the co-operation between NRAs is emphasized in the regulatory 
framework in order to achieve a genuine and consistent market for telecommunication in Europe.63 
At the top of the NRA network is BEREC. 
Comitology is also part of the telecommunications regulatory framework. The 
Communications Committee (Cocom), established under the Framework Directive64, replaced the 
Advisory Committee on the implementation of Open Telecommunications Network Provision 
(ONP) and the Licensing Committee which were set up under the 1998 regulatory package for 
telecommunications. The Cocom assists the Commission in carrying out its executive powers under 
the regulatory framework. It exercises its functions through 'advisory', and 'regulatory with 
scrutiny' procedures in accordance with the Comitology Regulation.65 
In the configuration process of a genuine Internal Market of telecommunications, the 
establishment of common standards is also decisive. Standards play an important role in the 
telecommunications industry. They are important to ensure the harmonized provision of electronic 
communication services. According to the Framework Directive66, Article 17(2) establishes that 
Member States shall encourage the use of standards for the provision of services, technical 
interfaces and/or network functions, to the extent strictly necessary to ensure interoperability of 
services and to improve freedom of choice for users. Standardization serves as a basis for 
encouraging the harmonized provision of electronic communications networks, electronic 
communications services and associated facilities and services.67 As a result, an integral part of the 
EU policy is to achieve the Lisbon goals through better regulation and the simplification of the 
legislation. In this regard, the Framework Directive establishes that Member States shall encourage 
                                                          
60  Kerber, W., and Wendel, J. (2014), “Regulation of network sectors in the EU: A federalist perspective”, Joint 
Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg. No. 22-2014. 
61 Lavrijssen, S. A. C. M., and Ottow, A, (2012), “Independent Supervisory Authorities: A Fragile Concept”, Legal Issues 
of Economic Integration, 39,  p. 419. 
62 Case C-424/07 European Commission v Germany  [2009] ECR I-11431. Paras. 89ff.  
63 Recitals 36 and 37 and Article 3(4) Framework Directive.  
64Article 22. 
65 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the 
rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of 
implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.02.2011, pp. 13-18).  
66 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a Common Regulatory 
Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services (Framework Directive) as amended by Directive 
2009/140/EC and Regulation 544/2009. 
67Article 17 Framework Directive. 
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the implementation of standards and/or specifications adopted by the European Standards 
Organizations.68 These European Standards Organizations are listed in the Framework Directive: 
European Committee for Standardization (CEN), European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization (CENELEC), and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). 
The Commission encouraged the establishment of ETSI in 198869  and the Institute has since 
contributed to EU law by producing many harmonized standards to be used in the enforcement of 
European Directives. For example, ETSI developed the GSMTM standard, which reached 2.5 billion 
mobile connections.70 
It is not only the aforementioned actors that are taking part of the law-making process; the 
broader landscape includes also trade and consumer associations that are engaged in legislative 
development. For example, Article 33 of the Universal Service Directive71 sets out that NRAs are 
required to take into account the views of end-users, consumers and telecommunications service 
providers. To this end, Member States are responsible for ensuring that NRAs establish a proper 
consultation mechanism to guarantee that the interests of these stakeholders are properly taken into 
account. 
4. Institutional design & institutional analysis 
The institutional design in the electronic communications sector includes the involvement of 
different –mainly sector-specific‒ actors at both the European and the national level. Their 
interaction epitomizes the highly debated issue of network governance. 72  Electronic 
Communications in Europe are regulated under a de-centralized model. Under this regime, 
National Regulatory Authorities are in charge of monitoring national telecommunications markets, 
73  underpinned by a European system of supervision of the implementation of the European 
regulatory framework. Accordingly, and mostly drawing on the empirical analysis conducted, this 
part tries to deeply scrutinize the actual competences of these actors in the telecommunications 
field and, more importantly, their operating relationships. 
 
 
                                                          
68Article 17 Framework Directive. 
69Council Resolution of 28 April 1989 on standardization in the field of information technology and telecommunications 
(OJ C 117/1, 11.05.1989). For a more detailed analysis see Walden, I. (2009). European Union Communications Law.in 
I. Walden (Ed.), Telecommunications Law and Regulation. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 167-209. 
70More info available at http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/AboutETSI/GlobalRole/Ourglobalrole.aspx. 
71 As amended by the 2009 Package. 
72 For network governance in Electronic Communications see De Visser, M. (2009). Network-based governance in EC 
law: the example of EC competition and EC communications law, Hart Publishing.  
73  Communication from the Commission of November 10, 1999, "Fifth Report on the Implementation of the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Package", COM(1999) 537, 9. See Geradin, D. (2000), “Institutional aspects of EU 
regulatory reforms in the telecommunications sector: an analysis of the role of national regulatory authorities” Journal of 
Network Industries., 1, p. 5 and Garzaniti, L. and O’Regan, M. (Eds.) (2010), Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the 
Internet. EU Competition Law & Regulation (3rd ed.), Sweet & Maxwell.  
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4.1 Network approach: Instruments and participants 
On the other hand, the European Commission drives coordination at EU level via the Article 7 and 
7a procedures74 and the enactment of recommendations or decisions for the harmonized application 
of the regulatory framework in view of fulfilling the regulatory objectives enshrined in Article 8 of 
the Framework Directive.75 By way of example, the European Commission has taken part in the 
law-making process by making extensive use of soft law measures, both formal 
Recommendations76 that have no binding legal force and informal guidelines and notices.77 These 
measures are aimed at enhancing harmonization within the Internal Market, providing a point of 
reference of good practices for national regulatory authorities.78   
In addition to the above, the regulatory design fostered the cooperation among the different 
European regulators in order to achieve a harmonized European market for telecommunications.79  
This cooperation has culminated in BEREC, which has replaced the former ERG. BEREC is made 
up of a Board composed of the heads of the 27 NRAs and is assisted by a permanent office 
(hereinafter, the Office). The Office is a Community Body managed by a Management Committee 
in which all NRAs and the Commission are represented. The Office is partially funded by the 
Community.80 It provides a forum of discussion between the Commission and the NRAs in order to 
foster the Internal Market for telecommunications services. Further, BEREC is the body 
responsible for ensuring a consistent application of the EU regulatory framework for electronic 
communications.81 BEREC is, therefore, intended to be a meeting point for the co-operation of 
regulators. It represents a further step concerning the former ERG towards a more formal 
organization endowed with the authority to issue opinions that NRAs are required to observe. Thus, 
for example, according to the Framework Directive (Article 3), Member States shall ensure that 
NRAs utmost account of opinions and common positions adopted by BEREC when adopting their 
own decisions for their national markets.82 
To this end, and also with the aim of avoiding potential conflicts of interests, the EU 
legislation required NRAs to be separated from the rest of the national administration (legislative 
and executive powers).83    
                                                          
74 Framework Directive.  
75 Article 19 Framework Directive.  
76 As for example the Commission Recommendation 2005/698/EC on accounting separation and cost accounting systems 
under the regulatory framework for electronic communications, OJ L 266, 11.10.2005. 
77For instance, Guidelines on the Application of EEC Competition Rules in the Telecommunications Sector (OJ C 233, 
06.09.1991). 
78 See Chapters 1 & 2 in Walden, I. (Ed.). (2012). Telecommunications law and regulation. Oxford University Press. 
79 Recitals 36 and 37 and Article 3(4) Framework Directive.  
80 See Article 11 BEREC Regulation. 
81 Article 1 BEREC Regulation. 
82Additionally, as is established in the BEREC Regulation, NRAs and the Commission shall take the utmost account of 
any opinion, recommendation, guidelines, advice or regulatory best practice adopted by BEREC. 
83 Thus, for example, the Framework Directive establishes in its Article 3(2) that “Member States shall guarantee the 
independence of national regulatory authorities by ensuring that they are legally distinct from and functionally 
independent of all organizations providing electronic communications networks, equipment or services. Member States 
that retain ownership or control of undertakings providing electronic communications networks and/or services shall 
ensure effective structural separation of the regulatory function from activities associated with ownership or control”.  
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National Regulatory Authorities 
NRAs were introduced in the EU legislation with the full liberalization,84 and they have been 
defined as the “body or bodies charged by a Member State with any of the regulatory tasks 
assigned by the specific Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework”.85 Their introduction 
has been the answer to (and the justification) to the institutional deficit of the Europeanization 
project.86 Thus, while regulation required the establishment of regulatory authorities, institutional 
aspects were mostly neglected. Most crucially, the legislation proved rather vague which regard to 
the essential legal requirements that such institutional shift would actually demand.87  Most of these 
regulatory authorities were established in the national systems in the late nineties. The existing 
disparities among the different institutional traditions of the Member States made difficult the 
adoption of a one-size-fits-all approach in Europe, as opposed to federal regimes like in the US, 
Australia or Canada, where regulatory tasks have been entrusted to a federal telecommunications 
regulator. This has implied a decentralization of the implementation and enforcement of the EU 
regulatory framework. This decentralized approach has contributed to a greater manifestation of the 
principle of subsidiarity.  
The process of liberalization has implied that regulated sectors now embrace contractual 
relationships and, consequently, it is not surprising that the significant role of NRAs had also meant 
its involvement within the private law realm. Thus, in order to carry out their obligations, they have 
been given broad regulatory powers and instruments to intervene in the area of private law. For 
instance, in the contractual relationships between undertakings for the use of the network 
(wholesale contracts) or in the provision of the service to end-users (retail).  
What functions do NRAs perform? 
NRAs’ responsibilities are mainly to apply the regulatory rules to individual cases, as an 
intermediary step between legislation and regulatory decisions. However, their intervention has an 
impact beyond the individual case. The execution of such responsibilities must be aimed at 
achieving the policy goals for telecommunications. In line with the regulatory principles of the 
European telecommunications legal framework, the role of NRAs is to ensure that regulation is 
effectively implemented. Yet regulation is not only about competition, but also about the 
development of the Internal Market and the protection of EU citizens. More specifically, Article 
8(2), (3) and (4) of the Framework Directive requires National Regulatory Authorities: 
i. To promote competition in the provision of electronic communications networks and 
services by (inter alia): ensuring users, including disabled users, derive maximum benefit 
                                                          
84 Article 7,Dir 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services, OJ L 192 , 
24.07.1990, pp. 0010 – 0016.  
85 Article 2(g) Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a Common 
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services (Framework Directive), OJ L 108, 
24.4.2002, pp. 33-50.  
86 Majone, G. (2000). The credibility crisis of Community regulation. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(2), 
273-302. 
87 Prosser, T. (1997). Law and the Regulators. Oxford University Press. 
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in terms of choice, price, and quality; guaranteeing that there is no distortion or restriction 
of competition in the electronic communications sector; encouraging efficient investment 
in infrastructure and promoting innovation; and, finally, encouraging the efficient use and 
ensuring the effective management of radio frequencies; 
ii. To contribute to the development of the Internal Market by (inter alia): removing obstacles 
to the provision of electronic communications networks and services at a European level 
and encouraging the interoperability of pan-European services; ensuring that there is no 
discrimination among undertakings’ treatment in the provision of networks and services; 
and finally, cooperating among them and with the Commission; 
iii. To promote the interest of EU citizens by (inter alia): ensuring access to universal services; 
ensuring a high-level of protection of consumers when it comes to the supplier-consumer 
relationship; contributing to ensuring a high level of protection of personal data and 
privacy; promoting the provision of clear information, in particular requiring transparency 
of tariffs and conditions for using publicly available electronic communications services; 
addressing the needs of specific social groups, in particular disabled users; and ensuring 
that the integrity and security of public communications networks are maintained. 
a. Contribution to the development of the Internal Market  
In order achieve the proper application of the Regulatory Framework, a requirement of co-
operation and co-ordination among the different NRAs was put in place. Thus, pursuant to Article 
7(2) Framework Directive, NRAs have to cooperate between one another and with the Commission 
in order to guarantee the consistent application of the Regulatory Framework (e.g. BEREC).88 
b. Facilitating competition (B2B dimension) 
By liberalizing the sector, the European Union seems to rely on a market-based approach. 
However, the market alone is not enough to manage the transition process to competition and, as a 
result specific (ex-ante) regulation was considered necessary. Thus, unlike the competition rules, 
the establishment of a sector-specific regime allows the implementation of certain policy goals 
such as “effective competition”.89 
Artificial barriers, market failures and the persistence of bottlenecks are problems that need 
to be tackled by NRAs. As mentioned previously, to put an end to markets that are not effectively 
competitive, NRAs shall conduct market analyses to detect if specific markets are not competitive 
and, if any fall into this category, shall impose regulatory remedies on the operator that has 
Significant Market Power (SMP). 
                                                          
88 The mechanisms for a consistent application of the EU Regulatory Framework are the subject of further analysis 
below.  
89 De Streel, A (2010). ‘Interaction between the Competition Rules and Sector-Specific Regulation’, in L. Garzaniti & M. 
O’Regan (Eds.), Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Internet. EU Competition Law & Regulation (3rd ed.), 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 3-262, (see in particular p. 867).  
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In the business-to-business dimension, NRAs are also responsible for the resolution of 
disputes between undertakings.90 The legislator has opted for out-of-court dispute settlement given 
that it is an extra-judicial mechanism. 91  This resolution of disputes between undertakings is 
considered to be an “additional form of regulatory intervention”.92 
c. Consumers (and citizens) protection (B2C dimension) 
The promotion of the interests of the EU citizens (access to universal services, consumer 
protection, privacy, etc.) cannot be achieved by competition tools alone; there are also social (non-
economic) policy objectives that pursue the public interest. Accordingly, they stand out from the 
competition approach, since these goals are not competitive in essence. In any case, when it comes 
to consumer issues, NRAs are also empowered to intervene in the retail market (imposing quality 
requirement if appropriate, etc.) and ensure the implementation of the EU rules, for instance: 
pursuant the mandate of Article 8(4) b, NRAs shall ensure “a high level of protection for 
consumers in their dealings with suppliers, in particular by ensuring the availability of simple and 
inexpensive dispute resolution procedures carried out by a body that is independent of the parties 
involved”. 
National Regulatory Authorities: A reconstructed concept 
NRAs are formally defined as the bodies charged with the performance of regulatory functions in 
the telecommunications sector. In practice, they are public agencies functioning at a detached level 
from the Government. The main feature of NRAs’ performance is its independence and the two 
lasts generations of European rules have introduced a set of measures reinforcing the independence 
of NRAs. 93  National regulators must be legally, functionally, institutionally and structurally 
independent from operators and service providers. Given that especially at the beginning of 
liberalization some Member States still maintained ownership of their formerly public 
undertakings, such Member States must ensure the institutional and structural separation from the 
rest of the administration.94 As a component of their required market impartiality, NRAs should 
have adequate resources –financial and human– to carry out the tasks assigned; i.e. sufficient 
independent and administrative capacity. 95  The safeguards of the de jure impartiality of the 
                                                          
90 Framework Directive, Articles 20 and 21.  
91 See Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
92 Walden, I. (2012). Telecommunications Law and Regulation: An Introduction. in I. Walden (Ed.), Telecommunications 
Law and Regulation. (Fourth Edition) New York: Oxford University Press, p. 17 citing the UK Competition Appeal 
Tribunal in the case T-Mobile, BT, H3G, C&W, Vodafone & Orange v Ofcom [2008] CAT 12, at paras. 89 and 94. 
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  69 
regulator also require de facto independence. Yet, complete isolation is not a guarantee of 
independence: Communication with the government is needed.96 
Notwithstanding this, the independence of NRAs is being questioned by several factors. 
First, the operators fund NRAs, for the most part. This is very important provided that it is the way 
NRAs claim to safeguard their independence.97 Secondly, the appointment of their Management 
Boards, whatever form they takes (e.g. Commission, Board of Directors, etc.), generally rests in the 
hands of the competent Ministry. This necessarily implies that the Government enjoys a certain 
degree of power within the regulator. Third, there are currently merger processes taking place, 
whereby some NRAs merge into one single mega-regulator at national level. This has been the 
case of the Netherlands or Spain, amongst others.98 Mega-institutional merger projects are the 
result of the merging of the telecommunications, energy and competition national authorities into a 
single supervisory body. These institutional mergers, which result from political choices, have also 
cast doubts on the independence of the regulator.99 On this last point, according to the personal 
view of one member of BEREC, authorities’ mergers may jeopardise the independence of the 
authority.100 He considers that the merging process may be very attractive from a theoretical point 
of view, but it is a project very difficult to implement because of the degree of expertise that 
regulated sectors require.101 To this agent, the merging of several NRAs into a single body “is not a 
valid option”. He claims:  
“it theoretically enhances more cost-efficiency but on the other hand every regulatory needs it specific 
expertise. So, merging everything together is not a valid option because, first of all, you cannot find a 
valid board to manage this authority because it needs experts for everything. So, it is a pharaonic position. 
But that is my personal opinion”.102  
Technicality and expertise are again at the heart of the telecommunications sector whose identity is 
often justified on the basis of its level of complexity. It is also clear that they (i.e. people who 
belong to the telecommunications sector) do not feel comfortable having outsiders sneaking into 
                                                          
96 “You cannot simply say: ‘Sorry, I cannot talk to you cause I am independent’”. Former Chairman of a European NRA.  
97Interview with a BEREC High representative. Brussels, 14.03.2013: “If we are financed by the market, then, we should 
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101 In this regard, the BEREC has issue a statement on the independence of NRAs where it states that it is “with great 
disquiet that BEREC notes the emergence in some Member States of initiatives which would have the effect of 
transferring responsibility for some regulatory tasks away from NRAs to become direct Government functions. This 
worrying trend, in contrast to both the letter and the spirit of the sector Directives, puts at risk the results achieved by 
independent regulators under the current institutional framework in relation to the promotion of competition and 
consumer protection in the electronic communications markets”.  
102Interview with a BEREC High Representative, 14.03.2013. 
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their party.103 As a way of example, BEREC Chair is convinced that “the Spanish project pertained 
to take away the responsibilities of the regulators and to give it to the Ministry”.104 BEREC is 
willing to take actions in this regard “by trying to convince the Governments that if they plan to 
merge regulators or take away responsibilities, this is not the right move, and by using also the 
colleagues from the Commission by doing that there is the possibility of infringements of EU 
law”.105 Again, this is a very strong statement which might suggest that they will take measures (as 
a threat to the national executives) against Government plans in order to preserve their 
independence.  
In the same vein, the European Commission is very concerned to any attempt to impede the 
independence of NRAs because “that is at the very heart of the EU regulatory approach”.106 In 
addition, the Commission believes that the system works because there are independent authorities 
that carry out independent market analyses and it is the major pillar for the success of the 
Regulatory Framework in the EU.107 As a result, the Commission is “actively concerned” about any 
form of limiting the independence of NRAs.108  In this regard, the Commission considers that 
independence is affected as a result of the economic crisis as long as Member States are 
restructuring the Administration for budgetary reasons. In the Commission’s view, Member States 
are sophisticated in developing new structures that would limit the independence of NRAs. In these 
cases, it is more difficult for the Commission to find out whether it actually impedes NRAs to carry 
out their tasks under the Regulatory Framework.109 
Forth, and together with the above, in their relationship with the Government, the high 
degree of technicality of the sector leads to a situation in which NRA’s officials are regularly asked 
to provide advice for the Government.110 It also has implications for the independence of the 
regulator.111 In this regard, it is noteworthy (or, at least, irritating) that a Principal Consultant in an 
NRA openly admits that he can advise something to the regulator that he is working for, whereas, 
at the same time, he admits to advising something completely different to the Government on the 
same issue.112 It also happens that there are informal contacts between the Governments and the 
regulators. And, more importantly, when developing advisory functions or representing the State in 
                                                          
103Interview with a BEREC High Representative. Brussels, 14.03.2013: “Our position, overall, is that the regulators 
giving less to the responsibility of the Government is very positive for the State to have independent regulators to oversee 
the proper function of the market, rather than try to merger with others and invalidate the regulator. That is the point”. 
104Interview with a BEREC High Representative. Brussels, 14.03.2013. 
105Ibid.  




110“This is a common practice all over Europe”. Interview with a BEREC High Representative. Brussels, 14.03.2013. 
111Interview with a BEREC High Representative. Brussels, 14.03.2013: “Every action that is removing either personnel 
or funds or administrative measures and the possibility for the NRAs to do their work affects our independence and 
administrative capacity”.   
112 Interview with the Principal Consultant at ANACOM, Portuguese NRA and former Chair of the End-Users Working 
Group at BEREC, 18.10.2012, Florence: “For instance […], from time to time I am required by the Foreign Office, for 
instance, to participate in meetings with other Governments. So, it is at the level of the EU, and there I have to tell them: 
well, if you are asking advice from me I will say, I will recommend this position to the Government, but if I am required 
to provide an advice to the regulators, for the purpose solely of regulatory functions, I could advice something completely 
differently”.  
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the international context, the distinction between the regulator and the Government might be not so 
obvious. In particular, when it comes to policy issues –i.e. those matters that are not purely 
regulatory–, there are some tensions, 113  and the authority is required to “cooperate more 
actively”.114 The fact that there are some tensions entails that it might not be a smooth relationship 
and, therefore, it can be seen as a sort of rivalry between the regulator and the Government. Any 
interference or instruction, either formal or informal, in the performance of the regulator may also 
be regarded as impairment to its independence. In addition to that, the Government is also 
responsible for the annual assessment of the regulator and it is on this assessment that the 
continuance of the authority is decided. This point highlights the delicacy of the subject insofar as 
the Government is not only able to exert some kind of power over the NRA, but also to decide on 
its survival. 
After the discussion about the independence of NRAs in the above paragraphs, one may 
wonder what independence actually means. Roughly speaking, being independent usually implies 
freedom that comes as a result of not being accountable to anybody. However, independence also 
has its limits. For instance, in case of infringement proceedings, Member States are required to 
instruct the national regulator, if appropriate.115 This can be regarded as a limit to independence as 
long as Member States are mandated to guide NRAs on the EU direction.116  According to a 
representative of the Commission: “Independence must have its limits! It is the only way that the 
Commission can control the NRAs because the NRAs cannot act independently of all national legal 
considerations or EU law considerations. There must be a limit to that”.117  
The present chapter seeks to highlight the relevance of the role of NRAs vis-á-vis the role 
of the legislator in the traditional sense, i.e. the parliament. The issue at stake here concerns the 
possibility of entrusting NRAs’ responsibilities to the national legislator. Before the 2009 review of 
the European regulatory package, there was no specific legal provision limiting such allocation. 
The ambiguity of the legislation led to conflicting case law on the matter. The European court 
maintained divergent positions concerning the institutional autonomy of the Member States 
concerning the distribution of the regulator’s responsibilities. Thus, whereas in the Spanish118 and 
Belgian119 cases, the court allowed the plurality of authorities and the distribution of regulatory 
powers between the regulator, the parliament and the concerned Ministry, in the case of Germany, 
                                                          
113 Interview with the Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012: “Within BEREC itself, the body […], the board 
is a collection of NRAs which are all independent. So, they don’t want to have Ministries on the table. So, there are some 
tensions there, that’s true”.  
114 Interview with a Principal Consultant at ANACOM, Portuguese NRA and former Chair of the End-Users Working 
Group at BEREC, 18.10.2012, Florence: “So, we do not receive directions when we are simply exerting core regulatory 
functions, but we can be asked to cooperate more actively with regard to public policies”.   
115 Head of Unit - DG CONNECT - European Commission), Speech at the Florence School of Regulation, October 2012. 
116 Ibid.  
117Ibid. Speech at the Florence School of Regulation, October 2012. 
118 Case C-821/07, Comisión del Mercado de Las Telecomunicaciones v Administración del Estado [2008] ECR I-1265.  
119 Case C-389/08, Base NV and others v Ministerraad [2010] ECR I-09073. Para. 106: “[…] it has already been held that 
the principle of non-regulation of new markets provided for in Paragraph 9a(1) of the TKG limits the discretion of the 
NRA under Articles 15(3) and 16 of the Framework Directive. The limitation of the NRA’s discretion to submit ‘new 
markets’ to a definition and to a market analysis necessarily involves a failure to comply in certain circumstances with 
the procedures provided for in Articles 6 and 7 of the Framework Directive”.  
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it decided that the national legislator cannot limit the regulator’s autonomy granted by the 
European regulatory framework.120 
This interplay between the national legislature and NRAs also gave rise to the question as 
to which of them is assigned the balancing of the different objectives of the Community regulatory 
framework. In this regard, the CJEU121 –following the opinion of Advocate General Maduro122– 
has submitted that it is clear from the provisions contained in Article 8(4) of the Access Directive, 
Article 17(2) of the Universal Service Directive and Article 8 of the Framework Directive that: 
“NRAs are required to promote the regulatory objectives referred to in Article 8 of the Framework Directive 
when carrying out the regulatory tasks specified in the common regulatory framework. Consequently, (…) it 
is also for the NRAs, and not the national legislatures, to balance those objectives when defining and 
analysing a relevant market which may be susceptible to regulation”.123  
To this end, the Court has also acknowledged that a national provision giving priority to one 
particular regulatory objective limits NRAs discretion in a manner incompatible with the EU 
Regulatory Framework.124 In addition, it can be draw that where the national legislation imposes 
more restrictive conditions than those provided for in the Framework Directive, it constitutes an 
infringement of the European framework and restricts NRAs sphere of action.125 
 On occasion of the 2009 review of the European telecoms regulatory framework, the 
European legislator opted to put an end to the ambiguity surrounding the allocation of regulatory 
functions. Recital 13 of the amendment Directive (Better Regulation Directive) states: 126 
“The independence of the national regulatory authorities should be strengthened in order to ensure a more 
effective application of the regulatory framework and to increase their authority and the predictability of their 
decisions. To this end, express provision should be made in national law to ensure that, in the exercise of its 
tasks, a national regulatory authority responsible for ex-ante market regulation or for resolution of disputes 
between undertakings is protected against external intervention or political pressure liable to jeopardise its 
independent assessment of matters coming before it. Such outside influence makes a national legislative body 
unsuited to act as a national regulatory authority under the regulatory framework (…)”.127 
In connection to the above, the European court has recently decided that, within the institutional 
frame of the telecommunications sector, public entities that are not the sector-specific regulator 
cannot perform regulatory tasks assigned to the NRA. Such cases particularly concern the 
                                                          
120 Case C-424/07, European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany [2009] ECR I-11431.  
121 In the Case C-424/07, European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany, [2009] ECR I-11431 (See paragraphs 
90-92).  
122 Delivered on 23 April 2009 (See paragraphs 61-64). 
123 Ibid. Para. 63. Emphasis added.  
124 Ibid. Paras. 93 and 94.  
125 Paras. 90-100.  
126 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directives 
2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on 
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the 
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, pp. 37–69.  
127 Emphasis added.  
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imposition of retail tariffs for services falling within the scope of the regulatory framework for 
telecommunications.128 
 Therefore, it may be concluded that national legislators cannot interfere with regulatory 
functions. This limitation of the national autonomy of the State can be translated in an alteration of 
the traditional sources of private law from the parliament to sector-specific actors. Following the 
analysis of national institutional autonomy, this section moves now towards the role of the main 
supranational actors in the EU (BEREC and the European Commission) and how the European 
institutional design impacts on the national procedural autonomy principle and in the procedure of 
judicial review of regulatory decisions.129 
BEREC  
In between the EU and the national level, a network of national regulators appears as a platform for 
coordination and cooperation among the different NRAs to ensure that they act consistently with 
the European regime: the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications, BEREC. 
This body was created in 2009, as part of the third telecoms package.130  
The establishment of a European regulator for telecommunications was debated for several 
years. Its creation was proposed already in the nineties.131 The original proposal was rejected in the 
review that led to the second package.132 However, the Framework Directive imposed on NRAs the 
duty to cooperate in the interest of the Internal Market.133This cooperation started via informal 
meetings, namely through dinners and lunches among the regulators in Europe. It evolved towards 
think-tank groups, workshops, etc., held around particular issues such as local unbundling.134 The 
technical cooperation evolved and the creation of the Independent Regulators Group (IRG) became 
a reality in 1997. At that time, there were a number of working groups where regulators could 
discuss very freely and openly the technical problems that were affecting them. The IRG “followed 
a practical approach concerning how the different problems were affecting the national markets and 
what solutions, if any, were found somewhere else in Europe. It was, more or less, like a forum 
where to agree an informal common standing to prepare conversations with the EU 
                                                          
128 Case C-518/11, UPC Nederland BV v Gemeente Hilversum. Para. 55: “ […] the directives which make up the NRF 
must be interpreted as precluding, from the expiry of the deadline for their implementation, an entity such as that at issue 
in the main proceedings, which is not a NRA, from intervening directly in retail tariffs in respect of the supply of a basic 
cable package”. In the case concerned, the entity is the municipality of Hilversum (The Netherlands).  
129 On the latter, see Section 5.1 of this chapter. 
130 Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 establishing the 
Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office (Text with EEA relevance) . OJ L 
337, 18.12.2009, pp. 1–10.  
131  “Report on Europe and the Global Information Society: Recommendations of the High-level Group on the 
Information Society to the Corfu European Council”. Bulletin of the European Union, Supplement No. 2/94. [follow up 
to the White Paper] (so-called the “Bangemann Report”).  
132 The original proposal was rejected as it was considered that it would provide insufficient added value to justify the 
costs. See Towards a new framework for electronic communications infrastructure and associated services. The 1999 
Communications Review. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. COM (99) 539 final, 10.11.1999. In particular, pp. 9-10. 
133 Article 7(2) 2002 Framework Directive.  
134Interview with a Principal Consultant at ANACOM, Portuguese NRA, 18.10.2012, Florence. 
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Commission”.135 For instance, in situation where the European Commission was preparing draft 
legislation or communications concerning specific issues, the regulators convened and amongst 
themselves prepared joint positions.136 
The EU Commission showed some interest in the activities of the IRG and its agenda, and 
it proposed a first attempt for the creation of a European regulator. In the 1990s, the Commission 
tried repeatedly to establish a European body, but the Member States discarded such option.137 This 
project having failed, a compromise solution was sought. Then, the second best choice for the 
Commission was the creation of the ERG –established by the 2002 regulatory package-, a simply 
amalgam of NRAs which, unlike the IRG, included the participation of the EU Commission. In 
short, the ERG was basically the IRG plus the Commission138 which acted as chair under this 
configuration, but did not enjoy voting capacity. 139  The idea was to promote a collaborative 
approach among the NRAs and the Commission and the NRAs themselves based upon new or soft 
governance standards. This project was not as successful as expected and it again raised debate 
about the creation of a European regulatory authority with the 2006 regulatory review process. The 
establishment of the Electronic Communications Market Authority (EECMA) was proposed,140 
however this envisaged plan did not pass the cost-benefit analysis of the impact assessment by the 
Commission, and it also encountered some political problems. 141  Furthermore, the internal 
procedures and voting systems associated with the creation of a proper European Authority would 
have displaced the decision-making power from the Member States, via the NRAs, to the European 
level, amounting to a “significant European supranationalisation of regulatory decision making”.142 
The national governments, supported by the NRAs, objected to this institutional (and power) shift. 
Also the European Parliament and the European Council of Ministers contributed to divest such 
project as it implied putting against the wall the subsidiarity principle. Among the contentious 
issues, one of the most important was the designation of the body.143  
Finally, with the 2009 package, the ERG was formally replaced by BEREC. The BEREC is 
not a European agency, which means that it does not have the traditional characteristics of an EU 
agency. Instead, BEREC performs two roles. On the one hand, it is the Board of Regulators (BoR) 
consisting of the Heads of the 28 National Regulatory Authorities; on the other, it is the BEREC 
Office (“the Office”) which is a European entity based in Latvia (Riga). The BEREC Office is a 
Community Body managed by a Management Committee in which all NRAs and the European 
                                                          
135 Interview with Principal Consultant working in ANACOM for more than eighteen years holding different positions 
including participation as representative of Portugal, inter alia, in the Independent Regulators Group (IRG), the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Communications Committee (Cocom), the OCDE, and the BEREC, 
where he has served as Chair of the Expert Working Group “End-Users”.  
136Interview with a Principal Consultant at ANACOM, Portuguese NRA, 18.10.2012 Florence. 
137  Simpson, S., (2011), “ ‘New’ Governance in European Union Policy Making: Policy Innovation or Political 
Compromise in European Telecommunications?”, West European Politics, 34(5), pp. 1114-1133.  
138Interview with a Principal Consultant at ANACOM, Portuguese NRA, 18.10.2012 Florence. 
139 Ibid.  
140 Ibid.  
141 Ibid at 1121.  
142 Ibid at 1122.  
143 Discussions revolved around whether the new body should be call “Body of European Regulators in Telecom” 
(BERT) or, as considered by the Council, “Group of European Regulators in Telecoms" (GERT).  
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Commission are represented. The Office assists the Board of Regulators (BoR). Therefore, BEREC 
functions as a bicephalous body, the Board of Regulators and the Office. The Commission, the 
EFTA Surveillance Authority, the heads of the NRAs from the EFTA States and from the States 
that are candidates for accession to the EU, also participate in the work of BEREC at a high level. 
Officially, BEREC pursues the same objectives as the NRAs, as set out in Article 8 of the 
Framework Directive. 144 It is also intended to contribute to the achievement of fair competition by 
way of consistent regulation throughout the Internal Market for Telecommunications. To this end, 
BEREC provides advice to its members (i.e. NRAs), the European Commission, and assists the 
European Parliament and the European Council on issues related to the application of the EU 
Regulatory Framework. By and large, it tries to “achieve a harmonized application of the 
Framework”.145  
As described by a Head of Unit of the EU Commission, BEREC is an “advisory body 
consisting of regulators and giving guidance to the European Commission and other European 
institutions on important regulatory issues”.146 Nonetheless, its assigned role of contributing to the 
Internal Market is considered to be not fully achieved under its current structure.147 
BEREC’S Tasks 
The objectives and functions of BEREC are established in the BEREC Regulation,148 its ultimate 
goal being to stimulate the harmonized application of the EU Regulatory Framework. Another 
objective is to advice the European Commission on general matters of the development of the EU 
Regulatory Framework, and also in individual cases where the Commission is interfering with the 
national regulators, i.e. within Article 7 of the Framework Directive procedure.149 
Others main functions of BEREC involve: participating in consultations under a single 
market consultation procedure (Article 7 of the Framework Directive); giving opinions on cross-
border disputes; disseminating best practices; assisting NRAs; advising the Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council; assisting the institutions and the NRAs in their relations with 
third parties; delivering opinions on draft recommendations and/or guidelines on the form, content 
and level of detail to be given in notifications; consultation on draft recommendations on relevant 
product and service markets; delivering opinions on draft decisions on the identification of 
transnational markets; consultation on draft measures relating to effective access to the emergency 
call number 112 and the effective implementation of the 116 numbering range; delivering opinions 
on draft decisions and recommendations on harmonization; and delivering opinions aiming to 
                                                          
144Article 1(3) of the BEREC Regulation. 
145Interview with the Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. 
146 Interview with Head of Unit ‘Regulatory Coordination & Users’ - DG CONNECT, EU Commission, 14.03.2013, 
Brussels.  
147Interview with Head of Unit ‘Regulatory Coordination & Users’ - DG CONNECT, EU Commission, 14.03.2013, 
Brussels.: “[…]But it is a cooperation forum for regulators which has its role in contributing to the Internal Market but 
under the current structure, to my view, it does not fully meet this role”.   
148Articles 2 and 3of the BEREC Regulation.  
149Interview with the Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. 
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ensure the development of common rules and requirements for providers of cross-border business 
services.150 
As a result of both its position as the guardian of the EU Regulatory Framework and its 
composition as the meeting point of the different regulators, BEREC has to accommodate the needs 
of the 28 NRAs. This is due to the fact that, in the end, NRAs are the ones who have to implement 
the legislation and BEREC has to monitor the implementation through the process of Article 7 and 
Article 7a of the Framework Directive.151 
When it comes to its relationships with the NRAs and the national Governments, being 
essentially a collection of NRAs and taking into account that not all NRAs are vested with the same 
tasks and functions, it may so happen that the issues addressed by BEREC touch upon some 
matters for which some NRAs are not competent. The discussions in BEREC are, thus, broader 
than the specific functions performed by NRAs at the national level. For instance, OPTA (former 
Dutch NRA) is not empowered in the field of spectrum issues, although some discussions within 
the BEREC are about spectrum issues or net neutrality. These matters concern policy, however, the 
BEREC “does not want politicians sitting around the table”.152 It is in these (potentially political) 
cases where a national Ministry could express some concern for the matter and signal its desire to 
being involved in one way or another. Accordingly, the distinction between the regulator and the 
Government is “quite clear” at the national level; whereas, at the European level, “is not that clear-
cut”.153 
As for funding, the BEREC Office is financed by a subsidy from the European Union and 
by financial contributions from Member States or from their NRAs made on a voluntary basis.154 
This characteristic way of funding ‒i.e. partially funded by the EU‒ in conjunction with the fact 
that the BEREC is required to issue opinions to support the EU Commission’s position on the basis 
of Article 7 procedure or not, might jeopardize its impartiality in the individual cases considered. 155 
Functioning of BEREC 
BEREC has a Chair and four Vice-Chairs appointed by the Board of Regulators from its members 
for a term of one year.156 In order to ensure the continuity of BEREC’s work, the BEREC Rules of 
Procedures establish that the BEREC Chair must serve as Vice-Chair the year prior to her/his Chair 
mandate as well as the following year.  
                                                          
150Article 3 of the BEREC Regulation ; see also http://berec.europa.eu/eng/about_berec/tasks/. 
151Interview with a BEREC High Representative. Brussels, 14.03.2013. 
152 Interview with the Economic Expert from OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. The interviewee has participated as 
representative of OPTA within the BEREC Expert Working Groups for several years.  
153Interview with the Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. 
154Article 11 of the BEREC Regulation. 
155 Article 4(1) para. 3 BEREC Regulation: “The members of the Board of Regulators shall neither seek nor accept any 
instruction from any government, from the Commission, or from any other public or private entity”. 
156 Article 4(4) BEREC Regulation.  
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The work of BEREC is organized into different Expert Working Groups (“EWGs”) which 
provide support to BEREC’s work.157  These EWGs work on specific topics according to the 
BEREC Working Plan.158 The Working Plan is adopted by the Board of Regulators at a Plenary 
Meeting.159 The Plan usually follows a bottom-up approach because the process takes into account 
different opinions which are asked of the Working Groups’ Chairs, the NRAs, and the European 
Commission. As a result, the draft agenda evolves over the time. There is also a public consultation 
stage where different interest groups can submit their opinions and suggestions. After this public 
consultation, a finalized document is approved. 160  The issues to be dealt with in the Expert 
Working Groups can also arise on an ad-hoc basis in case BEREC has been requested for advice or 
opinions by the EU institutions.161 
An additional Working Group is the Contact Network, which assists the Board of 
Regulators. The Contact Network is composed of senior representatives of the NRAs participating 
in BEREC, and representatives of the EU Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority.162 
This specific Working Group is in charge of ensuring the coordination of the proposals to be 
considered by the Board of Regulators and the BEREC Office Management Committee.  
The Board of Regulators meets four times a year. These are the “Plenary Meetings”. The 
EU Commission must be invited to all plenary meetings of the Board of Regulators. 163 
Extraordinary Plenary Meetings may take place at the initiative of the BEREC Chair in 
consultation with the Administrative Manager, or by requirement of at least one third of the Board 
of Regulators’ members. 164 
Since the overall aim is to achieve a consistent and harmonized application of the 
Regulatory Framework, the regulators have to agree on a specific approach in order to achieve that 
aim. Accordingly, the different Expert Working Groups develop several projects in different topics 
(e.g. net neutrality, Next Generation Access, end-user issues, etc.). In practice, since it is complex 
for each NRA to participate in all the EWGs, there are smaller groups –where the real work takes 
place– which start working on a particular approach and develop draft proposals.165 This means that 
not all the 28 member representatives actively participate in all the EWGs. Rather, and mostly 
                                                          
157 Article 4(7) BEREC Regulation. 
158 Currently, there are 12 EWGs grouped by different topics: Benchmarking EWG; BEREC-RSPG Cooperation EWG; 
Convergence and Economic Analysis EWG; Framework Implementation EWG; End-User EWG; International Roaming 
EWG; Net Neutrality EWG; Next Generation Networks EWG; Remedies EWG; Regulatory Accounting EWG; 
Termination Rates EWG; Evaluation of BEREC and BEREC Office EWG.  
159Article 14 of the BEREC’s Rules of Procedures. 
160Interview with the Principal Consultant at ANACOM, Portuguese NRA and former Chair of the End-Users Working 
Group at BEREC, 18.10.2012, Florence. 
161Interview with the Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. 
162 The Contact Network is chaired by a representative of the Chair of the Board of Regulators. The 2013 BEREC 
Contact Network Chair is Dr. Minas Karatzoglou from the Hellenic Telecommunications and Post Commission (EETT). 
163Article 4(8) BEREC Regulation. 
164Article 4(2) of BEREC Rules of Procedures. 
165 The more active or passive involvement of the NRAs in the different EWGs does not correspond to the Member 
States’ size. Rather, following the BEREC Annual Working Plan, the NRAs individually decide where to play a more 
active role and vice versa depending on the subjects to be dealt with (Interview with Economic Expert at OPTA).  
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depending on the topic to be addressed, there are smaller groups which really take the lead.166 Once 
the draft is ready, it is consulted into wider groups. It goes to the Board of Regulators, which 
discusses and finally approves it with a consensus of the 28 members.167 Usually, before it is finally 
adopted, there is a public consultation phase.  
The output of the different EWGs may take different shapes, such as Common Positions,168 
Opinions,169 Guidelines,170 Reports,171 etc. These products ‒as one interviewee designates them‒ do 
not have a binding nature, but an advisory one.172  However, under the Article 7 Framework 
Directive procedure, market analysis decisions have to be notified to the European Commission 
and, in those cases where the Commission finds serious doubts concerning the decisions by the 
NRAs, BEREC is requested for advice. This formal advisory role performed by BEREC is carried 
out by a group of experts from the different NRAs, with the exception of the ones involved in the 
procedure. This procedure gives rise to a sort of peer-pressure or disciplining factors, in so far as 
the other NRAs are the ones which assess their fellow NRAs performances:  “your colleagues are 
reviewing what you are doing”.173 
With regard to the transparency of its activities, currently there is a more transparent 
approach for dealing with interest groups, as well as with regard to the issues that are included in 
the BEREC Agenda.174 As for the participation of the civil society in BEREC’s activities, more 
transparency has been provided. The different groups of interest are now informed about what it is 
discussed in the BEREC meetings as a result of the publication of its Agenda and the holding of 
Public Debriefings following the Plenary Meetings where the outcomes of those quarterly meetings 
are presented175 and also published on its website. However, in spite of this, there are still some 
                                                          
166 In this regard, it would have been very enlightening for this research to get access to one of the working sessions of 
the EWGs or to the Plenary Meetings. However, civil society is not allowed to attend those meetings. Apart from the 
BEREC’s members, only observers are allowed to attend Plenary Meetings. The observer status is only granted to the EU 
Commission, NRAs from the European Economic Area (EEA) States and from those States that are candidates for 
accession to the European Union, as well as other experts and observers that the BEREC may invite to attend the 
meetings (Article 4(2) and (3) BEREC Regulation). “BEREC’s Policy is, in general, very strict towards accepting 
external observers”, BEREC Contact Network responsible. Upon my requests to attend to any of the BEREC’s activities 
as observer, I was informed that due to confidentiality requirements associated with the documents discussed, all similar 
requests were rejected in the past. 
167 Whereas the different Expert Working Group reach consensus among their members, the Board of Regulators in the 
BEREC operates on the basis of a voting system. The voting system (Article 9 and 10 of the Rules of Procedures of the 
BEREC Board of Regulators) requires the approval by two-thirds majority of its members.  
168 For instance, the lasts Common Positions (CPs) on wholesale local access (WLA), wholesale broadband access 
(WBA) and wholesale leased lines (WLL) at the BEREC Plenary on 7 December 2012. 
169 As an example, the contentious BEREC Opinon on Commission draft Recommendation on non-discrimination and 
costing methodologies, BoR (13) 41.  
170BEREC Guidelines on the application of Article 3 of the Roaming Regulation -Wholesale Roaming Access, BoR (12) 
67. 
171As way of example, the BEREC Report on the Implementation of the NGA-Recommendation, BoR (11) 43. 
172Interview with the Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. 
173Interview with the Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. As a matter of fact, the BEREC agrees with the 
EU Commission in most of the cases so far: “it happens, in most of the cases so far, that the BEREC agrees with the 
problems that the Commission has with the notifications”.  
174Interview with the Principal Consultant at ANACOM, Portuguese NRA and former Chair of the End-Users Working 
Group at BEREC, 18.10.2012, Florence. 
175 I had the possibility to attend to the Public Debriefing of the BEREC 14th Plenary Meeting held in Brussels the 14th 
March 2013. The Public Debriefing consists of a first part where the BEREC’s Chair presents, very briefly, the main 
outcomes of the Plenary Meeting and a second half devoted to Questions & Answers where participants are allowed to 
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practices which distance civil society from BEREC activities176 and, as a result, the BEREC is 
considered to be hardly accessible for groups of interest. It is also regarded as a kind of secret club 
despite the formal procedures put in place.177 To put an end to such situation, and boosted by the 
number of requests by the interested parties on their willingness to join the BEREC in a permanent 
forum, the BEREC put in place a Contact Network. This platform is intended to be an on-going 
process where the results of every meeting will be evaluated in order to determine whether to take 
into account the concerns expressed by the stakeholders or not. 178  In addition to that, the 
stakeholders’ participation will be subject to the fulfillment of certain criteria. 179 The Contact 
Network tries to be a structured and organized channel of communication between the BEREC and 
the different groups of interests. The idea was to create a Committee of senior representatives 
whose mandate goes beyond the one-year Chairs’ mandate. This Committee is composed by 3 or 4 
Heads of the NRAs with the purpose of organizing the Stakeholders Dialogue.  
Finally, the European Commission carries out the monitoring of the organization180 and the 
European Parliament issues its opinion on the evaluation report prepared by the Commission.181  
European Commission 
In relation to telecommunication, within the Commission the Directorate General for 
Communications Networks, Content and Technology (also known as DG CONNECT) is 
responsible of electronic communications. This DG is in charge of managing the EU’s Digital 
Agenda. Within DG Connect there are, amongst others, three Units which deal with the European 
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications at Directorate B: Electronic 
Communications Networks & Services. More specifically, these are Unit B1 (Regulatory 
Coordination & Business), Unit B2 (Regulatory Coordination & Users), and Unit B3 (Regulatory 
Coordination & Markets).  
The EU Commission performs two main actions with regard to telecommunications. On 
the one hand, it monitors the implementation of the Regulatory Framework in the different Member 
States. Units B1, B2 and B3 are in charge of this surveillance. These Units look after the proper 
implementation of the legal framework into the national law “as it should be” and, also make sure 
that the rules are being implemented properly (i.e. in line with EU law).182 If this were not the case, 
the EU Commission would step in to the implementation process. It would then be at its discretion 
whether to pursue further actions. To this end, the European Commission carries out different 
                                                                                                                                                                                
raise questions, if needed. Remarkably, sitting in the Head table they were the 2013 BEREC Chair, the Contact Network 
Chair and the Head of the IRG Secretariat.  
176 During the Public Debriefing of the BEREC 14th Plenary Meeting held in Brussels the 14th March 2013, the major 
concern expressed by attendees during Q&A was the access of stakeholders to BEREC’s activities.  
177 Interview with a stakeholder (Belgian Company providing platform networks for telecommunications’ operators). 
Brussels, 14.03.2013. 
178 BEREC High Representative, following a question by a representative from the European Broadcasting Union within 
the Public Debriefing of the 14th Plenary Meeting held in Brussels the 14th March 2013.  
179 BEREC High Representative. This is the reply to one question concerning the process for the participation in the 
Dialogue. However, he did not specify what these requirements will be.  
180 See Article 25 of the BEREC Regulation.  
181 Ibid.  
182 Interview with Head of Unit ‘Regulatory Coordination’ - DG CONNECT, EU Commission, 14.03.2013, Brussels.  
 
  80 
follow-up actions aimed at eliminating possible deviations from the EU rules. Where the European 
Commission considers that Member States are not applying the EU Regulatory Framework, it may 
initiate infringement proceedings. However, this is a last resort remedy. First, the Commission tries 
to cooperate with Member States in a pro-active way; i.e. they try to resolve any issues and 
problems prior to any formal proceedings and, to achieve this, the EU Commission is in “regular 
contact” with Member States, Member States authorities, and with the stakeholders.183 NRAs are 
often engaged in a pre-notification stage with the EU Commission in order to see whether the 
proposed measures would cause problems with EU Law. In order to execute such a collaborative 
approach, the Commission has a Desk Office for each Member State consisting of officials who 
follow-up the national process.184 
Taking into account that the monitoring process is “very resource consuming”, the 
Commission identifies some priority areas and follows a horizontal approach looking at general 
issues country by country; e.g. the Commission decides to look at how independent NRAs are 
following the EU mandate in practice. 185  This ex-ante approach to the monitoring of the 
implementation of the EU rules makes it easier for the Commission to anticipate problems. As for 
the topics to be identified as priority areas, they “can be anything”.186  This is a very strong 
statement which implies that the European Commission enjoys definite leeway to scrutinize any 
area of the Regulatory Framework and the accomplishment of the required actions at the national 
level; i.e. the Commission enjoys police powers to monitor the implementation process.  
In addition, and linked to its monitoring role, the European Commission also reports on the 
regulatory and market developments in the context of the Digital Agenda Scoreboard on an annual 
basis.187 This coverage means an additional possibility for the Commission to recognize weaker 
points to be discuss also with the Member States’ authorities and the stakeholders, as well as giving 
it the chance to identify some regulatory issues which may, then, fit into the Commission’s policy 
development.188 
In addition, Unit B2 is in charge of policy developments in aspects related to end-users and 
the legal framework and these responsibilities “may entail a number of issues” in practice.189 
Currently, Unit B2 is working on Universal Service issues, with one of its focus areas being the 
elaboration of guidance on how the Universal service rules as laid down in the Universal Service 
Directive should be applied in the broadband context.190 This Unit also works on Net Neutrality, 
providing guidance in this area on issues such as transparency, switching, and traffic management. 
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Finally, Unit B2 is in charge of revising Roaming rules and following-up on the implementation of 
any changes.191 
A consistent application of the EU Regulatory Framework is the cornerstone of the 
European Commission’s work in the telecommunications sector. The Commission has different 
instruments to achieve that aim. The so-called Article 7 procedures enable the Commission to 
ensure a consistent application of the legal framework in the Member States. 192 Under the Article 
7a procedure, the Commission wanted to have veto powers, but it did not get them in the legislative 
process. However, the new package of EU rules has reinforced this procedure and now empowers 
the Commission to issue harmonization Recommendations in order to ensure a higher level of 
consistency between Member States in the application of the European legal framework.193 The 
Commission can issue such recommendations where it finds that NRAs’ performance may create a 
barrier for the internal market.194  In addition, the Commission is allowed to issue a Decision 
(although it has not yet done so) obliging regulatory authorities “to do something, not only 
[recommend] it”. 195  Although this power has not yet been used, through these Decisions the 
European Commission would not only be entitled to recommend, but also compel, regulatory 
authorities to take action in the issue concerned.196 It is intended as a process for double-checking 
at the EU level, however the wording of Article 7a introduces legal language that does need to be 
clarified by the courts over time.197 That might be the reason why the European Commission has 
not yet chosen to make use of this mechanism.  
As for the internal procedures and functioning within the European Commission, the 
different Units dealing with the Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications coordinate 
their efforts. This implies that they pursue their enforcement policy consistently in both units.198 In 
other words, that means that Unit B1 (dealing with business concerns) and Unit B2 (looking after 
consumer issues) should develop a common approach. The reason for that might be that, in the end, 
regulatory interventions in the B2B domain are ultimately aimed at achieving a genuine 
competitive market for electronic communications and this is a mediate goal to increase consumer 
welfare.  
As one might anticipate, the European Commission is much more interested in policy 
issues. Particularly, Heads of Unit are not fully aware of the actual problems that the 
telecommunications sector faces because the performance of such position does not involve any 
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knowledge of the market performance in practice. This observation might expose a flaw in the 
regulation-making system insofar as some measures are proposed from Brussels without 
considering their actual outcomes (e.g. the challenges of implementing the one-working-day 
portability). It is the understanding of the present author understand that desk offices do not work 
to overcome such deficiencies, but rather to control that the EU rules are being effectively 
implemented. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight, that this ex-post approach significantly 
contributes to policy development by enabling the identification of problems and their frequency. 
In the Commission’s view, “the market-based approach recognizes that is not the EU Commission 
who knows best what is happening in the markets of the Member States, it is the NRAs because 
they are on the spot, they carry out the market analyses, they know the companies, whereas if the 
EU Commission would do market analyses consistency could be easily achieved”.199 
Finally, it must be said that the goal of creating a true Internal Market for 
Telecommunication has not yet been fully achieved and there are still very fragmented markets. 
There might be several reasons leading to this situation, and “maybe […] the way we regulate 
telecoms markets on a national basis […] is one important impediment to the Internal Market and 
probably in the future we have to look again and how these obstacles can be removed”.200 This can 
be translated as the European Commission seeking greater powers to properly implement the EU 
aspirations and to achieve a real Internal Market for Telecommunications. 201  Notably, the 
Commission is not afraid to say so: “We also try as the Commission to gain more powers because 
there must be an additional possibility to work toward consistent regulatory approaches in 
Europe”.202 With the 2009 review of the Regulatory Framework effective as of May 2011, the 
European Commission has acquired extended investigation and suspension powers on regulatory 
remedies (e.g. harmonization Recommendations).  
In its relationship with other DGs within the Commission, DG Connect is in constant 
dialogue with DG Justice and DG Sanco, especially in working areas where there are common 
interfaces (e.g. consumer issues).203 By way of example, DG Sanco is currently working on the 
European Consumer Agenda and there are some actions that are envisaged to enhance the 
transparency of electronic communications services. In this regard, overlapping is not regarded as a 
concern given that sector-specific legislation, i.e. the regulatory framework for telecoms, 
prevails.204 
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Relationship between the BEREC and the EU Commission & “Utmost Account” 
As has been mentioned, the European Commission has become interested in the collaborative 
activities amongst the different NRAs. Since the European coordination activities were commenced 
by NRAs, the Commission has sought to take a more active role in the IRG activities and to control 
its agenda for regulatory issues. This resulted in the EU Commission gaining a seat in BEREC.205 
However, it only enjoys observer status, and therefore does not have a vote in the Plenary Meetings 
of the Board of Regulators.206 In addition, the European Commission participates in the BEREC’s 
Expert Working Groups. By so doing, the Commission learns, firsthand, about the positions of 
BEREC and the NRAs where particular issues are concerned. It also provides the Commission with 
the possibility to express its views and positions already at an early stage of BEREC’s work.207 The 
role of the European Commission within the different Expert Working Groups is a reflection of its 
position within the Board of Regulators; i.e. the European Commission is an observer enjoying full 
participation, but it does not have vote.208 Nevertheless, the European Commission is a full member 
of the BEREC Management Committee and the management of the BEREC Office where it has 
vote.209 
To put it clearly, the active participation of the European Commission in BEREC’s 
activities depends on the nature of the issues to be deal with. Thus, the Commission enjoys full 
participation rights and has a say in administrative issues. However, when it comes to regulatory 
affairs, the Commission is sitting in the corner. From that position it is allowed to witness the 
decision-making process, but not take part in it. Whereas the Commission claims that this position 
is useful for learning about the positions of the NRAs and BEREC at the early stage of the 
regulatory process, this ubiquitous presence seems to suggest that it might also be used to exhibit 
its authority.  
The relationship between the BEREC and the European Commission is “formally 
articulated though the participation and the constant interaction by the Commission sending to the 
BEREC legislative documents, mostly soft law instruments like Communications, 
Recommendations, etc.”.210  This reference to “constant interaction” seems to suggest that the 
European Commission is regularly guiding the work of BEREC by delivering documents and 
resorting to soft law mechanisms. By so doing, the Commission tries to put in place a certain 
modus operandi for BEREC to act in accordance with its aspirations. This unidirectional 
relationship is counterbalanced by an unclear formulation: utmost account.  
According to Article 3(3) of the BEREC Regulation, the European Commission shall take 
the utmost account of any opinion, recommendation, guidelines, advice or regulatory best practice 
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adopted by BEREC. But what does utmost account mean? According to a BEREC’s representative 
it means that “the European Commission has to be in the position to integrate the BEREC’s 
opinions in their Recommendations”.211 There is not legal or formal obligation on the Commission 
to take into account all of BEREC’s positions; i.e. the Commission is not bound by BEREC. 
Furthermore, the BEREC understands that the Commission, as a policy-making body, has to push 
forward some measures. It is a “dynamic approach that heavily relies on BEREC to produce high-
quality work and expertise that the Commission has to take it into consideration”.212 Consequently, 
the European Commission has to take into account BEREC’s opinions, mostly because it provides 
the expertise as in the case of the NRAs for the national Governments. In practice, BEREC’s 
positions on a particular issue, as an advisory body, may have an impact into the proposals or drafts 
prepared by the Commission. Then, the Commission assesses the potential impact and comes to the 
conclusion whether to take into account BEREC’s opinions or not. The Commission can disagree 
and not modify the proposals, and “this is still taking utmost account”.213 However, in those cases, 
the Commission will have to justify and explain its decision, because taking utmost account implies 
that the Commission cannot freely deviate of the BEREC’s opinions and that it needs to justify it 
on the basis of a proper assessment.214 
Utmost account may then by defined as a method that proselytizes BEREC’s opinions as 
the benchmark or the guiding light for the regulatory approach undertaken by the European 
Commission and the National Regulatory Authorities. Utmost account would, thereby, function as 
a counterbalance to the influence of political instances in regulatory affairs. Translated into the 
legislative process, this implies that the European Commission and national Governments, when 
legislating, are accountable to BEREC as long as they are required to justify themselves where they 
deviate from the designed path.  
The interplay between BEREC and the European Commission has been hitherto “very 
positive” according to BEREC.215 In this regard, it is satisfied with its own performance and 
declares that the European Commission is also pleased with its work.216 In addition, pursuant to 
Article 25 of the BEREC Regulation, an independent evaluation has recently taken place.217 This 
evaluation reported that the BEREC is “the most appropriate [body] to regulate 
telecommunications across Europe through the members”.218 This is also the institutional view of 
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BEREC. However, this position does not match with the Commission’s views, or at least the 
viewpoint of one of its Heads of Unit, who instead finds that the fact that the BEREC is composed 
of the national regulators hinders the possibility to take a genuine European approach or to pursue 
the Internal Market properly. 219  Thus, taking an unadulterated Internal Market approach is 
considered to be a “big challenge” for the BEREC under its current structure. This is due to the fact 
that the BEREC when issuing decisions under Article 2 or 3 of the BEREC Regulation –either 
upon the request by the European Commission or at its own initiative‒ is not really accountable to 
anybody, despite the importance of its role as an advisory body.220 
A marriage relationship or a turf war?  
The European Commission is constantly nagging the BEREC (and, therefore, the integrant NRAs) 
to operate in a certain way, whereas the BEREC, for its part, is pretty convinced that it is 
performing its responsibilities appropriately. To date, although it is not a very tortuous 
cohabitation, the collaborative relationship seems to be coming to an end. This can be seen through 
the case of the process behind the recent European Commission’s Draft Recommendation on 
consistent non-discrimination obligations and costing methodologies.221 Pursuant to the European 
legal framework, the regulatory process requires BEREC to issue an Opinion responding to the 
Commission’s proposal.222 According to BEREC, “BEREC and the Commission agree that the 
implementation of this Recommendation be followed very closely in a dedicated network between 
the Commission and BEREC, so that the practical impacts of the Recommendation, notably the 
impact on investment and competition, can be monitored and any unanticipated consequences 
managed in a timely and cooperative manner”.223 However, BEREC’s opinion in this case,224 in 
contrast to the usual practice, does not fully share the Commission’s approach as the best model to 
foster investment. BEREC shows concern about the particular measures proposed and in particular 
it considers that “the EU wide application of the recommended costing methodology will not 
guarantee that prices will converge to the target range and could in practice lead to prices which 
fall outside the target (...). It may thus lead to the opposite effect to what the draft Recommendation 
was intended to achieve, i.e. disincentivising instead of encouraging NGA (Next Generation 
Access) investment”. The national regulators left a meeting with the European Commission in 
Brussels with the belief that “the Commission considers the Recommendation to be de facto 
binding law”.225 The European Commission may take into (utmost) account the BEREC’s position 
or not. Be that as it may, it is evident that there are some divergences between these two 
institutions. Whether the BEREC has supported the Commission more than the national regulators 
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in its opinions it is still an overly hasty judgment to make given the relative youth of the recently 
created body. Nonetheless, it can be said any case that whereas in an early stage there was a clear 
support for the Commission concerns, the trend seems to be to reach a balance, BEREC being a 
sector-related counterweight between the NRAs and the European Commission.226 
 
4.2  Implementation. Interplay EU-National Law. Towards a hierarchical 
network?  
The different regimes governing Services of General Economic Interest also have particular 
features concerning the bodies responsible for their implementation into national law and 
enforcement procedures. The analysis of the implementation process of the EU regulatory 
framework for telecommunications is here used as an illustration of the features that characterize 
the application of the private law rules contained in the sectoral regimes, as opposed to the 
application of the traditional private law contained in the national civil codes, if any, or the national 
private law regimes.  
The design system for supervision of the implementation of the Regulatory Framework for 
Electronic Communications raises the concern about the concept of implementation itself, which in 
this context might serve as an example of how it can be interpreted very expansively. This is 
particularly when it comes to the border drawing exercise between implementing existing EU law 
as opposed to the making (application) of national law and the application of the European regime. 
The CJEU has already stated that the concept of implementation comprises both “the drawing up of 
implementing rules and the application of rules to specific cases by means of acts of individual 
application”.227 
The fragmentation between the EU and the Member States, linked to the scattering of 
powers between EU institutions, generates problems that encourage the adoption of laws with 
“strict, judicially enforceable goals, deadlines and transparent procedural requirements”. 228 
Likewise, due to the limited implementation and enforcement capacities of the EU law, the 
European legislator –as understood in a broad sense– has “an incentive to create justiciable rights 
and to empower private parties to serve as the enforcers of EU law”.229 Under this approach, the 
national legislation would turn into a mere “implementer […] co-opted by the framing purpose”.230 
This section discusses these issues in relation to the actors involved in the application of EU 
telecommunications regulation.  
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Judicial Co-operation & implementation networks 
The role of the national judiciary must be observed as it encompasses institutional and procedural 
features that determine its role in the implementation process of telecommunications regulation.  
Institutionally, a national court may be designated as an NRA having to fulfil the 
obligations entrusted to the regulator following the functional, yet broad, definition contained in 
Article 2(g) of the Framework Directive.231 However, in practice such a designation has not taken 
place.  
Procedurally, different jurisdictions are involved in the effective enforcement of the 
regulatory framework for telecoms, mainly administrative and civil courts.232 The national judiciary 
comes into the picture in the appealing of regulatory decisions. National courts might be required to 
control regulatory decisions as a way of monitoring their regulatory mandate. The Framework 
Directive (Article 4) provides a right of appeal against regulatory decisions. The body dealing with 
the appeal might be of judicial or non-judicial character.233 In any case, such a body shall be 
independent from the parties concerned. In practice, however, most jurisdictions have opted to 
designate administrative courts as the appellate bodies. Judicial or not, 234  Article 4 of the 
Framework Directive requires that the body in charge of the appeal enjoys “the appropriate 
expertise to enable it to carry out its functions effectively”.  
Problems arise with regard to the uniformity in the implementation of the European 
regulatory framework for telecoms. By way of example, the case study analysed below (section 
5.1) shows the relevance of the national judiciary not only in the enforcement but also in the 
implementation of the European framework. Provided that one of the main aims of the European 
framework is its consistent application, judicial cooperation becomes key. 
On a sociological note, in a forum consisting of national judges dealing with 
telecommunications and regulatory issues one can easily appreciate the disparities of criteria 
employed in different Member States. This is particularly striking in a field where the main efforts 
are currently focused on the building of an Internal Market for telecommunications.235  These 
divergences are visible also with regard to the judiciary and the regulators.236 Empirical analysis 
has shown that these disparities are very common and that such dialogue is indeed necessary.237 It 
gives raise to a sort of judicial cooperation beyond the traditional cooperation in criminal matters. 
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Network Approach. Law-Making vis-à-vis Implementation & Enforcement: A Thin Line 
Telecommunications regulation, together with competition law, is placed at the core of the 
network-based governance. 238  The institutional design of the regulatory system for electronic 
communications and the interactions among they key players are built on the basis of a network of 
cooperation. If we look to the work of Ladeur,239 we can see that within this network there are no 
hierarchical relationships; rather the network tries to give shape to multiple (heterarchical) 
relationships that are made among its different members. The observation process shows how the 
Internal Market approach, which ‒in turn‒ is the ultimate goal of the EU Regulatory Framework, is 
the main factor that has paved the way for the evolutionary development of the network. As we 
have seen, telecommunications regulation is currently more committed to harmonization of the 
Internal Market and the creation of the Digital Single Market240 than to liberalization. The most 
obvious example of this shift is represented by the legal basis employed. Thus, whereas the first 
generation of European rules were enacted under Article 86 EC Treaty (now Article 106 TFEU) 
aimed at opening the market to competition, the last two generations have been based on the 
internal market harmonization (Article 114 TFEU).  
At the national level, the interplay between the EU provisions and national law is 
articulated by the decisive role played by NRAs. Thus, the particular institutional design of the 
telecommunications law regime has inevitably implied the transformation of the traditional private 
law approach when it comes to decision-making. Traditionally, the regulation of private law was 
carried out by the legislative power in a narrow sense (i.e. Parliament) in combination with some 
minor interventions by the executive. However, the regulation of telecommunications services 
involves new instruments and actors as opposed to the traditional ones. As a result of the inevitable 
delegation, 241  the legislative power no longer corresponds to a concrete actor (individually 
considered, the legislature), but now lies in the hands of different players. Altogether, BEREC, the 
different NRAs and the European Commission are linked by an interdependence relationship that 
is modulated by the two-way formula of utmost account, which, in the absence of any legal 
definition, each side ‒inevitably‒ interprets differently.  
Telecommunications regulation is not an area of EU exclusive competence and, therefore, 
there is no formal transfer of powers between the Members States to the EU. Rather, the regulatory 
network put in place is underpinned by a system of supervision that seeks to monitor the consistent 
application of the EU provisions.242 Within this framework, the role of the European Commission 
overseeing the effective implementation of EU law seems to blur the borderline between rule-
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making, implementation and enforcement. Thus, the need to ensure a proper and consistent 
application of the Regulatory Framework via supervisory control or consultation mechanisms 
places the Commission in the role of a watchdog enforcer. Similar features can be applied to NRAs 
given its twofold role as rule-maker on the one hand, and enforcer, on the other. Thus, the 
implementation of EU law is merged within the application (enforcement) of the measures 
provided for in the European Regulatory Framework when it comes to decision-making by the 
NRAs. In this regard, the interpretation of the concept and scope of “implementation” hinders the 
border drawing exercise between rule-making, implementation and enforcement. As a result, the 
role of the national legislator is reduced to that of a mere implementer of goals.243 Implementation 
should thereby be understood in a broader sense, encompassing the enforcement of the EU 
measures when applying them (i.e. decision-making in the case concerned) at the local level.244 
This transnationally networked institutional setting 245  is aimed at the creation of a 
governance network. Such institutional choice has been regarded fertile for consensus building, 
particularly in areas reluctant to European integration.246 This perfectly marries with the legal basis 
employed to regulate telecommunications services (Article 95 EC, now Article 114 TFEU). In 
doing so, the EU is following a functionalist approach for telecoms (Internal Market as a finalité 
and as an objective) that also touches upon contract/consumer law (i.e. integration through private 
law).247 
Supervisory tools at EU level. Article 7 procedures 
In order to ensure a consistent application of the EU rules, a control mechanism was put in place, 
the so-called Articles 7 of the Framework Directive procedure. These procedures are in nature 
consultation and notification mechanisms through which NRAs are required to adopt a 
collaborative approach informing the European Commission and the other NRAs when it comes to 
measures taken under their regulatory responsibilities that may have an impact on the Internal 
Market. There are two different Article 7 procedures: Article 7 (“Consolidating the internal market 
for electronic communications”) applies when performing Market Definition 248  and Market 
                                                          
243Davies, G. (2015), “Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence”, European Law Journal, 
21(1), pp. 2-22.  
244The ECJ already recognized the vagueness of the concept of “implementation” in the case C-16/88 Commission of the 
European Communities v Council of the European Communities, [1989] ECR 03457. In this case, the Court upheld that 
the concept of implementation “comprises both the drawing up of implementing rules and the application of rules to 
specific cases by means of acts of individual application”; see para. 11.  
245 Here we have to recall Ladeur K-H, (2010), The State in International Law, in Joerges/Falke (eds.), Karl Polanyi, 
Globalisation and the Potential of Law in Transnational Markets, Hart Publishing Oxford, pp. 397-418. See also Svetiev, 
Y. (2012), "W(h)ither Private Law in the face of the Regulatory Deluge", in Micklitz, H.-W. and Svetiev, Y. (eds.), A 
Self-Sufficient European Private Law - A Viable Concept?, EUI Working Papers Series Law No. 2012/31, 26-44. 
246  Maggetti, M. (2014) "The rewards of cooperation: The effects of membership in European regulatory 
networks", European Journal of Political Research, 53(3), pp.480-499. 
247Caruso, D. (2006) “Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization”, New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, 39, pp. 1–74. For the consumer law aspects, see Schmid, C. (2005), “The Instrumentalist 
Conception of the Acquis Communautaire in Consumer Law and its Implications on a European Contract Law Code”, 
European Review of Contract Law, vol. 1(2) 211-227. 
248Article 15 of the Framework Directive. 
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Analysis procedures;249 and Article 7a (“Procedure for the consistent application of remedies”) 
which comes into play when obligations are imposed on operators with Significant Market Power.  
Particularly, as it stands today, the Article 7 procedure (“Consolidating the internal market 
for electronic communications”) establishes that the NRA concerned shall notify the European 
Commission when adopting a proposed measure for a particular market.250 This measure shall 
concern market definition or SMP designation.251 The regulatory decision is then assessed by the 
Commission, which may require the regulator to make a clarification or  provide more details 
within a period of three days. The European Commission will have to conclude the assessment in a 
period of one month. In case the Commission does not express “serious doubts” on the 
compatibility of the draft measure with the EU Regulatory Framework, it may provide comments 
and the NRA involved will have to take into consideration those comments when adopting the 
measure concerned. In case the European Commission raises “serious doubts” concerning a 
proposed measure, there will be an extension of the investigation procedure by an additional two 
months, leading to the opening of what is called “Phase II”. During this stage, the NRA can provide 
further evidence and BEREC gives an Opinion on the Regulator’s proposal, which cannot be 
adopted during the proceedings. The final stage involves three possible scenarios: 1) The European 
Commission may withdraw its serious doubts, in which case the regulator may adopt the measure; 
2) the Commission can make comments and the regulator must take utmost account of them when 
implementing the draft measure; 3) the Commission may require the regulator to withdraw its 
proposed measure.252 In any event, the regulator may also withdraw its draft measure at any time 
during either phase. 
With the 2009 review of the Regulatory Framework, the European Commission extended 
its investigation powers also to remedies, i.e. beyond market definition and market analysis. 
Accordingly, the “Better Regulation Directive” 253  introduced Article 7a into the Framework 
Directive. Compared to Article 7, this new provision establishes a more complex procedure where 
BEREC is also required to intervene and cooperate with the national regulator to modify the 
proposal by making concrete recommendations. The process can be summarized as follows: 
                                                          
249Article 16 of the Framework Directive. 
250 The markets where competition is considered not to be effective and where national regulators are expected to carry 
out market analysis are listed in the Commission Recommendation 2007/879/EC on relevant product and service markets 
within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex-ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services. These markets are: Access to the fixed telephone network; Call origination on the fixed telephone 
network; Call termination on individual fixed telephone networks; Wholesale access to the local loop; Wholesale 
broadband access; Wholesale terminating segments of leased lines; Voice call termination on individual mobile networks. 
Nonetheless, if a NRA detects consistent market failure on another market/s, it is allowed to regulate, but it will have to 
justify its decision. 
251 Article 7(4) framework Directive.  
252 Under the Article 7 procedure, the Commission is empowered to “veto” draft measures, where such measures seek: to 
define markets other than those defined in the Commission Recommendation; or to designate or not operators with 
significant market power and such draft measures would affect trade between Member States, and the Commission 
considers that the draft measure would create a barrier to the single European market or has serious doubts as to its 
compatibility with Community law. 
253 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directives 
2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on 
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the 
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, pp. 37–69.  
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Phase I: “Communication of draft regulatory measures”. This Phase may take up to 1 
month during which other NRAs and the BEREC may provide comments on the proposed measure, 
as well as the European Commission which may agree (providing comments or not) or may raise 
“serious doubts”. 
Phase IIa: “Regulatory Dialogue”. This Phase may take up to 3 months, preventing the 
adoption of the draft measure (standstill period).254 Within the first six weeks, the BEREC may 
issue and Opinion expressing an evaluation of the Commission’s serious doubts. In that case, there 
is a process of cooperation between the actors involved; i.e. BEREC, the Commission and the 
NRA. This stage may be resolved in 3 different ways: a) the NRA withdraws its proposal; b) the 
NRA amends its proposal taking utmost account of the Commission’s serious doubts and BEREC’s 
Opinion; or c) the NRA maintains its proposal.  
Phase IIb: “Commission say on remedies”. If the NRA decides not to withdraw from its 
proposal, or if the BEREC does not share the Commission’s serious doubts or it has no opinion, the 
proposal goes to the European Commission. The Commission then has 1 month to, first, issue a 
Recommendation requiring the withdrawal or amendment of the Regulator’s proposal or, second, 
withdraw its serious doubts. In any case, the Commission is not entitled to veto the imposition of 
remedies. Therefore, the ultimate decision about modifying the proposal or maintaining it 
unchanged remains with the national regulator.  
Finally, within 1 month of the Commission’s position, the national regulator has to inform 
the Commission and BEREC about the final measures taken, and, where the Commission’s 
Recommendation has not been followed, the NRA must provide a reasoned justification.  
The following chart illustrates the whole process of Article 7a: 
                                                          
254 Article 7a(1) of the Framework Directive as introduced by the Directive 2009/140/EC (Better Regulation Directive). 
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What is the influence Article 7a procedure in practice? The consultation procedure of Article 7a is 
about the subsidiarity principle in so far as market analysis ‒the cornerstone of the regulatory 
model for telecommunications‒ is carried out at the national level by the National Regulatory 
Authorities. It results in a supervisory mechanism which is “controlled to a large extent by the 
Commission and now, with the recent addition, the BEREC”.255  Through this mechanism, the 
European Commission attempts to achieve consistency in the application of the EU Regulatory 
Framework in concert with the BEREC and the different NRAs. The following section develops a 
closer analysis of this distinctive procedure.  
5. Case-studies: the making of telecommunications regulation and its impact 
in wholesale and retail pricing  
As aforementioned, the EU Regulatory Framework for Telecommunication includes provisions that 
have an impact in private law matters, either in B2B (wholesale markets) or B2C (retail market) 
relationships. The following case-studies are intended to illustrate the making of 
telecommunications regulation. Such analysis will bring some light to the influence of 
telecommunications regulation over national law, and the role of the national legislator and the 
national judiciary. 
The first case study featured here deals with the implementation of a Commission’s 
Recommendation (soft law) on costing methodologies for termination rates in wholesale markets. 
This case illustrates well the role of new actors in law-making and the interplay between the 
different actors (co-operation) underpinned by a multi-level networked institutional apparatus 
where the EU and the national jurisdictions interact. The second case is more closely related to the 
EU’s constitutional backing of price regulation. The case concerned –the landmark Vodafone case– 
covers the suitability of Article 95 EC Treaty ‒now Article 114 TFEU– to regulate retail prices.  
5.1  Law-making and its impact over contractual relationships within 
wholesale markets: Article 7 procedure in practice 
Background of the case 
This case illustrates the functioning of the Article 7a procedure in a situation that involves the 
participation in the regulatory process of OPTA (the former Dutch NRA, now ACM)256 , the 
European Commission, BEREC, interest groups −in this case the telecommunications operators−, 
and the national judiciary. It is the result of a highly controversial case concerning the 
implementation of the European Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications by a 
national regulator, supported by the European Commission, vis-à-vis the national judiciary.  
                                                          
255 Head of Unit - DG CONNECT - European Commission, Speech at the Florence School of Regulation, October 2012. 
256 OPTA (Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie Autoriteit, "Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority", 
in English) has been replaced by a single “super watchdog” body: the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets 
(“ACM”) after the merger of the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa), the Netherlands Consumer Authority, and 
the Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority of the Netherlands (OPTA). ACM became operational as of 1st 
April 2013. 
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First of all, it is important to recall here that NRAs are required to perform their regulatory 
duties in line with the policy objectives contained in Article 8 of the Framework Directive, namely: 
promotion of competition, contribution to the development of the Internal Market, and promotion 
of the interests of the citizens of the European Union. 257 The European Framework requires NRAs 
(in the case at issue, the current Dutch ACM), among other duties, to investigate market 
termination, and to impose regulatory obligations upon operators enjoying Significant Market 
Power (SMP). 258  Among the different regulatory obligations price control is a regulatory 
intervention required in order to prevent excessive pricing and margin squeeze. To that end, the 
European framework enabled NRAs to impose cost accounting obligations. 259  Under such 
obligations, NRAs may compel SMP operators to structure their cost accounting system (CAS) and 
pricing system under a certain methodology to meet the regulatory requirements in order to support 
price controls, grouping activities in specified accounts and applying particular rules for the 
allocation of costs to different services in order to prevent unfair cross-subsidies, excessive or 
predatory prices, with the aim of preventing margin squeeze as well as promoting sustainable 
competition and efficiency for the benefit of the user. 260  Accordingly, NRAs must impose 
obligations to implement the CAS at the national level. This regulatory system was transposed in 
the Netherlands into national law 261 and in particular, as to the imposition of regulatory remedies, 
the national framework provided that regulatory obligations shall be appropriate if they are based 
on the nature of the problem identified in the market concerned and are proportionate and justified 
in the light of the objectives of Article 1(3) of the Dutch Telecommunications Act.262 
In order to harmonize pricing control measures in Europe, in 2009, the European 
Commission issued a Recommendation on termination rates.263 Without much elaboration on the 
technical details, termination rates are the rates which telecoms networks charge each other to 
deliver calls between their respective networks, i.e. how much mobile phone operators can charge 
to connect calls on each other’s networks. These costs are ultimately included in call prices paid by 
consumers and businesses. The 2009 Commission Recommendation establishes that termination 
rates (fixed and mobile) should be calculated on the basis of the effective costs incurred by an 
                                                          
257 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services (“Framework Directive”), as ammeded by Directive 
2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on 
a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of 
electronic communications networks and services.  
258Article 15 of the Framework Directive and Commission Recommendation 2007/879/EC on Relevant Markets. 
259  Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (‘Access Directive’); Article 13. 
260 Article 13(2) Access Directive.  
261 Law of 19 October 1998, containing rules on Telecommunications, Telecommunications Act (Wet van 19 oktober 
1998, houdende regels inzake de telecommunicatie, Telecommunicatiewet); hereinafter ‘Dutch Telecommunications 
Act’. Chapter 6a. Obligations of Undertakings with Significant Market Power.  
262 Article 6a.2(3). Such objectives are a mere transposition of those contained in Article 8 of the Framework Directive, 
namely: a. promoting competition in the provision of electronic communications networks, electronic communications 
services, or associated facilities, including by encouraging efficient investment in the field of infrastructure and 
supporting innovation; b. the development of the internal market; c. promoting the interests of end-users as regards 
choice, price, and quality. 
263Commission Recommendation (2009/396/EC) of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile 
Termination Rates in the EU, OJ L 20.5.2009, pp. 67-74. 
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efficient operator using the pure Bottom-up Long Run Incremental Cost (BULRIC) methodology 
for its calculation. This method imposed a stricter costs measurement method than the previous one 
operating in The Netherlands, BULRIC+. BULRIC+ model not only assumes the costs that are 
incremental to providing termination, but also applies a mark-up to non-incremental fixed costs. 
Thus, unlike BULRIC+, under the pure BULRIC methodology some of the costs are not 
considered for the calculation of the price cap.264 
On the 7th July 2010, OPTA (now ACM), as part of its regulatory duties,265 published its 
market analysis including a decision in relation to:  (a) the review of the wholesale market for voice 
call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location; and (b) the 
review of the wholesale market for voice call termination on individual mobile networks in the 
Netherlands.266 This decision included conditions establishing price control for mobile and fixed 
termination rates in line with Article 13 of the so-called Access Directive. 267 The methodology 
used by OPTA (now ACM) in that decision, consistent with the Commission’s Recommendation 
on terminations rates, was based on the pure BULRIC cost standard. The national regulator, in 
issuing that regulatory decision, considered that establishment of the pure BULRIC costing 
methodology was thought to be the best way to regulate for the “highest consumer welfare”, 
provided that lower termination rates in the wholesale markets would be translated in lower retail 
prices.268 
The above-mentioned regulatory decision gave rise to a judicial procedure before the Dutch 
Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (College van Beroepvoor het bedrijfsleven, hereinafter CBb) 
following the appeal of a number of telecommunications operators in the Netherlands.269 The 
appeals raised several issues, including the regulator’s decision to set the price controls on the basis 
of the pure BULRIC cost standard. Telecommunications operators contended that the cost-price 
method based on pure BULRIC was not an appropriate price obligation within the meaning of 
Article 6a.2(3) of the Dutch Telecommunications Act, as they considered that this obligation would 
go beyond what was strictly necessary to rectify the potential competition problems by implying 
that operators were no longer allowed to include certain costs in their tariffs.270 In particular, they 
argued that applying a cost-price method based on BULRIC+ could also offset the competition 
problem of excessively high prices. The economic consequences of the case provide an overview 
of the influence of regulatory measures on the (private) relationships amongst operators. In 
                                                          
264Interview with an Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. 
265 Pursuant to Chapter 6(a) of the Dutch Telecommunication Act.  
266 Decision of 7 July 2010, OPTA/AM/2010/201951.  
267  Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive). 
268Interview with an Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. 
269 T-Mobile Netherland B.V., Vodafone Libertel B.V., Koninklijke KPN N.B., KPN B.V., Telfort B.V., and Lycamobile 
Netherlands B.V. 
270  Interview with an Economic Expert from OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012: “When we take a decision, we have to 
formally consult the draft decision and, then, they (the operators) react to it and said: ‘we don’t agree with it’. That’s 
what they’re always saying and then that there should be lower prices, because there are lower costs. Then, you as a 
company you’re not happy, it is logical and […] So, there is a consultation phase and after that we have a final decision 
and, then, they have, of course, the right of defense […] and they have a right to go to the Court and fight the decision 
and they did that successfully”.  
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monetary terms, the difference between pure BULRIC and BULRIC+ is only about 1 Euro cent. 
However, that cent, translated into a market where millions of transactions take place every day 
involves important sums. As stated in the CBb’s judgment, ACM estimates a loss of revenue 
suffered by mobile providers to the order of €21 million to €219 million; the estimates produced by 
mobile providers themselves were even higher.271 The question to be answer by the national court 
was whether the adoption of the new costing methodology (pure BULRIC) could be considered 
appropriate in light of the observed competition problem, within the meaning of the Dutch 
Telecommunications Act.272 
The CBb’s Judgment was released on 31st August 2011, rendering judgment in the first and 
sole instance. In very broad terms, and leaving aside further competition concerns and issues of 
market analysis that were also object of the plea, the Court, upholding the appeal, argued that 
despite the Commission’s Recommendation on termination rates, conditions remained unchanged 
and, therefore, it was unfounded to adjust the methodology for cost calculation from plus to pure 
BULRIC. The Court grounded its reasoning on the requirement proportionality and justification as 
to the objectives of the Dutch Telecommunications Act (Article 1(3)) when imposing price control 
obligations such the one concerned.273 Whereas the authority’s aim is to neutralize consequences of 
market inefficiencies, likely margin squeezes and excessive retail prices by way of imposing a 
price control obligation, the action “goes beyond what is strictly necessary to correct the identified 
competitive problem”; the national judge casts doubts on the proportionality of the measure.274 
Essentially, the court concludes that the inefficiencies in retail pricing cannot be resolved by 
imposing a “more invasive measure” at wholesale level, given that the retail mobile market was 
already considered competitive.275 As a result, the Court established new cap prices for termination 
rates and compelled the regulator to take a new decision setting the relevant rates on the basis of 
BULRIC+ methodology.276  
Pursuant to Article 7a notification procedure explained above,277 in January 2012, OPTA 
notified the European Commission the new decision compliant with the court’s judgment and 
setting the rate following the BULRIC+ methodology. Since this measure departs from the 2009 
Commission Recommendation on termination rates, OPTA (now ACM) justified this deviation on 
the basis of the order by the CBb’s Judgment, as the highest appeal body in the Netherlands, to take 
a new regulatory decision regarding both the price caps for fixed termination rates and for direct 
                                                          
271 CBb Judgment of 31st August 2011, 4.8.3.1. See also Case C-424/07, Commission v. Germany, 3 December [2009] 
ECR I-11431, See, in particular, paragraphs 90-92.  
272  In particular within the meaning of its Article 6a.2(3)., that is, proportional and justified in light of Article 1.3 
objectives.  
273 CBb Judgment of 31st August 2011, 4.8.3.1. 
274 Ibid: “Pure BULRIC is a more stringent form of price regulation than BULRIC+ - there is no mark-up for non- 
incremental fixed costs - and the text of Article 6a.7(2) of the TA does provides no support for an interpretation to the 
effect that a form of price regulation might be imposed which goes beyond a price measure that can already be considered 
cost-oriented”. 
275 CBb Judgment of 31st August 2011, 4.8.3.4.  
276 In fact, the CBb itself even set the price cap for Mobile Termination Rates at 0.056 €/min as of 7 July 2010, 0.042 
€/min as of 1 January 2011, 0.027 €/min as of 1 September 2011, and 0.024 €/min as of 1 September 2012 on the basis of 
the BULRIC+ methodology and OPTA's own calculations. 
277 Section 4.2.  
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interconnection rates following a BULRIC+ cost accounting methodology. During Phase I of the 
notification procedure, the European Commission raised concerns about the newly adopted 
regulatory measure and sent a serious doubts letter to ACM on the 13th February 2012 opening 
Phase II investigation.278 Phase II investigation opens a “Regulatory Dialogue” that may take up to 
3 months preventing the adoption of the draft measure (standstill period).279 In the serious doubts 
letter, the Commission expressed reservations concerning the compatibility of the measure with the 
European Regulatory Framework and provided reasons why it believed that the draft measure 
would not only create a barrier to the internal market, but would also involve an increase in the 
retail prices leading to a decline in consumer welfare.280 In particular, the Commission considered 
that the measure did not comply with the requirements of Article 16(4) of the Framework 
Directive, and Article 8(4) of the Access Directive in conjunction with Article 8 of the Framework 
Directive. In that regard, the European Commission acknowledges that NRAs are allowed to 
deviate from the Commission’s Recommendation but, in that event, the deviation must be duly 
justified in light of the policy objectives and regulatory principles of the Regulatory Framework.  
This serious doubts letter initiated the Phase II investigation and meant that for its 3 
months duration the draft measure could not be adopted (standstill period).281 However, the revised 
mobile termination rates based on the BULRIC+ methodology were already in effect in the 
Netherlands, as a consequence of the CBb’s judgment. Within the first six weeks of the Regulatory 
Dialogue, BEREC may intervene in the procedure by issuing an opinion expressing its views on the 
Commission’s serious doubts. In such case, there is a process of cooperation between the actors 
involved (i.e. the BEREC, the Commission and the NRA). As noted above, this stage may play out 
in 3 different ways: a) the NRA withdraws its proposal; b) the NRA amends its proposal taking 
utmost account of the Commission’s serious doubts and BEREC’s opinion; or c) the NRA maintain 
its proposal. In the case concerned, BEREC was required to issue an opinion on the serious doubts 
letter indicating its position. To this end, and following the mandate enshrined in Article 7a(3) of 
the Framework Directive, a specific Expert Working Group (EWG) within the BEREC was 
established.282  
This EWG held its first meeting in London on the 20th February 2012. ACM was invited to 
provide further clarifications and explanations. Several questions followed which were sent to 
ACM who replied by the 28th February. A second video-conference meeting took place one week 
                                                          
278  SG-Greffe (2012) D/2859. Brussels 13.02.2012, C(2012) 1038. Interview with an Economic Expert at OPTA, 
Florence 18.10.2012: “The process of notification requires that you have to notify again to the Commission. So, we came 
with the Commission and said: “ok, we are going to do this, we have a Court decision, we cannot do anything else than 
this, so this is what we are going to do”. And, then, the Commission got very annoyed, because they had serious doubts 
about what we were doing there with regard to the economic analysis underlying the regulator’s decision”.  
279 Article 7a(1) of the Framework Directive as introduced by the Directive 2009/140/EC (Better Regulation Directive). 
280  Commission Recommendation of 13 June 2012, in accordance with Article 7a of Directive 2002/21/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services ("Framework Directive") in Case NL/2012/1284: call termination on individual 
public telephone networks provided at a fixed location in the Netherlands and in Case NL/2012/1285: voice call 
termination on individual mobile networks in the Netherlands; C(2012) 3770.  
281 Article 7a(1) of the Framework Directive as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC. 
282 The EWG was charged with the task of drafting an opinion containing a summary of the notification and the serious 
doubts, the experts’ analysis, and clear conclusions concerning the compatibility of the proposed regulatory measure with 
the EU Regulatory Framework, as well as the provision of possible alternative proposals (if any). 
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later, on the 7th March, to gain supplementary clarifications. By the 15th March, on the basis of a 
comprehensive economic analysis, the EWG had drafted an opinion that was referred to the 
BEREC’s Board of Regulators for comments. On the 23th March, the majority of the Board of 
Regulators adopted a final opinion. 283 In that decision, the BEREC found that the serious doubts 
raised by the European Commission were justified and agrees that: 1) The regulator has not 
provided an economic justification for the use of the BULRIC+ methodology as the appropriate 
measure “to promote efficiency and sustainable competition and maximize consumer benefits set 
out in Recital 20 to the Access Directive”; and 2) the proposed measure may create a barrier to the 
Internal Market. Nonetheless, as for the BEREC’s position on whether the measures should be 
amended or withdrawn, it did not consider appropriate to impose on the regulator any particular 
way to proceed, due to the legally binding nature of the Judgment by the CBb.284 
The procedure at hand concludes with a final notification by which, within 1 month after 
the Commission’s position, the national regulator must inform the Commission and BEREC about 
the final measures taken, and where it does not follow the Commission, the NRA must provide a 
reasoned justification. In our particular example, ACM deviated from the Commission on the basis 
that, under national law, the CBb’s judgment overturned the original regulatory measure.  
Two years after the original decision that gave rise to the case at hand, the national 
regulator decided to attempt once more to set the pure BULRIC costing methodology.285 This 
second regulatory decision following the Recommendation was again appealed in front of the CBb. 
During the process of judicial review, and after an initial unwillingness of the national court to 
refer the case to the CJEU on the most problematic issues at stake ‒i.e. the legal effect of the 
Recommendation–, the national judge has finally decided to suspend the proceedings and request a 
preliminary reference from the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU. 286  The preliminary questions 
submitted for reference are examined below. 
Comment 
This case concerns a conflict between some telecommunications operators in The Netherlands and 
the National Regulatory Authority for telecommunications. In particular, the case features the 
implementation of a Commission’s Recommendation (soft law) on costing methodologies for 
termination rates in wholesale markets. The implementation procedure put in place (so-called 
Article 7a procedure) is grounded on a multi-level networked institutional apparatus where the EU 
and the national jurisdictions interact. In particular, this sector-specific consultation procedure 
                                                          
283 BEREC Opinion in Phase II investigation pursuant to Article 7a of Directive 2002/21/EC as amended by Directive 
2009/140/EC Case NL/2012/1284 – Call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location 
in the Netherlands Case NL/2012/1285 – Voice call termination on individual mobile networks in the Netherlands, 
BoR(12)23.  
284 Ibid.: “BEREC  therefore considers that the Commission’s serious doubts, as narrowly expressed in its letter to OPTA 
of 13 February 2012 (i.e. without explicitly addressing the legally binding nature of the CBb’s judgment for OPTA), are 
justified”.  
285 Effective as of 1st September 2013. 
286 Case C-28/15, Koninklijke KPN and Others v Autoriteit Consument en Markt (ACM) [in progress].  
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touches upon the competences and powers of the regulator, and involves the participation of the 
regulators’ umbrella group (BEREC), the European Commission, interest groups and the national 
judiciary. Therefore, some issues concerning implementation and decision-making are the subject 
matter of the analysis below: How are regulatory decisions made? What criteria are taken into 
account? Who intervenes in decision-making processes? What is the role of the judiciary? Whose 
interests are taken into account? What is the actual effect of a European Recommendation (soft-
law)? As such, by illustrating the role of new actors in law-making and their interplay together with 
the role of the national judiciary under the judicial review of regulatory authorities, this particular 
case turns out to be a very good example of the interplay between the national and the EU level, 
and the role of the European Union in the decision-making processes for issues touching upon 
private law matters.  
i. Implementation of the EU regulatory framework for telecoms and private law  
To begin with the implementation of the EU regulatory framework, a potential solution to this case 
might well have been the opening of infringement proceedings. Yet, an infringement procedure is 
against the Member State infringing EU law provisions and it is necessary to recall here that 
National Regulatory Authorities are required to be independent.287 Accordingly, given that the 
NRAs are independent and also that there was no problem of incompatibility of the national law 
with the European provisions, in an infringement context this case would have raised the question: 
Infringement by whom? The Netherlands or the Dutch regulator?288 
In the field of private law, a problematic matter of competence is represented by the 
delegation of substantive competence to “specialized institutions”.289 The establishment of NRAs 
in the telecoms sector is a clear example of the partial integration or integration by sectors that 
Pescatore speaks about.290 In order to gain a clear understanding of this, it is necessary to look at 
the functional competence of such institutions as well as the interplay between the EU, the Member 
States and the established administrative structures. A closer look to the implementation of the EU 
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications reveals a subtly increasing power of the EU 
Commission’s role at the functional level when it comes to the achievement of the regulatory goals, 
i.e. consistent application of the legal framework and harmonization of the Internal Market. This 
might be the result of the nature of the prerogatives reserved to the European Commission with 
regard to the control mechanisms which grant it certain powers aimed at the adjustment of the 
national measures, e.g. via consultation procedures. 291  The rationale behind such procedures 
responds to the political and legal imperatives set out at EU level.292 
                                                          
287 Article 3(2) Framework Directive. See Lavrijssen, S. and Ottow, A. (2012) “Independent Supervisory Authorities: A 
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The case at stake concerns the implementation of a Commission’s Recommendation on the 
methodology employed for the calculation of termination rate costs.293 When it comes to contracts 
between telecoms operators, NRAs exert price control over the prices that the incumbent charges to 
alternative operators for the use of the network (termination rates).294 
Therefore, this case is a good example for illustrating the implementation process of EU 
decisions by the Member States with implications for private law (price control in B2B contracts). 
This regulatory pricing control prerogative arises in the context of regulatory obligations that might 
be imposed by the national regulator over operators in wholesale markets. In particular, the 
concerned price control arises from cost accounting obligations. Article 13 Access Directive 
compels SMP operators to structure their cost accounting system (CAS) and pricing system under a 
certain methodology to meet the regulatory requirements in order to support price controls, 
grouping activities in specified accounts and in particular rules for the allocation of costs to 
different services in order to prevent unfair cross-subsidies, excessive or predatory prices and to 
prevent margin squeeze as well as to promote sustainable competition and efficiency for the benefit 
of the user.295 In the case at hand, the disputed regulatory decision establishes a cap for termination 
rates so that it can avoid excessive tariffs or margin squeeze practices.  
The economic consequences of the case provide an overview of the influence of regulatory 
measures on the (private) relationships amongst operators. In economic terms, as stated above, the 
difference between pure BULRIC and BULRIC+ is only about 1 Euro cent. Yet, the multiplied 
effect of such price alteration amounts to millions of Euros.296 
Without entering into all the economic, competitive and regulatory consequences of the 
case, it will suffice to examine here the interplay among the actors involved in the implementation 
of the European Regulatory Framework for telecoms. This alone gives rise to governance 
problems. 
- Multi-level (network) governance conflicts 
Essentially, this case is about the national procedural autonomy principle. As aforementioned, the 
implementation and enforcement of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications 
follows a decentralized approach. Under this scheme, we can identify three types of conflicts:  
a) Vertical conflicts 
NRAs are required to perform their regulatory duties in accordance with the regulatory objectives 
of the specific Directives.297 In principle, the national regulator enjoys a certain degree of autonomy 
                                                          
293Commission Recommendation (2009/396/EC) of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile 
Termination Rates in the EU (OJ L 20.5.2009, pp. 67-74). 
294 In accordance with Article 13(1) of the Access Directive.  
295 Article 13(2) Acess Directive.  
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when carrying out its regulatory tasks. Yet, the European Commission also enjoys a certain degree 
of control by virtue of Articles 7 and 7a procedures and Article 19 of the Framework Directive.  
The vertical conflict arises in relation to the divergence between the European mandate and 
the disputed national decision that occurs as a consequence of the national ruling. This is a very 
common situation that the consultation procedures put in place attempt to palliate. The internal 
market rationale takes precedence over the national legal regime as has been long established by 
the case law of the European Court.298 
b) Horizontal conflicts of jurisdictions 
The horizontal conflict is epitomized by the discrepancy between two different national 
jurisdictions. A conflict in the field of telecommunications would take place between civil or 
contract law rules –i.e. general contract law– vis-à-vis telecommunications regulation. Another 
example would be a potential inconsistency between telecommunications regulation and 
administrative law. Such incompatibilities might well be solved by rules of conflict and the maxim 
lex specialis derogate generalis. However, jurisdictional conflicts shall be recalled here. In the case 
at stake, the national regulator maintains the application of sector-specific regulation whereas for 
the national judge major principles such as legality and the administrative principle of legal 
certainty prevail. 299  
c) (Multi) diagonal conflicts 
The literature has thoroughly addressed diagonal conflicts in issues of European governance.300 
Diagonal conflicts arise particularly in issues of decentralized enforcement, such as the one that 
concerns us here. It epitomizes a multi-dimensional interplay that brings together the national 
regulator, the European Commission, the umbrella organization BEREC (in a more modest way) 
and the national judiciary. The latter steps in the framework of the procedure for the judicial 
scrutiny of regulatory decisions conferred under the right of appeal against such decisions.301 
The (potential) diagonal conflict emerges in particular with regard to the sought 
optimization of the market versus the proportionality of the (contested) intervention. As 
aforementioned in the background of the case, the regulator and the judiciary hold divergent views 
about the suitability of the measure. In turn, the judicial conclusion and the subsequent new 
regulatory decision restoring the BULRIC+ methodology triggered the opening of an Article 7a 
                                                          
298 Inter alia: Case C-6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, Case C-26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie 
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299  On the decay of the legality principle see Lavrijssen, S. and Ottow, A. (2011), ‘The Legality of Independent 
Regulatory Authorities’, in L. Besselink, F. Pennings and A. Prechal (eds.), The Eclipse of Legality, Kluwer Law 
International.  
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impact of European integration on private law: Reductionist perceptions, true conflicts and a new constitutional 
perspective" European Law Journal 3(4), pp. 378-406. Joerges, C. (2006) “‘Deliberative Political Processes’ Revisited: 
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procedure deploying a turf war involving three parties – the European Commission, the national 
regulator and the national judiciary.  
On the one hand, the regulator argues that adopting a costing methodology in line with the 
European Recommendation would imply lower costs and, therefore, it would be translated into 
lower consumer prices. In the eyes of the European Commission, in re-establishing the former 
methodology as required by the national court, ACM did not provide any economic justification of 
the departure from the pure BULRIC methodology that guarantees that the BULRIC+ 
methodology would equally promote efficiency and sustainable competition, as well as maximizing 
consumer benefit in the Dutch market.302 In addition, the European Commission considered that it 
would create barriers to the Internal Market because mobile termination rates set via the pure 
BULRIC level would contribute to a level playing field at EU level by eliminating competition 
distortions between fixed and mobile networks.303 
On the other hand, the national court holds the view that the intervention of wholesale markets 
under conditions of inefficiency to resolve retail market prices are disproportionate, provided that 
NRAs cannot intervene in a market that has been already considered competitive and that, 
therefore, is not subject to ex-ante regulation.304 Retail and wholesale markets are different markets 
operating at different –and not interlinked– levels. The Recommendation is about the wholesale 
market. The court reasoning concludes that, the regulator –together with the Commission– cannot 
come up with a justification from a different market (i.e. it cannot use the retail market to say 
something about the functioning of the wholesale level).  
ii. Compatibility of the regulatory decision with EU law and institutional conflicts 
Drawing on the empirical analysis conducted consisting of interviews with staff related to this 
particular case, this brief case comment tries to draw attention to the implications of European 
telecommunications regulation in private law relationships. Although ACM sought to follow the 
Commission’s Recommendation on termination rates, it was impossible to not to comply with the 
CBb’s judgment. 305  Formally, the case –including the Commission’s investigation procedure 
carried out– gave rise to a complex situation because ACM had to apply the Court’s decision. As 
such, the national court adopted the role of the regulator by overturning the new price caps 
resulting from the recommended new cost accounting model and restoring the previous 
methodology, and requiring the regulator to issue a new regulatory decision from the 1st January 
2012 pursuant the judicial reasoning.306 The court here performed the role of a de facto regulator.307 
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Furthermore, this case was not, in principle, a problem of compatibility of Dutch law (the 
Dutch Telecommunications Act) with EU Law, because the concerned provision (its former Article 
6) existed from 2004 and the European Commission never raised questions concerning the law, 
only about the specific reasoning of the Court.308 That means that the Commission was not arguing 
about a lack of compliance of the Dutch Telecommunications Act with EU law, but was only 
questioning the regulatory decision issued as a consequence of the court’s ruling which set the 
price cap on the basis of the BULRIC+ costing methodology, to the contrary of the cost model 
suggested by the Commission’s Recommendation. 
This situation perfectly reflects a clear decoupling of the CBb’s Judgment and the EU 
understanding, which poses a debate on the nature of the EU soft-law –in particular concerning the 
binding effect of the 2009 Commission’s Recommendation on termination rates– firmly on the 
table. In this regard, NRAs (OPTA in the case concerned) are required to take “utmost account” of 
the Commission comments. Once again, utmost account comes into play in order to modulate the 
relationship among the different participating institutions, but this time in a different direction: 
NRAs to take the utmost account of the Commission’s position. In reality, the CBb decided that its 
conclusions are not affected by the Commission’s Recommendation and the fact that NRAs have to 
take the utmost account does not imply that OPTA cannot deviate from the (non-binding) 
Recommendation, especially if this would require a breach of national law.309 According to the 
Court, “that Article 19(1) of the Framework Directive requires Member States to ensure that 
national regulatory authorities, when carrying out their duties, try their utmost to use the 
recommendations of the Commission, […] does not affect the obligation of OPTA to deviate from 
the ‒non-binding‒ call termination recommendation because they would otherwise act in violation 
of provisions of national law”.310 This is the only reference made to utmost account throughout the 
Judgment. Utmost account, then, would imply that “you do not have to follow it exactly, but you 
have to take account of it”.311 Unfortunately, the Court did not go deeper into the nature of the 
Recommendation and did not clarify what utmost account actually involves either. In the case at 
issue, OPTA initially followed the Commission’s Recommendation because, above all, the new 
methodology (pure BULRIC) revealed itself after economic analyses to be the best solution 
economically; it was the national Court who overturned that decision.312 Meanwhile, the European 
Commission held: “it is very important to note that this is a case where the European Commission, 
BEREC and OPTA were working closely together. There was no confrontation. It was about the 
European Commission not being happy with the decision taken by the national Court”.313 
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These conflicting views between the court and the regulator have resulted in a complex 
situation because the European Commission is not allowed to compel the national regulator to 
disregard the court’s ruling. Besides, although NRAs are supposed to be independent, OPTA would 
not have been allowed to adopt the decision establishing the pure BULRIC methodology in so far 
as the Court would annul it again. Neither could OPTA appeal the Court’s decision due to the fact 
that, in the Netherlands, there is no higher appeal body as a result of the choice for efficient 
procedures. Otherwise, OPTA would have appealed the CBb’s ruling.314The result was, then, a 
“deadlock situation” which could have been overcome if the Court would have asked to the CJEU 
for its opinion on the interpretation of the status of the Commission’s Recommendation.315 In the 
same vein, the European Commission also considers that the Dutch Court should have referred the 
case to the CJEU.316  
- Socio-legal comment  
This case exemplifies a situation where the judiciary spills over into the regulatory process of 
telecommunications. What do key players of the sector say on this? BEREC for instance is not 
pleased with the idea of national courts intervening in the cases and fears that they could alter the 
objectives set out at European level. “We do not like the Court to step in and change our targets”.317 
In this case, the court set the price, the methodology, etc., and it created a problem for the 
Commission since it attempts to implement a consistent methodology that can be followed and 
adopted across the different Member States: The Court “has changed that by jumping in in issues 
where it does not have any real competence, perhaps formal, but not real”.318 
These are very significant statements. It seems that the regulators chose to disregard the 
formal and legal competences of the national court, as they might not be qualified enough to carry 
out such task.319 It may reveal the omnipotent aspirations of the telecommunication sector, showing 
itself as a sort of Supreme Being even above the judiciary. Technicality and expertise alienates the 
telecommunication sector from the traditional legal structures bypassing the anchored control 
(judicial) mechanisms. It also seems to suggest that telecommunications unfolds within its own 
parallel world and only once in a while does it go down to earth to deal with specific issues when 
they may hamper the smooth functioning of the market. In addition to that, the European 
Commission disagrees with the ruling: “[T]he Commission was not happy with this decision by the 
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national court. We think that the entire earth would agree!. A court decided that the cost model that 
we all want to achieve at the European level should not be applied in this Member State and that 
can be, from a European perspective, non-acceptable”.320 Once again, it shows that the Commission 
puts on airs, believing that it alone possesses the absolute truth and that nobody would dare ‒or 
even should not dare!‒ doubt it. 
iii. The role of “soft-law” 
Essentially, what is at stake here is the influence of a Commission Recommendation. To this end, it 
is important to determine the nature of the Recommendation. The, let’s say, “soft-law box” 
encompasses those instruments that we are reluctant to qualify as “hard law”. 321 Hence, 
Recommendations would fall within the category of “soft-law”. To a lawyers mind, that is directly 
translated into non-binding. Yet, it is crucial to ascertain the legal effect of the measures contained 
in the Recommendation.  
Article 60 TFEU enables the Commission to issue recommendations in the field of 
liberalization of SGEIs. According to Article 288 TFEU (former Article 249 in the EC Treaty), 
Recommendations do not enjoy binding force. 322  Rather, they are indicative guidelines to 
implement and to interpret legislation. Nonetheless, the CJEU has recognized that they are not 
completely deprived of legal force, and that the national judges should take them into 
consideration.323 As a matter of fact, national courts shall take a Recommendation into account 
“where they are capable of casting light on the interpretation of other provisions of national or 
Community law”. 324  Against this background, Recommendations would serve the purpose of 
harmonization or, at least, the performance of the European Commission in this particular case of 
study sheds some light on the reading that the Commission seems to make of the Recommendation 
by attributing de facto binding force. 
The reasons that lead the Commission to issue a Recommendation on cost-accounting 
methodologies might well be its impact on private relations, a subject matter which falls outside 
EU’s competence. Actually, as recognized in Grimaldi, the European institutions generally adopt 
Recommendations “when they do not have the power under the Treaty to adopt binding 
measures”.325 In the issue that has brought us here, the European Commission alleges lack of 
harmonization in the application of cost-accounting principles to termination markets, divergence 
between price control measures and different practices in implementing costing tools.326 In addition, 
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the Recommendation seeks for a consistent application of the specific provisions concerning cost 
accounting and accounting separation.327 
The confrontation in the case does not lie on the proportionality of the measure itself, but in 
the nature of the instrument it stems from. Thus, the Court observes that although the mandate of 
Article 19 of the Framework Directive for NRAs is to try their utmost to follow the Commission’s 
Recommendations when carrying regulatory duties, it does not preclude the possibility of deviation. 
The court acknowledges that it is particularly important that this compliance with EU rules entails a 
violation of national law. The regulatory decision on tariff-regulation setting cap prices using the 
pure BULRIC cost model is at odds with the former Article 6a.2(1), (a), and (3) of the Dutch 
Telecommunications Act.328 Accordingly, the legal debate at stake is a supremacy concern EU soft-
law vis-à-vis hard national law.  
Determining the legal effect of the Recommendation might give a proper locus standi to 
other operators –those seeking access to the network– to appeal the regulatory decision329 setting 
cap prices via the BULRIC+ methodology on the grounds that the national measure impairs the 
outcome achieved via the application of EU law (i.e. the Recommendation).330 Accordingly, the 
question to pose here would be whether the supremacy or precedence principle can be extended to 
a Recommendation that, in practice –and as a result of the control mechanisms put in place such as 
Article 7a procedure–, might be considered de facto binding.   
iv. Independence and expertise 
The issues at stake in this case also call for looking an examination of the role of the actors 
involved and the governance structure. What is the difference between the national court and the 
regulatory authority? The court has taken over the role of the regulator undermining the remit of 
the authority.  
Independence might be impaired as a result of the complexity of the implementation 
procedure put in place. Furthermore, a veto power exercised by the Commission not only 
undermines the national procedural autonomy, but also interferes with the independence of the 
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national regulator, given that the Commission pursues policy goals.331 But, to what extent does 
independence guarantee the effective application of the law?  
The role of the judiciary as a regulator calls for scrutiny; given that telecommunications is 
a highly technical sector. In fact, expertise is one of the rationales for NRAs’ continued existence. 
The independence requirement logically also applies to the judiciary. Thus, in order to ensure 
effective legal protection, the court –or the body in charge of deciding the appeal– should also 
ensure a proper level of expertise.332 This raises an institutional issue as to what is the instance that 
provides a better understanding, the national regulator or the judge? From a technical point of view, 
it is hardly possible to translate into legal terms these costing methodology issues. Accordingly, the 
interpretation of the national market conditions requires a high level of specialization. In the case at 
stake, it turns out that the Dutch court is composed of specialized team of economist, but this might 
not be the case in every single Member State.  
v. Contextualization in further European experiences. Termination tariff regulation 
As a matter of fact the above case is neither the first nor the last where the Commission put into 
practice the mechanism of Article 7a. Despite its short life ‒Article 7a entered into force with the 
third package (May 2011)‒ to date there have already been 29 Opinions issued by BEREC in cases 
which have given rise to the Phase II investigation. 333 As previously mentioned, in those cases 
BEREC largely shared the Commission’s doubts. In 18 of them BEREC supported the European 
Commission in having serious doubts. In another 5 cases, BEREC only partially agreed with the 
Commission, while in 5 cases BEREC considered that the Commission’s concerns where 
unjustified.  
Particularly, in the field of termination rates, some NRAs in different Member States have 
followed the Commission’s Recommendation proposing pure BULRIC methodology in that 
context. In these countries, the application of this methodology has “succeeded so far”.334 On the 
contrary, there have been other cases where NRAs are also coming across similar issues in similar 
issues as the Netherlands when implementing the Commission’s Recommendation, such as is the 
case for Germany335 or Italy336inter alia. 
vi. The role of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
The CJEU may get involved in this procedure as a consequence of the preliminary reference 
procedure.337 Already within the first appeal procedure culminating in the judgment that gave rise 
to the opening of the Phase II of the Article 7a procedure, the national judge should have submitted 
the case for consideration by the European Court. However, at that time, the CBb did not see the 
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need to consult the European Court for clarification. 338  This particular reluctance has been 
identified as a usual practice within the Dutch judiciary, at least in the highest administrative 
court.339 In a case such as the one at stake, which concerns the legal effect of a piece of European 
guidance embodied in the form of a Commission’s Recommendation, the national court is required 
to submit a request for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU.340 
Be that as it may, the new appeal on a new regulatory decision on termination rates seems 
to now be being referred by the CBb. The questions referred for preliminary ruling are as 
follows:341  
1. Must Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive, read in conjunction with Articles 8 and 13 of the Access 
Directive, be interpreted as meaning that, in principle, in a dispute concerning the lawfulness of a cost-
oriented scale of charges imposed by the national regulatory authority (NRA) in the wholesale call 
termination market, a national court is permitted to make a ruling which does not accord with the 
European Commission Recommendation of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and 
Mobile Termination Rates in the EU (2009/396/EC), 3 in which pure BULRIC is recommended as the 
appropriate price regulation measure for call termination markets, if, in that national court’s view, this 
is required on the basis of the facts in the case brought before it and/or on the basis of considerations of 
national or supranational law? 
 
2. If the answer to Question 1 is affirmative: to what extent is the national court permitted, in assessing a 
cost-oriented price regulation measure: 
a. in the light of Article 8(3) of the Framework Directive, to evaluate the NRA’s argument that the 
development of the internal market is promoted by reference to the degree to which the 
functioning of the internal market is in fact influenced? 
b. to assess, in the light of the policy objectives and regulatory principles laid down in Article 8 of 
the Framework Directive and Article 13 of the Access Directive, whether the price regulation 
measure: 
i. is proportionate; 
ii. is appropriate; 
iii. has been applied proportionately and is justified? 
 
c. to require the NRA to demonstrate adequately that: 
i. the policy objective, referred to in Article 8(2) of the Framework Directive, that the NRAs 
should promote competition in the provision of electronic communications networks and 
electronic communications services is genuinely being attained and that users are 
genuinely deriving maximum benefit in terms of choice, price and quality; 
ii. the policy objective, referred to in Article 8(3) of the Framework Directive, that NRAs 
should contribute to the development of the internal market is genuinely being attained; 
and 
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iii. the policy objective, referred to in Article 8(4) of the Framework Directive, that the 
interests of the citizens should be promoted is genuinely being attained? 
 
d. in the light of Article 16(3) of the Framework Directive, and of Article 8(2) and (4) of the 
Access Directive, when assessing whether the price regulation measure is appropriate, to take 
into account the fact that the measure has been imposed on the market on which the regulated 
undertakings possess significant market power but, in the form chosen (pure BULRIC), has the 
effect of promoting one of the objectives of the Framework Directive, namely the interests of 
end users, on another market which has not been earmarked for regulation? 
 
The first question is expected to result in an important debate on the role of EU law. Furthermore, it 
addresses classic and timely questions about the role and legal effect of EU soft-law in the context 
of the new governance debate. The national judge asks the European court to clarify the discretion 
of the national judge to deviate from a European Recommendation where, at the national level, not 
only legal national legal but also factual circumstances require doing so. It refers here to the fact 
that the national conditions remain unchanged.  
The second question would challenge the nature and rationale of the Article 7a procedure 
itself as a supervisory mechanism, provided that the national court is interested in defining to what 
extent the effect on the Internal Market of a national regulatory decision is enough so as to justify a 
mandatory compliance with a non-binding European instrument. For the telecommunications sector 
in particular, the court should also determine the suitability of the Internal Market argument to 
follow the Recommendation when it actually has little effect outside the national borders. To this 
end, the European court will have to address the question of proportionality of the regulatory 
decision to modify a measure in the national market in accordance with the Recommendation, 
especially when national circumstances remain unchanged.     
Interestingly, the national court poses question(s) on the legitimacy of the court to deviate 
from the Recommendation, but does not refer to the NRA’s. This reflects a significant decoupling 
of the regulator and the judiciary, even though, in practice, they are performing the same task of 
tariff regulation. Thus, the role of the regulator might be adulterated by the Commission’s view in 
its pursuit of the internal market-building project, or replaced by the judiciary when overturning 
regulatory decisions. 
Conclusions 
This case serves as a reminder for European private lawyers to look beyond the institutional design 
of the legal areas concerned. Apart from the actors involved in this institutional conflict, the case 
has evidenced the impact of the sector-specific European supervision procedure put in place as well 
as the practical legal effect of a soft-law instrument. The CJEU will be decisive in confirming the 
latter.   
The examination of this case reveals the intricacies of a highly bureaucratic procedure 
whose raison d’être is consolidating the Internal Market for electronic communications (finalité) 
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through a consistent implementation of the European Regulatory Framework vis-à-vis national law 
and the judiciary. The established co-ordinated approach in the implementation of 
telecommunications regulation involves a regulatory power transfer. However, this regulatory 
power shift seems to replace democratically elected bodies (i.e. Parliament) as power is re-
allocated to administrative bodies further from democratic accountability. As for private law 
concerns, it represents a novel source a law-making that comes from polarized sources. Thus, the 
role of the regulator might be influenced by the Commission’s view in its pursuit of the internal 
market-building project, or replaced by the judiciary when overturning regulatory decisions in an 
attempt to restore the democratic deficit in the established regulatory system. Moreover, the 
collaborative scheme –mainly based on persuasion and guidance– between the European 
Commission and the (network of) NRAs seems to be more effective than coercion via the adoption 
of binding rules or the use of veto powers. As a matter of fact, Article 7a procedure unfolds as a 
mechanism for a “new” and network governance that potentially shifts the power from the national 
to the European level. Under this co-ordinated approach, the EU Commission has managed to 
dodge the political rejection −coming particularly from the Member States, the European 
Parliament and even the Council of Ministers itself− associated with the creation of an ex novo 
European authority or the enactment of hard law.342  
In consequence, even though the combination of hard and soft law is considered a less 
intrusive measure, it actually increases regulatory harmonization with the advantage of bypassing 
political accountability. This mode of law-making of a post-national nature, 343 and the use of a 
Recommendation coupled with the scrutiny of the Article 7 procedure extends the mandatory 
interpretative role of the recommendation.344  
 
5.2 Law-making and price setting on retail markets  
At the retail level, the definition of spheres of competence and power relationships in the telecoms 
sector has been tackled by the CJEU in the landmark Vodafone case. This case concerns the 
validity of the implementation of the Regulation (EC) No 717/2007, commonly known as the 
“Roaming Regulation”.345 This legal text establishes maximum charges, the so-called Eurotariff, 
that mobile telephony operators are allowed to invoice end-users for voice calls received or made 
by an end-user travelling abroad. Provision is also made for a cap on wholesale charges, i.e. the 
prices payable by the consumer’s network operator to the foreign network. Initially scheduled to 
expire on 30th June 2010, this Regulation was amended to extend its validity until 30th June 2012, 
whilst at the same time extending the caps on charges to SMS and other data transmissions.  
                                                          
342 By way of example, the conferring of powers to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which gave 
rise to the Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 January 2014 (ESMA case), also C-217/04, ENISA. See also 
Ottow, A. (2012) ‘Europeanization of the Supervision of Competitive Markets’. European Public Law 18(1), pp. 191–
221, and Simpson (2011).  
343 Senden, L. (2013), “Soft Post‐Legislative Rulemaking: A Time for More Stringent Control”, European Law Journal, 
19(1), 57-75. Here, Senden refers to decisional acts. Article 7a procedure could well be an example of such acts.  
344 Recall Grimaldi case.  
345 Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2007 on roaming on public 
mobile telephone networks within the Community and amending Directive 2002/21/EC (OJ 2007 L 171, p. 32). 
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The validity of this Regulation was challenged before the High Court of Justice in England 
and Wales (High Court). In particular, a reference has been made to the CJEU concerning the 
validity of provisions for the implementation of Regulation No 717/2007 adopted by the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in proceedings between Vodafone Ltd and other 
operators of public mobile telephone networks in the United Kingdom, the European Union and 
other international markets, and the Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform. 
 On these grounds, the questions referred to the suitability of Article 95 EC (now Article 
114 TFEU) as a legal basis for the adoption of the Regulation and the imposition of a ceiling tariff 
for Roaming charges and its compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. In 
particular, the national court referred the following questions:  
a) Is Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 invalid, in whole or part, by reason of the inadequacy of 
Article 95 EC as a legal basis? 
b) Is Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 (together with Articles 2(a) and 6(3) insofar as 
they refer to the Eurotariff and obligations relating to the Eurotariff) invalid on the grounds 
that the imposition of a price ceiling in respect of retail roaming charges infringes the principle 
of proportionality and/or subsidiarity? 
The Grand Chamber rendered judgment on The 8th of June 2010.346 The Court recalls that it 
already held, in United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council, ENISA,347 that the authors of the 
Treaty intended to confer on the Community legislature a discretion, depending on the general 
context and the specific circumstances of the matter to be harmonized, as regards the method of 
approximation most appropriate for achieving the desired result, in particular in fields with 
complex technical features.348 The Court also considered that the attempts to solve the problem of 
the high level of retail prices using the existing legal framework did not yield the effect of lowering 
charges. In fact, in the court’s view, the Regulatory Framework for telecommunications had not 
provided NRAs with enough tools to act against this problem because of the cross-border nature of 
roaming services.349 Therefore, the adoption of the Regulation on the basis of Article 95 TEC is 
suitable for the purpose it is aimed for.  
As for proportionality of the measure adopted regards the cap price in retail markets, the 
Court considered that the Regulation does not infringe the principle of subsidiarity as long as a 
“regulation of wholesale charges alone would not have had a direct and immediate effect for 
consumers”, a regulation on retail charges being more appropriate, and that the regulation adopted 
was the only solution, to tackle the problem at stake.350 In addition, as for the subsidiarity principle, 
                                                          
346 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 June 2010. Case C-58/08, The Queen, on the application of Vodafone 
Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2010] ECR I-04999.  
347 C-217/04 United Kingdom v. European Parliament and Council (ENISA), [2006] ECR I–3771.  
348 Ibid. Para. 35 
349 Ibid. Para. 40.  
350 Paragraph 66: “(…)it is clear that regulation of wholesale charges alone would not have had a direct and immediate 
effect for consumers. By contrast, only the regulation of retail charges could improve the situation of consumers 
directly”. See also paras. 61-65.   
 
  112 
the situation is said to require a joint approach in both retail and wholesale markets.351 In addition, 
the Court identified that the pursued aim is best achieved at Community level.352  
Comment 
This case is about the EU the boundaries of EU competence on the basis of Article 114 TFEU 
(Article 95 TEC at that time). The constitutional backing of EU’s legislation concerning the 
internal market harmonization basis is a traditional issue within the European case-law.353  
 The relevance of this case for private law resides not in the competence of the national 
legislator or national regulator, but on the suitability of the European legislator to establish 
maximum prices in the retail market under the internal market legal basis, provided that it may 
represent a spillover of the Internal Market competence. In order to decide on the case, the court 
had to assess the measure in the view of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.  
 By virtue of the proportionality principle, the content and form of Union action shall not 
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.354 In the case at stake, the EU 
legislature shall justify its decision of setting cap prices not only in the wholesale market, but also 
of putting in place ceiling prices, together with information duties concerning roaming charges to 
end-users. To that end, Recital 14 of the Roaming Regulation states that “experience has shown 
that reductions in wholesale prices for Community-wide roaming services may not be reflected in 
lower retail prices for roaming owing to the absence of incentives for this to happen”. In addition, 
Recital 19 of the Roaming Regulation provides that the Eurotariff reasonably reflects the 
underlying costs involved in the provision of the service giving operators a reasonable margin over 
the wholesale costs. On this matter, the court acknowledged that regulation of the wholesale market 
would not be directly translated into a benefit for consumers and that, accordingly, only the 
regulation of retail prices would directly improve consumers’ welfare in terms of lower prices.355 
The court also verified that this target could be best achieved with a supranational action.356  
 Furthermore, the temporary character of the measure also became a justification on the 
basis of the proportionality principle. In fact, Recital 39 of the Roaming Regulation introduced a 
sunset rule concerning the limitation of the intervention.357 In this regard, the court held that the 
intervention, since it is aimed at protecting consumers against excessive charges, is proportionate 
even if it implies negative consequences for certain operators, given that such a measure is limited 
                                                          
351Para. 77.  
352Para. 78.  
353 Tobacco, Federutility, etc.  
354 On this account, see Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04 ABNA and Others [2005] ECR I-10423.  
355 Para. 66.  
356 Para. 77. 
357 Recital 39: “This common approach should be established for a limited time period. This Regulation may, in the light 
of a review to be carried out by the Commission, be extended or amended. The Commission should review the effective- 
ness of this Regulation and the contribution which it makes to the implementation of the regulatory framework and the 
smooth functioning of the internal market and also examine the impact of this Regulation on the smaller mobile 
telephony providers in the Community and their position in the Community-wide roaming market”.  
 
  113 
in time.358 To date, Roaming charges and pan-European price ceilings are still in place and only 
recently an agreement has been reached on their removal from June 2017.359 
On subsidiarity, a question arises regarding the extent to which prices can be regulated, 
even once the market has been opened to competition.360 One may ask whether price regulation is 
the aim of EU telecommunications regulation and how it might come into conflict with the 
regulatory goals of the European Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications. Indeed, putting 
an end to geographic lottery might be justified on grounds of non-discrimination and in the field of 
roaming charges by the fundamental freedoms. 361  But how can this European intervention be 
justified in cases where there is no supranational dimension, i.e. where there is not a single market 
for telecommunications? 
Furthermore, it has been argued, that the consumer protection argument might not be 
enough of a reason to justify a EU intervention, given that the EU legislature is not exclusively 
competent in consumer issues. In addition, the suitability of Article 114 TFEU as the basis to put 
an end to a situation that is the result of the conditions of national markets and not a consequence 
of the disparity between the national legal regimes has been questioned.362 Accordingly, it has been 
suggested that a more fitting legal basis would have been Article 308 EC Treaty (now Article 352 
TFEU) instead of Article 95.363  
Conclusions 
In Vodafone, the court has again conducted a non-restrictive reading of Article 114 TFEU. 
Particularly in this case, the European justice supports retail price fixing by the European 
legislature on the grounds of a need for European action to tackle excessive prices. In doing so, the 
Court confirms the suitability of the Internal Market competence for the adoption of retail prices by 
the EU legislator itself. 
 The practical relevance of the intervention results is indisputable. Since the cap prices 
entered into force, prices for calls and SMS has decreased by 80%, whereas data roaming is 
currently more than 90% cheaper than it was in 2007.364 
It remains to be discussed, however, whether it is the aim of the EU to allow fixed prices in 
certain markets. Remarkably, only a few weeks before the CJEU rendered judgment in Vodafone, 
again the Grand Chamber was in charge of ruling on State intervention on the price for the supply 
                                                          
358 Para. 69. In a more substantive assessment, Advocate General (Maduro) argues that the time restraint gives the market 
a “second opportunity” to correct the market failure. See Para 41 of the AG’s Opinion.  
359 Commission welcomes agreement to end roaming charges and to guarantee an open Internet – Press Release – 30 June 
2015, IP/15/5265. Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5265_en.htm.  
360 See case C-265/08, Federutility and Others v Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas [2010] ECR I- 03377.  
361 Para. 32 Vodafone.  
362 Brenncke, M. (2010). ‘Case C-58/08, Vodafone Ltd and Others v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 8 June 2010’. Common Market Law Review, 
47(6), 1793-1814. 
363 Ibid.  
364 Commission welcomes agreement to end roaming charges and to guarantee an open Internet – Press Release – 30 June 
2015, IP/15/5265. 
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of natural gas.365 And, as expected, such intervention was allowed in view of its compliance with 
the proportionality principle, although this time by the national regulator. 
In conclusion, this means that both the European legislator and the national regulator in the 
respective markets, supported by the European court, are paradoxically in favor of allowing 
regulatory price setting in liberalized markets, and this does not come into conflict with the defined 
objectives of the respective regulatory frameworks.  
6. Conclusions: From parliamentary rule-making to specialized regulatory 
powers and sector-specific supervisory mechanisms 
This chapter represents a legal analysis of the potential sources of intervention in the sphere of 
private law via the making of telecommunications regulation. Such analysis has evidenced how 
new modes of governance have also influenced the creation of (regulatory) private law. 
The liberalization of the telecommunications sector has entailed a shift from national 
regulation to supranational law-making. The legal basis employed reflects that telecommunications 
regulation is part of the Internal Market construction project. Against this background, the 
European Commission seems to take the lead in telecommunications regulation and controls the 
coordination efforts for a consistent application of the regulatory framework, particularly, in the 
application of Internal Market principles. 366  As a corollary of liberalization, the regulatory 
framework for telecommunications contains several contract-related provisions both at the 
wholesale or retail level. The rights and remedies provided for by the telecoms rules entail 
implications for private law and, in particular, for the freedom of contract. This has meant an 
increasing transformation in the way private law is manifested, enacted and applied. 
Decision-making at the EU level takes place in a wide range of forms. In the telecoms 
sector, it occurs via an institutional design based on a system of supervision in which the 
Commission holds strong supervisory powers that prevent the distorted application of the EU rules 
by relying on a collaborative approach. This aims to remove the divergences among the 
performance of the different national regulatory authorities. Interestingly, what is also at stake in 
the implementation case analyzed is the role of EU soft-law. In any case, this chapter has illustrated 
how a separation of roles between policy/law-making vis-à-vis execution/implementation gets 
blurred when it comes to the supervisory powers of the Commission and the role of NRAs as 
decision-makers,367 which must try to give shape not only to the implementation of the measures 
                                                          
365 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) 20 April 2010, Case C-265/08, Federutility and Others v Autorità per 
l'energia elettrica e il gas [2010] ECR I- 03377. 
366 Groenleer, M., & Kars, M. (2008). Regulation and governance of the European telecommunications sector: from 
network to agency. In ECPR Standing Group on Regulatory Governance Conference ‘(Re) Regulation in the Wake of 
Neoliberalism. Consequences of three decades of privatization and market liberalization’. Utrecht. 
367 Interview with the Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012: “The discussions in BEREC are, thus, broader 
than the specific functions performed by NRAs at the national level. For instance, OPTA (former Dutch NRA) is not 
empowered in the field of spectrum issues and some discussions within the BEREC are about spectrum issues or net 
neutrality. These matters concern policy. However, the BEREC does not want politicians sitting around the table. And, 
therefore, it is in those (potentially political) cases where the Ministry could express some concern into the matter and its 
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adopted at EU level, but also to their consistent application. This has given rise to a “semi-
autonomous level of governance”.368 
In particular, the analysis of the case-study on termination rates has shown how the 
national authority, at the very far end representing the role of the Member State vis-à-vis the EU, 
has become just a mere “executive authority”369 (strongly) subordinated to the regulatory objectives 
set out at the EU level. In a similar vein, a closer look at the implementation of the EU Regulatory 
Framework for Electronic Communications reveals a subtle increasing relevance of the EU 
Commission’s role at the functional level when it comes to the achievement of one of the major 
regulatory goals: the consistent application of the legal framework and harmonization of the 
Internal Market. Hence, given the lack of capacity of the EU to implement EU rules according to 
the EU’s aspirations, it has set up a proper institutional framework made out of national players 
(NRAs), European fora (BEREC) and implementing procedures (Article 7 Framework Directive) 
which ensure the application of the Regulatory Framework according to the EU understanding and 
in line with its policy goals. Against this background, the European Commission seems to take the 
lead in telecommunications regulation and controls the coordination efforts for a consistent 
application of the regulatory framework, particularly for the application of Internal Market 
principles.370 This means that under the Internal Market-driven institutional and procedural setting 
put in place, the European Commission might be enjoying a significant level of control and could 
potentially restrict the national procedural autonomy principle, giving rise to a new mode of law-
making deeply committed to a market building project. 
In close connection to the above, one may ask whether NRAs, under the exercise of powers 
defy the orthodox separation of powers and the principle of legality. 371  Particularly, the 
examination of this case brings normative conclusions related to the democratic accountability of 
the examined supervisory mechanism and the principle of legality. Here the role of the national 
court becomes prominent in order to counterbalance the side effects of the procedure regarding the 
legitimacy of the regulatory intervention, be it national or European. This gives rise to the issue of 
the spillover of the judiciary in the making of regulatory law. Thus, when the national judiciary is 
reviewing a regulatory decision, it is not getting into the shoes of the regulator, but it certainly 
shapes the way in which EU legislation must be applied into the national system. Whereas the clash 
(conflict and resistance) of the national judiciary vis-à-vis the application of EU rules affecting 
private and contract law is visible in the implementation process of the Regulatory Framework, this 
                                                                                                                                                                                
desire of being involved in one way or another. Accordingly, the distinction between the regulator and the Government is 
“quite clear” at the national level; whereas, at the European level, is not that clear-cut”, emphasis added.  
368 As Joerges has put it; in Joerges, C. (2006). “Deliberative Political Processes’ Revisited: What Have we Learnt 
About the Legitimacy of Supranational Decision‐Making”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(4) 779-802. 
369 Pescatore supra n 42, at p. 46. 
370 Groenleer, M., and Kars, M. (2008). Regulation and governance of the European telecommunications sector: from 
network to agency. In ECPR Standing Group on Regulatory Governance Conference ‘(Re) Regulation in the Wake of 
Neoliberalism. Consequences of three decades of privatization and market liberalization’. Utrecht. 
371 See for a discussion of the position of NRAs in various Member States: Zwart, T. and Verhey, L. (eds.) (2003), 
Agencies in European and Comparative Law, Intersentia; and Caranta, R., Andenas, M. and Fairgrieve, D. (2004), 
Independent Administrative Authorities, London, British Institute of International and Comparative Law. 
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turf war is most noticeable under the judicial review process of regulatory adjudication of disputes 
by NRAs.372  
In sum, the making of telecommunications regulation is multidimensional. Formal and 
informal procedures come together and, together with delegated acts and monitoring practices by 
the EU, increase the role of soft-law. The internal market harmonization expands EU’s competence 
to regulate issues related to private law. In particular, the influence of telecommunications 
regulation in private law takes place mainly via regulatory decisions. Thus for example, price 
control and tariff regulation are part of the NRAs’ regulatory duties. This allocation of powers 
exclusively to the sector-specific regulator shifts the source of private law from the legislature to 
the sector-specific regulator, monitored by sector-specific European supervisory mechanisms. To 
conclude, this chapter argues that the institutional design of telecommunications regulation, 
together with the institutional conflicts, as evidenced in the cases analyzed, clearly impact on the 
substance of private law as long as regulatory interventions are contingent upon the objectives of 
the regulatory framework for electronic communications, namely the promotion of competition and 
protection of EU citizens and, most importantly the development of the Internal Market. 
                                                          
372 See, in this particular, Chapter 5 of this Dissertation.  
 
  117 
CHAPTER 4 – SUBSTANTIVE LAW. 
CONTRACTUAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE EU REGULATORY 




1. Introduction. Contracts as a regulatory tool 
In recent decades, Private law has been used as an equally efficient technique to regulate markets 
as other forms of public, social or economic regulation.1 As a matter of fact, contracts in the 
telecommunications sector are aimed at enabling (an efficient) market participation. This market 
participation regulatory model builds heavily upon the idea of access. 2  Given that 
telecommunications is a networked industry,3 access is crucial for the functioning of the market. 
The configuration of the access paradigm operates at two different levels, wholesale and 
retail markets. At the wholesale level, the network operator (owner of the network infrastructure) 
must grant access to the network at least to an alternative undertaking providing telecom services in 
order to facilitate competition. Competition in the electronic communications field is based on the 
assumption that all market players should be able to provide services through the network, 
regardless of who is the holder of the property rights through the network; usually the incumbent.4 
To this end, the European regulatory scheme for telecommunications provides for a regime of 
regulatory obligations that enable access to and the interconnection of networks. Access and 
interconnection are thus used as regulatory tools that circumvent to a great extent the cardinal 
private law principle of freedom of contract. At the retail level, the idea of access is more easily 
linked to access to the market (access justice).5 The legal regime provides for a set of rights that are 
oriented to strengthen consumer protection on the basis of a more competitive ‒i.e. efficient‒ 
behavior at retail level, facilitating the functioning of the market. Yet, simply introducing 
competitive contract rules6 (competition law approach) does not fulfill the aims of competition 
policy as long as certain consumers remain excluded from the market. Accordingly, in addition to 
more competition-oriented mechanisms, the legislator has introduced more redistributive tools 
(universal service approach) aimed at enabling access to the market to those users who are, 
economically or geographically, vulnerable. By so doing, the regulatory framework provides for 
                                                          
1 Collins, H. (1999), Regulating Contracts, Oxford University Press.  
2 Micklitz, H. W. (Ed.) (2011), The many concepts of social justice in European private law. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
3 Millward, R. (2005), Private and public enterprise in Europe: energy, telecommunications and transport, 1830-1990. 
Cambridge University Press. 
4 In telecommunications, the incumbent is the former monopolist who, under such condition, still enjoys significant 
market share.  
5 Micklitz, H.W. (2011), “Social Justice and Access Justice in Private Law” EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2011/02..  
6 Micklitz, H. W. (2005), ‘The Concept of Competitive Contract Law’, Penn State International Law Review, 23, pp. 
549ff. 
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certain universal service obligations binding telecommunications operators that also impact the 
classical autonomie de la volonté.  
Against this background, the introduction of private law rights and remedies aim to 
advance market competition. Hence, in the design of a competitive market for telecom, the 
legislator has deployed contract law as a regulatory instrument in order to achieve the aims of the 
European Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications.7 This chapter argues that, when 
contract law is used to give access to the market, it is used as a regulatory instrument in such a way 
that it implies a transformation in the way private law has been traditionally understood.8 In other 
words, it raises the question of whether there is a contrast between the objectives of the European 
regulatory framework for telecommunications and the traditional functions of private law. The 
analysis carried out in this chapter will thereby aim fruitful in order to assess the role of contract 
law in both the wholesale and the retail markets. In the former contracts are regulatory in nature, in 
the retail market the focus is on whether we can it is apt to talk about the emergence of a New 
European Socio-Private Law9 as long as it that introduces certain rights whose features bring the 
law closer to public services ideals under in a privatized relations resulting in a blurred distinction 
between public and private law. Furthermore, and most importantly, this chapter looks at a 
potential development of the Market-State10 and whether there is a gradual introduction (intrusion 
and substitution) of new remedies in B2C (business-to-consumer) relationships. In other words, it 
addresses the implications of a potential transformation in private law when it comes to contractual 
relationships.  
Having analyzed the creation of telecommunications regulation in the previous chapter, not 
only from an historical perspective, but also from the viewpoint of the actors involved and their 
interaction, this chapter exhibits, from a descriptive perspective, the content of telecommunications 
rules and their substantial provisions in view of their potential implications for private law. The 
chapter is structured in different sections. It deals first [section 2] with the regulatory goals and the 
two different approaches envisaged to achieve those aims. Secondly [section 3], it provides an 
overview of the rights and remedies provided for in the EU Regulatory Framework at the wholesale 
–regulatory obligations– as well as the retail level –consumer protection provisions. Section 4 
elaborates on two cases studies. The first case study, concerning the wholesale market, is related to 
the obligation to negotiate interconnection agreements between undertakings that publicly provide 
electronic communications services. A second case study examines the Italian retail market dealing 
with a consumer-related dispute where the breach of quality standards in the provision of services 
gives rise to the emergence of a remedy apparently endogenous to the telecommunications sector; 
in this case, the right to switch for free or contract termination without incurring a penalty. Finally, 
                                                          
7 Already introduced by Micklitz supra n 6.  
8 Understood as a “coherent set of rules for the centralized adjudication of contracts, torts, and property dispute”, Caruso, 
D. (2006) "Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization", New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics, 39, 1–74; at p. 5, referring to the notion of traditional private law in the literature on global State-
making.  
9 Micklitz, H.-W., (2011) ‘Universal Services: Nucleus for a Social European Private Law’, in Cremona, M. (ed.), Market 
Integration and Public Services in the European Union, Oxford University Press, pp. 63-102.  
10 Bobbitt, P. (2002), The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History, Knopf. 
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section 5 aims to display the interplay between sector-specific rules vis-à-vis horizontal regimes 
represented by broader private law rules and the paradoxes in the application of the different 
regimes. The chapter concludes [section 6] by arguing that the expansion of (goal oriented) private 
law provisions contained within sector-specific regulation downgrades the application of civil and 
contract law.  
2. Policy objectives of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications  
The policy objectives of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications are:11 1) 
contributing to the development of the Internal Market by removing obstacles to the provision of 
electronic communications networks and services at European level and fostering the 
interoperability of pan-European services, on the basis of non-discrimination and under a 
collaborative approach between the NRAs and the EU Commission and among them; 2) 
encouraging competition, by ensuring users to derive the maximum benefit in terms of choice, 
price, and quality; and 3) guaranteeing basic users’ (citizens’)12 service rights by ensuring access to 
universal services, a high-level of protection of consumers, and that the integrity and security of 
public communications networks are maintained. 
 
The first objective was already addressed in the previous chapter [chapter 3], where it can 
be seen that the Internal Market aspiration penetrates the institutional design of telecommunications 
rule-making as a whole. The two other goals ‒i.e. encouraging competition and ensuring basic 
user’s services rights– are achieved via substantive law provisions. Given that they are two distinct 
goals, two different approaches are used. The EU Regulatory Framework provides a set of rules 
that are clearly competition-oriented. The role of the law in the retail market is to facilitate 
competition by grating certain rights that seem to place the consumer at a certain level field to 
participate efficiently in the market. At the wholesale level, this is reflected in certain provisions, 
which provide for regulatory obligations (e.g. access and interconnection). These obligations seek 
to open the market to competition by enabling the participation of third parties to deliver services 
through the network. At the retail level, the idea of access prevails too. The universal service ideal 
is deeply rooted in the idea of non-discriminatory access. This twofold approach towards 
substantive law provisions has given rise to the emergence of two differentiated sets of rules: 
competition-oriented (autonomy) and social-oriented (regulation). 13  Notwithstanding this 
differentiation, both approaches are accommodated within the sector-related regime, reconciling 
the nature of the service with the liberalization of the sector and the subsequent imposed 
                                                          
11 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC (‘Framework 
Directive’). Article 8: Policy objectives and regulatory principles.  
12 Benyon, F. ed. (2013), Services and the EU Citizen. Hart Publishing.  
13 On the distinction of autonomy vis-à-vis regulation see the dichotomy of the Formal v the Social in Kennedy, D. 
(1997), ‘The Paradox of American Critical Legalism’ European Law Journal, 3(4) 359–377.    
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competition. This dualist discourse can be applied not only to the telecommunications sector, but 
also to other network services given their nature as Services of General Economic Interest.  
 
Between Competition (Autonomy) and the Social (Regulation): A dual approach in 
Services of General Economic Interest 
Services identified as Network services ‒particularly, telecommunications services and the supply 
of electricity, gas, and water14‒ are included within the concept of Services of General Economic 
Interest (hereinafter, SGEIs). Traditionally, SGEIs were provided by the State under a public 
monopoly regime. However, since the 1980s, the European Community has been pressing for the 
liberalization of these markets, and many formerly state-owned companies have been gradually 
privatized. In addition, in the course of this liberalization, national monopolies were broken up and 
their privileges were drastically reduced, with the aim of making competition possible. The main 
purpose of the liberalization process was to create competition and, thus, more cost-efficient 
services. The relationship with the recipients has, thereby, been transferred from the public to the 
private law domain. Accordingly, the provision of the service falls within private law. Yet, their 
nature as network services and the fact that they constitute economic activities of particular 
importance to citizens means that they are subjected to public intervention. Its nature as regulated 
markets services entails, therefore, a particular configuration of the contracts for the provision of 
these services, freedom of contract being, to some extent, limited. Hence, the implemented regime 
pursues the model of the Regulatory State.15 Under this model, the provision of the immediate 
service is entrusted to a private company, whereas the State guarantees that private providers 
comply with their supply obligations.16  
The aim of achieving an Internal Market means that the regulation of Services of General 
Economic Interest occurs at the European Union level. The provision of such services (i.e. the 
relationship user-provider) is, thus, an evolving field of European Private Law. Nevertheless, 
despite several attempts,17 the European Union does not have a single European Contract Law, 
resulting in the regulation of different contracts in an isolated manner. In addition, freedom of 
contract is not expressly recognized in European Union Law. Nonetheless, in spite of this lack of 
recognition, it has been acknowledged by the European Union Court of Justice, 18  and it has 
gradually gained a foothold within public policy; e.g. consumer protection.19 Further, some claimed 
that the principle of contractual freedom can be constructed in relation to the protection of 
                                                          
14 This Chapter mainly addresses Telecommunications Services, as part of the Services of General Economic Interest. 
However, I have omitted any further reference to the classification of the Services of General Economic Interest as this 
task involves a more detailed analysis into the conceptual dimension of such services and this is not the purpose of this 
section.  
15 Majone, G. (1994) ‘The rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’, West European Politics, 17(3) 77-101.  
16 Rott, P. (2005), ‘A New Social Contract Law for Public services?–Consequences from Regulation of Services of 
General Economic Interest in the EC’, European Review of Contract Law, 3, pp. 323–345.  
17 Niglia, L. (2015), The Struggle for European Private Law. A Critique of Codification, Hart publishing.  
18 Case C-240/97 Spain v European Commission [1999] ECR I-6571; Case C-277/05 Société thermale d’Eugénie-les-
Bains v Ministère de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie [2007] ECR I-6415.  
19 Whittaker, S. (2011), ‘The optional instrument of European contract law and freedom of contract’, European Review of 
Contract Law, 7(3) 371-398.  
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competition, as a result of its interrelation with the EC Treaty’s aim of an open, competitively-
structured market.20 In other words, private autonomy is seen as “an instrument for allocation of 
national economic resources as long as the participants interact with one another on an 
approximately equal level –which is often not the case”.21 Following the argument of Basedow, 
when this is not the case, the State takes measures to lift the weaker party to a similar level. In the 
case of SGEIs, these measures may consist of, for instance, information duties 22  (enhancing 
competition), universal service requirements (protecting the social), or –as in the case of 
telecommunications– both.  
Market liberalization was envisaged to entail a new outlook for services provided within 
regulated markets as former public services. In theory, as a result of competition, the opening of 
these markets would mean an improvement in the position of services users, as a larger supply 
creating choice, better prices and an increase in quality. 23  With liberalization, new 
telecommunications service providers have recently emerged which has implied greater 
competition. Now, telecommunications users are able to look for better deals taking part in the 
competition game. However, the reality is that, as a result of the market-opening, there were –and 
there still are‒ people who stand outside of these markets and Universal Service requirements were, 
thereby, established. The necessity of preserving access conditions in liberalized markets has led to 
the use of private law principles in combination with other values coming traditionally from 
economic public law or social policies; i.e. private supply contracts but under the obligation to 
contract (access and interconnection remedies & universal service obligations) or price regulation 
via tariff controls and price caps, for instance. The regulation of these services is, thus, derived 
from a combination two different approaches. 
Since there is no explicit EU competence in relation to the Universal Service, it had to be 
created out of existing EU Treaty competition rules and the principles and instruments dealing with 
the creation of the Internal Market.24 In fact, the rules that govern these services are mostly based 
on Article 95 EC Treaty (now Article 114 TFEU), related to the establishment and functioning of 
the Internal Market. In this regard, rights such as information duties, the right to switch provider, 
the right of termination, cancellation, withdrawal, etc., are aimed at fostering competition. These 
rights function as a counterbalance for consumers and encourage its efficient actuation in the 
market. Nevertheless, the provision of SGEIs is also subject to public/universal service obligations, 
                                                          
20 Basedow, J. (2008), ‘Freedom of Contract in the European Union’, European Review of Private Law, 16, pp. 901-923.  
21 Ibid., see p. 904 
22 In this case, I do not pretend to go further into the debate concerning the real recipients of disclosure regulation and the 
different dichotomies that are part of the Wilhelmsson analysis, in Wilhelmsson, T. (2004a) ‘Varieties of Welfarism in 
European Contract Law Blunt Dichotomies on Contractual Values’. European Law Journal, 10(6) 712-733. 
23 For example, broadband Internet is today much cheaper than a few years ago.  For an analysis of the improvement of 
the German telecommunications markets as a result of the liberalization, see Möschel, W. (2009), ‘The Future Regulatory 
Framework for Telecommunications: General Competition Law instead of Sector-Specific Regulation–A German 
Perspective’European Business Organization Law Review, 10(1) 149-163. 
24 Braun, J.-D. & Capito, R. (2009) The emergence of EC Telecommunications Law as a new Self-standing field within 
Community Law, in Koening, C.; Bartosh, A.; Braun, J.D and Romes, M., EC Competition and Telecommunications 
Law, 2nd edition, Wolters Kluwer, pp. 41-52. See also Davies, J., & Szyszczack, E. (2011), ‘Universal Service 
Obligations: Fulfilling New Generations of Services of General Economic Interest’, in E. Szyszczack, J. Davies, M. 
Andeanes & T. Bekkedal (Eds.), Developments in Services of General Interest, The Hague. T.M.C. Asser Press, pp. 155-
178.  
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due to its character as essential services/facilities. These obligations lie at the heart of the human 
rights dimension, protecting the most vulnerable consumers; whereas private law is traditionally 
considered to encourage the functioning of the competitive market by contract deeply rooted in the 
autonomy of the parties. As a result, the rules governing these services pursue a dual approach: to 
enhance competition within the Internal Market (Internal Market approach), and –at the same 
time– to protect other social/welfarist values (Universal Service approach). 
With regard to the Internal Market approach, the provision of mandatory rules is intended 
to empower users of SGEIs in general or telecommunications users in particular. Thus, rights such 
as information, cancellation, choice, termination, withdrawal, switching, etc., are oriented to 
encourage competition by granting consumers the necessary tools to participate in the market 
efficiently.  
On the other hand, there is a more interventionist stream (a clear visible hand) granting 
other rights more in the line with social policies.25 Market failures cannot be corrected simply by 
the establishment of rights and remedies aimed at the promotion of competition; rather, it is also 
necessary to protect the most vulnerable consumers. This approach is derived from the premise that 
the forces of the market are not able to produce a satisfactory outcome at all times. Thus, room is 
left to authorities to interfere in order to fill gaps consistent with public policy objectives; for 
example, access rights, affordable access, physical access, continuity, prohibition of disconnection, 
etc., were granted due to the link between the absence of such services and social exclusion. It is 
not, therefore, an intervention based on the enhancement of competition within the Internal Market, 
but rather a regulatory market interference granting new rights ‒related to the accessibility to the 
service‒ hitherto unknown within the European consumer acquis or within the different national 
private legal orders.   
Universal Service as a concept existed already in the 19th Century in the UK26 and widely 
adopted in the US,27 has been used by the European Union in order to guarantee the effective 
accessibility to essential services by ensuring the availability a provider of last resort in order to 
keep those services designated as Universal Services accessible, equivalent to the level of access 
previously provided by the State itself.28 Therefore, access to services is achieved by imposing 
Universal Service Obligations (hereinafter, USOs), which are aimed at guaranteeing that everyone 
has access to certain essential services of a high quality and at prices that they can afford.29 Further, 
according to the European Commission, Universal Service is a concept aimed at preventing social 
                                                          
25 The European Social Model was recognized by the Nice European Council 2000. On this account, see Ross, M. (2009), 
The value of Solidarity in European Public Services, in Krajewski; Neergaard; Van de Gronden (Ed.), The Changing 
Legal Framework for Services if General Interest in Europe, pp. 81-100. The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press. See also 
Scharpf, F. W. (2002), ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 40, pp. 645–670.  
26 Uniform Penny Post, Rowland Hill’s Post Office Reform: its Importance and Practicability (February 1837).  
27 US Communications Act of 1934.  
28 See Communication from the Commission (1996), Services of General Interest in Europe. COM(96) 443 final. 
29 Ibid. p. 2.  
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exclusion. 30  Hence, the designation of a service as a Universal Service implies “the right of 
everyone to access certain services considered as essential and imposes obligations on service 
providers to offer defined services according to specified conditions, including complete territorial 
coverage and at an affordable price”.31 These assumptions entail interventions within the freedom 
of contract which go beyond the traditional private law. In the telecommunications field, an 
illustration of this intervention is Article 1(2) Universal Service Directive32:  
“[t]his Directive establishes the rights of end-users and the corresponding obligations of undertakings 
providing publicly available electronic communications networks and services. With regard to ensuring 
provision of universal service within an environment of open and competitive markets, this Directive 
defines the minimum set of services of specified quality to which all end-users have access, at an 
affordable price in the light of specific national conditions, without distorting competition (…)”.  
Another example statement can be found in Recital 47 of the Directive 2009/73/EC concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas33, which establishes that “[t]he citizens of the 
Union and, where Member States deem it to be appropriate, small enterprises, should be able to 
enjoy public service obligations, in particular with regard to security of supply and reasonable 
tariffs”.34 These public service obligations are contained in Article 3 of the Directive 2009/73/EC, 
establishing that Member States may impose on undertakings public service obligations which may 
relate to security, including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies, and 
environmental protection, comprising energy efficiency, energy from renewable sources and 
climate protection. Article 3 of Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal 
market in electricity 35  is drafted in similar terms. Likewise, Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal 
Service Directive), allocates its entire Chapter II to Universal Service obligations. Freedom of 
contract has, thereby, been strongly limited in favor of the most vulnerable consumers who, 
without access, could be subject to discrimination or social exclusion.   
At the wholesale level, Article 1(1) of the Access Directive establishes that the aim is “(…) 
to establish a regulatory framework, in accordance with internal market principles, for the 
relationships between suppliers of networks and services that will result in sustainable competition, 
interoperability of electronic communications services and consumer benefits”.36 To this end, when 
it comes to relationships among operators (wholesale market), the rules establish certain mandatory 
                                                          
30 Inter alia, Conclusions of the European Commission Communication on ‘Universal service in e-communications: 
report on the outcome of the public consultation and the third periodic review of the scope in accordance with Article 15 
of Directive 2002/22/EC, 23.11.2011, COM(2011) 795 final, p. 12.  
31 See Green Paper on Services of General Interest, COM (2003) 270, 21.5.2003, paragraphs 50 to 54. See also Micklitz, 
H.-W., (2011) ‘Universal Services: Nucleus for a Social European Private Law’, in Cremona, M. (ed.), Market 
Integration and Public Services in the European Union, Oxford University Press, pp. 63-102; and Rott, P. (2005)  
32 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' 
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (OJ L 108 , 24.04.2002, pp. 55-77) and now amended 
by the Directive 2009/136/EC (OJ L 337 18.12.2009 , pp. 11-36).  
33 OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, pp. 94-136 
34 Emphasis added.  
35 OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, pp. 55-93.  
36  Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive). 
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rules.37 The main idea is access, given that access regime allow alternative operators to access to 
the Significant Market Power (SMP) operators’ networks which enables competition.  
The goals in the wholesale and in the retail markets are closely connected. They follow 
common approaches, since the achievement of a competitive market in telecommunications is a 
mediate goal to enhance consumer welfare. Accordingly, the different European rules that govern 
the provision of services in regulated markets comprise both private and public law mechanisms. 
As a result, the mix between private and public instruments, in conjunction with the absence of a 
coherent welfarist system of values in the EU regulation, trigger “an inherent and inevitable tension 
in the welfare-state concept itself”.38 Hence, the challenge for the legislator is to successfully 
combine the enhancement of competition with the preservation of Universal Service 
requirements. 39  All this leads to the existence of rules concerning private relations ‒such as 
contracts for the supply of a service categorized as Service of General Economic Interest– which 
establish not only mandatory provisions concerning private law, but also make use of the 
establishment of public/universal service obligations –which are more akin to public policy. 
3. Contractual regulation in the Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications. Wholesale and retail markets  
The cornerstone and the main purpose of telecommunications regulation is the achievement of a 
fully competitive (internal) market for telecommunications.40 The designed system is then based on 
the assumption that competition contributes to the creation of economic welfare by yielding 
consumer benefits, translated into lower prices, better quality services and more consumer choice. 
The paramount idea of network services is, consequently, access to the market. Against this 
background, the legislator has relied on ex-ante regulatory intervention via contract law to achieve 
the regulatory goals. Because electronic communications markets encompass two different levels –
and, hence, rationales‒, it requires two different models of intervention: one for wholesale and 
another for retail markets. At the wholesale level, the access paradigm interferes with the 
contractual dimension as it implies a regulatory obligation for the network operator to contract with 
the party seeking access to the network. As mentioned above, the European Regulatory Framework 
harmonises the manner in which Member States regulate access to, and the interconnection of, 
                                                          
37 Article 1(2) Access Directive.  
38 Wilhelmsson (2004a), p. 715.  
39 This conflict related to the European social market economy has been addressed by the Court of Justice within the 
Viking case judgment (Case C-438/05, International Transport Worker’s Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking 
Line ABP, OÜ Viking Line Esti), observing that ‘[s]ince the Community has … not only an economic but also a social 
purpose, the rights under the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital must 
be balanced against the objectives pursued by social policy’ (para. 79). For a deeper analysis see Azoulai, L. (2009) ‘The 
Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy. The emergence of an ideal and the conditions for its realization’. 
Common Market Law Review, 45, pp. 1335-1355. For an illustration of the conflicting “market-making” and “market-
correcting” policies, see Scharpf, Fritz W. (2012), ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of 
Diversity’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (4), pp. 645–670. 
40 Pillar I of the Digital Agenda for Europe. Europe 2020 Strategy, available at http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/digital-
agenda-europe.  
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electronic communications networks.41 Accordingly, the Access Directive sets up the “rights and 
obligations for operators and for undertakings seeking interconnection and/or access to their 
networks or associated facilities”. 42  For instance, under the European legal framework for 
electronic communications, operators enjoying Significant Market Power must subject the terms 
and conditions of access and/or interconnection provision to the approval of the regulator. The 
contract is formally called “Reference Interconnection Offer” or “RIO”. On the other hand, at the 
retail level, provided there is a contractual relationship between the user and the service provider, 
the provision of Services of General Economic Interest (“SGEIs”) also falls within contract law. 
Consumer law provisions are also applicable to these contracts, insofar as SGEIs users are 
household customers, i.e. they act as consumers.43  
This section briefly analyzes the contractual rights and remedies provided for in the EU 
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications.  
3.1. “Regulatory rights and obligations” in wholesale markets 
At the wholesale level, the introduction of competition is undertaken via regulation, whose 
rationale is to ensure a certain level of “sustainable competition”44 by creating a level playing field 
through granting access to the networks –and its interoperability‒ in order to overcome market 
entry barriers. Given that telecommunications are characterized by economies of scale and scope, 
the simple opening to competition does not prevent the existence of undertakings holding 
Significant Market Power (SMP operators), which may hinder competition. While the combined 
system adopted (competition law + sector-specific regulation) provides for an extensive 
supervision that encompasses a three-stage procedure (market analysis, SMP designation, and 
imposition of regulatory obligations), this section will focus only on the latter as long as regulatory 
obligations, remedies so-called, have an impact in the contractual relationships between the 
different telecommunications network operators. The imposition of regulatory obligations is the 
third stage of such regulatory process.  
In particular, this tiered-procedure can be summarized as follows:45 1) first, there is a 
process of market definition in order to identify whether the market is subject to regulatory 
intervention46, so-called relevant markets; 2) then, a market analysis is carried out in order to detect 
whether there are undertakings which hold a certain level of market power which may distort prices 
at a competitive level ‒Significant Market Power; SMP–;47 3) the last stage involves the imposition 
of regulatory obligation(s). 48  Accordingly, the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
                                                          
41  Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (‘Access Directive’); Article 1(1).  
42Ibid. Article 1(2). 
43 Rott (2009).  
44 Article 1(1) Access Directive.  
45 For a deeper analysis of the imposition of regulatory remedies in telecoms, not only ex-ante, but also ex-post, see De 
Streel (2004) ‘Remedies in the European Electronic Communications Sector’, in Geradin, D. (Ed.). Remedies in Network 
Industries: EC Competition Law vs. Sector-specific Regulation, Intersentia, pp. 67-122.  
46 The procedure of market identification and definition is set out by Article 15 Framework Directive.  
47 Articles 14 and 16 Framework Directive.  
48 Article 16 Framework Directive, Article 8 Access Directive and Article 17 Universal Service Directive.  
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Communications provides for a system whereby the imposition of regulatory obligations is 
conditional upon the existence of markets susceptible to ex-ante regulation (relevant markets), and 
SMP operators, giving rise to asymmetric regulation;49 provided the telecommunications sector is 
considered to be a competitive market, with the exception of those situations where a contracting 
party is identified as SMP on a relevant market. In such event –i.e. when in a market the two 
premises can be identified (relevant market + SMP power) the NRA concerned should impose, at 
least, one regulatory obligation. Its choice will depend on the nature of the problem. This means 
that NRAs enjoy a certain degree of flexibility in the imposition of remedies. In addition, the 
specific regulatory obligation imposed should be effective in addressing the lack of competition and 
must be proportionate in relation to the problem concerned. The imposition of these remedies also 
needs to be justified in the light of the objectives enshrined in Article 8, Framework Directive,50 
and proportionate;51 i.e. the interventions chosen should be the least intrusive option possible to 
achieve the regulatory aim.   
Role and nature of “regulatory obligations” 
From the empirical analysis it follows that contractual disputes between operators mainly obtain to 
problems concerning the breach of some of the terms specified in the interconnection and access 
contracts as well as their economic conditions.52 This is the result of conflicts of interests caused by 
the extant bottleneck facilities. Thus, operators enjoying dominant positions sometimes abuse their 
position by imposing economic barriers to operators seeking network access or physically interrupt 
the access to the relevant infrastructure, which leads those concerned to report these abuses or to 
initiate a dispute settlement procedure.53 Further, certain operators have reported problems of client 
migration, i.e. when operators block the transfer of clients from one company to another.  
The regulatory design is aimed at mitigating the potential conflicts between undertakings 
that provide electronic communications networks and services, via the imposition of regulatory 
obligations. The rationale for regulatory intervention is the existence of market failures, negative 
network externalities and information asymmetry.54 Regulatory intervention is grounded on the 
necessity of preventing the abuse of a dominant position over other network operators. The target is 
the achievement of the ideal of a flawless, competitive and cost-oriented commercial relationships 
between the parties, such that it can give rise to interconnected networks and services at 
competitive costs in the wholesale market which, in turn, might be translated into lower prices in 
                                                          
49 Petiz, M. (2005), “Asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets”, European Economic Review, 
49(2), pp. 341–358. See also Carter, M. and J. Wright (2003), “Asymmetric network interconnection”, Review of 
Industrial Organization, 22, pp. 27-46.  
50 Articles 5 and 8, Access Directive.  
51 Article 5(2), 8(4), 12(2) and Recital 15 of the Access Directive.  
52 Interconnection is the process of handling calls for other service providers. This allows the customers of one service 
provider to communicate with the customers of another service provider. Thus, as a way of example, if two operators A 
and B are not interconnected partners then it would not be possible for a customer of Operator A to communicate with a 
customer of operator B. 
53 An exhaustive analysis of dispute resolution and its institutional design in telecoms wholesale market and is carried out 
in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.  
54  Stiglitz, J. E. (1999), “Promoting competition in telecommunications”, Centro de Estudios Economicos de la 
Regulacion. Working Paper Series. 
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the retail market. To this end, the Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications has put in 
place a set of obligations on operators and market review procedures. In particular, Articles 9 to 13 
of Directive 2002/19/EC (Access Directive) lists the following obligations on operators: 
transparency obligation, 55  non-discrimination obligation, 56  accounting separation obligation, 57 
obligation of access to essential facilities,58 price control and cost accounting obligations.59  In 
addition, the 2009 Amendment to the Access Directive includes two new obligations: imposition of 
functional separation of vertically integrated undertakings under specific circumstances (ultima 
ratio),60 and the procedure to follow when a vertically integrated undertaking decides to carry out a 
voluntary separation.61  
In circumstances in which none of the wholesale remedies proves to be effective, i.e. not 
resulting in the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 8 of Framework Directive, NRAs 
are entitled to impose regulatory obligations at the retail level.62 With the aim of protecting end-
users interests whilst promoting effective competition, these obligations on the retail market may 
consist in the application of appropriate retail price caps, measures to control individual tariffs, or 
measures to orient tariffs towards costs or prices on comparable markets.63  
In practice, this has resulted in National Regulatory Authorities attempting to put an end to 
the contractual problems arising from the existence of bottleneck facilities via the establishment of 
regulatory decisions concerning, mainly, the fees to be paid for the wholesale services 
(interconnection charges, access, termination rates, etc.) or the establishment of regulatory 
contracts (Reference Offers; “RO” or “RIO”) in order to avoid further potential disputes.  
As opposed to, or rather compared to, the remedies provided under competition law, these 
regulatory obligations do not consist in fines and/or damages, but rather they are akin to ex-ante 
remedies that have a direct impact in the contractual relationships between operators. The legal 
understanding of “remedy” is crucial for the dichotomy regulation/competition interventions in a 
certain market. Thus, while competition remedies are aimed at correcting existing market failures, 
the imposition of regulatory obligations aims to avoid future market failures.64 This distinction is 
significant for present purposes given that this section deliberately leaves aside competition law 
                                                          
55Ibid. Article 9. 
56Ibid. Article 10.  
57Ibid. Article 11.  
58Ibid. Article 12.  
59Ibid. Article 13.  
60  Article 13a as introduced by the Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (‘Better 
Regulation Directive).  
61Article 13b as introduced by the Directive 2009/140/EC (Better Regulation Directive). 
62 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' 
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (OJ L 108 , 24.04.2002, pp. 55-77) and now amended 
by the Directive 2009/136/EC (OJ L 337 18.12.2009 , pp. 11-36); Article 17(1): ‘Regulatory controls on retail services’ 
63 Ibid. Article 17(2) Universal Service Directive.  
64 For a deeper analysis on the dichotomy antitrust vis-à-vis sector-specific remedies, see Sidak, J. G. (2003), “Remedies 
and the Institutional Design of Regulation in Network Industries”, Michigan State DCL Law Review, Vol. 2003, Issue 3, 
741-756.  
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remedies.65 Rather, the present Section aims to provide evidence of the impact of sector-specific 
regulation in contractual relationships.  
From our reading of the regulatory objectives pursued, and our reading of Article 1 Access 
Directive, which harmonizes the regulation of access and interconnection for the relationships 
between telecommunications operators, it is considered that the key element of the system for 
achieving the policy goals of the regulatory framework is the “legal relationship” between 
telecommunications providers.66 The rationale of the framework might well be “embodied in the 
interconnection terms” agreed between the parties.67 Articles 9 to 13 of the Access Directive stand 
as the “most intrusive parts of the regulatory scheme”.68 
3.1.1. Transparency obligation 
Article 9(1) of the Access Directive establishes that  
National regulatory authorities may, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8, impose obligations for 
transparency in relation to interconnection and/or access, requiring operators to make public specified 
information, such as accounting information, technical specifications, network characteristics, terms and 
conditions for supply and use, including any conditions limiting access to and/or use of services and 
applications where such conditions are allowed by Member States in conformity with Community law, 
and prices.  
 
Paragraph 2 sets out, in addition, that where an operator has obligations of non-discrimination, the 
NRA may request from that operator the publication of a reference offer. Reference offers (RO) or 
Reference Interconnection Offers (RIOs) include the terms and conditions applicable to wholesale 
network infrastructure access contracts for supply and use. Such reference offers, which must be 
sufficiently unbundled, i.e. the contract offer does not require the other party to pay for facilities 
that are not required for the provision of the requested service, must also contain a description of 
the relevant offerings containing a minimum set of elements. They must include, at least:69 
A. Conditions for unbundled access to the local loop  
1. Network elements to which access is offered covering in particular the following elements together 
with appropriate associated facilities:  
(a) unbundled access to local loops (full and shared);  
(b) unbundled access to local sub-loops (full and shared), including, when relevant, access to network 
elements which are not active for the purpose of roll-out of backhaul networks;  
(c) where relevant, duct access enabling the roll out of access networks.  
                                                          
65 A more general application of ex-ante competition law does not take place generically, but rather under a more case-
by-case approach (e.g. mergers and acquisitions concerning telecommunications markets), as opposed to the role 
performed by NRA on market analysis (SMP analysis) and the imposition of access and interconnection obligations; see 
Gijrath, 2006, p. 9. 
66 British Telecommunications Plc v Telefónica O2 UK Ltd and Others, [2014] UKSC 42, at para. 8. Next Chapter 
provides an extensive analysis of the reading of the EU Regulatory Framework and the application of its principles vis-à-
vis contract limits by the judiciary.  
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid. at para. 9.  
69 Annex II Access Directive.  
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2. Information concerning the locations of physical access sites including cabinets and distribution 
frames, availability of local loops, sub-loops and backhaul in specific parts of the access network and 
when relevant, information concerning the locations of ducts and the availability within ducts;  
3. Technical conditions related to access and use of local loops and sub-loops, including the technical 
characteristics of the twisted pair and/or optical fibre and/or equivalent, cable distributors, and 
associated facilities and, when relevant, technical conditions related to access to ducts;  
4. Ordering and provisioning procedures, usage restrictions. 
B. Co-location services  
1. Information on the SMP operator's existing relevant sites or equipment locations and planned update 
thereof (∗).  
2. Co-location options at the sites indicated under point 1 (including physical co-location and, as 
appropriate, distant co-location and virtual co-location).  
3. Equipment characteristics: restrictions, if any, on equipment that can be co-located.  
4. Security issues: measures put in place by notified operators to ensure the security of their locations.  
5. Access conditions for staff of competitive operators.  
6. Safety standards.  
7. Rules for the allocation of space where co-location space is limited.  
8. Conditions for beneficiaries to inspect the locations at which physical co-location is available, or sites 
where co-location has been refused on grounds of lack of capacity. 
C. Information systems  
Conditions for access to notified operator's operational support systems, information systems or 
databases for pre-ordering, provisioning, ordering, maintenance and repair requests and billing. 
D. Supply conditions  
3 Lead time for responding to requests for supply of services and facilities; service level agreements, 
fault resolution, procedures to return to a normal level of service and quality of service parameters.  
4 Standard contract terms, including, where appropriate, compensation provided for failure to meet lead 
times. 
5 Prices or pricing formulae for each feature, function and facility listed above. 
 
The underlying idea to this obligation is that the EU legislator relies on the transparency of the 
terms and conditions for access and interconnection as a way to accelerate the negotiation process, 
but also as a manner of avoiding disputes and, more importantly, as a means to place trust in the 
market by guaranteeing a non-discriminated access. 70 
The Access Directive entitles NRAs to impose changes to the reference offers in order to 
fulfill the obligations arising from the Directive.71 
                                                          
70 Recital 16 Access Directive.  
71 Article 9(2) Access Directive.  
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3.1.2. Non-discrimination obligation 
The Access Directive (Article 10) entitles NRAs to impose obligations of non-discrimination in 
relation to interconnection and/or access. More specifically, Paragraph 2 establishes that those 
obligations shall ensure 
(…) that the operator applies equivalent conditions in equivalent circumstances to other undertakings 
providing equivalent services, and provides services and information to others under the same conditions 
and of the same quality as it provides for its own services, or those of its subsidiaries or partners. 
It establishes, in addition, that in the case of vertically integrated firms, they should provide 
information under the same conditions and quality as it provides for its own services or 
subsidiaries.72 
The non-discrimination obligation is essential for the opening of the market and the 
achievement of a fully competitive market for telecoms, provided that it ensures the equivalence of 
access.73 According to a private law understanding, non-discrimination is translated into the supply 
and the application of comparable terms and conditions under equivalent circumstances for 
undertakings providing equivalent services. The non-discrimination requirement is particularly 
significant in the case of vertically integrated SMP operators, which should provide the same supply 
conditions and quality as the service provided to their subsidiaries.74   
3.1.3. Accounting separation obligation 
Accounting separation means that NRAs may require a vertically integrated company to make 
transparent its wholesale prices and its internal transfer prices to ensure, inter alia, compliance 
where there is a requirement of non-discrimination to prevent unfair cross-subsidization. National 
regulatory authorities may specify the format and accounting methodology to be used.75  
Article 11(1) of the Access Directive refers, in particular, to the need for the vertically 
integrated firm to make transparent its wholesale and internal transfer prices. It is a minimum 
requirement to demonstrate compliance with non-discrimination.  
3.1.4. (Mandated) Access obligation. Network access 
The underlying aim in network services is interoperability, 76  which is also enshrined in the 
Treaty. 77  Access and interconnection are the means to achieve interoperability. Accordingly, 
networks are required to be interconnected, directly or indirectly, to allow the connection between 
                                                          
72 De Streel, A (2004). ‘Remedies in the European electronic communications sector’, in D. Geradin (ed.), Remedies in 
Network Industries: EC Competition Law vs. Sector-specific Regulation, Intersentia, pp. 67-124. 
73 See Commission Recommendation on consistent non-discrimination obligations and costing methodologies to promote 
competition and enhance the broadband investment environment; 11.9.2013, C(2013) 5761 final.  
74 De Streel supra n 72.  
75 Article 11 Access Directive.  
76 Recital 9 of the Access Directive.  
77 Article 170 TFEU (ex Article 154 TEC): “To help achieve the objectives referred to in Articles 26 and 174 and to 
enable citizens of the Union, economic operators and regional and local communities to derive full benefit from the 
setting up of an area without internal frontiers, the Union shall contribute to the establishment and development of trans-
European networks in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructures”. 
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users of different networks. This is accomplished via access and interconnection agreements 
between the different network operators. Article 2 of the Access Directive provides the definition 
of both elements: 
(a)     “access” means the making available of facilities and/or services, to another undertaking, under 
defined conditions, on either an exclusive or non-exclusive basis, for the purpose of providing 
electronic communications services. It covers inter alia: access to network elements and associated 
facilities, which may involve the connection of equipment, by fixed or non-fixed means (in 
particular this includes access to the local loop and to facilities and services necessary to provide 
services over the local loop), access to physical infrastructure including buildings, ducts and 
masts; access to relevant software systems including operational support systems, access to 
number translation or systems offering equivalent functionality, access to fixed and mobile 
networks, in particular for roaming, access to conditional access systems for digital television 
services; access to virtual network services; 
(b)     “interconnection” means the physical and logical linking of public communications networks used 
by the same or a different undertaking in order to allow the users of one undertaking to 
communicate with users of the same or another undertaking, or to access services provided by 
another undertaking. Services may be provided by the parties involved or other parties who have 
access to the network. Interconnection is a specific type of access implemented between public 
network operators; 
Access and interconnection to the network is the major objective of the Directive aimed at ensuring 
the achievement of competition. The Access Directive claims that increasing competition is a 
justification to impose access obligations on the network infrastructure.78 To this end, Article 12(1) 
of the Access Directive enables NRAs to 
(…) impose obligations on operators to meet reasonable requests for access to, and use of, specific 
network elements and associated facilities, inter alia in situations where the national regulatory authority 
considers that denial of access or unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder 
the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level, or would not be in the end-user's 
interest. 
Yet, according to the essential facility doctrine of competition law, access may only be imposed 
when the facility is essential. 79  To be sure, compelled access may entail a disincentive to 
investment in networks; as such, NRAs are required to strike a balance between the economic 
rights of the network infrastructure owner and the rights of the operators seeking access to the 
network. The Access Directive provides that access requests can only be rejected on the basis of 
objective criteria, such as technical feasibility or the need to maintain network integrity.80 
Moreover, a recent Directive on broadband cost reduction81 (Article 3) imposes on Member 
States the obligation to ensure access to the physical network infrastructure. Under this obligation, 
                                                          
78 Recital 19 Access Directive.  
79 Ibid: “(…)as long as this access becomes essential to enable competition in network industries”. See also Sullivan, E. 
T., and Hovenkamp, H. (2004), Antitrust Law, Policy, and Procedure: Cases, Materials, and Problems, 5th Edition. 
LexisNexis.  
80 Recital 19 Access Directive.  
81 Directive 2014/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on measures to reduce the cost 
of deploying high-speed electronic communications networks (OJ L 155, 23.5.2014, p. 1–14).  
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network operators82 are obligated to give access to their physical infrastructure, on reasonable terms 
and conditions, including price, with a view to deploying elements of high-speed electronic 
communications networks.  
With regard to private law and, in particular, freedom of contract, mandated access and 
interconnection obligations require not only third-party access, 83  but, also, an obligation to 
negotiate in good faith with undertakings requesting access.84 
3.1.5. Price control & cost accounting obligations  
Recital 20 Access Directive establishes that 
Price control may be necessary when market analysis in a particular market reveals inefficient 
competition. The regulatory intervention may be relatively light, such as an obligation that prices for 
carrier selection are reasonable as laid down in Directive 97/33/EC, or much heavier such as an obligation 
that prices are cost oriented to provide full justification for those prices where competition is not 
sufficiently strong to prevent excessive pricing. In particular, operators with significant market power 
should avoid a price squeeze whereby the difference between their retail prices and the interconnection 
prices charged to competitors who provide similar retail services is not adequate to ensure sustainable 
competition.85 
The Cost Accounting obligation (Article 13 Access Directive) compels SMP operators to structure 
their cost accounting system (CAS) and pricing system according to a certain methodology to meet 
the regulatory requirements in order to support price controls, grouping activities in specified 
accounts and, in particular, rules for the allocation of costs to different services in order to prevent 
unfair cross-subsidies, excessive or predatory prices and to prevent margin squeeze as well as to 
promote sustainable competition and efficiency for the benefit of the user.86 The Directive does not 
impose any particular costing methodology as a preferred option. Accordingly, the differences in 
costing methodologies for termination rates –the price that operators pay to deliver calls on others 
operators’ networks– around Europe, prompted the EU Commission to recommend the use of a 
particular methodology to harmonize the matter.87 The legal effect of the recommendation has led 
to a heated debate in different Member States, notably in the Netherlands, examined in the previous 
chapter.  
One of the main problems concerning interconnection is related to the price charged. In 
such a case, problems mostly arise in relation to the reimbursement of the sums already paid after 
                                                          
82 According to Article 2 of such Directive, ‘network operator’ means an “undertaking providing or authorised to provide 
public communications networks (…)”.  
83 See Case C-64/06 Telefónica O2 Czech Republic a.s. v Czech On Line a.s., [2007] ECR I-04887. Here, the Court 
recognizes the obligation to contract to those undertakings enjoying Significant Market Power; see, in particular, 
paragraph 28.  
84 Article 12(1) let b) Access Directive. See Section 4.1 infra, for an extensive treatment of the subject matter.  
85 Emphasis added.  
86 Article 13(2) Access Directive.  
87 Commission Recommendation (2009/396/EC) of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile 
Termination Rates in the EU, OJ L 20.5.2009, pp. 67-74. 
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the NRA has corrected the tariff to be actually paid.88 Although these are disputes of a contractual 
nature, the NRA when deciding a dispute under its mandate 89  issues a regulatory (hence, 
administrative) decision and civil litigation can take place only according to a separate procedure 
once the issue has been, administratively, resolved.90 
The extent to which these prices may be considered reasonable is another important 
matter. One may wonder what the aim of this pricing fixing strategy is and whether is it the aim of 
the EU to allow fixed prices.91 Unlike affordability as defined in the Universal Service Directive 
for retail markets,92 in Federutility in the energy field, the Court states that “reference prices” are 
allowed provided the intervention maintains prices at a reasonable level for end consumers. Yet, it 
is necessary to clarify the scope of the reasonableness of prices in a liberalized market; in 
particular, whether it responds to public or private (contractual) standards. 93  Case law in the 
Netherlands reflects a clash between, on the one hand, the regulator, which maintains the view that 
it must meet public standards and requires that reasonableness is interpreted in the light of the EU 
regulatory framework for telecoms, and the judiciary, on the other hand, who consider that a 
NRA’s powers are limited by the obligations arising from the contract that binds the parties.94 
3.1.6. Functional separation (ultima ratio) 
Functional separation is established by the newly introduced Article 13a of the Access Directive, 
where the NRA identify that the  
“appropriate obligations imposed (…) have failed to achieve effective competition and that there are 
important and persisting competition problems and/or market failures identified in relation to the 
wholesale provision of certain access product markets, it may, as an exceptional measure, (…), impose an 
obligation on vertically integrated undertakings to place activities related to the wholesale provision of 
relevant access products in an independently operating business entity. That business entity shall supply 
access products and services to all undertakings, including to other business entities within the parent 
company, on the same timescales, terms and conditions, including those relating to price and service 
levels, and by means of the same systems and processes”.95  
 
3.1.7. Voluntary separation  
Voluntary separation is understood as the procedure by which designated SMP operators 
voluntarily intend to transfer their local access network assets or a substantial part thereof to a 
separate legal entity under different ownership, or to establish a separate business entity in order to 
                                                          
88 See Ottow, A. (2012), ‘Intrusion of public law into contract law: the case of network sectors’, The Europa Institute 
Working Paper 03/12.  
89 Article 20 Framework Directive.  
90 Ottow, A. (2012), “Intrusion of public law into contract law: the case of network sectors”, The Europa Institute 
Working Paper 03/12 referring to the case Administrative Court of Rotterdam in first instance, 29 November 2001, 
BabyXL vs. KPN Telecom.  
91 See Case C-265/08, Federutility and Others v Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas [2010] ECR I-03377.  
92 See below.  
93 Ottow supra n 90.  
94 Ibid., referring to the case Administrative Court of Rotterdam January 31, 2003, Mediaforum 2003-4, Jur. Nr. 21., p. 
139-141.  
95 Emphasis added.   
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provide to all retail providers, including its own retail divisions, fully equivalent access products. 
Against this background, Article 13b of the Access Directive sets out the information conditions 
under which the operator concerned is required to inform the national regulator of its intention in 
such a way that it enables the regulator to assess the effect of the intended transaction on existing 
regulatory obligations under the Framework Directive.96 
3.1.8. Regulatory controls on retail services (Article 17 Universal Service 
Directive) 
The imposition of regulatory controls in retail markets is foreseen where obligations imposed in the 
wholesale markets are insufficient to achieve the objectives of the Regulatory Framework. 
Moreover, these obligations are only imposed on undertakings with SMP power in those markets 
not effectively competitive.97 These regulatory obligations must be proportionate and necessary to 
achieve the aims enshrined in the Framework Directive.98 These obligations must be aimed at 
controlling and preventing the imposition of excessive prices, avoiding the distortion of 
competition and the bundling of unnecessary services. To this end, NRAs are entitled to impose on 
SMP operators, retail price cap measures, measures to control individual tariffs, or measures to 
orient tariffs towards costs or prices on comparable markets.99  
 
 
3.2. Rights and remedies in retail markets  
At the retail level, the goals of the Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications ‒
guaranteeing basic users’ service rights by ensuring access to universal services, and a high-level of 
consumer protection100‒ are based on the idea of access (universal access) to the market without 
compromising the quality of the service. In order to prevent market failure and ensure consumer 
access, Universal Service Obligations (USOs) are required; also to ensure the non-discrimination of 
consumers, especially those who are geographically and economically vulnerable. Universal access 
encompasses a set of rights linked to the concept of universal service itself. Thus, the Universal 
Service Directive establishes that Member States shall ensure not only access to the service, but 
also safeguard the access conditions (availability and affordability of the service) at a reasonable 
quality.101 
In addition to this Universal Service approach, at the retail level, we find a more 
competitive approach oriented towards the empowerment of the consumer. To advance these aims, 
we find the introduction of other parameters based consumer protection understanding but with 
particular sector-related features that justify the existence of particular consumer protection 
measures belonging (endogenous) to the telecoms sector and, therefore, provided in the Regulatory 
                                                          
96 Article 13b(2) Access Directive.  
97 Article 17(1) Universal Service Directive.  
98 Article 17(2) Universal Service Directive. 
99 Ibid.  
100 Article 8(4) Framework Directive.  
101 Article 3 Universal Service Directive.  
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Framework for Electronic Communications itself; i.e. lex specialis. By way of example, these 
rights encourage consumers to make the most of competition –under assumptions of efficient 
market-behavior– by way of reducing minimum duration of contracts to enable frictionless 
switching of service provider and relying on an information paradigm. In fact, the second 
generation of EU telecoms rules (2002 package) already introduced a set of sector-specific rules 
dealing with consumer-related issues to alleviate the common problems faced by 
telecommunications users. As such, the Universal Service Directive establishes the conditions 
under which the services shall be provided.  
Consequently, under the European telecommunications regime, we can identify two 
different sets of consumer-rights: those provided under the universal service idea, and therefore, 
applicable only to the beneficiaries of universal service, and those more general that apply to all 
end-users. This duality gives rise to a differentiated scope of application determined by the concept 
of universal service itself.  
 
Rights under universal service 
(Article 3 Universal Service Directive) 
End-users rights 
Availability of the service Right to a contract 
(Article 20(1) USD) 
Specified Quality Right to switch of provider 




(Article 21 USD) 
Identical conditions Quality of the service 
(Article 22 USD) 
Affordable price Telephone directory enquiry, emergency 
services, European telephone access 
codes (Article 27 USD) 
 Number portability 
(Article 29 USD) 
 Access to out-of-court procedures 
(Article 34 USD) 
  Table 4.1 Universal service rights and End-users rights 
 
The following two sections provide a more detailed picture of these two sets of 
telecommunications-related consumer rights.  
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3.2.1. Universal Service rights  
As a result of the dual approach pursued by the European legislator in the configuration of Services 
of General Economic Interest, users were granted not only “consumer-empowerment rights”, but 
also with provisions that take into account the situation of vulnerable consumers. Thus, in order to 
ensure that liberalization would not lead to a situation where some social groups would be excluded 
from basic telecommunications services, the legislator also provided legislation granting Universal 
Service rights, such as access, affordability, quality and continuity, to mention a few. The EU 
Treaty acknowledges universal services access as one of the shared values of the Union concerning 
SGEIs,102 and European telecommunications regulation defines the parameters access for markets 
players via sector-specific legislation materializing the fundamental freedoms.103 
In order to guarantee the availability and the access to these set of (universal) services, the 
Universal Service Directive establishes the guidelines for Member states to ensure the provision of 
universal services to those end-users that, otherwise, would be excluded from the market.104 From 
the wording of Article 3 of the Universal Service Directive it follows that universal service 
corresponds to a minimum set of services, of a specific quality, that has to be available to everyone 
under particular conditions and at a reasonable price. As such, the Universal service idea works as a 
safety net for social inclusion. For example, consumers who do not enjoy access to the Internet do 
not have access a certain amount of choice and deals available solely online (online markets).  
Universal service is based on the idea of availability of the service, meaning access to 
everyone regardless of his or her economic, or geographic situation. The Universal Service 
Directive provides access to elementary services to which Universal Services rights apply. Under 
Chapter II, the Universal Service Directive establishes the Universal Services Obligations (USOs) 
applicable to universal services. The universal service concept covers the following services 
(“minimum set of services”): 
- Telephony services at a fixed location: voice + data105 
- Directory enquiry services and directories106 
- Public pay telephones and other publics voice telephony access points107 
- Measures for disabled users108 
 
The Directive provides for a system of cost recovery for “designated operators” to guarantee the 
provision of universal service under Universal Service Obligations.109 Member States may extend 
the Universal Service Obligations beyond the services listed in Chapter II of the Directive. In such 
                                                          
102 Protocol of the Lisbon Treaty (Protocol n.26), Article 1.  
103 Micklitz, H. W. (2013), “Do Consumers and Businesses Need a New Architecture of Consumer Law? A Thought 
Provoking Impulse”, Yearbook of European Law, 32(1) 266-367. 
104 Article 1(1) Universal Service Directive: “(…) to deal with circumstances in which the needs of end-users are not 
satisfactorily met by the market”.  
105 Article 4 Universal Service Directive.  
106 Article 5 Universal Service Directive.  
107 Article 6 Universal Service Directive.  
108 Article 7 Universal Service Directive.  
109 Article 12 and 13 Universal Service Directive.  
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circumstances, the Directive clearly states that no compensation mechanism can be put in place for 
the provision of those services not covered within the meaning of universal service.110 
The most prominent example of the constraints on the concept comes from the limitation of 
the concept of data communications to “data rates that are sufficient to permit functional Internet 
access”. This raises the question as to what extend broadband is considered “functional” under the 
current prevailing technologies and technical feasibility as enshrined in Article 4 of the Universal 
Service Directive. To date, access to broadband Internet has not been included in the scope of 
universal service. The Universal Service Directive was enacted in 2002. Article 15 contains a 
provision on the review of its scope. Scope was reviewed but never amended, despite technological 
developments. 111  Thus, the European legislator has also decided not to extend the scope of 
universal services to mobile communications and Internet data provided via mobile 
communications. Currently, there is European case-law where the feasibility of mobile 
communications and broadband to be included as part of the Universal service scope is 
examined.112 The Court, following the Advocate General’s Opinion, considered that the financing 
provisions of the Universal Service Directive of the Universal Service Obligations does not cover 
internet subscription services provided by means of those mobile communication services.113 As 
such, provided that the national legislator decides to expand the obligations contained in the 
Directive, such extra services would only fall under the category of ‘additional mandatory services’ 
where the Directive excludes compensation.114 
Access and right to contract  
Pursuant to Article 3(1) Universal Service Directive, “Member States shall ensure that the services 
set out in this Chapter are made available at the quality specified to all end-users in their territory, 
independently of geographical location, and, in the light of specific national conditions, at an 
affordable price”. 115  From the wording of this provision it follows that, this obligation has, 
therefore, two implications: economic access, on the one hand; and physical access, on the other.116 
Economic access refers to access rights for the more economically vulnerable citizens, and physical 
access entails accessibility to the network infrastructure, regardless of the consumer’s geographic 
location.117 Concerning the former, economic access is linked also to the idea of affordability, 
whereas for the latter, the use of telecommunications services requires the previous installation of 
the line in remote areas. Access is also coupled with the idea of continuity. Thus, continued access 
                                                          
110 Article 32 Universal Service Directive.  
111 In 2014, the European Commission launched a tender to study the feasibiliy of reviewing the scope of universal 
service. See Review of the Scope of Universal Service – Study SMART 2014/0011, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/review-scope-universal-service-–-study-smart-20140011.  
112 See Case C-1/14, Base Company NV and Mobistar NV v Ministerraad, not yet reported.  
113 Ibid. Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber), of 11 June 2015. See paras 32-43.  
114 Ibid. See also Article 32 Universal Service Directive.  
115 Emphasis added 
116 See also Micklitz supra n 9.; Rott supra n 16, and Rott, P. (2009) ‘The user-provider relationship: informed choice and 
user protection through private law’, in The Changing Legal Framework for Services if General Interest in Europe (pp. 
215-232). The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 
117 Article 4(1) Universal Service Directive: “Member States shall ensure that all reasonable requests for connection at a 
fixed location to a public communications network are met by at least one undertaking”. 
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to services also implies that contracts guaranteeing access cannot be easily terminated.118 This is 
particularly important where the termination of a contract exposes the user to risks such as social 
exclusion.  
 Furthermore, in telecommunications retail markets, this interference is particularly 
manifested as a right to contract, recognized in the Universal Service Directive which establishes 
that  
Member States shall ensure that, when subscribing to services providing connection to a public 
communications network and/or publicly available electronic communications services, consumers, and other 
end-users so requesting, have a right to a contract with an undertaking or undertakings providing such 
connection and/or services (…). 119  
Access rights involve particular implications for –specifically freedom of contract– not 
necessarily/previously addressed by the general consumer acquis. Access rights are intended to 
guarantee a certain level of availability of the service which results in a number of obligations for 
the providers nonexistent outside Services of General Economic Interest’s scope or within the 
national private legal orders. Accordingly, as a result of the universal service idea, all end-users –
who request it– will have a right to a contract for the provision of the services covered by the 
universal service’s scope. This statement entails two effects. First, the service is not provided 
automatically. Interested users will have to demand the supply of the service, which only will be 
provided, therefore, on request; and secondly, the service must be listed as a universal service to be 
subject of the access rights obtained. Thus, users are not granted general access to the service, but 
rather with a right to the provision of the (universal) service upon request. This means that network 
providers designated as having Universal Service Obligations will not be allowed to refuse to 
contract with those who request a contract, regardless their geographical location or economic 
situation.120  
Affordability and control of expenditure  
Within the universal service system, tariffs for the use of telecommunications services are to be 
paid by users. However, the universal service idea requires them to be “affordable”.  Affordability 
is a new concept within the field of contract and consumer law, the result of the obligations derived 
from the Universal Service approach. According to the Universal Service Directive, affordable 
price is “a price defined by Member States at national level in the light of specific national 
conditions, and may involve setting common tariffs irrespective of location or special tariff options 
to deal with the needs of low-income users”, related to the ability of individual consumers to 
monitor and control expenditure.121 As a result, Member States have to ensure that prices are not 
excessive and must encourage users to control their expenditure.  
                                                          
118 Rott supra n 116, at 225 and Rott n 9, at 333.  
119 Article 1 Directive 2009/136/EC, amending Article 20 Directive 2002/22/EC. Emphasis added.  
120 Article 3 Universal Service Directive.  
121 2002 Universal Service Directive, Recital 10 and Recital 15.  
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Affordability is explicitly mentioned in the Protocol (n.26) of the Lisbon Treaty and, 
together with control of expenditure, is regulated in the Universal Service Directive, articles 9 and 
10 respectively. Considering that prices are entrusted to market forces as a result of liberalization, 
National Regulatory Authorities are responsible for monitoring the evolution and level of retail 
tariffs of the services falling under the universal service obligations. To this end, NRAs will take 
into account, in particular, national consumer prices and income.122 More specifically, Article 9 
USD establishes 
National regulatory authorities shall ensure that, where a designated undertaking has an obligation to 
provide special tariff options, common tariffs, including geographical averaging, or to comply with price 
caps, the conditions are fully transparent and are published and applied in accordance with the principle of 
non-discrimination. National regulatory authorities may require that specific schemes be modified or 
withdrawn. 
In addition, Article 9 enables Member States to put in place social obligations. These social 
obligations may require designated undertaking to introduce price differentiations for low cost 
consumers different than market prices with the aim of ensuring access to telecommunications 
services by economically vulnerable consumers.123  
One of the particularities of telecommunications services is “bill shock”. Excessive bills 
may be incurred and when the user is not able to pay such bills he or she may be disconnected, 
which will distort the chief aim of the universal service requirement. In order to avoid such an 
event, Member States must ensure that designated undertakings with Universal Service obligations, 
allow subscribers to monitor and control their expenditure.124 
Affordability requirements also impact the right to unilaterally modify prices when 
universal service considerations apply. In those circumstances, at least in the energy sector, timely 
information on contractual modifications and a right to termination is not enough to compensate the 
imbalance of the contractual parties.125 
Continuity 
Access rights are coupled with the idea of continuity. Thus, continued access to services implies 
that contracts guaranteeing access cannot be easily terminated.126 This is particularly important 
where the termination of a contract exposes the user to risks such as social exclusion as a result of 
                                                          
122 Universal Service Directive, Article 9. 
123 Article 9(2): “Member States may, in the light of national conditions, require that designated undertakings provide to 
consumers tariff options or packages which depart from those provided under normal commercial conditions, in 
particular to ensure that those on low incomes or with special social needs are not prevented from accessing the network 
referred to in Article 4(1) or from using the services identified in Article 4(3) and Articles 5, 6 and 7 as falling under the 
universal service obligations and provided by designated undertakings”. 
124  Article 10(2). The information concerning facilities and services billing have to be described according to the 
parameters established in Annex I, Part a.  
125 See Case C-92/11, RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V.,nry. See paras. 53-54. Para 54: 
“(…) Account must be taken in particular of whether the market concerned is competitive, the possible cost to the 
consumer of terminating the contract, the time between the notification and the coming into force of the new tariffs, the 
information provided at the time of that communication, and the cost to be borne and the time taken to change supplier”. 
126 Rott supra n 116, at 225 and Rott n 9, at 333. 
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the importance of telecommunications services today.127 According to the 2002 Universal Service 
Directive, except in cases of persistent late payment or non-payment of bills, consumers should be 
protected from immediate disconnection from the network on the grounds of an unpaid bill and, in 
particular, in the case of disputes over high bills for premium rate services, should continue to have 
access to essential telephone services pending the resolution of the dispute. Member States may 
decide that such access may continue to be provided only if the subscriber continues to pay line 
rental charges.128 
(“Specified”) Quality 
Quality is another key objective in the Universal Service idea. As opposed to the former system by 
which telecommunications services were provided by the State, where good quality was not an 
essential requirement, it is now a decisive parameter not only for market competition but also for 
market inclusion. Article 3 of the Universal Service Directive does not only require access to 
certain services, but also this access has to be provided according to a “specified quality”.129 In this 
regard, Member States should ensure that Universal Services are made available with the quality 
specified to all end-users in their territory. 130  Pursuant to the Universal Service Directive 
amendment,  
[a] competitive market should ensure that end-users enjoy the quality of service they require, but in particular 
cases may be necessary  to ensure  that public  communication networks attain minimum quality levels so as 
to prevent degradation of service, the blocking of access and the slowing of traffic over networks.131  
To this end, NRAs may require that designated operators with universal service obligations provide 
the services under certain performance targets.132 National regulators must also monitor quality 
standards compliance.133 Quality parameters at the European level are established by the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). 134  These are minimum requirements, with 
additional quality parameters regarding services for disabled end-users and disabled consumers, for 
instance, at the national level by NRAs.135  
3.2.2. End-users rights 
Apart from the bundle of rights provided under universal service obligations, the European legal 
framework provides for a second set of consumer (“end-user”) rights that apply not only to services 
falling within the scope of universal services, but to the rest of telecommunications services; i.e. 
“services normally provided for remuneration which consists wholly or mainly in the conveyance 
                                                          
127 See Conclusions of the European Commission Communication on ‘Universal service in e-communications: report on 
the outcome of the public consultation and the third periodic review of the scope in accordance with Article 15 of 
Directive 2002/22/EC’, 23.11.2011, COM(2011) 795 final, p. 12.  
128 2002 Universal Service Directive, Recital 16. 
129 Article 3(1) Universal Service Directive.  
130 2002 Universal Service Directive, Recital 7. 
131 2009 Universal Service Directive, Recital 34. 
132 Article 11(4) Universal Service Directive.  
133 Article 11(5) and (6).  
134 See Annex III, 2002 Universal Service Directive and 2009 Amendment.  
135 2002 Universal Service Directive, Article 11(2). 
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of signals on electronic communications networks, including telecommunications services and 
transmission services in networks used for broadcasting, but exclude services providing, or 
exercising editorial control over, content transmitted using electronic communications networks 
and services”.  
As a matter of fact, data shows that issues related to billing, tariff transparency and Internet 
quality are still the most frequent causes of telecommunications users’ complaints.136 Thus, the 
right to a contract, information and transparency duties, the quality of the service, and the right to 
switch provider, together with the availability of out-of-court mechanism for the settlement of 
consumer-related disputes, comprise end-users rights stemming from European minimum standards 
for the provision of telecommunications services aimed at achieving a fully competitive market 
(competition law approach). The Universal Service Directive specifies these contractual rights in 
Chapter IV (‘End-users interests and rights’).  
Transparency and information 
The tool for the establishment and maintenance of competition on the consumer side is the choice 
of the best service provider.137 This has to be an informed choice. Information duties are oriented to 
consumers to make qualified decisions and informed choices. Thus, pre-contractual information, 
suppliers’ duties of information, information rights, transparency and so on are specified in the 
rules governing these services, and consist of  important obligations operating at the time of the 
conclusion of this kind of contracts. Thus, the accessibility to full, truthful and up-to-date 
information is of paramount importance to the consumer in order to be able to choose, in an 
efficient way, the best provider according to her needs. Information duties are, therefore, 
complementary to the effective operation of competition.138  
In the case of telecommunications, the provisions contained in the Universal Service 
Directive are related to the availability of transparent and adequate information on offers and 
services, as well as price and tariffs.139 Providing information on prices is decisive given that 
consumers consider price as the primary factor when subscribing to an Internet connection.140 In 
addition, obtaining adequate information on, for example, possible limitations or traffic 
management enables consumers to make informed choices.141 In fact, according to the BEREC, the 
greater part of consumer complaints compiled by NRAs is related to the discrepancy between 
advertised and actual delivery speeds for an Internet connection.142  
The third regulatory package (Article 21(3) USD) relies on NRAs to oblige public 
electronic communications networks and/or publicly available electronic communications services 
to inter alia: 1) provide information on tariffs and pricing conditions; 2) inform subscribers of any 
                                                          
136 Special Eurobarometer 414 - e-Communications Household Survey.  
137 Rott supra n 16 at 334.  
138 “Competitive transparency is deeply rooted in competition law”, Micklitz supra n 9, at 567.  
139 See Universal Service Directive Recital 32 and Article 21(1).  
140 Eurobarometer special issue on e-communications and household (2014).  
141 Commission Communication on The open internet and net neutrality in Europe, p. 7.  
142 Commission Communication on The open internet and net neutrality in Europe, 19.4.2011, COM(2011) 222 final.  
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change of access to emergency services or caller location information; 3) inform consumers about 
any change to conditions limiting access to and/or use of services and applications; 4) provide 
information on any procedures put in place by the provider to measure and shape traffic such as to 
avoid filling or overfilling a network link, and on how those procedures could impact on service 
quality; 5) inform subscribers of their right to determine whether or not to include their personal 
data in a directory, and of the types of data concerned; and 6) regularly inform disabled subscribers 
of details of products and services designed for them. For this purpose, NRAs, if they deem it 
appropriate, may promote self- or co-regulatory measures prior to imposing any binding 
obligations.  
In addition to the above, users are also granted a sector-specific right of withdrawal, 
without penalty, on notice of proposed modifications in the contractual conditions, if they do not 
accept the new conditions.143   
Quality  
Apart from the quality parameters established under the universal services approach, Article 22 
requires NRAs to set up “minimum quality of service requirements” on undertakings with the aim 
of preventing the degradation of the service and/or the slow-down of traffic over the networks.144 In 
addition, BEREC has set up a Quality of Service Measurements working group and recommends 
that NRAs collaborate on a voluntary basis on the development of a potential future multi-NRA 
opt-in quality monitoring system. 
By way of example, given that quality problems are widely recurring (in Italy, low quality 
of the services represents 44.7% of the problems related to broadband internet), the Italian NRA 
has developed a quality measurement system regarding the internet at a fixed location. According 
to the 2012 AGCOM Report, Misura Internet allows users to test free of charge, by means of the 
Ne.Me.Sys. software (acronym for NEtwork MEasurement SYStem), downloadable from the site 
www.misurainternet.it, the performance of the broadband internet connection service from a fixed 
position. In order to assess the evolution of the performance of the service on the basis of the daily 
network capacity, Ne.Me.Sys. registers a measurement in each of the 24 hourly time brackets, for a 
total of 24 measurements per day. The user has 3 days to complete the measurements in each time 
brackets. The test results are reported in a certificate containing the values of the key performance 
indicators (KPI, i.e. transmission speed, delay and loss of data packets during the uploading and 
downloading phases). If the value of at least one of the indicators is of inferior quality than the 
contractual parameters, the user is entitled to present a complaint to the operator for non-fulfillment 
and ask for the restoration of the agreed standards; if, according to a subsequent test with 
                                                          
143 Universal Service Directive, Article 20(1). See Case C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-
Westfalen e.V., nry; in particular, para. 44: “Information, before concluding a contract, on the terms of the contract and 
the consequences of concluding it is of fundamental importance for a consumer. It is on the basis of that information in 
particular that he decides whether he wishes to be bound by the terms previously drawn up by the seller or supplier”. See 
also Case C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt (Invitel), para. 29. See also Reich, N. 
(2015), 'I Want My Money Back' – Problems, Successes and Failures in the Price Regulation of the Gas Supply Market 
by Civil Law Remedies in Germany, EUI Department of Law Research Paper No. 2015/05. 
144 Article 22(3) Universal service Directive.  
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Ne.Me.Sys., the service quality is not restored to the required level, the user has the right to 
withdraw from the contract free of charge, avoiding the payment of a penalty for the internet 
access service from a fixed location.   
Right to switch of provider 
The possibility to switch provider is linked to the transparency, the supply of information and 
quality of the service provided. As part of the information paradigm, consumers must be informed 
of their right to terminate the contract.145 Enabling switching is another essential tool to contribute 
to the functioning of competition. Hence, the different Directives concerning network services 
contain provisions related to the right to switch service provider. 
According to the European Commission, effective consumer rights are essential to ensure 
that liberalization delivers real choice and gives consumers the confidence to switch supplier if they 
wish to do so.146 Stimulating consumer interest in alternative supply offers is expected to play a 
part in creating competitive markets as well. The claim is that past experience has shown that 
consumers will only be active on the market if they are confident that their rights continue to be 
protected, in particular, when switching operator.147 Moreover, the European Commission in its 
recent Open Internet and Net Neutrality Communication has also expressly recognized:  
The EU regulatory framework aims at promoting effective competition, which is considered the best way to 
deliver high-quality goods and services at affordable prices to consumers. For competition to work, consumers 
must be able to choose between a variety of competing offerings on the basis of clear and meaningful 
information. Consumers must also be effectively able to switch to a new provider where a better quality of service 
and/or a lower price is offered, or where they are not satisfied with the service they are receiving, e.g. where their 
current provider imposes restrictions on particular services or applications. In a competitive environment this acts 
as a stimulus to operators to adapt their pricing and abstain from restrictions on applications that prove popular 
with users, as is the case with voice over IP (VoIP) services. 148 
Moreover, the Commission is of the opinion that the rules on transparency, switching and quality 
of service that form part of the revised EU electronic communications framework should contribute 
to producing competitive outcomes.149 Thus, in order to take full advantage of the competitive 
environment within the electronic communications sector, consumers should be able to make 
informed choices and to change providers when they want.150 Therefore, transparency and the right 
to switch are crucial to the functioning of competition. 
In the case of network industries, the user-provider relationship is usually governed by 
long-term contracts. In this regard, long-term contracts present a barrier to competition, since 
                                                          
145 See Invitel case, para. 29. Article 20(1)(e) and Recital 30 Universal Service Directive.  
146  Commission Communication, Towards a European Charter on the Rights of Energy Consumers, 5.7.2007 
COM(2007)386 final, p. 2. 
147 Ibid. p. 3. 
148 Commission Communication, The open internet and net neutrality in Europe, 19.4.2011, COM(2011) 222 final, p.4 
(Emphasis added). 
149 Ibid. Conclusions, pp. 8-10. 
150 Universal Service Directive (2009), Recital 47. 
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competition requires the possibility of changing provider.151  The third regulatory package for 
telecoms (2009) provides a contractual limit of an initial maximum duration not exceeding of 24 
months. 152  It also mandates Member States to ensure that operators provide contracts with a 
maximum duration of 12 months.153 In addition, the regulatory framework provides that minimum 
duration clauses do not prevent consumers changing service provider.154 
EU legislation, in addition, takes into consideration practical issues that may prevent 
customers from changing their providers: number portability. Number portability is a “key 
facilitator of consumer choice and effective competition in a competitive telecommunication 
environment”, as specified by Recital 40 Universal Service Directive. The 2009 package was 
significant for the switching process. In this regard, the Article 30(4) Universal Service Directive 
establishes that the “[p]orting of numbers and their subsequent activation shall be carried out within 
the shortest possible time. In any case, subscribers who have concluded an agreement to port a 
number to a new undertaking shall have that number activated within one working day”. Moreover, 
operators must offer users the possibility to subscribe to a contract with a maximum duration of 12 
months. The new rules make sure that conditions and procedures for contract termination do not act 
as a disincentive against changing service provider. In addition, with regard to the terminal 
equipment, Recital 24 of the Universal Service Directive amendment requires that “(…) the 
customer contract should specify any restrictions imposed by the provider on the use of the 
equipment, such as by way of ‘SIM-locking’ mobile devices, if such restrictions are not prohibited 
under national legislation, and any charges due on termination of the contract, whether before or on 
the agreed expiry date, including any cost imposed in order to retain the equipment”.   
As a result, all the measures introduced by the legislator in this matter are envisaged to 
enhance competition –the aim of the Internal Market– by facilitating not only the change of 
provider, but also the switching process itself, in order to remove possible barriers to the switch 
procedure if the user wishes to do so. 
Availability of extrajudicial settlement procedures 
The effectiveness of the rights granted by the Universal Service Directive will be conditional upon 
the success of consumer redress mechanism for the resolution of consumer-related disputes. 
Accordingly, the Universal Service Directive requires effective procedures to solve disputes 
between end-users and undertakings providing telecommunications services. In particular, and 
without prejudice to judicial procedures,155 the Directive requires member states to ensure the 
availability of “transparent, non- discriminatory, simple and inexpensive out-of-court 
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The liberalization of the telecommunications sector and the shift from public to privately provided 
services implies the need for the European Regulatory Framework to regulate private relationships 
under the rationality and goals of the sector in order to manage the transition to competition. 
Nevertheless, general (traditional) contract law consists of different rationales than those of sector-
specific regulation. In case of conflict, regulatory goals and traditional schemes of contract law 
collide. While the regulatory goals respond to European concerns –mainly the completion of the 
Internal Market– contract law, understood in the traditional sense, remains national. The main 
question to answer is: what is the role for contract law in the telecommunications sector? This 
Section attempt to disclose the role and function of private law when it comes to particular cases, 
both in wholesale and in retail markets. The first case of the two cases addressed in this section 
deals with the obligation to negotiate in good faith with a third party operator. The second case, 
concerns a commonplace dispute between an operator and the user (consumer) concerning the 
application of compensation and switching for free as a remedy for the degradation of the quality of 
the service provided.  
By examining two case-studies, this section discerns whether particular 
telecommunications-related problems are decided on the basis of national (contract) private law or 
European (regulatory) private law and the relative significance of each of these legal regimes in 
practice.  
4.1. Regulatory intervention in wholesale markets 
In the telecommunications sector, when it comes to B2B relationships in wholesale markets, the 
major focus has always been placed on competition law issues.158 Yet, little attention has been paid 
to the contractual dimension of such cases and to how it affects the contractual relationship 
between the parties as a result of the function of NRAs responsible for securing adequate access, 
interconnection and interoperability of services in the interest of end-users including via the 
imposition of regulatory obligations on undertakings. By way of example, Article 5(1) Access 
Directive, “without prejudice to measures that may be taken regarding undertakings with 
significant market power in accordance with Article 8 [of the same legal text]”, requests NRAs to 
impose:  
                                                          
156 Article 34(1) Universal Service Directive.  
157 Ibid. The following chapter contains a detailed analysis of these procedures.  
158 For instance, the seminal ‘TeliaSonera case’ (C- 52/09, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB. ECR [2011] I-
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  146 
a) to the extent that is necessary to ensure end-to end connectivity, obligations on undertakings that control 
access to end-users, including in justified cases the obligation to interconnect their networks where this is 
not already the case;  
ab) in justified cases and to the extent that is necessary, obligations on undertakings that control access to 
end users to make their services interoperable.  
b) to the extent that is necessary to ensure accessibility for end-users to digital radio and television 
broadcasting services specified by the Member State, obligations on operators to provide access to the other 
facilities referred to in Annex I, Part II on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. 
The issue at stake here is whether such obligations may be imposed on all operators providing 
electronic communications services. Accordingly, the following case examines the role of NRAs 
when it comes to the regulatory powers of NRAs to intervene in the wholesale market via the 
imposition of certain obligations, which clearly has an impact in private law matters as it concerns 
the obligation to contract an interconnection agreement and the necessity to conduct such 
negotiation in good faith, such that it does not imply a distortion of competition.159 This case, 
therefore, provides a comparison between negotiated vis-à-vis regulated access.  
Background of the case 
Under EU legislation, National Regulatory Authorities may impose obligations on undertakings 
that control access to end-users including, where justified, the obligation to interconnect their 
networks where this is not already undertaken.160 In addition, the general authorisation for the 
provision of electronic communications networks or services gives undertakings providing 
electronic communications networks or services to the public the right to “negotiate 
interconnection with and where applicable obtain access to or interconnection from other providers 
of publicly available communications networks and services covered by a general authorisation 
anywhere in the Community under the conditions of and in accordance with Directive 2002/19/EC 
(Access Directive)”.161 In addition, Article 12 of that Directive provides that NRAs may impose 
access obligation obligations on operators  
“in situations where the national regulatory authority considers that denial of access or unreasonable terms and 
conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail 
level, or would not be in the end-user’s interest”.162 The European legal framework establishes that operators 
may be required, among other obligations, to “negotiate in good faith with undertakings requesting access”. 
163  
These provisions were implemented in the Finnish legal system under the Finnish Communications 
Market Act.164 In Paragraph 39 (‘Interconnection obligations of a telecommunications operator’), 
the national text provides that telecommunications operators have an obligation to negotiate 
                                                          
159 Case C-192/08 TeliaSonera Finland Oyj v iMEZ Ab, ECR [2009] I-10717. 
160 Article 5(1) let a) Access Directive. Emphasis added. See also Article 12(1) let i) Access Directive.  
161 Article 4(2) let a) Authorisation Directive.  
162 Article 12(1) Access Directive.  
163 Ibid. let. b).    
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interconnection agreements. Furthermore, the national provision enables the national regulator 
responsible for telecoms to impose interconnection obligations not only for Significant Market 
Power (SMP) operators,165 but also to non-SMP operators. 166 
On 10 May 2006, a small Swedish service operator (iMEZ) requested the intervention of 
the Finnish NRA for telecommunications (CRA) 167  in order to facilitate the conclusion of an 
interconnection contract with TeliaSonera to enable the transmission of text messages (SMS 
messages) and multimedia messages (MMS messages) over the networks of both operators. 
Accordingly, on 18 May 2006, CRA referred the case to arbitration. In August 2006, in view of the 
failure of arbitration, iMEZ requested CRA to oblige the network operator (TeliaSonera) to 
negotiate an agreement in good faith pursuant to the Access Directive.168 In particular, NRAs are 
entitled to oblige operators to negotiate in good faith with undertakings requesting access.169 
Therefore, in the absence of an agreement, iMEZ requested CRA to impose an interconnection 
obligation on TeliaSonera concerning SMS and MMS and to price the forwarding of those two 
types of messages on the basis of the costs incurred and in a non-discriminatory manner. 
Alternatively, it sought a declaration that SMS and MMS are relevant communications markets and 
the designation of TeliaSonera as an SMP operator, so that iMEZ could obtain (compulsory) 
interconnection.  
In December 2006, CRA issued a decision in which it acknowledged that TeliaSonera had 
not fulfilled its obligation to negotiate in good faith the interconnection agreement with iMEZ. In 
those circumstances, TeliaSonera appealed against that decision to the Korkein hallinto-oikeus 
(Finnish Supreme Administrative Court) seeking the annulment of the CRA’s decision. The 
Korkein hallinto-oikeus, decided to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling:170 
1.       Is Article 4(1) of Directive 2002/19/EC of the … Access Directive, when read in conjunction with 
recitals 5, 6 and 8 in the preamble to that directive and with Article 5 and Article 8 thereof, to be 
interpreted as meaning that: 
(a) national legislation may provide, as in Paragraph 39(1) of the … [Communications Market Law], 
that any telecommunications operator has an obligation to negotiate on interconnection with another 
telecommunications operator and, if so, 
(b) a national regulatory authority can take the view that the obligation to negotiate has not been 
complied with where a telecommunications operator which does not have significant market power has 
offered another undertaking interconnection under conditions which the authority regards as wholly 
                                                          
165 Ibid. Paragraph 39(2). 
166 Ibid. Paragraph 39(3). 
167 Communications Regulatory Authority – FICARO (in Finnish Viestintävirasto).  
168 See Recital 5: “In an open and competitive market, there should be no restrictions that prevent undertakings from 
negotiating access and interconnection arrangements between themselves, in particular on cross-border agreements, 
subject to the competition rules of the [EC] Treaty. In the context of achieving a more efficient, truly pan-European 
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requests for access or interconnection should in principle conclude such agreements on a commercial basis, and 
negotiate in good faith”. Emphasis added.  
169 Article 12(1) let. b) Access Directive. 
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unilateral and likely to hinder the emergence of a competitive market at the retail level, where they have 
hindered in practice the second undertaking from offering its customers the opportunity to transmit 
[MMS] messages to end-users subscribed to the telecommunications operator’s network and, if so, 
(c) the national regulatory authority can in its decision require the aforementioned telecommunications 
operator, which therefore does not have significant market power, to negotiate in good faith on the 
interconnection of [SMS] and [MMS] communications services between [the] systems [of the two 
undertakings concerned] in such a way that, in commercial negotiations, regard must be had to the 
objectives which interconnection seeks to achieve and negotiations must be based on the premise that 
the operation of SMS and MMS services between undertakings’ systems can be made subject to 
reasonable conditions so that users have the possibility of using telecommunications operators’ 
communications services? 
2.       Do the nature of [iMEZ’s] network or whether iMEZ … should be regarded as an operator of public 
electronic communications networks have any bearing on the assessment of the questions set out above? 
 
Reasoning of the CJEU 
The first part of the first question and the second question concern the applicability of access 
obligations to operators that do not have significant market power, including the obligation to 
negotiate in good faith with undertakings requesting access as specified in the Access Directive.171 
In this regard, the Court acknowledged that the way in which Article 4(1) is drafted clearly implies 
that the obligation to negotiate interconnection agreements applies to “all operators of public 
communications networks when requested to do so by another authorised undertaking”.172 The 
Court states that according to the Authorisation Directive,173 “general authorization” refers to “a 
legal framework established by the Member State ensuring rights for the provision of electronic 
communications networks or services” and that it concerns not only network but also service 
operators.174 Given the reciprocal nature of interconnection, the Court states that, therefore, both 
parties to the negotiations have to be public network operators.175 The Court concludes that the 
obligation to negotiate an interconnection agreement can only be imposed on operators of public 
communications networks, such that Member States may not impose that obligation to negotiate on 
those operators that do not enjoy the status and nature of public communications networks 
operators and, therefore, it corresponds to the national court to determine such classification.176 
As to the second part of the first question, the Court states that in view of the tasks to be 
performed by the NRAs which are “aimed at promoting competition in the provision of electronic 
communications services, ensuring that there is no distortion or restriction of competition in the 
electronic communications sector and removing remaining obstacles to the provision of those 
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172 Para. 28. Emphasis added.  
173  Article 2(2)(a) Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the 
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services at European level”,177 the regulator may consider that the obligation to negotiate has been 
breached even if it concerns a non-SMP undertaking which has proposed interconnection “under 
unilateral conditions likely to hinder the emergence of a competitive market at the retail level 
where those conditions prevent the clients of the second undertaking from benefiting from its 
services”.178  
Accordingly, and concerning the answer to the third part of the first referred question, the 
Court grants NRAs the power to require non-SMP operators which control access to end-users “to 
negotiate in good faith with other undertakings for either interconnection of the two networks 
concerned if the undertaking which requests such access must be classified as an operator of public 
communications networks, or interoperability of SMS and MMS message services if that 




The main question at stake is whether any operator, and not only those enjoying Significant Market 
Power, has an obligation to negotiate interconnection with another telecommunications operator. In 
case of a positive answer, the safeguards of competition alone do not serve as a basis to justify such 
a regulatory obligation. Hence, competition is not the rule and simply the involvement on the 
telecommunications market as an authorized undertaking providing electronic communications 
networks or services to the public becomes sufficient to apply regulatory obligations. The 
contractual relationships between undertakings (B2B) in wholesale markets ‒and, consequently, the 
interest of the (private) parties– are strongly affected by higher regulatory goals; adequate access 
and interconnection and interoperability of services in the interest of end-users. 
Para 55: It is clear from the foregoing that the answer to the second part of the first question referred is that a 
national regulatory authority may take the view that the obligation to negotiate an interconnection has been 
breached where an undertaking which does not have significant market power proposes interconnection to 
another undertaking under unilateral conditions likely to hinder the emergence of a competitive market at the 
retail level where those conditions prevent the clients of the second undertaking from benefiting from its 
services. 
From the foregoing it follows that, even though under conditions of a competitive market, the 
objective of Article 8 Framework Directive are to be achieved through the terms of the 
interconnection agreements in a context of minimum regulatory interference, these contractual 
terms have to be consistent with the regulatory obligations contained in Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the 
Access Directive.180 This means that the interconnection terms, given that they have to secure the 
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paragraphs 62 and 63.  
178 Paras. 50, 54-55.  
179 Paras. 61-62. Emphasis added.  
180 Article 4(1) Access Directive.  
 
  150 
policy objectives contained in Article 8 Framework Directive, must be available to any contractual 
party requesting them.181 
The case-in-point evidences a clear erosion of freedom of contract. And here one may ask: 
what is the rational(es) for such an intervention into such a central principle of private law?; is it 
because of the contractual imbalance and the weaker party argument?;182 who is the weaker party 
here: access seekers (wholesale) or end-users? In this situation what happens is that the contractual 
imbalance in the wholesale market have an impact on the retail market (and therefore for the end-
user). Accordingly, the regulatory framework establishes a statutory duty to contract. As such, 
contract law in telecommunications serves to attain the objectives of the regulatory framework. 
Yet, despite such configuration, can one still talk about private law?  
Is it private law?  
In the end, the decision of the Finnish authority (CRA), the competent court was the Administrative 
Court (Korkein hallinto-oikeus, Finnish Supreme Administrative Court) decided the dispute. Even 
though the conflict concerned conditions concerning the terms of an agreement to be negotiated 
with respect to the interconnection of SMS and MMS services between two private parties, what 
was challenged was the administrative decision (and the powers of the NRA) to impose those terms 
and conditions over non-SMP operators. Notwithstanding these issues are, in the end, about two 
(private) parties in a wholesale market and it deals with pure private law institution (agreement, 
negotiation and good faith), there is not a single mention of the private law of contract.183 Rather, 
the provision examined in this case stem either from the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications or the national law that applies the latter and related exclusively to the 
telecommunications market (Communications Market Law). In any case, what it is relevant, from a 
private law perspective, is the powers of NRAs to intervene in contractual relations. 
The Court noted that those interventions are subject to the protection of the objectives 
enshrined in Article 8 of the Framework Directive, yet there are no rules for power delimitation.184 
Accordingly, the NRAs enjoy discretionary powers to intervene in private relations between 
operators providing electronic communications services, provided that these interventions are 
contingent on the preservation of regulatory goals. Private law is, thus, subservient to those goals, 
namely, in this case the removal of measures that “hinder the emergence of a competitive 
market”.185 The designed system, with a regulatory regime which relies on the existence (and 
                                                          
181 See British Telecommunications Plc v Telefónica O2 UK Ltd and Others, [2014] UKSC 42. Para 12. This reading is in 
line with the Recital 5 Access Directive: In an open and competitive market, there should be no restrictions that prevent 
undertakings from negotiating access and interconnection arrangements between themselves, in particular on cross-
border agreements, subject to the competition rules of the Treaty. In the context of achieving a more efficient, truly pan-
European market, with effective competition, more choice and competitive services to consumers, undertakings which 
receive requests for access or interconnection should in principle conclude such agreements on a commercial basis, and 
negotiate in good faith. 
182 Gijrath, S. J. (2006). Interconnection regulation and contract law, DeLex.  
183 In fact, Advocate General in its Opinion specifies that interconnection agreements are “similar in nature to a private 
law institution” (see para. 110 of the Opinion). Yet, there is no single mention to private rules.  
184 Para. 60 of the Judgment.  
185 Ibid. Para. 55.  
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imposition) of regulatory obligations in access and interconnection contracts, is aimed at achieving 
the major objectives enshrined in the Regulatory Framework through the terms of the 
interconnection agreements between the contractual parties.186 This regulatory model is the result 
of the wording of Article 5(4) of the Access Directives, which requires NRAs to secure the policy 
objectives contained in Article 8 of the Framework Directive.187 Therefore, interconnection is seen 
as a safeguard that “must be available to any party which asks for them”.188 This means that we are 
beyond a (traditional) private law dispute, and are rather facing a sort of regulatory private law 
understood as private law subordinated to the achievement of regulatory objectives. As such, the 
private law contained in telecommunications regulation is shaped by competition law 
considerations under which NRAs intervene in order to facilitate contract formation. Accordingly, 
the question now to ask is: what would is the role of civil courts under such regulatory 
configurations? Would contract law, understood in the traditional sense, be sufficient to attain the 
goals of the regulatory private law? The first question is addressed in the next chapter. As a matter 
of fact, the nature of the court dealing with a contract related dispute in telecoms –or, better, the 
nature of the body responsible for deciding on the dispute– is relevant when it comes to interpret 
the contractual terms in light of sector-specific regulation. As to the suitability of civil law rules on 
contracts, it is sufficient to say that they are contingent such that private law operates insofar as it 
does not distort the accomplishment of the regulatory objectives.  
4.2. Regulatory and consumer provisions in the retail market. Switching (for free) 
as a new remedy 
The second case-study concerns the resolution of a dispute in Italy under the settlement procedure 
provided for in the Italian legislation (definizione della controversia) in which the regional 
authorities (delegated powers from the Italian NRA) define and adjudicate the dispute. The issue at 
stake here is not the procedure itself,189 but the nature of the problem concerned, given the high 
number of problems related to quality and malfunctioning of the internet service provider. Against 
this context, the Italian company Pub S.r.l., as a services user,190 challenged the failure of the DSL 
service provided by the Italian operator N. S.p.a., as not reaching the minimum bandwidth 
requirement, as well as the billing of undue amounts as they relate to an ADSL service provided 
which do not respond to the parameters contained in the commercial offer. 
Background of the case  
In particular, the applicant from January 2010 to September 2010 noticed the failure of the DSL 
service, characterized by repeated falls and breaks of her connection, which did not permit a 
                                                          
186 See, by way of example, British Telecommunications Plc v Telefónica O2 UK Ltd and Others [2014] UKSC 42; para. 
10.  
187 Now Article 5(317) of the access Directive. As required also by Article 4(1).  
188 BT v Telefonica, supra n 185, para. 10.  
189 For a profound overview of dispute settlement procedures in Italy see Chapter 5.  
190 The Universal Service Directive expands its consumer protection provisions to SMEs. Recital 49: “This Directive 
should provide for elements of consumer protection, including clear contract terms and dispute resolution, and tariff 
transparency for consumers. It should also encourage the extension of such benefits to other categories of end-users, in 
particular small and medium-sized enterprises”.  
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regular and continuous use of the service. The applicant was aware of the fact that the company N. 
S.p.a. operated a downgrade in the service, which prevented the bundling of two lines, useful to 
ensure the agreed services. This disruption was repeatedly reported by the claimant to the customer 
service of the operator, without solution. 
 
The applicant sought, therefore, the refund of the amounts invoiced equal to € 1,710.00 
from January 2010 to September 2010, the partial repayment of the amounts billed for the month of 
October 2010 until the date of request, the payment of compensation the disruption caused, as well 
as reimbursement of the costs of the proceedings.  
The internet service provider (N. S.p.a.), pointed out that  
“as evidenced in our communication of 4 July 2011, already pending the settlement procedure, 
the undersigned in the face of the downgrade denounced by the user with reference to the 
period between January 2010 and September 2010 has already acknowledged an extension of 
free wireless internet service equal to 5 months. In this regard, it should be noted that this 
extension, although it was not compulsory, finds its reason in the will of the undersigned to 
avoid the rise of any dispute in origin, trusting indeed in the absolute good faith of the user. The 
company states that it had always guaranteed a minimum bandwidth with 1000 kb/s. Lastly, it 
declares that, for what concerns the last customer communication of 12th July 2011 in which 
the user reports once again problems with the connection speed, the technical area of expertise 
has been working, immediately, in order to verify the quality of the guaranteed connection, 
noting as a result of these checks, and contrary to what was reported, an excellent quality of 
service”. 
 
Grounds for the decision 
The deciding Authority points out that the company N. S.p.a. provided no technical justification or 
legal responsibility for the failure of the internet service, but merely informs the recognition of “an 
extension of the free wireless internet service equal to 5 months” assuming its own free will in the 
view of the downgrade objected to by the claimant. In this regard, the deciding Authority states 
that, in order to exempt itself from liability, the company N. S.p.a. could have provided the copy of 
the log files in order to demonstrate the possible existence, without interruption, of access 
connections to the Internet during the period from January 2010 to September 2010. Therefore, the 
Authority decides that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the irregular and intermittent 
delivery of DSL service, which however did not result in the total interruption of service by the 
number of 272 days in the aforementioned period is due solely to the responsibility of the company 
N. S.p.a. and as such requires the payment of compensation proportionate to the outage suffered by 
the user, calculated according to the parameter of EUR 2.50 per day provided for in Article 5, 
paragraph 2 of Resolution n.73/11/CONS. However, the Authority provides for a different 
determination of the request for a full refund of fees billed for the specified reference period is not 
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acceptable, provided that the applicant has, however, used the service albeit with discontinuities 
and intermittently. 
In addition, the deciding Authority highlights that as regards the second point at issue, 
namely the issue of connection speed, that in light of the new framework regulations outlined by 
resolution n.244/08/CSP, there is an obligation of the supplier to specify in the contract the 
minimum benefits promised. Given the above, the Authority emphasizes that the slight degradation 
of the single-band minimum upload speed of data transmission (960 instead of 1,000 Kbit/s), 
demonstrated primarily by surveys performed by speed test and confirmed by the results on July 9, 
2011 by Ne.Me.Sys software, cannot be considered as a cause of failure or partial use of the 
service, such as to require the return in part or in full the fees paid.  
Moreover, in accordance with the provisions of Article 8, paragraph 6 of resolution 
n.244/08/CONS, states that  
If the customer finds the measured values of the indicators less favorable than those mentioned above may 
submit, within 30 days the receipt of the measurement results, a detailed complaint to the operator and 
where the evidence does not restore the levels of quality of service within 30 days of the submission of 
such complaint, he is entitled to withdraw from the contract without penalty for the part relating to the 
service of Internet access from a fixed location, with a notice of one month, by notice sent by registered 
mail to the operator 
Accordingly, the user, once the relevant proofs are demonstrated, has the power to change operator 
without the necessity to pay any termination or penalty costs. 
Comment 
 
This case evidences only one of the numerous problems reported by users of electronic 
communications services. However, the particularity of such a case resides in the fact that, apart 
from compensation, the adjudicator ‒in this case, the Italian NRA– grants the consumer a right to 
freely change provider at zero cost; i.e. without the need of paying the penalty for terminating the 
contract before its expiration. The introduction of such a remedy responds to the particular features 
of telecommunications contracts, given that they are contract for the supply of telecommunications 
services and, therefore, they usually are long-term contracts. Nevertheless, in order to foster 
competition via facilitating change of provider, the European legal framework places a limit on the 
duration of the contract up to a maximum of 24 months as an initial commitment period.191 In the 
event that the user/consumer wishes to terminate the contract prior to its expiration, he must pay a 
penalty. In this case, by the annulment of the effect of the penalty clause the consumer may switch 
for free implying that the adjudicator is granting a novel sector-specific remedy. In so doing, 
telecommunications regulation is reducing the scope of application of private law remedies,192 but 
at the same time, it is expanding sector-related consumer redress by creating ex-novo (sector-
specific) remedies outside civil law, granted by the sector-specific regulator. The introduction of 
                                                          
191 Article 30(5) Universal Service Directive.  
192 Bellantuono, G. (2014). Forthcoming in P. Monateri (ed.), Handbook of Comparative Contract Law, Elgar Publishing, 
2015. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2486066.  
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private law remedies via European sector-specific legislation is not new. In the financial sector, the 
Mifid II Directive entitles supervisory authorities to impose remedies.193 This attempted expansion 
of private law remedies via sector-specific regulation has been visible with the (abortive) 
amendment of the European regulatory framework for telecoms. In this regard, the draft Regulation 
entitled NRAs to grant compensation remedies in the line of the Mifid II Directive.194 
This approach also makes more difficult their enforcement via civil courts.195 Yet, the issue 
of exclusionary powers of the NRA does not operate in Italy where, compliant with the principle of 
liberty enshrined in EU law, the legislator has provided that the definition of the dispute by the 
regulator, at least in B2C, does not preclude civil compensation.196  Should a civil court have 
decided the case, the judge would have (probably) resolved the case under the Italian civil law. By 
analogy, as it has been already pointed out with regard to the energy sector, “a civil judge 
employing the traditional tools of contract interpretation might come to different conclusions”.197 In 
regulated markets, regulatory goals in civil courts are not relevant, disregarded by civil judges vis-
à-vis contract law principles; whereas these contractual principles might in parallel be disregarded 
by the regulators in those cases where they are opposed to the regulatory goals pursued.198  
5. Consumer law v sector-specific regulation. Substitution or 
complementarity? 
While major attention has been paid to the intersections between sector-related regulation and 
competition law, the analysis of the interactions of sector-specific provisions and the broader 
(horizontal) instrument of contract law (particularly consumer law) has been, with some 
exceptions,199 mostly neglected. This section seeks to examine the interplay between sector-specific 
rules vis-à-vis horizontal instruments of consumer protection (Consumers Rights Directive, CESL, 
Service Directive, etc.). The analysis of such interplay aims to shed some light on the relation of 
the two different legal regimes (horizontal v vertical). Because these two regimes serve different 
rationalities, and hence purposes, comparing the different instruments becomes an important 
analytical exercise. Is it possible to apply horizontal law provisions to sector-related issues? How 
do they interact? Does the sector-related regime overrule horizontal provisions? Do they lead to 
different outcomes?  
                                                          
193 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, 12.06.2014, OJ L 173/349. Article 69.  
194 Draft Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures concerning the European 
single market for electronic communications and to achieve a Connected Continent - COM(2013) 627, Article 30(8).  
195 Ibid.  
196 Article 11(4) Delibera 179/03/CSP ‘Direttiva generale in materia di qualità e carte dei servizi di telecomunicazioni’: 
La corresponsione dell'indennizzo non esclude la possibilità per l'utente di richiedere in sede giurisdizionale il 
risarcimento dell'eventuale ulteriore danno subito (The payment of compensation does not exclude the possibility for the 
user to apply to the courts for compensation for any further damage). See chapter 5 of this dissertation.  
197 Bellantuono, G. (2010), “The Limits of Contract Law in the Regulatory State”, European Review of Contract Law, 6, 
115-142. 
198 Ibid.   
199 Micklitz, H. W. (2013), "Do Consumers and Businesses Need a New Architecture of Consumer Law? A Thought 
Provoking Impulse", Yearbook of European Law, 32(1), 266-367. For a particular analysis on the Energy sector see 
Bellantuono, G., & Boffa, F. (2007) “Energy Regulation and Consumers' Interests”. Available at SSRN 1120928. 
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Sector-related rules apply without prejudice to consumer protection rules. The Universal 
Service Directive makes particular reference to Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Contract Terms, 
and Directive 97/7/EC on Distance Selling.200  
Because the enforcement of telecoms rules can be performed by a multiplicity of actors 
(national court or national regulatory authority), it raises the question as to which instruments are 
better-suited for applying consumer protection measures or whose values are more relevant for the 
resolution of a particular issue.201 In this regard, and setting aside the procedure (who applies the 
law?) by focusing on the substance (hierarchy of norms), Case C-522/08 represents a conflict 
between two legal regimes. 202  It concerned the issue of services bundling; i.e. a commercial 
practice consisting in the provision of a service contingent on the supply of an additional service. 
By way of example, in the telecoms field it represents those cases in which the user can only obtain 
Internet or TV services by means of the conclusion of a contract of supply of telephone services. 
In the case concerned, Telekommunikacja Polska (TP, nowadays Orange Poland) made the 
conclusion of a contract for the provision of ‘neostrada tp’ broadband internet access services 
contingent on the conclusion of a contract for telephone services.203 Under the Universal Service 
Directive (sector-specific legislation),  
Member States shall ensure that designated undertakings, in providing facilities and services additional to 
those referred to in Articles 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9(2), establish terms and conditions in such a way that the 
subscriber is not obliged to pay for facilities or services which are not necessary or not required for the 
service requested.204 
On the other hand, national law provided that: 
Article 46(2) of the Polish Law on Telecommunications205 
For the purpose of protecting the end-user, the President of the [UKE] may, by way of a decision, impose 
on a telecommunications undertaking with significant market power in the retail market the following 
obligations: 
(…) 
      (5) not to oblige an end-user to subscribe to services which that end-user does not require. 
Article 57(1) of the Polish Law on Telecommunications provides: 
1.   A service provider may not make the conclusion of a contract for the provision of publicly available 
telecommunications services, including connection to a public telecommunications network, contingent 
on: 
                                                          
200 Article 1(4) Universal Service Directive.  
201 On the multiciplity of actors and outcomes see Chapter 5.  
202  Case C-522/08. Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 11 March 2010, Telekommunikacja Polska SA w 
Warszawie v Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej. ECR [2010] I-02079. 
203 Para. 15.  
204 Article 10(1) of the Universal Service Directive.  
205  Ustawa – Prawo telekomunikacyjne, of 16 July 2004, Dz. U. No 171, item 1800, (hereinafter, ‘Law on 
Telecommunications’).  
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 (1) The conclusion, by the end-user, of a contract for the provision of other services or the purchase of 
equipment from a specific provider; 
(...) 
Under these provisions, the President of UKE issued a decision in order to put an end to such a 
commercial practice. 206  TP challenged that decision in front of the Wojewódzki Sąd 
Administracyjny w Warszawie (Regional Administrative Court, Warsaw) seeking the annulment of 
the decision by arguing the incompatibility of Article 57(1) with the Universal Service Directive. 
However, the Regional Administrative Court dismissed the action and ruled that the decision by the 
President of UKE did not constitute an erroneous application of the legal provision (i.e. Article 
57(1)). 207  TP appealed that judgment before the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Supreme 
Administrative Court), which referred a question for preliminary ruling on the compatibility of the 
introduction of a prohibition on making the conclusion of a service-provision contract contingent 
on the purchase of another service by the Member States.208 The European Court recalled that 
under the Universal Service Directive, Member States must ensure that designated undertakings do 
not establish terms and conditions obliging the subscriber “to pay for facilities or services which 
are not necessary or not required for the service requested”.209 Accordingly, the Court declared that 
the Framework Directive and the Universal Service Directive do not preclude national legislation 
“which, for the purpose of protecting end-users, prohibits an undertaking from making the 
conclusion of a contract for the provision of telecommunications services contingent on the 
conclusion, by the end-user, of a contract for the provision of other services”.210 
In the joined Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07, the Court acknowledged that Directive 
2005/29/EC precludes national legislation that imposes a “general prohibition” of combined offers 
made by a vendor to a consumer.211 In the case-at-hand, there seems to be a clash of rationalities of 
the two different sets of rules emanating from the EU (horizontal versus sector-specific legislation). 
The different policy objectives of the horizontal rules in consumer protection have given rise to a 
paradoxical situation where horizontal legislation undermines originally afforded consumer 
protection by sector-specific regimes.  
This example may serve to illustrate the complex co-existence of both regimes sector-
specific and general contract law. Certain authors have already noted the difficulties of applying 
general contract regimes such a, by way of example, the Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR) to sector-related problems.212 The application of more general principles of contract law 
would require a radical new interpretation of its rules because contract law is unable to 
                                                          
206 Decision of 28 December 2006 upheld by Decision of 14 March 2007.  
207 Para 16.  
208 Para 17.  
209 Para. 24.  
210 Para. 30.  
211 See Joined cases VTB-VAB NV v Total Belgium NV (C-261/07) and Galatea BVBA v Sanoma Magazines Belgium NV 
(C-299/07) [2009] ECR I-2949, Para 68.  
212 In the field of Energy, Bellantuono supra n 197.  
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accommodate a regulatory approach.213 Until a new /paradigm of European Contract Law emerges 
– European (Regulatory) Private Law may serve as a placeholder‒ embodying perhaps such a 
perspective, the problems will be focused inreconciling the interaction of the two different 
regimes.214 
6. Conclusions. The intrusion of goal-oriented (Regulatory) Private Law 
Under the configuration of the European Regulatory Framework for electronic communications, 
telecommunications regulation meets private law. This is mainly due to the fact that the shift 
towards the liberalization of telecoms sector coincides with a shift towards its privatization. As 
such, telecommunications regulation encompasses contractual provisions concerning, typically, 
private law relationships in wholesale and in retail markets. This chapter has displayed the 
implications of such approach.  
Following the institutional design displayed in the previous chapter, the analysis of the 
substantive provisions concerning private law relationships reveals a clear orientation towards the 
achievement of the regulatory objectives of telecommunications sector-specific regulation. Against 
this background, whilst regulatory goals are European, traditional private law principles are 
embodied in national understandings.215 Thus, on every occasion we talk about European private 
law, in relation to the private law provisions contained in EU regulated sectors such as telecoms, 
the harmonization of such regulatory goals requires special procedural rules, since the application 
of private law principles would distort the achievement of the regulatory goals as evidenced in 
chapter 3. In this regard, the present chapter has proved that private law provisions within 
telecommunications regulation are subordinated to public law and economic regulation; in short, to 
regulatory law. The Internal Market has been the driving force behind the European private law and 
contracts have become an instrument of such higher policy (and regulatory) objectives. Contract 
law becomes competitive contract law, 216 as part of serving a regulatory function. As such, private 
law is used for economic regulation under a public interest rationale (universal access and 
connecting everyone or end-to-end connectivity). Under this paradigm, the relevant question relates 
to the number of transformations have private law has experienced. While in traditional contract 
law mandatory rules are the exception, in the telecommunications sector one might venture to 
suggest that they have become the rule. The boundaries between public and private law become 
blurred. Consequently, private law provisions in telecommunications are regulatory in nature. This 
chapter has addresses the particular private law implications for B2B (wholesale) and for B2C 
(retail) relationships. 
                                                          
213 Ibid.  
214 Bellantuono supra n 197. See also Ottow, A. (2012), "Intrusion of public law into contract law: the case of network 
sectors", The Europa Institute Working Paper 03/12. 
215 Comparato, G. (2014), Nationalism and private law in Europe. Bloomsbury Publishing. 
216 Competitive contract law implies that “the contract law rules are shape so as to allow effective competition between 
suppliers in the Internal Market” Micklitz, H.-W., (2005) “The Concept of Competitive Contract Law”, Penn State 
International Law Review, 23(3) 549-586; see p. 555.  
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As to the contractual relationships between operators, private companies through 
mandatory provisions concerning access conditions now carry out the provision of former public 
services. The provision of these services has been, therefore, transferred to the market. By way of 
example, according to universal access, there is the obligation to contract and negotiate for the sake 
of competition and market inclusion safeguards. The lack of a fully-fledged EU contract law 
together with the absence of a properly harmonized private law among the member states 
concerning contract formation, negotiation, performance and remedies means that the EU cannot 
develop a regulation of access and interconnection under a single contract law.217 This enterprise 
was, then, undertaken according to public law considerations –i.e. via telecommunications 
regulation– which indeed pursues different aims than those for which (traditional) private law 
stands, creating a tension between public and private law objectives.218 As a result, the principles 
applied in the Regulatory Framework for telecoms (non-discriminated access) are substantively 
different to those underpinning contract law, based on freedom of contract. This is to say that 
NRAs, when imposing regulatory obligations, do not apply private law but regulatory standards; as 
opposed to civil courts which inevitably apply private law principles. It gives rise to a tension and 
potential divergent outcomes in the enforcement of telecommunications regulation.219   
As to consumer protection, the Universal Service approach strives for the maintenance of a 
provider of last resort by imposing obligations to contract as a safety net for vulnerable consumers. 
This means that there is room for social policy elements within European Private Law, in contrast 
to the private law contained in the 19th Century Codes.220 In this light, consumer-related provisions 
in regulated markets depart from the more horizontal approaches of private and consumer law.221 
One may query the permanent nature of sector-specific regulation: Whether sector-specific 
regulation aims to construct a new and basic architecture or is entirely an ad hoc construction? The 
answer to this question can be observed in the character of its provisions. Thus, whereas the 
competition law approach ‒number portability, information, etc. – may eventually exempt the need 
of sector-specific regulation in favor of competition law or, in the field of private law, a broader 
contract law (e.g. Unfair Contract Terms and general consumer law); interconnection, access and 
price regulation in telecommunications indicate more embedded forms of special regulation.222 
Further, as a matter of fact, civil law regimes remain applicable to telecommunications contracts 
even by traditional judicial schemes of enforcement. Yet, different approaches yield different 
outcomes, because the different regimes are built according to different rationales. It is also 
noticeable that new (specialized) bodies have emerged for the enforcement of the sector-related 
provisions, especially for the resolution of disputes arising within the provision of 
telecommunications services. The succeeding chapter will address, then, the institutional design for 
                                                          
217 Gijrath, S. (2006), Interconnection Regulation and Contract Law, dLex. 
218 Bergkamp, L. (2003). European Community Law for the New Economy. Intersentia nv. 
219 These issues are subject to extensive treatment in the following chapter.  
220 Micklitz, H.-W., (2011) ‘Universal Services: Nucleus for a Social European Private Law’, in Cremona, M. (ed.), 
Market Integration and Public Services in the European Union, Oxford University Press, pp. 63-102. 
221 Ottow, A. (2012), ‘Intrusion of public law into contract law: the case of network sectors’. The Europa Institute 
Utrecht, Working Paper 02/12.  
222 Möschel, W. (2009), “The Future Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications: General Competition Law instead 
of Sector-Specific Regulation–A German Perspective”, European Business Organization Law Review, 10(1) 149-163. 
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dispute resolution in telecoms and its implications for the enforcement of provisions that are, in 
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Chapter 5 – THE ENFORCEMENT OF EUROPEAN REGULATION VIA 







The liberalization trend has changed the telecommunications sector dramatically. The number of 
providers of telecommunications services has radically increased giving rise to new markets and 
services developing at a very high speed. As a result of market competition and the increasing 
number of market participants, a huge number of potential disputes take place in the telecoms 
sector in such a way that telecoms disputes have become by-products of the competition model in 
both wholesale and retail markets. Disputes related to the telecoms sector involve a wide range of 
issues, most importantly, and concerning private law, the failure to fulfill contractual obligations. 
Against this background, all these new processes and the way in which telecoms markets develop 
nowadays necessarily calls for rapid responsiveness when it comes to dispute resolution.  
Effective enforcement of the European legal framework for the telecommunications sector, 
meaning the availability of effective mechanisms for dispute resolution provided by judicial or 
extrajudicial bodies, become essential for the achievement of the objectives of telecommunications 
regulation and policy. A lack of effective mechanisms for dispute settlement under 
telecommunications regulation would hinder the development of the market, obstruct the 
functioning of competition and, finally, endanger investment by reducing the flow of capital from 
investors. 1  Thus, the European Union –being aware of the significance of having effective 
alternative means of dispute resolution– has opted for fostering the availability of out-of-court 
bodies for the enforcement of the provisions contained in the regulatory framework for electronic 
communications services.  
Drawing on the objectives of the EU Telecommunications rules, this chapter describes the 
institutional choice and the different approaches towards dispute resolution at the national level 
given the procedural autonomy principle. It then undertakes a comparative analysis of different EU 
Member States, looking at both the wholesale and retail levels.  
 
First it is relevant to briefly recall the goals of the EU legal framework for telecoms. The 
main policy aims are to foster competition and achieve a single electronic communications network 
and services market in Europe. This policy push strives for the creation and development of a 
                                                          
1  International Telecommunications Union (2004), Dispute resolution in the Telecommunications Sector. Current 
Practices and Future Directions (Hereinafter, ITU Report).  
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genuine Internal Market for telecommunication in the EU. Therefore, as this dissertation has 
already displayed [Chapter 4], the competition and market-oriented approach has implied the 
establishment of rights and remedies that are aimed at setting up the conditions for achieving a 
truly competitive market. The underpinning rationale of the market is access. This idea of access is 
twofold: The opening of the market is deeply grounded on the idea of providing the conditions for 
operators to participate in the market (wholesale level), whereas at the retail level access conditions 
should enable the spread of telecommunications services to make them available to all citizens.2 
There is no doubt that in order to achieve these aims the rights and remedies provided for in the 
legislation concerning telecommunications must be properly and effectively enforced; not only for 
the achievement of the main purposes of the legislation, but also to succeed with secondary goals 
such as the fostering of investment via regulatory certainty.3  
 
Be this as it may, we are dealing with sector-specific rights and remedies as opposed to 
civil and contract law rights and remedies. The latter find their most important manifestation when 
provided as the solution to a particular dispute. Accordingly, their effective enforcement will be 
very much based on the designed scheme for dispute settlement as long as civil courts will apply 
civil and contract law principles, whereas –as this chapter will show− the allocation of adjudicative 
powers to NRAs would imply the application of sectorial remedies and the adoption of decisions 
largely based on regulatory principles. 
 
This chapter provides a snapshot of the current institutional scheme that has been designed 
in order to achieve the enforcement of those goals and objectives enshrined in the European legal 
framework. Further, this chapter analyzes how the EU scheme is enforced at the national level. To 
this end, this chapter looks at some Member States (Italy, Germany, Poland and the United 
Kingdom) as paradigmatic examples of how dispute resolution mechanisms have been put in place 
around Europe. However, this chapter deliberately sets aside the enforcement of competition rules. 
With regard to private law, this means the enforcement of competition law via commitment 
decisions, which is not subject of analysis here. 
 
Telecommunications regulation relies on sector-specific institutional structures to build up 
a system of enforcement for telecommunications-related disputes, be they B2B or B2C.  Here, a 
movement towards out-of-court dispute settlement –a service increasingly provided even by the 
different NRAs themselves– can easily be seen. This raises the question of the role (i.e. relative 
importance) of extrajudicial enforcement vis-à-vis the judiciary. The amount and technical 
complexity of telecoms-related disputes has favored the emergence of sector-specific schemes and 
                                                          
2 The aim of the Universal Service Directive (2002) –as stated in its Article 1– is to “ensure the availability throughout 
the Community of good quality publicly available services and choice and to deal with circumstances in which the needs 
of end-users are not satisfactorily met by the market”.   
3 For example, as it is stated in the Better Regulation Directive, effective enforcement fosters regulatory certainty which, 
in turn, implies an important factor for investment attraction. See Recital 51, Council Directive 2009/140/EC of 25 
November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services, 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (OJ 
L337/3711).  
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procedures specifically designed for disputes taking place in the telecoms sector. The questions that 
this chapter seeks to respond to concern the legal framework (section 2) and the institutional design 
of the actors involved in the enforcement process (section 3). It then provides two examples of 
dispute resolution in the wholesale (section 4.1) and in the retail (section 4.2) market. Accordingly, 
it tries to underline the issues resulting from enforcement design and how these impact upon the 
outcome of dispute settlement stemming from typically contractual problems that give rise to 
regulatory (administrative) interferences within the different layers of (EU) telecommunications 
law enforcement.  
2. Setting the scene: Dispute resolution in the EU Regulatory Framework for 
Electronic Communications 
 
The liberalization of telecommunications implied the restructuring of the market with the 
emergence of new market operators. Yet, despite the fact that the telecommunications market it is 
strongly characterized by economies of scale and scope, the simple liberalization of the sector does 
not suffice to avoid Significant Market Power situations hindering the enforcement of the rules 
contained in the regulatory framework. In this sense, it is necessary for the public authorities to 
closely monitor the functioning of the market. In so doing, public authorities may rely on three sets 
of rules: European competition law; national competition law; or sector-specific legislation.4 Each 
legislative regime is applied (differently) by different institutions: European competition law is 
applied by the European Commission, National Competition Authorities (NCAs), national courts, 
and in some countries NRAs; the national competition regimes are monitored by NCAs, national 
courts, and possibly NRAs; and sector specific legislation is applied by NRAs (under the control of 
national Courts via judicial review procedures).5 Hence, the analysis of the institutional design 
becomes crucial in order to fully grasp the how the enforcement of the rules applicable to issues 
arising in relation to the provision of telecommunications services functions.  
 
In addition, dispute resolution is decisive for giving effect to the provisions contained in 
telecommunications regulations. Accordingly, the practice adopted and the enforcement design will 
have an indisputable impact on the effectiveness of the application of the regulatory scheme. This 
noted, the national procedural autonomy principle and the national procedural rules also play a 
relevant role in the effectiveness of the application of such provisions and the level of 
harmonization of the substantive provisions. In order to overcome potential obstacles resulting 
from the procedural design and the conflicting objectives between the EU and the national level 
and the application of sector-specific regulation, the European legislator has opted for fostering the 
establishment of sector-specific schemes for the enforcement of the provisions contained in the 
telecommunications legal regime via extrajudicial enforcement, mostly compelling Member States 
                                                          
4 Garzaniti, L. and M. O’ Regan (eds.) (2010), Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Internet: EU Competition Law 
and Regulation, 3rd ed.; Sweet and Maxwell. 
5 De Streel (2004) ‘Remedies in the European Electronic Communications Sector’, in Geradin, D. (Ed.). Remedies in 
Network Industries: EC Competition Law vs. Sector-specific Regulation, Intersentia, pp. 67-122. 
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to put in place extrajudicial mechanisms for dispute settlement. By establishing some procedural 
principles for extrajudicial procedures, the enforcement of EU telecommunications regulation 
surpasses potential conflicting problems among legal regimes arising from the application of 
national procedural rules.   
 
The EU was not exclusively competent in the area of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) and, therefore, it employed soft law mechanisms to establish minimum-quality criteria on 
ADR.6 Since that time, it has been gradually pushing the harmonization in this field. The promotion 
of ADR mechanisms in the EU has been especially visible in regulated markets, where the EU has 
clearly opted for the establishment of out-of-court mechanisms for the settlement of disputes. Thus, 
not only in telecommunications, but also in the energy,7 consumer credit,8 or payment services 
sectors,9 EU laws oblige Member States to set up ADR mechanisms, while in other sectors such 
as e-Commerce 10  or postal services 11  they only encourage such a step. This movement has 
culminated in the enactment of a EU Directive on Consumer ADR12 and a Regulation on Consumer 
Online Dispute Resolution (ODR)13 following a more horizontal approach by establishing certain 
procedural principles to cover a broad set of consumer disputes.  
 
In the electronic communications sector in particular, within the EU regulatory framework 




Generally, as the previous chapter of this dissertation has described, the most common conflicts 
between operators of electronic communications services and/or networks arise in the context of 
access and interconnection agreements. This is largely due to the fact that these contracts usually 
involve high technical requirements and this may easily lead to lack of clarity about the contractual 
terms. That is particularly the case when the service provider that has exclusive control over the 
essential facility fails to reach an interconnection agreement or to provide access to the network. 
Disputes originating from the contract terms or the performance of obligations arising from them 
                                                          
6 For example, the European Commission Recommendation of 30 March 1998 on the principles applicable to the bodies 
responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes (98/257/EC) and the European Commission 
Recommendation of 4 April 2001 on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the consensual resolution of 
consumer disputes (2001/310/EC).  
7 Directive 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and Directive  
2009/73/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (OJ L 211, 14.8.2009).  
8 Directive 2008/48/EC of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers (OJ L 133, 22.5.2008, pp. 66–92).  
9 Directive 2007/64/EC of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market (OJ L 319/1, 5.12.2007).  
10 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (OJ L 178 , 17/07/2000).  
11 Directive 2008/6/EC of 20 February 2008 with regard to the full accomplishment of the internal market of Community 
postal services (OJ L 52, 28.2.2008).  
12 Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution 
for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, (OJ L 165 18.6.2013).  
13 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and 
amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (OJ L 165 18.6.2013). 
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can be resolved either by the (civil) court or the NRA concerned. In particular, for disputes arising 
in wholesale markets, Article 20(1) of the Framework Directive provides that:  
“In the event of a dispute arising in connection with existing obligations under this Directive or the 
Specific Directives between undertakings providing electronic communications networks or services in a 
Member State, or between such undertakings and other undertakings in the Member State benefiting from 
obligations of access and/or interconnection arising under this Directive or the Specific Directives, the 
national regulatory authority concerned shall, at the request of either party, and without prejudice to the 
provisions of paragraph 2, issue a binding decision to resolve the dispute in the shortest possible time 
frame and in any case within four months, except in exceptional circumstances. The Member State 
concerned shall require that all parties cooperate fully with the national regulatory authority”.  
 
Adjudication of the dispute by the NRA is generally the forum chosen for handling the issue.14 
Should the civil court have had the occasion to consider these issues, some argue that they would 
have done so “just as well as NRAs”.15 The issue is controversial, but be that as it may, what 
becomes clear from the following analysis is that the potential involvement of different bodies in 
the absence of a common approach or single guidance on the applicable legal regime will likely 
lead to divergent outcomes. This is also the case when the judiciary is involved via the stipulated 
judicial review procedure.16 The rationale of having a parallel settlement procedure as opposed 
involving the judiciary may indeed respond to the nature of the disputes, which are usually 
complex with high values at stake, involving various commercial, technical and legal aspects. The 
institutional and procedural aspects of sector-specific regulatory adjudication and their legal 
implications are analyzed below.  
Retail market 
Consumer-related disputes in telecommunications are often related to billing, tariff transparency 
and internet quality. These issues generally represent the most frequent causes of 
telecommunication user complaints.17 Disputes concerning billing are related to disagreements on 
the charges billed to consumers for the provision of the service(s). Very close to billing problems 
are issues related to tariff transparency, which involve the failure to provide clear information 
about the tariffs to be applied and the charges billed. Poor quality of services, usually Internet 
speed, are –together with service interruption– a common reason for consumer-related disputes. 
The different Member States have put in place quality measurement mechanisms (e.g. Misura 
Internet in Italy)18 and quality service standards have been adopted.19  
In order to solve these consumer-related disputes in a rapid manner, out-of-court dispute 
resolution is encouraged in the Universal Service Directive. Thus, according to its Article 34(1):  
 
                                                          
14 Gijrath, S. J. (2006). Interconnection regulation and contract law, DeLex. See pp. 395ff for the Dutch example.  
15 Ibid.  
16 See Section 4.1 below.  
17 Data from the analysis of the national experiences presented within the Framework of the Workshop Private Law and 
the Telecommunications Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012. 
18 See Chapter 4.  
19 ETSI Quality Standards, see http://www.etsi.org/technologies-clusters/technologies/quality-of-service.  
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Member States shall ensure that transparent, non-discriminatory, simple and inexpensive out-of-court 
procedures are available for dealing with unresolved disputes between consumers and undertakings 
providing electronic communications networks and/or services arising under this Directive and relating to 
the contractual conditions and/or performance of contracts concerning the supply of those networks and/or 
services.   
 
Such a procedure should be available for disputes between users and providers of services under 
the Universal Service Directive and for disputes related to the contractual conditions and/or 
performance of contracts concerning the supply of those networks or services.20 The means of 
initiating such procedures should be clearly contained in the subscription contract.21 Independent 
dispute resolution bodies must be established and must adhere to the minimum principles 
established by the Commission for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes.22  
 
The following sections are aimed at outlining different schemes for dispute resolution, 
either in B2B and B2C contract-related disputes. This analysis aims to shed some light on such 
schemes and to contribute to a better understanding of the foundations for the existence of sector-
specific mechanisms for dispute resolution in the telecommunications sector in a manner isolated 
from general structures of private law and public law. As a matter of fact, this sector-specific 
enforcement design outlines a blueprint for an enforcement system that takes place away from the 
judiciary and the civil procedural rules. The judiciary would only come into play via judicial 
review procedures in case of appeal of the regulatory decision issued by the competent authority in 
the wholesale market or in cases where consumers decide to go to court when seeking consumer 
redress. The latter seems improbable.23 Accordingly, the following section provides an overview of 
the different actors and procedures for dispute resolution in the context of telecommunications 
regulation.  
3. Institutional design: Different (p)layers in the enforcement of 
telecommunications regulation  
 
As mentioned above, the designed legal and institutional schemes yield a landscape in which 
different institutions are in charge of enforcing different sets of rules. There is an interplay of 
judicial, administrative and out-of court settlements, and an interaction between the applicable 
rules, which gives way to a multilevel system of enforcement consisting in manifold (and 
networked) layers: first, we have European competition law, monitored by the European 
                                                          
20 Queck, R., de Streel, A., Hou, L., Jost, J., &Kosta, E. (2010), 'The EU Regulatory Framework Applicable to Electronic 
Communications', in Garzaniti, L. and O’Regan, M. (Eds.), Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Internet. EU 
Competition Law & Regulation (3rd ed.), London: Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 3-262.  
21 Article 20(2) letter g Universal Service Directive.  
22 These principles are listed in the Commission Recommendation 98/257 of March 30, 1998 on the principles applicable 
to the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes and Recommendation 2001/310/EC of 4 April 
2001 on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in the consensual resolution of consumer disputes.  
23 “Disputes that reach a court also seem to be the exception rather than the rule in the field of universal services”, 
Mickltiz, 2012, at 52. See also 2009 DG SANCO, Study on the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European 
Union (Civil Consulting 2009) at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_study.pdf.  
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Commission, the European Competition Network (ECN), National Competition Authorities 
(NCAs), national courts, and –in some countries– a single regulator for markets and competition 
tasked with the combined role of   applying competition and sector-specific rules; second, there are 
the national competition regimes, scrutinized by the NCA; finally, in those countries that have 
maintained distinct functions for the regulator and the competition authorities, sector-specific 
legislation is applied by the NRA. Courts also apply competition and sector-specific rules, but their 
role will be determined by the nature of the court.24 Provided that disputes arise in connection with 
the contractual relations that bind the parties, the application of private law also comes into play. 
In the case of telecommunications services, the European regulatory framework has opted 
for providing a system of regulatory adjudication of disputes (for B2B disputes) and fostering the 
use of ADR (not only for B2B situations, but also for consumer disputes), thus giving rise to the 
displacement of civil courts to resolve inter partes conflicts. This design centralizes dispute 
resolution largely with the regulator. This procedural innovation draws on the expertise argument: 
The high level of technicality of the market of telecommunications leads to a situation where the 
resolution of disputes becomes a very complex task and expertise becomes essential for the 
resolution of dispute that are of a high technical nature. Therefore, it happens that regulatory and 
legal institutions are not always sufficiently endowed to handle telecoms disputes in an efficient 
and effective manner.25 Accordingly, the legislator has relied on the technical, economic and legal 
expertise of NRAs for the effective enforcement of the telecommunications framework. Expertise 
has also favored the emergence of sector-related ADR providers for consumer-related disputes, 
such as Co.Re.Com in Italy or CISAS in the UK.26  
In the wholesale market, there is also a wide catalogue of dispute resolution techniques, 
ranging from regulatory adjudication to the use of ADR mechanisms. NRAs often encourage 
parties to try to resolve disputes before approaching the regulator due to the lack of resources in 
some cases, as well as expertise limitations. There might also be NRAs that simply refuse to 
resolve the case by redirecting or delegating them to specific schemes set up specifically by the 
regulator for the resolution of these kinds of disputes. Under this sector-specific setting, there is 
also room for non-official mechanisms for dispute resolution to be used, giving rise to private 
schemes of pure private enforcement.   
In view of this multilevel system of manifold actors and legal regimes, the question that 
arises concerns the role of NRAs when deciding disputes within the framework of their mandates 
as adjudicators. The legislation does not clearly state whether their mandate stands to act as a 
safeguard for EU regulatory principles over national contract law –so that NRAs act in their 
administrative capacity as European enforcers– or if, on the contrary, the applicable rules for the 
determination of the dispute are left entirely to their discretion within the limits and safeguards of 
national legislation. A third alternative would be that the application of the transposed legislation is 
                                                          
24 See below, Section 4.1.  
25 ITU Report.  
26 See below. Section 3.  
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to be read through the lens of local considerations –including national private law‒ in combination 
with the overarching (European) principles that guide telecommunications regulation. This latter 
interpretation seems the most plausible in the view of the case-study examined below.27  
As a result of this institutional design, in both wholesale and retail markets the enforcement 
of telecommunications regulation via dispute resolution can take place in three different ways by 
three different players: regulatory dispute resolution by the regulator; ADR mechanisms; or the 
judicial route. The resulting different layers in the enforcement of telecommunications regulation 
via dispute resolution are examined in this section.  
 
3.1 Regulatory dispute settlement by NRAs 
The European Regulatory framework for Electronic Communications engages NRAs in the 
enforcement of the sector-related provisions. In this regard, apart from market supervision, 
regulators also play a role in (private) dispute settlement.  
3.1.1 The role of NRAs in the enforcement of telecommunications regulation  
 
Sector-specific national regulators are actively involved in the resolution of telecoms-related 
disputes. At the wholesale level, NRAs have a specific mandate to act as dispute adjudicators, 
whereas in the case of consumer disputes, even though there is no formal obligation the authorities 
often set up and/or monitor sector-specific mechanisms for dispute settlement.  
B2B disputes 
 
In the event of a telecom-related dispute between telecoms undertakings that is associated with 
obligations arising from telecommunications regulation (“regulatory obligations”), the Regulatory 
Framework for electronic communications provides that the national regulator is responsible for the 
resolution of the dispute.28 More specifically, parties can request the intervention of the authority to 
impose a solution on the parties: 
 
In the event of a dispute between undertakings in the same Member State in an area covered by this 
Directive or the Specific Directives, for example relating to obligations for access and 
interconnection or to the means of transferring subscriber lists, an aggrieved party that has 
negotiated in good faith but failed to reach agreement should be able to call on the national 
regulatory authority to resolve the dispute. National regulatory authorities should be able to impose 
a solution on the parties. The intervention of a national regulatory authority in the resolution of a 
dispute between undertakings providing electronic communications networks or services in a 
Member State should seek to ensure compliance with the obligations arising under this Directive or 
the Specific Directives.29 
 
                                                          
27 Section 4.1.  
28 Article 20(1) of the Framework Directive.  
29 Recital 32 Framework Directive.  
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Article 20 of the Framework Directive narrows the mandate of NRAs, which enjoy broad 
discretion with regard to the procedure put in place to decide on the dispute.30  NRAs are solely 
required to issue a binding decision within a time frame of 4 months. 31  Yet, the different 
mechanisms may vary from “formal procedures, including court-like hearings with oral or written 
evidence, to much more informal or ‘legislative’ approaches to fact finding and determination”.32 
As to the procedure for statutory dispute resolution by the NRA, telecommunications legislation 
usually establishes the procedural framework, but it may also be the case that this procedure is 
subject to administrative regulation. This said, it is not uncommon for the agency to be entitled to 
decide the most appropriate procedure according to the dispute at stake.33  
National experiences 
By way of example, Italy has developed the following mechanism for the settlement of disputes 
among operators. According to Article 23(1) of the recently amended Codice delle communicazioni 
elettroniche (Electronic Communications Code),34 if a dispute arises concerning their obligations 
under the Code between undertakings providing electronic communications networks or services, 
or between such companies and other businesses that benefit from the imposition of obligations for 
access or interconnection arising from the Code, the Authority (AGCOM, Autorità per le Garanzie 
nelle Comunicazioni), at the request of any party, shall adopt as soon as possible and in any event 
within a period of four months (except in exceptional circumstances) a binding decision to resolve 
the dispute. The entire procedure is regulated in the resolution 352/08/CONS.35 This regulation 
provides for an initial attempt at conciliation by the parties in the first hearing of the procedure.36 If 
conciliation succeeds, the authority responsible for the proceedings must prepare the minutes of the 
special agreement concluded, to be signed by the parties that reached the agreement. 37  Such 
agreement can be amended during the procedure. As a characteristic of the conciliatory nature of 
the procedure, the regulation provides the possibility for the official in charge of the procedure to 
propose, upon request of one party, one or more alternatives for a possible amicable settlement of 
the dispute.38 The proposals put forward for this purpose are totally without effect if they are not 
accepted and they are not binding in any way on the body competent to settle the dispute.39 During 
the investigation phase, the officer leading the proceedings may freely formulate questions to the 
parties at the hearing in order to clarify the facts in support of their claims, defences and 
                                                          
30 For a deeper analysis of the different ADR techniques in business-to-business disputes and their application in a 
comparative perspective, see Warwas, B. A. (2014), “ADR in B2B Disputes in the EU Telecommunications Sector: 
Where Does the EU Stand and What Does the EU Stand for?”, EUI Working Paper Series LAW 2014/12. 
31 Article 20(1) Framework Directive.  
32 ITU Report (2004); pp. 5-6. 
33 ITU Report.  
34 Decreto legislativo 1° agosto 2003, n. 259, modifica da Decreto legislativo 28 maggio 2012, n. 70.  
35  Delibera N. 352/08/CONS, Regolamento concernente alla Risoluzione delle controversie tra operatori di 
Comunicazione Elettronica (Regulation concerning the resolution of disputes between operators of electronic 
communications). In particular, the procedure is regulated in Annex A (Allegato A)) of such Regulation 
36 Article 9.  
37 Ibid. Para. 4.  
38 Ibid. Para. 6.  
39 Ibid.  
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exceptions, or to clarify the points of the dispute.40 Unless otherwise advised by the Commission 
for infrastructure networks Authority (Commissione per le infrastrutture e le reti dell’Autorità), the 
definition of disputes relating to the provision of purely financial and commercial matters, not 
related to issues of regulation, is normally delegated to the Director of networks and electronic 
communications services (Direttore della Direzione reti e servizi di comunicazione elettronica).41 
This means that the adjudication of disputes concerning commercial and contractual matters of a 
non-regulatory nature rests in the hands of the Director. The Regulation mandates that the decision 
in which the solution is adopted must be justified and must pursue the regulatory objectives 
contained in Article 13 of the Telecommunications Code. 42  Such a decision enjoys a binding 
nature.43  
In Poland, according to the Polish Telecommunications Law44 Act, the President of the 
Polish Office for Electronic Communications (Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej, UKE) is the 
body responsible for resolving disputes related to network access by alternative 
telecommunications operators, either upon a request of the parties involved in the negotiations for 
the conclusion of Telecommunication Access Agreement (if any) or ex officio. 45  Should 
negotiations prior to an interconnection or access agreement have taken place, both parties are 
entitled to submit a request to resolve the dispute to the President of UKE, who will have to specify 
the deadline for concluding the negotiations leading to the agreement. This period shall not be 
longer than 90 days, starting on the day that the request was submitted to the authority.46 In case of 
a lack of prior negotiations, in situations where they have not been concluded during the specific 
time period or simply when they fail, any of the parties may request the President of the authority 
to issue a decision on the dispute or to determine the conditions for cooperation.47 The particularity 
of this scheme is that the determination of the regulator usually replaces the Telecommunications 
Access Agreement between the parties involved in the dispute.48 The adjudicator may also, of its 
own motion, require a modification to the scope of the agreement. In particular, Article 29 
provides: “[T]he President of UKE may ex officio, by means of a decision, modify the content of a 
telecommunications access agreement or oblige the parties to the agreement to modify it in cases 
justified by the need to protect the interests of end users and to ensure effective competition or 
                                                          
40 Article 10.  
41 Article 11, para. 4.  
42 Ibid. Para. 5.  
43 Ibid. Para. 6.  
44 The Act of 16 July 2004. Telecommunications Law (OJ 2014. item. 243) is the basic act of national law establishing a 
legal framework for the operation of the telecommunications market and the scope of activities of the regulatory authority 
in Poland. Available at http://en.uke.gov.pl/telecommunications-act-77.  
45 Polish Telecommunications Act, Article 27. 
46 Ibid. Article 21(1). 
47 Ibid. Article 21(2). 
48 Ibid. Articles 28 and 29.  
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interoperability of services”;49 i.e. it subordinates the individual terms and conditions of the access 
agreement to achieve the regulatory objectives (as enshrined in Article 8 Framework Directive).50   
Notwithstanding this adjudication mandate, NRAs may decline to solve the dispute.51 In 
such an event, Member States must ensure that other procedures have been put in place and that 
these would better contribute to the resolution of the conflict.52 These “non-official” or “delegated” 
schemes refer to those procedures involving “arbitrators, mediators, and negotiators, who do not 
hold permanent government or judicial appointments” as opposed to representativee from a public 
(official) authority who act as the guarantor of the legality principle and due process.53Accordingly, 
the involvement of “non-official” actors clearly impacts on the enforcement of the devised policy 
aims for telecommunications. However, there is no clear-cut distinction between the two schemes. 
There are many variations by which official and non-official actors complement each other. 
Delegation is often used and the official sector can still retain a certain degree of control over the 
procedure.54 However, this distinction is important particularly in the context of judicial review. 
The Framework Directive (Article 4) establishes a mandatory right of appeal against NRAs’ 
decisions. Yet, the judicial review of decisions by non-official bodies is not required.  
Thus, and continuing with the Italian example, besides the dispute resolution scheme 
provided by the Italian regulator (AGCOM), OTA-Italia55 also discusses problems among operators 
on a voluntary basis. OTA-Italia is a body established by AGCOM that aims to facilitate 
implementation, ensure non-discriminatory terms, and simplify technical and operational processes 
for access to the fixed network of Telecom Italia (the former monopolist) by alternative operators. 
OTA-Italia, in cases of dispute and litigation, also has the task of acting as a mediator to find 
solutions reasonably satisfactory to both parties in conflict. 56 Parties are free to voluntarily adhere 
to the scheme provided by OTA-Italia. Accordingly, OTA-Italia intervenes on the basis of a 
voluntary agreement between Telecom Italia and alternative operators (Accordo di Adesione, 
Adhesion Agreement) with respect to technical and operational issues that may arise in relation to 
accessing fixed network services in order to facilitate the implementation of the different processes. 
As to the procedure followed, having heard the operators involved in a dispute, OTA-Italia 
                                                          
49 For an in-depth assessment of the procedure for dispute resolution in Poland, see Warwas, B. A. (2014), ‘ADR in B2B 
Disputes in the EU Telecommunications Sector: Where Does the EU Stand and What Does the EU Stand for?’, EUI 
Working Paper Series LAW 2014/12. 
50  See Case C-42/14 Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej,Telefonia Dialog sp. z o.o. vT-Mobile Polska SA, 
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 16 April 2015 nyr, at para. 45: “It must also be borne in mind (i) that 
Article 20(3) of the Framework Directive provides that, in resolving a dispute, the NRA is to take decisions aimed at 
achieving the objectives set out in Article 8 of that directive, (ii) that Article 7(1) of that directive provides that, in 
carrying out their tasks under that directive and the Specific Directives, NRAs are to take the utmost account of those 
objectives, including in so far as they relate to the functioning of the internal market, and (iii) that it is apparent from 
Article 5(1) and (4) of the Access Directive that, with regard to access and interconnection, the intervention of the NRAs 
also has the aim of pursuing and securing those same objectives. According to Article 8(3)(d) of the Framework 
Directive, the NRAs are to contribute to the development of the internal market by, inter alia, cooperating with each other 
and with the Commission in a transparent manner to ensure the development of consistent regulatory practice and the 
consistent application of that directive and the Specific Directives”. 
51 Article 20(2) Framework Directive.  
52 Ibid.  
53 ITU Report (2004).  
54 Ibid.  
55 http://www.ota-italia.it/.  
56 Article 1 Delibera N. 121/09/CONS, “Istituzione dell’OTA Italia” (Establishment of OTA-Italia).  
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prepares a draft regulation intended to define –together with the means of dialogue with operators– 
the procedural rules to be followed by OTA-Italia to perform the conciliation and to define the 
dispute by recalling the requirements of the regulations of the Authority applicable to operators 
and, where necessary, proposing appropriate and necessary adjustments.57 This means that even if 
the designated dispute settlement body follows the requirements already established by the NRA, 
the procedure in front of OTA-Italia is more flexible as it allows for adjustments to be made to the 
proposed procedure as a result of the dialogue with the parties. The procedural rules also provide 
that OTA-Italia will arrange the contractual schemes to which parties adhere (Accordo di 
Adesione).58 The contractual scheme must provide for the commitment of operators to comply with 
the requirements of the Rules for the functioning of OTA-Italia and their annexes. It also requires 
operators to not submit an application to the Authority (AGCOM) for the resolution of the dispute 
in accordance with Article 23 of the Electronic Communications Code before the conciliation has 
been ‒unsuccessfully– attempted.59  The requirements of the regulations of the Authority shall 
prevail over any conflicting contractual terms and are still applied in the event of questions of 
interpretation.60 This entails that even though OTA-Italia provides for a more private scheme for 
dispute resolution, the designed system does not greatly differ in practice from the official 
procedure offered by the NRA, AGCOM. It is merely a delegated reproduction of the official 
procedure. This outsourced regulatory adjudication is a practice also used in other Member States, 




As for consumer-related disputes, the national regulator may also act as the settlement facilitator or 
even the adjudicator of consumer disagreements. As aforementioned, Article 34 of the Universal 
Service Directive requires Member States to have in place “transparent, non-discriminatory, simple 
and inexpensive out-of-court procedures” for the resolution of consumer-related disputes. Apart 
from the establishment of ADR procedures which will be examined in the following section, some 
NRAs have set their own sector-specific mechanism for the resolution of B2C disputes.  
National experiences  
The Italian legal framework has provided a procedure for the resolution of consumer-related 
disputes using a tiered process with two phases.61 The first stage involves a compulsory attempt at 
conciliation (tentativo obbligatorio di conciliazione).62 In the event of unsuccessful conciliation, 
the parties ‒or even one of them upon request‒ may jointly ask for the definition of the dispute, a 
                                                          
57 Ibid. Article 2(1).  
58 Ibid. Article 2(2).  
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Regolamento in materia di procedure di risoluzione delle controversie tra operatori di comunicazioni  
elettroniche ed utenti, approvato con delibera n. 173/07/CONS. Testo consolidato con le modifiche apportate con 
delibera n. 597/11/CONS, delibera n. 479/09/CONS, delibera n. 95/08/CONS e delibera n. 502/08/CONS.  
62 On the nature and effects of this compulsory conciliation procedure, particularly for access to justice see Section 4.2 
below (Alassini Case).  
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procedure that culminates with the adjudication of the dispute by the regulator. The procedure is 
characterized by the existence of a “Procedure Regulation” containing the procedural rules that the 
parties and the dispute settlement bodies are required to apply.63According to Article 3 of the 
Italian Regulation on the procedures for settling disputes between electronic communications 
operators and users,64 judicial recourse is precluded until the mandatory conciliation attempt has 
taken place before one of the competent bodies. In order to carry out the compulsory conciliation, 
Italian users can choose among the existing dispute settlement bodies, provided that they operate 
free of charge and comply with the principles of transparency, fairness, and effectiveness as per 
Recommendation 2001/310/EC.65 In this regard, the Italian regulator has put in place a specific 
mechanism for the attempt at a conciliation procedure, which is thereby conducted by the NRA 
under regional delegated authorities: Co.Re.Com. (Regional Committee for Communications, 
Comitati Regionali per le Comunicazioni, delegated by AGCOM). 66  In those cases where an 
agreement is reached during the conciliation stage, the outcome takes the form of accordo 
transattivo (contractual agreement). This contractual agreement is compiled/registered in an 
official form.67 In this form, the parties may indicate the partial solution on which they agree. It is, 
therefore, an agreed solution fixed in a “public” (administrative) document. This written form is 
signed by the public officer, and by the two parties of the dispute. The outcome of the conciliation 
(if any) is documented, printed and signed in the moment. It enjoys the nature an executive title 
(titolo essecutivo).68 In this regard, it is important to highlight that in case of agreement, parties 
reject the possibility to go to the Court, even to seek further redress for damages.69 The agreement 
has the effect, thereby, of res judicata. However, in those cases where the Authority decides on the 
case (i.e. second phase: definition of the dispute), the parties still retain the possibility to bring the 
case in front of a court to claim for redress for damages. Although courts are exclusively competent 
for damage redress, the procedure does allows for small compensations and reimbursements to be 
decided directly by the public official.70 
                                                          
63 Regulations on the procedures for settling disputes between electronic communications operators and users, approved 
by Resolution 173/07/CONS, modified by Resolutions no. 95/08/CONS, 502/08/CONS, 479/09/CONS and 
597/11/CONS. (Regolamento in materia di procedure di risoluzione delle controversie tra operatori di comunicazioni  
elettroniche ed utenti, approvato con delibera n. 173/07/CONS. Testo consolidato con le modifiche apportate con 
delibera n. 597/11/CONS, delibera n. 479/09/CONS, delibera n. 95/08/CONS e delibera n. 502/08/CONS).  
64  Delibera n. 173/07/CONS, Regolamento sulle procedure di risoluzione delle controversie tra operatori di 
comunicazione e utenti.  
65 In line with Alassini case.  
66 There are regional authorities in each Italian region (21 regions), which are delegated by AGCOM to carry out the 
conciliation attempt procedure. Co.Re.Com is a body that, upon delegation by AGCOM, the Italian regulator. This 
authority deals with attempts at conciliation, settlement of disputes and urgent reactivation of telephone line (or pay TV). 
The procedure in front of the Co.Re.Com is free of charge for users; both consumers and businesses, and also top-level 
businesses.   
67 Document A, See Annex.  
68 Articolo 2, comma 24 lettera b) della legge n. 481 1995: “[...]Il verbale di conciliazione o la decisione arbitrale 
costituiscono titolo esecutivo”. AGCOM Representative (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, Italy). Speech at 
the Workshop ‘Private Law and the Telecommunications Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in 
Florence, 7-8 December 2012: “it is a piece of paper which has direct legal effect. We say titolo essecutivo (executive 
title), which means that you can… it is like a check. You can ask for money upon it without going to the Judge”.  
69 The agreement provides: “le parti danno atto quanto sopra dichiarandosi integralmente soddisfatte e di non avere 
niente altro a che pretendere in qualsiasi sede, anche giudiziale, per le questioni di cui all’odierna istanza”. (“the parties 
acknowledge the above declaring themselves fully satisfied and having nothing else to claim in any site, also judicial, for 
the matters referred in today’s instance”, see Annex, Document A) 
70  Delibera n. 173/07/CONS, Regolamento sulle procedure di risoluzione delle controversie tra operatori di 
comunicazione e utenti. Article 19(5).  
 
  174 
 In the event of unsuccessful conciliation, the parties jointly or the user alone may ask for 
the definition of the dispute. In such a case, the person conducting the proceedings draws up a 
report in which he notes that the dispute has been subject to a conciliation attempt and 
acknowledges that no agreement has been reached. Thus, if the same parties have not already 
brought the same subject matter before the judicial authorities, the parties jointly or the user can ‒
within 3 months‒ ask Co.Re.Com itself to settle the or go directly to the Communications 
Regulatory Authority (AGCOM) for settlement. The time-limit for the conclusion of the procedure 
is 180 days from the date of submission of the request submission. At the hearing, the parties are 
authorized to orally explain their positions and may be assisted by advisers or representatives of 
consumer associations. If, based on the statements of the parties, the possibility of reaching a 
settlement agreement emerges, the hearing of the proceedings may serve as a second attempt at 
conciliation where agreement can be reached.71 If not, in those cases in which it is found that the 
petition is well-grounded, the AGCOM (via the delegated authorities Co.Re.Com) may sentence 
the operator to refund amounts that have been proven not to be owed, or the payment of 
indemnities in cases envisaged by the contract and/or service charter, as well as in cases identified 
by the regulatory provisions or AGCOM resolutions. This system is based on standard 
indemnities.72 This means that for every infringement of the contract, there is a fixed compensation 
amount;73 it is not therefore a system based on fairness or equity, although in very particular cases 
the decision might be based on (very discretionary) fairness. In the period April 2013-April 2014, 
AGCOM has participated in adjudication of 1,994 cases.74 
The German NRA (Bundesnetzagentur, BNetZA) is not only the telecoms regulator, but its 
mandate encompasses also energy and transport issues. In the field of telecommunications it is 
competent to act as mediator in consumer-related disputes, as provided by the German 
Telecommunications Act (TKG).75 According to the BNetZA, the aim is “to find a solution that is 
acceptable to both parties and to provide an efficient and cost-effective alternative to legal 
disputes”.76 Unlike the Italian example, the number of requests for dispute resolution submitted to 
the regulator is very low; with a total of only 866 requests submitted in 2013.77 Moreover, with the 
                                                          
71 The outcome of the agreement is similar to that resulting from the conciliation procedure; i.e. it is an executive title 
(titolo essecutivo).  
72 AGCOM Representative (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, Italy). Speech at the Workshop ‘Private Law 
and the Telecommunications Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012: 
“So you see that for each kind of, let’s say, infringement of the contract, there is a specific standard […] penalty. So, for 
delay activation of the service it is 7,5 € per day and there are then the declinations […] so this is available to you. We 
can see that these are based on standards penalties. It is not a system based on fairness or equity. Sometimes we also 
decided based on fairness, in very particular cases, but this decision on fairness is too discretional. Everyone deciding 
seems to give too much discretion, this is not good for standards and uniform decisions in a system where you have 
involved a standard body like AGCOM or a number of regions”. 
73 Approvazione del regolamento in materia d’indennizzi applicabili nella definizione delle controversie tra utenti ed 
operatori e individuazione delle fattispecie di indennizzo automatico ai sensi dell’articolo 2, comma 12, lett. g), della 
legge 14 novembre 1995, n. 481. http://www.agcom.it/default.aspx?DocID=5863.  
74 According to the AGCOM Annual Activity Report, “[t]he average value of agreements reached at hearings amounted 
to Euro 1,161, while the average value of the transactions was Euro 669. The sum of the amounts recognized to users, as 
a result of the Authority's decisions was therefore more than Euro 1,000,000.00 net of administrative fees and sums 
reimbursed for bills claimed as unjustified by the user”.  
75 Section 47a of the German Telecommunications Act. Telekommunikationsgesetz, hereinafter TKG.  
76 BNetZA Annual Report 2013, p. 81.  
77 Ibid.  
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2012 amendment to the TKG, now it is possible to initiate dispute resolution proceedings in 
relation to contract law disputes where consumer rights are provided in the TKG.78 The rules of the 
procedure for the settlement of consumer-related disputes are also contained in the TKG79 and 
further specifications are provided for in a BNetZA regulation that contains the rules of procedure 
for conciliation. To carry out the settlement, the regulator shall consult the users and providers. It 
should work towards an amicable settlement between the subscriber and the provider. The 
conciliation procedure ends in those cases where: the arbitration complaint is withdrawn; the 
participant and the provider have reached a solution and reported it to the regulator; the participants 
and providers consistently explain that the dispute has ceased; the regulator decides that there is no 
possibility to reach an agreement via a mediation process; or when the regulator does not identify 
any breach of contract from those provisions listed in the TKG. According to the procedural rules 
provided by the German regulator, the settlement panel, which is composed of three NRA officials, 
verifies the request. Should it fulfill the requirements of admissibility mentioned above, the request 
is sent to the operator, which will have to respond to the claim within four weeks.80 The procedure 
does not provide for any extensive means of collecting evidence beyond requesting details from the 
parties. The consumer is invited to respond to the operator’s determination within 3 weeks. The 
operator may respond to that also within the time frame of 3 weeks. Under this scheme, the 
regulator proposes a non-binding solution to the parties that the parties may then accept or decline. 
Should the proposal be accepted, it constitutes an amicable settlement contractually enforceable. In 
the event of unsuccessful conciliation, the parties can refer the dispute to the civil court. In such 
case, the dispute cannot be addressed again in front of the regulator.81  
 Consumers in the UK can refer their complaints to the telecoms regulator (Ofcom),82 but 
the resolution of telecoms-related disputes corresponds, since 2011, to an Ofcom-approved 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) scheme,83 to which operators must adhere to. There are two 
ADR schemes approved by the UK regulator: the Communications and Internet Services 
Adjudication Scheme (CISAS) and the Office of the Telecommunications Ombudsman 
(OTELO).84 Since these are ADR schemes provided by independent bodies, they are analysed in 
the following section (3.2) of this chapter. 
In Poland, the mediation procedure for telecoms consumer-related disputes is conducted by 
the President of the Office of Electronic Communications (Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej, 
UKE). According to Article 109 of the Polish Telecommunications Act,85  a civil law dispute 
between a consumer and a provider of publicly available telecommunications services may be 
ended in a conciliatory manner during the course of mediation proceedings. Mediation proceedings 
                                                          
78 Ibid.  
79 Section 47a.  
80  Representative of Deutsche Telekom AG, Germany. Speech at the Workshop ‘Private Law and the 
Telecommunications Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012. 
81 Ibid.  
82 Office of Communications.  
83 Communications Act 2003, Section 14(7).  
84 For an extensive analysis of the two schemes, see Hodges, C., Benöhr, I., & Creutzfeldt-Banda, N. (2012). Consumer 
ADR in Europe. Hart Publishing. 
85 Law of 16 July 2004, Telecommunications Act.  
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shall be conducted by the President of UKE at a consumer’s request or ex officio where the 
protection of consumer interests so requires. During mediation proceedings, the President of UKE 
shall inform the telecoms provider concerned about the existence of a consumer’s claim, the law 
applicable to the particular case, and provide possible proposals for a conciliatory resolution of the 
dispute by the parties. The President of UKE may specify the deadline for reaching a conciliatory 
solution of the case by the parties themselves.86 The President of UKE must abandon mediation 
proceedings if the case has not been resolved in a conciliatory manner within the specified time 
limit as well as when at least one of the parties states that it does not agree to resolve the case in a 
conciliatory manner. 
In a similar vein, in the Czech Republic, the National Regulatory Authority (Český 
Telekomunikační Úřad, CTU) must resolve disputes between telecommunications operators and 
users, on the basis of a motion filed by any of the parties to the dispute, as far as the dispute relates 
to obligations imposed by, or on the basis of the Czech Telecommunications Act. 87  An 
administrative fee is charged for the submission of the claim.88 The authority awards to the party 
who fully succeeded in the proceedings a compensation for the costs required for effective 
application of law, or defense thereof, against the losing party to the proceedings. In the event that 
a party succeeded only partially in the proceedings, the Authority may split the compensation for 
the costs into appropriate proportions, or may decide that neither of the parties is entitled to such 
compensation.89 Even in the case that a party succeeded only partially, the authority may award full 
compensation for such costs to that party provided that it was unsuccessful in only a negligible part 
of the proceedings, or that the decision on the amount to be discharged depended on an expert 
opinion or was at the discretion of the authority.90  
 
3.1.2 Public v private enforcement  
 
Traditionally, NRA’s decisions have been considered administrative measures. Despite this, 
dispute-resolution in the telecommunications sector makes reference to a dispute arising from two 
private parties, where the nature of the dispute is generally purely contractual. It can happen, 
therefore, that the system of enforcement is designed under an administrative structure, for instance 
when the NRAs host the dispute settlement procedure in its premises and under its own rules, or 
where even the regulator acts as adjudicator of the dispute. In such cases, the judicial review of the 
decision adopted by the NRA concerned is performed by an administrative court, given that in the 
                                                          
86 UKE representative (Office of Electronic Communications, Poland). Speech at the Workshop ‘Private Law and the 
Telecommunications Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012: 
“Generally, the President, when she receives a claim on the consumer, sends this claim to the operator and waits for the 
opinion and, usually 75% of the cases are resolved in this manner”.  
87  Act No. 127/2005 Coll., on Electronic Communications and on the Amendments to the Other Acts (Zákon o 
elektronických komunikacích, Electronic Communications Act). Section 129.  
88 Ibid.   
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid.  
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end what is being reviewed is a decision from a body which is part of the administrative structure 
and, hence, subject to the principles and procedures of administrative law.  
Lawyers find difficulties in accommodating such procedures within the private or 
administrative law domains. The grounds for the dispute are contract-related, but the procedure –
especially in cases of adjudication by the regulator– is purely administrative. The identification of 
the domain where these dispute settlement mechanisms fall is crucial in order to determine the 
applicable legal regime. The application of public law standards and principles differs from the use 
of private law logic. Accordingly, it is necessary to carry out an analysis that identifies the 
rationalities involved; i.e. whether they follow public or private law discourses. It may happen that 
the scheme comprises of elements of both, e.g. whereas the source of the dispute is private, the 
procedural design is built entirely upon an administrative understanding. The latter is more visible 
in the case of dispute settlement between operators of telecommunications networks and/or services 
in wholesale markets. These two elements (substance + procedure) shape, then, a hybrid system 
between private and public law. Furthermore, the EU rules establishing the legal framework for 
telecoms do not provide specific guidance on how these procedures are to be designed, giving rise 
to a large range of dispute resolution mechanisms which vary from country to country and where, 
depending on the approach chosen, the tools and instruments of public and private law also differ. 
There are even some disparities within single Member States on a case-by-case basis.  
Be that as it may, the issue at stake here is the suitability of private or non-official 
mechanisms to deal with public policy concerns. In particular, where there is a conflict between the 
public policy aims and the resolution of a privately negotiated or arbitrated dispute.91 In those 
cases, where the public goal may be compromised, regulators must guarantee the availability of an 
official process.92 The regulatory framework for telecoms in Europe endorses the adjudication of 
B2B disputes to National Regulatory Authorities. By so doing, the European Union is relying in a 
model of regulatory adjudication. 93  This resolution of disputes between undertakings is also 
considered to be an “additional form of regulatory intervention”.94 Such account is due to the fact 
that NRAs are required to solve the disputes securing the objectives of Article 8 of the Framework 
Directive. 95  Accordingly, NRAs should enforce the rights and obligations contained in the 
regulatory framework through the imposition of regulatory obligations, but also via the imposition 
of binding decisions in case of a dispute.  
 
                                                          
91 Recital 6 Access Directive: “[...] National regulatory authorities should have the power to secure, where commercial 
negotiation fails, adequate access and interconnection and interoperability of services in the interest of end-users. In 
particular, they may ensure end-to-end connectivity by imposing proportionate obligations on undertakings that control 
access to end-users […]”. 
92 ITU Report.  
93 See below. 
94  Walden, I. (2012), ‘Telecommunications Law and Regulation: An Introduction’, in I. Walden (Ed.), 
Telecommunications Law and Regulation. (Fourth Edition) New York: Oxford University Press, p. 17 citing the UK 
Competition Appeal Tribunal in the Case T-Mobile, BT, H3G, C&W, Vodafone & Orange v Ofcom [2008] CAT 12, at 
paras. 89 and 94. 
95 Article 20(3) Framework Directive and Article 317 of the Access Directive.  
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On the other hand, the existence of delegated dispute resolution in the context of 
telecommunications regulation raises the question of the extent to which non-official bodies are 
entitled to correctly interpret and apply the regulatory objectives of the regulatory framework 
while, at the same time, safeguarding the private nature of these mechanisms without undermining 
the effectiveness of the enforcement of telecommunications rules. Thus, in issues concerning key 
policy objectives, NRAs may decide not to delegate the scheme to private entities, so that public 
policy consideration can be taken into consideration.96 
In view of the above, in the enforcement of telecommunications regulation, NRAs function 
as a hybrid between private and public “courts”. In the exercise of regulatory dispute settlement 
prerogatives, regulators can even grant compensation for damages. 97  The particularities of the 
different regulatory models of dispute resolution have been put on the table during debates about 
the nature of enforcement of contract-related telecommunications provisions via sector-specific 
mechanisms for dispute resolution: are they private or public enforcement? And, most importantly, 
are they law? 
Under the Italian model, the Co.Re.Com scheme provides a sort of mixture procedures 
between mediation and arbitration (hybrid form). However, in the event of the procedure reaching 
the second stage, i.e. when the Co.Re.Com decides on the case (definizione), it is pure arbitration 
(arbitrato puro). As such, it can be considered as an administrative arbitration, given that an 
administrative authority issues the decision. However, its procedural design evidences otherwise. 
For instance, by and large, conciliation –either in the conciliation procedure or in the hearing 
proceedings corresponding to the definition of the dispute– is a more flexible procedure. The 
agreements arising from a procedure of dispute settlement in Italy is of a contractual nature. 
Despite this, they are formulated in the form of a public document that is directly enforceable (see 
annex). Parties can agree as much as they want to, whereas when deciding on the dispute, the 
authority has no margin to decide beyond the documentation and the standardized redress 
compensation scheme. This raises the question of the extent to which the agreement can be 
considered to be of a private or of a regulatory nature, insofar as the public official participating in 
the settlement signs and stamps the document granting it and allowing the full exploitation of the 
guarantees deriving from its character as “enforceable title” (titolo esecutivo), it is therefore based 
on contractual compromises embodied in the form of a public document.  
The legal effects of voluntary agreements beyond the scheme provided by an 
administrative document undersigned by the authority remains to be discussed: To what extent do 
these agreements have to comply with legality requirements? Is this an epitome of the return of 
private law and private autonomy over regulatory law? Furthermore, the regulatory decision in case 
                                                          
96 ITU Report.  
97 See Ottow, A. (2012), “Intrusion of public law into contract law: the case of network sectors”, The Europa Institute 
Working Paper 03/12, KPN case. As such, in this particular case, compensation is granted in application of 
telecommunications regulation and attending to regulatory objectives within the context of the administrative sanction 
procedure. 
 
  179 
of a lack of agreement is a pre-settled (statutory/standardized) compensation by law.98 It seems that 
the Italian system is quite legalistic, so they do not decide on the basis of fairness but on the basis 
of the law and standards in order to get uniform decisions.99 In this regard, the Italian scheme of 
regulatory dispute adjudication could resemble an administrative procedure and, as such, be subject 
to administrative judicial review.100 Nonetheless, its functioning in practice brings it closer to a 
judicial procedure in front of a civil court. By way of example, the regulatory procedure provides 
an action for injunction to be adopted while the dispute is being decided.101 A second distinctive 
feature of the emergence of sector-specific dispute settlement mechanisms is the necessity of 
technical advice. The complexity of the cases justifies the existence of sector-related bodies 
endowed with the appropriate expertise.102 
As to the Polish scheme, even though there is a mediation procedure for the settlement of 
consumer-related disputes, most of the cases are solved through completely informal conciliation 
schemes.  There is no procedural rule regulating the conciliation procedure or the legal effect of its 
outcome. Accordingly, the conciliation outcome consists of a privately negotiated contract that 
does not derive from any legal provision. As a matter of fact, around 80% of the disputes are solved 
via this mechanism.103 
At the other end of the spectrum we find the Czech model. The Czech Telecommunications 
Office started claiming that the large number of cases to deal with, due to the fact that it was a 
relatively new institution, overwhelmed them.104 The Czech NRA was established in 2000 and 
                                                          
98 Delibera n. 73/11/CONS. Approvazione del regolamento in materia di indennizzi applicabili nella definizione delle 
controversie tra utenti ed operatori e individuazione delle fattispecie di indennizzo automatico ai sensi dell'articolo 2, 
comma 12, lett. g), della legge 14 novembre 1995, n. 481 
99AGCOM Representative (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, Italy). Speech at the Workshop ‘Private Law 
and the Telecommunications Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012: 
“All of this is written down in a guidance for the regions which I will show you. So, in this guide, you find the sintetic 
explanantion of the decision and the list of the decisions on the same case. So, a civil servant involved on this activity can 
just click on it, because it is online, and you can open all decisions, possible with some rationale in the decision, and then 
you issue your proposal for the decision in the region to the collegial body in the region, because the collegial bodies… 
the regions are structured more or less like AGCOM centrally. So, this is a very powerful tool in order to avoid that there 
is a deviation, not uniform decision. The last version dates back August 2010, but –anyway- everyday we receive calls 
from our colleagues in the regions in order to have explanations and so on. So there is a kind of back-office services for 
the regions and this is very important in order to have quality of the decisions. So, everyday we receive phone calls and 
mails and we issue, let’s say, to a certain mailing list, a kind of daily guidelines on specific cases”. Emphasis added.   
100 The competent court to decide on the appeal of Co.Re.Com decisions is Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale (TAR) 
in the region of Lazio. 
101 Concurrently with the proposal of the request for the experiment of conciliation or settlement of the dispute, or in the 
course of the relevant procedures, the user can ask the authority for the communications or the Co.re.com. delegates for 
the adoption of temporary measures aimed at ensuring the continuity of service or eliminating forms of abuse or improper 
operation by the operator of telecommunications until the end of the settlement procedure. Article 21 Delibera n. 
73/11/CONS. 
102 AGCOM Representative (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni, Italy). Speech at the Workshop ‘Private Law 
and the Telecommunications Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012: 
“So, those involved in these activities of decision must be very well prepared on this matter. So, we regularly update and 
make information and training with this people working in the regions. And these are mainly lawyers, most of them, even 
though some disputes need some technical advice since the sector is particularly difficult in certain disputes, especially 
when they involve business. So, this is just a slide listing the decisions we adopted in a time about quality of services 
which is one of the topics which is causing disputes, the low quality”. Emphasis added.  
103 UKE representative (Office of Electronic Communications, Poland. Speech at the Workshop ‘Private Law and the 
Telecommunications Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012 
104 Representative of Ministry of Industry and Trade, Czech Republic. Speech at the Workshop ‘Private Law and the 
Telecommunications Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012. 
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before that telecommunications were dealt with by a part of the Ministry, so there was no 
independence.105 As a result of the second package of EU telecoms regulation, a new Act was 
enacted in 2005. This Act entrusted the NRA with the competence to make administrative 
decisions about the payments in cases of dispute. The NRA was exclusively competent to decide on 
the issue. To some extent, there was even some confusion about the role of civil courts in such 
matters. 106A second relevant issue is that represented by the transfer of disputes related to payment 
obligations to civil courts. This type of dispute is most representative when it comes to consumer-
related issues in the Czech telecoms market.107 It certainly represents, as mentioned above, an 
enormous administrative burden, especially if the authority is underdeveloped. Thus, given their 
civil character, they have been redirected to civil courts, given that they “do not necessarily relate 
with performance of regulation and control in electronic communications sector”.108 This resulted 
in the downsizing of staff within the NRA.109 Does this mean that here we are dealing with an 
administrative procedure for dispute resolution? There is not actually an administrative decision, 
even though the authority has to follow the administrative procedure.110 The issue of unpaid bills 
represents an example of this.111 However, the existence of a mechanism to follow administrative 
procedure without taking an administrative decision does not represent the substance of an ADR 
procedure either. Accordingly, even though these mechanisms are indeed alternative to judicial 
redress, they are not administrative procedures or ADR mechanisms. 112 
The next section focuses on the different out-of-court mechanisms for the settlement of 
telecoms-related disputes different via ADR techniques.  
 
                                                          
105 Ibid. 
106 Representative of Ministry of Industry and Trade, Czech Republic. Speech at the Workshop ‘Private Law and the 
Telecommunications Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012: “So you 
would have a dispute concerning the payment of the service that is provided by third parties. And they are the only ones 
who can decide on the topic. So, if you are a operator and you send one […] receipt and in the receipt you have payments 
for transport and then in the same receipt you have a bill for the telephone, you have to split the bill and ask for procedure 
in the Czech Telecommunications office and the civil court for the second bill. Not for the same matter. Well, I don’t 
know the details but it is confusing what is what even for the people working in the Czech Telecommunications Office”. 
(Emphasis added).  
107 EU Digital Agenda Scoreboard 2012.  
108 EU Digital Agenda Scoreboard 2012 and 2014.  
109 EU Digital Agenda Scoreboard 2012: “The transfer of disputes related to a payment obligation to a civil court will 
mean releasing of capacities for performance of regulation, on the other hand possible reduction of approximately 100 
employees from 2013”. 
110 Representative of Ministry of Industry and Trade, Czech Republic. Speech at the Workshop ‘Private Law and the 
Telecommunications Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012. 
111 In such cases, a public institution (the Authority) is taking care of the debt to be collected by private companies 
(statutory debt collection). This is resulting in telecoms operators using the procedure for debt-collecting, given that it is a 
quicker, cheaper and faster mechanism than the civil courts. This is a particularly attractive mechanism for telecoms 
operators especially because, in some instances, the Czech Telecommunications Office issues payment orders. 
Representative of Ministry of Industry and Trade, Czech Republic. Speech at the Workshop ‘Private Law and the 
Telecommunications Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012. 
112 Representative of Ministry of Industry and Trade, Czech Republic. Speech at the Workshop ‘Private Law and the 
Telecommunications Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012: “I do not 
see any alternative dispute resolution in this procedure I have to say”.  
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3.2 Alternative Dispute Resolution in telecommunications 
ADR is distinguished from traditional litigation and also from administrative adjudication. The 
underlying idea behind the promotion of ADR mechanisms for the settlement of disputes is to 
privately (and amicably) negotiate agreements in order to avoid contentious litigation, so that the 
commercial relationship is not affected by the existence of an adversarial procedure that escapes to 
the control of the parties. 113  This is true particularly concerning disputes between 
telecommunications operators.  
The telecommunications sector is subject to constant evolution and hence rapid changes. In 
particular for businesses usually engaged in long-term commercial relationships, it is crucial that 
potential disputes can be solved in a flexible and rapid manner. It also so happens that dispute 
resolution techniques are evolving to new modes and practices that are useful and effective as ways 
to put an end to the disagreements between the parties involved in the dispute.  A large number of 
extrajudicial mechanisms have been designed in order to accommodate the settlement of disputes 
arising within the telecoms sector. As a result of the procedural autonomy principle, National 
Regulatory Authorities enjoy considerable flexibility when it comes to designing the procedures for 
B2B dispute settlement. For consumer-related disputes there is also a wide array of consumer ADR 
methods. This leads to a situation where we can find different techniques and procedures for the 
extrajudicial settlement of disputes at both the wholesale and retail market levels.  
ADR in B2B disputes 
In compliance with the mandate of Article 20 of the Framework Directive, NRAs have put in place 
different procedures to adjudicate disputes between operators concerning the obligations arising 
from sector-specific regulation. Some national regulators have provided for an internal mechanism, 
including the establishment of delegated bodies for dispute resolution. These procedures have been 
addressed in the previous section. Still, asides from these regulatory adjudication schemes and in 
parallel to them, different schemes for extrajudicial settlement have emerged. Given that the EU 
legal framework requires NRAs to solve disputes within 4 months, the use ADR mechanisms has 
been encouraged.114 The proliferation of out-of-court procedures entails an abundant taxonomy 
which, in some cases, it is also characterized by variations of regulatory adjudication, arbitration, 
mediation or negotiation.115 Usually, the regulator adjudicates B2B disputes via the use of ADR-
alike techniques. However, these practices have not been widely extended beyond the regulator.116 
ADR in B2C disputes 
Unlike disputes arising in wholesale markets, ADR techniques have flourished significantly when 
it comes to the resolution of consumer-related disputes in telecoms. As aforementioned, Article 34 
of the Universal Service Directive requires member states to ensure the availability of “transparent, 
                                                          
113 ITU Report.  
114 Article 20(1) Framework Directive.  
115 On the different schemes and the ADR techniques adopted to solve B2B disputes see Warwas (2014), supra n 49.  
116 Ibid. See also Gijrath supra n 14, at p. 429.  
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non- discriminatory, simple and inexpensive out-of-court procedures”.117 This requirement does not 
restrict Member States to providing a single model of ADR. Thus, while in a majority of Member 
States, out-of-court procedures have been provided by the national regulators, in some Member 
States other bodies are in charge of dealing with procedures involving consumer protection that are 
also applicable to resolving consumer disputes in the electronic communications market. 
Furthermore, a number of measures aiming at facilitating the resolution of consumer complaints 
have been introduced across the EU. 118  In short, there is a large catalogue of out-of-court 
mechanisms for disputes in the telecommunication sector, which are aimed at achieving a prompt 
settlement at the speed required for this ever-developing market.119 
National experiences 
ADR methods have been developed and strongly promoted in Italy. 120  As to this movement 
towards consumer out-of-court dispute settlement for consumer redress, the CJEU has considered 
that the establishment of a mandatory process of dispute settlement, prior to bringing a judicial 
action before the court, does not infringe the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and effective 
judicial protection. This was essentially the ruling given by the CJEU in the Alassini Case121, 
concerning the adoption of Italian legislation that prescribed that a mandatory attempt at 
conciliation is required prior to initiating court procedures. In this case the defendants argued that 
the actions against them were inadmissible because the applicants (consumers) had not first 
initiated the mandatory attempt to settle the dispute before the settlement bodies, as was required 
under Italian law. 122  As a consequence of this requirement, since the 1990s different ADR 
mechanisms emerged in the Italian legal landscape for consumer-related dispute settlement.123 
Thus, apart from the conciliation procedure carried out before the regulator,124 consumers can 
alternatively request Chambers of Commerce to attempt the compulsory conciliation125 or –under 
the acclaimed conciliation procedure– Conciliazione Paritetica.126 The latter is a particular model 
of ADR that provides for the establishment of a Conciliation Commission formed jointly by a 
representative of a consumer association representing the consumer and one representative of the 
                                                          
117 Article 34(1) Universal Service Directive.  
118 Garzaniti, L. and O’Regan, M. (Eds.), Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Internet. EU Competition Law & 
Regulation (3rd ed.), Sweet & Maxwell.  
119 An overview of different sector-related extrajudicial schemes is provided below [Section 3.2].  
120 A digest of the Italian legislation on ADR can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/adr/adr_ita_en.htm.  
121 ECJ joint cases: C-317/08, C-318/08, C-319/08 and C-320/08, [2010] ECR I-02213 
122 For a deeper analysis on the case, see below [Section 4.2].  
123  Legge 14 Novembre 1995, n. 481, Norme per la concorrenza e la regolazione dei servizi di pubblica utilità. 
Istituzione delle Autorità di regolazione dei servizi di pubblica utilità (Antitrust provisions and the regulation of public 
utilities. Establishment of regulatory authorities for utilities). Article 2(24) let b). 
124 Examined above, section 3.1.1. 
125 There are 105 Chambers of Commerce in the whole Italian territory. In this case, the procedure is not free for the 
consumer, who has to pay a low fee in case the conciliation it is finally reached: starting at € 40,00 (+IVA). Indennita’ 
del servizio di mediazione e criteri di determinazione.  
spese di avvio; fees available at:  http://www.pc.camcom.it/regolazione-del-mercato/camera-di-conciliazione/ulteriori-
approfondimenti/indennita-del-servizio-di-mediazione.  
126  In 1995 the European Union recognised the procedure as a “pilot project for consumer access to justice”. 
Representative of Telecom Italia, Consumer protection Department. Speech at the Workshop ‘Private Law and the 
Telecommunications Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012. 
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telecommunications operator involved in the dispute. 127  In addition to these mechanisms, 
consumers can also refer their case to a specific mediation mechanism for disputes with the 
incumbent.128  
Conciliazione paritetica provided by Telecom Italia (the former incumbent) also relies on 
its own rules of procedure contained in a Procedural Regulation containing procedural rules that the 
parties sign and that the conciliation commissions are required to apply.129 This particular out-of-
court mechanism has some characteristics that differentiate it from all other models of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution. 130  These features make it particularly effective in handling disputes with 
entities such as large service companies that need to offer a fast, efficient, free of charge settlement 
procedure to their customers.131 The main feature of this procedure is the lack of a third party acting 
as a mediator. The Conciliation Commission (Commissione di Conciliazione) is composed of two 
conciliators, one representing Telecom Italia and one representative of the consumer. 132  The 
Conciliation Commission examines the case and the problem concerned and hears the complaints 
of the user, after which the Commission is allowed to fix a further hearing. After the examination 
of the case, the Commission proposes a solution to the client who has to accept or refuse the 
conciliation agreement. According to the procedural rules, the conciliation outcome here, unlike the 
outcome of the conciliation provided by the regulator, has the legal effect of a settlement agreement 
within the meaning of the Italian Civil Code (accordo transattivo). 133  The procedure usually 
concludes within 45 days of the application.  
In the UK, there is a system of compulsory ADR, as communications providers are 
required –by the terms of the general authorization to which they are all subject and the 
requirements of Ofcom (UK telecoms regulator) under the Communications Act 2003– to put in 
place complaints handling and dispute resolution procedures. 134  In January 2012, Ofcom also 
delivered new rules to deal with consumer complaints.135 As mentioned above, Ofcom receives and 
monitors complaints from consumers who are dissatisfied with their experience in the 
                                                          
127 The presence of a third party acting as a mediator or arbitrator it is not expected, insofar as the resolution of the 
dispute takes place exclusively between the parties. Telecom Italia introduced this mechanism in 1991. Nowadays, many 
providers operating in Italy are adhered to this procedure: Fastweb S.p.A., PosteMobile S.p.A., TeleTu S.p.A./ OpiTel, 
TIM S.p.A. (Telecom Italia Mobile), Vodafone Omnitel NV, and Wind S.p.A. 
128 Conciliation bodies under Article 141 of the Consumer Code (D. Lgs. 206/2005).  
129  The procedure provided by Telecom Italia can be found at 
https://www.telecomitalia.it/sites/default/files/images/Regolamento_di_Conciliazione.pdf.  
130 Although it complies with the procedural principles enshrined in the European Commission Recommendation of 30 
March 1998 on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes 
(98/257/EC), OJ L 155, 17.04.1998.  
131 Representative of Telecom Italia, Consumer protection Department. Speech at the Workshop ‘Private Law and the 
Telecommunications Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012. 
132  For instance, Telecom Italia has subscribed a Protocol with 20 Consumers’ associations belong to the CNCU 
(National Organism of Consumers Associations). 
133 Regolamento di Conciliazione Servizi Telecom Italia. Articolo. 7 Conclusione della procedura di conciliazione: “Nel 
caso in cui la Commissione abbia individuato la proposta di soluzione accettata dal cliente, la procedura si conclude con 
la sottoscrizione di un verbale di conciliazione che ha efficacia di accordo transattivo, ai sensi dell'art. 1965 cod. civ.” 
[Regulation of Conciliation Telecom Italy. Article. 7 Conclusion of the conciliation procedure: "In the event that the 
Commission has identified the proposed solution accepted by the customer, the procedure ends with the signing of a 
statement of conciliation that has the legal effect of a settlement agreement, pursuant to art. 1965 civil code"].  
134 Section 52.  
135 Available at http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/ga-scheme/general-conditions/customer-code-practice/ 
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communications sector; it does not, however, handle individual complaints. Out-of-court dispute 
settlement is provided by sector-specific bodies. There are two Ofcom-approved ADR schemes: 
Ombudsman Service Communications (OS:C), and the Communications, and Internet Services 
Adjudication Scheme (CISAS). Currently there are minor procedural divergences between the 
ADR models provided by the two established systems.136 The customer must apply to the scheme 
to which his/her operator is adhered. This means that the consumer cannot select between the two 
existing regimes. As to membership of one scheme or the other, around 50% of providers belong to 
the existing schemes, but this parity is not reflected in market share terms.137 For instance, British 
Telecom (BT), which accounts for most of the market share for fixed telephony services, belongs 
to the Ombudsman Services scheme. However, for mobile and Internet the division is more equal, 
with around 50% per scheme. Ofcom provides information on which of the two available schemes 
is used each operator in the UK.138  
Given that this section is based on empirical material gathered, the observations made 
hereinafter concern the ADR scheme provided by the Communications, and Internet Services 
Adjudication Scheme (CISAS).139 The scheme provides its own procedural rules, although these 
are monitored by Ofcom.140 Individual customers of the telecoms service can initiate the procedure 
provided to the scheme where their communications operator is adhered to a particular scheme, and 
SMEs up to 10 employees. In order for the procedure to come into play, there must have been a 
previous attempt to settle the dispute with the company within eight weeks of first complaining to 
the company or, where the company has previously agreed in writing, that the dispute should be 
settled under the scheme.141 Furthermore, to be eligible for the adjudication scheme, the dispute at 
stake has to be related to bills, the quality of customer service received or communication services 
provided to customers.142 In any case, the adjudicator alone retains the authority to determine 
whether the dispute falls within the scope of the scheme.143 The use of the scheme is free of charge 
for the consumer, as mandated by Ofcom.144 A fixed subscription fee maintains the cost of the 
scheme for the operator plus a fee according to the number of cases stemming from that adhered 
telecoms operator. The request may include a request for compensation, which must be no more 
                                                          
136 For an extensive analysis of these ADR schemes, see Hodges et al. supra n 84.  
137 Hodges et al. supra n 84: “The two ADR providers in the sector are CISAS 244 and OS:C. 245 Some 206 providers 
use the former (now run by CEDR Disputes Group) and around 250 companies use OS:C. The former has 70 per cent of 
internet service providers, the latter 95 per cent of fixed line providers, with mobile services split roughly equally”.  
138 http://consumers.ofcom.org.uk/phone/problems-and-complaints/adr-schemes/.  
139 Further and much more comprehensive information about the UK scheme and the approach of Ofcom as to complaint 
handling can be found in Hodges et al. supra n 84. . 
140  The procedural rules can be found at: http://www.cisas.org.uk/downloads/CISAS%20RULES%202013%20-
%20Final%20Nov%202013.pdf.  
141 Ibid. Section 1, let. c).  
142 Section 2, let. a). The following issues are excluded from the scope of application of the scheme (let. b): Claims for 
more than a total value of £10,000 including VAT; Disputes involving a complicated issue of law; Disputes relating to 
equipment faults; Disputes that are the subject of an existing or previous court action or existing or previous valid 
application made under the scheme; - Cases where it has been longer than twelve months since the customer first 
complained to the company. CISAS can extend this period in exceptional circumstances if both the customer and the 
company agree or if, in our opinion, the company has unreasonably delayed handling the complaint; Cases where it has 
been less than eight weeks since the customer first complained to the company (unless the company has agreed in writing 
that the dispute should be settled through the Scheme). 
143 Section 2, let. e).  
144 Section 1, let. f).  
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than £10,000 (including VAT). 145 The claim will be subject only to the remedies set out in the 
application form.146 The appointed adjudicator will have to make a decision on the grounds of the 
information provided by the parties within 6 weeks from the request, 147  unless it requires 
independent technical advice to be provided by an expert.148 Such a decision must be fully reasoned 
and be made on grounds of the principle of fairness, and –provided that they are line with the law– 
the codes of conduct and the contract between the parties. 149  To conclude, the adjudicator’s 
decision is only binding if the customer accepts it within six weeks.  The decision cannot be 
appealed against and it can only be accepted or rejected and only by the customer.150  
In a similar vein, Polish consumers, apart from referring their telecoms disputes to the 
regulator for mediation, have the possibility to submit a dispute to the Permanent Consumer 
Arbitration Court at UKE (Polish NRA). Thus, according to Article 110 of the Polish 
Telecommunications Act, permanent consumer arbitration courts must be established under the 
supervision of the President of UKE (“arbitration courts”). The arbitration courts are created via 
agreements concerning the functioning and procedures of such courts concluded between the 
President of UKE and non-governmental organizations representing consumers, 
telecommunications undertakings or postal operators. The aforementioned agreements shall specify, 
in particular, the rules for covering arbitrators’ remuneration costs and the return of costs borne in 
relation to the performance of arbitrator activities.151 
The national models presented above provide quite a broad overview of the existing 
divergences since –as a result of the national procedural autonomy principle– different models of 
ADR can be applied. For instance, whereas Italy has established a “consumer friendly” scheme via 
the imposition of a mandatory attempt at conciliation that is easily accessible, quick and free for 
consumers so that they do not have to through the (slower and more expensive) Court system, the 
United Kingdom has opted for a more pragmatic approach by establishing two different arbitration 
schemes involving consumer-related telecommunications disputes (Ombudsman Services and 
CISAS) that are decided on a good faith basis. At the far end of the spectrum, we find Eastern 
countries such as Czech Republic and Poland, which have not yet fully developed proper ADR 
mechanisms. These two latter countries rely heavily on administrative structures and, in the case of 
the Czech Republic, most of the cases are redirected to civil courts –especially pecuniary ones. 
These divergences are the result of the different speeds at which the telecommunications sector 
develops in the different Member States. A more developed market enables consumer choice and 
makes consumers more aware of their rights. It triggers a more complainant consumer, which 
requires of a proper structure dispute settlement that is quicker, cheaper and a real alternative to 
civil justice; i.e. it demands the creation of ADR mechanisms such as the ones developed Italy or 
the United Kingdom. 
                                                          
145 Section 3, let. b).  
146 Section 3, let. e).  
147 Section 4(5), let. a).  
148 Section 5, let. c).  
149 Section 5, let. a).  
150 Section 4(5), let. d), e) and f).  
151 Article 110 of the Polish Telecommunications Act.  
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3.3 Judicial enforcement  
The traditional way of enforcing rights is in a court of law. In the case of contractual or consumer 
rights, an action in front of the court is expected to provide redress for the applicant. However, in 
the enforcement of telecommunications regulation, we have already seen how NRAs and ADR 
mechanisms are fostered as “best ways” to resolve disputes. Thus, whereas judicial procedures are 
not always sufficiently operational to decide on highly complex disputes in an efficient and 
effective way, extrajudicial mechanisms –particularly sector-related schemes– are better suited and 
feature the necessary expertise to resolved disputes in a timely and proficient manner. Taking this 
assumption as a starting point, the role of courts in adjudicating disputes is becoming reduced as a 
final resource for less policy-related disputes.152 
 Be this as it may, the role of the judiciary in the enforcement of telecommunications 
regulation cannot be disregarded. Parties in both wholesale and consumer-related disputes can still 
enforce their rights stemming from telecoms rules in front of the civil judge. In addition, the role of 
the judiciary is equally relevant when it comes to decisions adopted in the framework of regulatory 
adjudication. Against this background, the adjudication is subject to (administrative) judicial 
review. This judicial control, despite being administrative, also impacts the enforcement of private 
law rights.  
3.3.1 Civil actions (wholesale & retail) 
Judicial redress in B2B disputes  
Under the EU regulatory framework for telecoms, the resolution of B2B disputes in the different 
Member States generally falls to the sector-related regulator.153 Nonetheless, dispute resolution 
powers granted to NRAs do not preclude either party from bringing an action before the courts.154 
The issue here lies in determining whether a judicial procedure of dispute resolution can be 
regarded as a civil action. The issue is controversial due to the principle of procedural autonomy, 
under which Member States set up their own national procedural rules. Under these circumstances, 
there are divergences amongst the different procedural systems establish along the European 
Union. Thus, while in some Member States the resolution of disputes between telecommunications 
operators are considered to be a civil action and therefore subject to the civil rules of procedure 
(e.g. France), in some other Member States parties are required to initiate an administrative 
procedure (e.g. the Netherlands). 155  The nature of the procedure is particularly important for 
instance when it comes to disputes concerning tariffs, where one of the parties seeks the refund of 
the amount already paid to the other party. In such cases, the party concerned should wait until the 
regulatory decision or the appeal (where applicable) in order to claim the reimbursement in front of 
                                                          
152 ITU Report.  
153 Article 20(1) Framework Directive.  
154 Article 20(5) Framework Directive.  
155 Ottow, A. (2003), “Dispute Resolution under the New European Framework”. Paper based on comparative study of 
the British Institute of International and Comparative Studies (London) and workshop held on October 30, 2003 by the 
British Institute in London. 
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the civil court.156 Notwithstanding this, some Member States have put in place a procedural model 
where NRAs have been entitled to grant private law remedies, such as compensation, as noted 
above.  
 Apart from this procedural disparity, a second issue concerning the resolution of B2B 
disputes by the judiciary is related to the interpretation of the legal provisions. It has been noted 
that the judiciary reaches different interpretations from those used within the regulatory practice.157 
This may result in long proceedings and legal uncertainty,158 precisely the opposite from what 
telecommunications regulation aims to achieve.159  
 Within this context, understanding B2B dispute resolution as adjudication or regulation 
clearly impacts on the role to be given to civil law as opposed to the contractual rules contained 
within sector-specific regulation.160 
Judicial redress in B2C disputes  
As in the wholesale market, the availability requirement of extrajudicial mechanisms for the 
resolution of consumer-related disputes enshrined in the Universal Service Directive, does not 
preclude either party from bringing a civil action in front of the court.161 
 There is no consolidated data on the number of telecommunications-related cases that end 
up in front of civil court. However, data on consumer complaints in Europe shows that more than 
the 90% of consumer complaints (all consumer complaints, not only related to 
telecommunications) are channelled by procedures other than the court system.162 This data can be 
extrapolated to the telecommunications sector, since around 50% of consumer complains are 
related to Information and Communications Technology (ICT).163 Accordingly, it can be concluded 
that the vast amount of telecommunications-related consumer cases does not reach the judiciary.164 
Courts are expensive and slow and, therefore, where there exist extrajudicial means for consumer 
                                                          
156 Ibid. See also Ottow, A. (2012), "Intrusion of public law into contract law: the case of network sectors", The Europa 
Institute Working Paper 03/12. 
157 See Andenas, M., and Zleptnig, S. (2004), “Telecommunications Dispute Resolution: Procedure and Effectiveness” 
European Business Law Review, 15, pp. 477-663. This issue of the different interpretation of sector-related provisions 
have been extensively treated in the next section [section 4.1].  
158 Ibid.  
159 Article 20(1) Framework Directive: “(…)in the shortest possible time frame”.  
160 Scott, A. (2015), ‘Dispute resolution: adjudication or regulation?’ Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Research Paper No. RSCAS, 2015/05. See Section 4.1 below. 
161 Article 34(4) Universal Service Directive: “This Article [‘Out-of-court dispute resolution’] is without prejudice to 
national court procedures. 
162  Eurobarometer Survey – The 2015 EU Justice Scoreboard. Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions COM(2015) 116 final.  
163 Extracted from the analysis of the data provided in the Workshop ‘Private Law and the Telecommunications Sector:  
National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012.  
164 Extracted from the analysis of the data provided in the Workshop ‘Private Law and the Telecommunications Sector:  
National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012.  
Representative of Deutsche Telekom AG, Germany. Speech at the Workshop ‘Private Law and the Telecommunications 
Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012: “ADR and customer care lead to 
the situation that the number of court cases is really minimal. In a year, it is it is lower than 3 digit number of court cases 
that our customers bring up before court against DT. So, it is a very low number. Just keep in mind how many million 
customers with lasting relationships we have”.  
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redress, consumers avoid having to go to court.165 The latter is particularly true for small claim 
cases.  
Notwithstanding this, there are cases that do reach civil courts. It is important to remark 
that these cases are representative of situations where consumers face systematic problems; in such 
situations, consumers seek redress through the courts, mostly represented by consumer associations 
in class actions procedures. 166 Following empirical research conducted, consumer-related court 
cases arising in the context of telecommunications services are essentially related to unfair contract 
terms or unfair commercial practices.167  In such cases, the interpretation of the rules and the 
interplay of sector-specific regulation with the more horizontal consumer protection rules means 
that the participation of the judge in order to develop a process of exegesis is not only appropriate 
but also necessary, in particular with relation to the functioning of the sector. The interpretative role 
of the judiciary is also desirable from the position of the industry.168 Accordingly, the sector, and 
the consumer problems arising in connection with the sector, usually function on the grounds of 
sector-specific understandings and, therefore, under sector-specific mechanisms of consumer 
redress. Nonetheless, the intervention of the judiciary becomes a tool for the interpretation of 
sector-related regulation and its integration within the dynamics of the market.  
This shift from judicial to administrative (and soft) enforcement and extrajudicial means 
for dispute resolution brings about the “access to justice” debate. The configuration of the different 
means for consumer redress in telecommunications relegates the role of civil courts. As 
aforementioned, the vast amount of consumer complaints is dealt with outside of courts. In this 
regard, and in order to ensure procedural guarantees, the analysis of the procedural safeguards of 
the extrajudicial procedures put in place becomes very significant. Access to justice is enshrined in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 47) under the principle of effective judicial protection. 
At the national level, the most controversial issue has been the introduction of mandatory ADR as a 
pre-requisite before seeking redress in front of the court.169 At the European level, the European 
Court of Justice has confirmed its position on the matter by declaring that the establishment of a 
mandatory attempt of conciliation is in compliance not only with the principle of effective judicial 
                                                          
165 Newman, E. (2012), ‘Consumer Protection and Telecommunications’, in Walden, I. (Ed.), Telecommunications law 
and regulation. Oxford University Press. 
166 Extracted from the analysis of the data provided in the Workshop ‘Private Law and the Telecommunications Sector:  
National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012.  
167 By way of example, Cases C-40/08, Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira, ECR [2009] I-
09579; C-522/08, Telekommunikacja Polska SA w Warszawie v Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej, ECR [2010] 
I-02079 and C-388/13, Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel, nyr.  
168 Extracted from the analysis of the data provided in the Workshop ‘Private Law and the Telecommunications Sector:  
National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012.  
Representative of Deutsche Telekom AG, Germany. Speech at the Workshop ‘Private Law and the Telecommunications 
Sector:  National Perspectives on EU Regulation’ held in Florence, 7-8 December 2012: “There are even cases where we 
want to be taken it to Court because we want to have clarity on the law. Because the whole telecoms industry it is so 
innovative and changes so much, introducing so many new products and services which require new terms and 
conditions, which requires new contractual arrangements that something just has to be clarify. That is not the law maker, 
the legislator, to legislate every new service, of course, but it is done before court, it is done before civil courts actually”.  
169  The most prominent example is found in Italy, where the Italian Constitutional Court has decide on the 
constitutionality of the established mandatory conciliation procedure.  
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protection, but is also compatible with EU telecommunications regulation. 170  Furthermore, the 
application of procedural safeguards is ensured by the procedural principles contained in the ADR 
Directive, which are also applicable to telecoms-related out-of-court dispute settlement 
procedures.171 
3.3.2 Judicial review of regulatory decisions 
 
The Framework Directive (Article 4) requires Member States to put in place mechanisms for the 
appeal of regulatory decisions.  
Member States shall ensure that effective mechanisms exist at national level under which any user or 
undertaking providing electronic communications networks and/or services who is affected by a decision of a 
national regulatory authority has the right of appeal against the decision to an appeal body that is independent 
of the parties involved. This body, which may be a court, shall have the appropriate expertise to enable it to 
carry out its functions effectively. Member States shall ensure that the merits of the case are duly taken into 
account and that there is an effective appeal mechanism. 
Given that regulatory adjudication of disputes between undertakings takes place by a decision of 
the authority, this will be also subject to judicial review. The appeal mechanism put in place is not 
only a mere judicial review; the appeal body must also take into account the merits of the case 
concerned. This means that the judiciary steps into private disputes arising in connection with 
contractual disagreements between two parties. The nature of the court involved in such procedures 
is administrative, inasmuch as it reviews regulatory decisions.172 This results in an administrative 
court deciding on what would otherwise be a private law case. Accordingly, here again there is a 
process of administrative enforcement of disputes concerning the relationship of private parties. A 
practical example of the implications of the process of administrative judicial review is displayed 
following section.  
 As for consumer-related disputes, those schemes where the NRA via a regulatory decision 
has carried out the adjudication of the dispute, an administrative court will usually perform the 
appeal. By way of example, in Italy, the decision of the regulator over a B2C dispute can be 
appealed in front of the Italian Highest Administrative Court. 
 
                                                          
170 ECJ joint cases (C-317/08, C-318/08, C-319/08 and C-320/08), Rosalba Alassini v Telecom Italia SpA, Filomena 
Califano v Wind SpA, Lucia Anna Giorgia Iacono v T elecom Italia SpA and Multiservice Srl v T elecom Italia SpA, 
[2010] ECR I-02213. See below, section 4.2. 
171 Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution 
for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, (OJ L 165 18.6.2013). 
Recital 19: “[S]ome existing Union legal acts already contain provisions concerning ADR. In order to ensure legal 
certainty, it should be provided that, in the event of conflict, this Directive is to prevail, except where it explicitly 
provides otherwise. In particular, this Directive should be without prejudice to Directive 2008/52/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters (1), which 
already sets out a framework for systems of mediation at Union level for cross-border disputes, without preventing the 
application of that Directive to internal mediation systems. This Directive is intended to apply horizontally to all types of 
ADR procedures, including to ADR procedures covered by Directive 2008/52/EC”.   
172 With the exception, for instance, of France, where the competent court for the appeal is a civil court. Ottow, A. 
(2003), “Dispute Resolution under the New European Framework”. Paper based on comparative study of the British 
Institute of International and Comparative Studies (London) and workshop held on October 30, 2003 by the British 
Institute in London. 
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4. Case-studies 
 
This section aims at displaying how extrajudicial procedures for the settlement of disputes related 
to telecommunications services develop in practice. It will show the legal implications of the 
(sector-specific) enforcement techniques of telecommunications regulation via two case studies.  
Now that the roles of NRAs in dispute resolution have been analyzed under the limited 
comparative approach used in this chapter, we can move to the first case-study, which reflects –
from a private law viewpoint– the different understandings of the applicable framework for the 
resolution of a dispute and the different outcomes reached depending on which body is to apply the 
rules (telecommunications regulation vis-à-vis contract law in B2B disputes). At the retail level, the 
second case-study –via the analysis of the Alassini case173– seeks to show the interplay of sector-
specific mechanisms for the resolution of consumer-related disputes with the procedural guarantees 
put in place and their comparability vis-à-vis judicial procedures of consumer redress.  
4.1 Wholesale market: From Civil Litigation to Regulatory Dispute Resolution via 
NRAs  
The case examined in this section concerns a dispute between some telecommunications operators 
in the UK and British Telecommunications (BT) that arose from the inclusion of a price revision 
contract clause in the context of a price adaptation by BT of an already existing Standard 
Interconnection Agreement between the parties. 174  
The resolution of disputes arising from such a contract binding the parties no longer 
primarily falls within the jurisdiction of civil courts or the application of private and contract law 
principles stricto sensu because the power to resolve disputes between undertakings arising in the 
context of regulatory obligations has been allocated to NRAs.175 This is the generally case except in 
those situations where Member States have provided NRAs with the possibility to decline to 
resolve the dispute where alternative mechanisms exist that “would better contribute to the 
resolution of the dispute in a timely manner in accordance with the provisions of Article 8 [of the 
Framework Directive]».176 More specifically, the case at hand concerns a judicial review process 
for the determination of a dispute between undertakings involving a regulatory decision made by 
the UK’s NRA, Ofcom.177  The dispute at issue subsequently reached the UK Supreme Court 
through a procedure of judicial review.  
                                                          
173 ECJ joint cases (C-317/08, C-318/08, C-319/08 and C-320/08), Rosalba Alassini v Telecom Italia SpA, Filomena 
Califano v Wind SpA, Lucia Anna Giorgia Iacono v T elecom Italia SpA and Multiservice Srl v T elecom Italia SpA, 
[2010] ECR I-02213. 
174 British Telecommunications Plc v Telefónica O2 UK Ltd and Others, [2014] UKSC 42. Para 3.  
175 Article 20(1) Framework Directive.  
176 Ibid. Para. 2.  
177 Ofcom’s Determination to resolve a dispute between BT and each of Vodafone, T-Mobile, H3G, O2 and Orange about 
BT‘s termination charges for 0845 and 0870 calls. Final Determination. Issue date: 10 August 2010; available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/enforcement/competition-bulletins/closed-cases/all-closed-
cases/761146/Final_Determination.pdf. (“Ofcom’s Determination”).  
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Leaving aside the technicalities involved, by focusing on the institutional design, this case 
study aims at drawing attention to the clashes and different outcomes achieved depending on who 
is adjudicating the dispute. The issues at stake relate to the nature and role of the NRA and the 
judiciary when deciding regulatory disputes. Thus, this section sheds some light on the nature of 
dispute resolution in the wholesale market for telecommunications as long as it directly impacts on 
the substantive provisions of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications.178 
Accordingly, the case concerned provides evidence of the role and effect of NRA’s binding 
decisions vis-à-vis the judiciary; in other words, regulatory arbitration versus state court litigation.  
Grounds of the dispute 
The dispute arose between British Telecommunications Plc (BT) and four Mobile Network 
Operators (MNOs) in the United Kingdom, Telefónica O2 Ltd, EE Ltd, Vodafone Ltd and 
Hutchison 3G UK Ltd. It concerned termination charges (the rates that network operators charge to 
other operator for terminating calls on their networks) imposed by BT. Whereas in Chapter 3 this 
dissertation dealt with the determination of maximum termination rates by the operator, the present 
example instead concerns termination price set between two contractual parties. In this case, BT 
charges the defendants for putting calls through to BT’s fixed lines with associated 08 numbers. To 
put it simply and in terms of monetary transactions, the telecoms operator will collect a termination 
charge from the mobile network operator from which it receives the call.  
The source of the dispute was the introduction of additional termination charges by BT for 
calls to 0845 and 0870 non-geographic numbers hosted on its own network.179 The new pricing 
scheme consisted of the pre-existing termination rates (fixed charges) applied to all calls terminated 
on BT‘s network, plus a new charge that was to vary depending on the average retail price of calls 
to the relevant number range charged by the mobile network operator to its customers (variable 
charge). This modification responds to the terms provided in the Standard Interconnect Agreement 
with BT. Clause 12 of the disputed contractual agreement provides that: 
12.1 For a BT service or facility the Operator shall pay to BT the charges specified from time to time in the 
Carrier Price List.  
12.2 BT may from time to time vary the charge for a BT service or facility by publication in the Carrier Price 
List and such new charge shall take effect on the Effective Date, being a date not less than 28 calendar days 
after the date of such publication, unless a period other than 28 calendar days is expressly specified in a 
Schedule. 
BT notified MNOs this new scheme on 2nd October 2009 and the charges took effect from 1st 
November 2009 (NCCN 985 and NCCN 986).180 The defendants rejected the introduction of these 
                                                          
178 For an extensive study of the effectiveness of dispute resolution in telecoms regulation, see Andenas and Zleptnig 
supra n 157. 
179 “'[N]on-geographic number' means a number from the national telephone numbering plan that is not a geographic 
number. It includes, inter alia, mobile, freephone and premium rate numbers”. Article 2 let. f) Universal Services 
Directive.  
180 NCCN 985: Network Charge Control Notice 985 issued by BT on 2 October and applicable 
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additional termination charges and submitted the issue to Ofcom under Section 185 of the 
Communications Act. On 4th March 2010, Ofcom decided that it was appropriate to handle the 
dispute.181 According to Ofcom’s Determination, the scope of the dispute was defined as being 
whether it is fair and reasonable for BT to apply new termination charges as specifically set out in 
BT's NCCN 985 and NCCN 986.182 Ofcom rejected the introduction of the revising scheme for 
termination charges.183  The Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) overturned that decision 184 
which was, in turn, overridden by the Court of Appeal (civil division), which restored the original 
Ofcom determination.185 Therefore, the appeal of the Ofcom decision to the CAT runs –on points 
of law only- to the Court of Appeal, and from there to the UK Supreme Court.186  
Comment 
 
Implications for private law. Conflicting jurisdictions vis-à-vis dual applicable law (vertical 
and horizontal conflicts) 
The institutional design of the enforcement of telecommunications regulation should not be 
neglected when it comes to the impact that it may have on the application of private law principles. 
The following analysis looks at the reasoning of each of the bodies involved in the resolution of the 
dispute in the UK, that is to say the regulator (Ofcom) as well as the judiciary via a procedure of 
judicial review of the (administrative) adjudication of the private dispute (Competition Appeals 
Tribunal, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court).  
Even if at first sight this appears only to be about some “pennies”,187 the individual sums 
involved in the dispute are highly relevant in monetary terms when multiplied by the number of 
transactions operated in the telecommunications market: pennies might translate into millions of 
pounds. The judicial review procedure also plays an interesting role when repayments are at stake, 
since interest accrual can also be significant. 
This sub-section examines the question of whether NRAs (via their adjudicatory powers) 
restrict freedom of contract in a more restrictive way than the judiciary when applying private law 
principles and reading them in the light of Article 8 regulatory goals of the Framework Directive. 
To this end, rather than focusing on an extensive and complex examination of the wide array of the 
issues at stake due to the technical nature of the dispute, the analysis will focus solely on the 
application of the potentially applicable regimes (i.e. regulatory against private law principles) and 
how these affect contractual freedom and any implications on the private law dimension of the 
case.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
from 1 November 2009; NCCN 986: Network Charge Control Notice 986 issued by BT on 2 October and applicable 
from 1 November (Network Charge Change Notice, “NCCN”).  
181 Pursuant to Section 186(3).  
182 Ofcom’s Determination, Section 1.8.  
183 Ofcom’s reasoning is examined below.  
184[2011] CAT 24 and 26.  
185[2012] EWCA Civ 1002.  
186 British Telecommunications Plc v Telefónica O2 UK Ltd and Others, [2014] UKSC 42. Para 3.  
187 Variable charges according to NCCN 985 and NCCN 986 range from 2.0 to 15.00 pence per minute.  
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i. Institutional design that matters. Mapping the actors involved 
Decisions of NRAs only bind the parties to the dispute. Hence, the role of the NRAs when deciding 
disputes between operators one of adjudication.188 Nevertheless, it is expected that third parties 
read across and follow the decisions when faced with similar legal problems. Also, in the UK, the 
Competition Appeals Tribunal must follow Court of Appeal and Supreme Court Judgments on 
similar cases. Institutional design matters, as does the allocation of decision-making powers. 
Accordingly, this section tracks the actors involved in the judicial review of regulatory decisions 
when their object is adjudicate a dispute. This mapping exercise is also relevant for the purpose of 
determining the nature of dispute resolution functions themselves. In this regard, the UK Supreme 
Court examines the extent to which dispute regulatory powers are of an adjudicatory or regulatory 
character.189 The configuration will impact not only on the contractual nature of the –current and 
future‒ relationship of the parties involved in the conflict, but also on third parties outwith the 
dispute but who may enter into similar contracts. 
NRA’s reasoning: The Role of Ofcom in Dispute Resolution  
The involvement of Ofcom in the dispute described above derives from the conferral made by the 
parties under the Standard Interconnect Agreement, which provides that the failure to resolve a 
dispute by agreement of the parties entitles either party to refer it to Ofcom.190 However, the role of 
the NRA and its impact on private law matters not only extends to regulatory obligations at the 
time of “contract-making” or when parties are seeking redress via regulatory adjudication, it also 
touches upon contractual amendments. The Standard Interconnect Agreement provided by BT that 
gave rise to the case at stake provides evidence of the influence of NRA’s decisions and 
determinations in the contractual relationship between the parties involved. Pursuant to the 
Agreement: 
12.5 As soon as reasonably practicable following an order, direction, determination or consent… by Ofcom 
of a charge (or the means of calculating that charge) for a BT service or facility, BT shall make any necessary 
alterations to the Carrier Price List so that it accords with such determination.  
[… ] 
12.9 If there is a difference between a charge for a BT service or facility specified in the Carrier Price List 
and a charge determined by Ofcom, the charge determined by Ofcom shall prevail. 
The Supreme Court reads the combination of Clauses 12 and 26 as that the unilateral alteration of 
charges by BT takes effect “automatically from the date proposed, subject to the counterparty’s 
right to object (…) Meanwhile, the variation is treated as provisionally valid”.191 In the case we are 
analyzing, all the notifications of the revised tariffs via the NCCN made by BT to its counterparties 
were disputed and referred to Ofcom for resolution. 
                                                          
188 See Scott, A. (2015), “Dispute resolution: adjudication or regulation?”, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Research Paper No. RSCAS, 2015/05. 
189 Ibid.  
190 Clause 26 of the disputed contract.  
191 UKSC para. 17.  
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By way of its Determinations, Ofcom concluded that it would allow the modification of the 
charges only if they were “fair and reasonable”.192 In particular, Ofcom grounds its decision in a 
balancing exercise governed by three principles that the Supreme Court summarizes as follows: 
Principle 1 entails that mobile network operators should be able to recover their efficient costs of 
originating calls to the relevant numbers. Principle 2 –so-called “welfare test” – is grounded on the 
assumption that the new charges should (i) provide benefits to consumers, and (ii) not entail a 
material distortion of competition. Finally, Principle 3 provides that the implementation of the new 
charges should be reasonably practicable. The Supreme Court rightly points out that these 
principles can be related to the regulatory principles contained in Article 8(2) of the Framework 
Directive. It also notes that, so far, these principles have not been challenged as an “appropriate 
analytical framework”.193  
Again without entering into technical details, Ofcom applies the welfare test and 
distinguishes three potential effects on consumers: the “direct effect” on consumer prices as a result 
of the variation, the “indirect effect” as a consequence of improved services, and the “mobile tariff 
package effect” (“waterbed effect”) by which MNOs might potentially compensate for the increase 
of the charges by raising prices elsewhere.194 As to the direct effect, Ofcom concluded that it is 
likely that the proposed scheme of charges which links the variable charge in proportion to the 
price charged to consumers yields benefits to the caller as long as it might lead MNOs to reduce the 
charges to callers.195 Ofcom also determined that an indirect effect might also eventually take place. 
However, it cast some doubt on the fulfillment of Principle 2(i), since the “waterbed effect” is 
likely to occur.196 The second part of Principle 2 (“competition test”) did not entail a problem for 
Ofcom as it considered that the risk of material distortion of competition as a result of the changes 
proposed by BT under its contractual freedom was “relatively low”.197 As a result, and given that in 
Ofcom’s view the requirements of Principle 2 were not fulfilled, it concluded that British Telecom 
should not be entitled to introduce the new pricing scheme as the extent to which MNOs would be 
able to compensate the increase in the charges198 could not be determined and therefore it would 
not be “fair and reasonable”.199 An appeal against this decision was lodged in the Competition 
Appeal Tribunal. Before proceeding to the analysis of the Competition Appeal Tribunal, should be 
noted that, in the period 2013-2014, Ofcom has been involved in the adjudication of 7 disputes, 
only one of which was appealed. To date, from this 2014-2015 exercise, Ofcom has issued 6 
determinations, one having now been appealed to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. 200  This 
demonstrates that only a few cases reach the judiciary.201 
                                                          
192 Ofcom’s Determination, Section 1.8.  
193 UKSC, para. 20.  
194 For an extensive view on the assessment of the principles see Section 5 of Ofcom’s Determination.  
195 See Section 5.25 and 5.26 of Ofcom’s Determination.  
196 Ibid. Section 5.28.  
197 See Section 8.157.  
198 Ibid. Sections 9.16 to 9.43.   
199 ibid. Section 9.55.  
200 Scott supra n 188.  
201 To date, the Competition Appeal Tribunal has dealt with 25 appeals under the EU Regulatory Framework dispute 
resolution regime. From these, only a minority of CAT judgments are appealed on points of law to the Court of Appeal 
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The role of the Competition Appeal Tribunal 
As explained above, pursuant to Article 4 of the Framework Directive, Section 195(2) of the UK 
Communications Act, the appeal to the Competition Appeals Tribunal is not limited to a mere 
judicial review or to points of law. Rather, it is an appeal “on the merits”.202 
In the case at issue, the conclusions reached by the Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”) 
were substantially similar to and in agreement with Ofcom’s approach and its balancing principles. 
Still, the CAT203 departed from a different hypothesis: that BT is prima facie entitled to modify the 
charges pricing system.204 In the view of the CAT, as summarised by the Supreme Court, BT’s 
contract power to vary prices is grounded on three things: first, BT had a “contractual right» to 
modify the tariffs to be charged to MNOs under its contractual freedom, as long as Ofcom could 
issue a decision in case of dispute (ex-post control); second, that the introduction of “innovative 
charging structures was itself a mode of competing, and that [regulatory] interference with it would 
restrict competition”; and third, that “price control is an intrusive form of control which, elsewhere 
in the 2003 Act, can only be introduced by SMP condition”.205 On the latter issue, the Tribunal 
acknowledges that the application of a “stringent test” to introduce the proposed variation in 
charges Ofcom is “significantly restricting communication providers’ commercial freedom to price 
which –absent the Dispute Resolution Process– is not constrained by regulation”.206 Despite these 
considerations, the CAT still emphasizes that it is not the nature of the assessment (referring to the 
“welfare test”) what it is considered particularly “stringent”, but the lack of empirical evidence 
about the impacts that charges modification would have on the market and the complexity of the 
issue the distinctively show that it would be beneficial for consumers.207 Be this as it may, the 
Tribunal actually concluded in a similar way to Ofcom concerning the welfare test insofar as both 
found that the test yields an inconclusive result.208  Yet, it is on this particular point ‒i.e. the 
uncertainty arising from the welfare test– that the CAT is at odds with Ofcom. Here, very 
importantly, the Tribunal asks what a regulator is to do in the context of such uncertainty. There are 
two possibilities from the Court’s viewpoint: 209  
(1) To prevent change unless it can be demonstrated that the change is beneficial- in which case it may well 
be said that the dead hand of regulation is constraining behaviour which may actually be beneficial to 
consumers. We stress that our conclusion regarding Principle 2(i) was that the welfare assessment was 
inconclusive, not that consumers would be harmed.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
and just once has a case been subject to a further appeal in front of the UK Supreme Court. Source: Competition Appeal 
Tribunal. 
202  UKSC 42 at para. 24. Also acknowledged in Case British Telecommunications Plc v OFCOM (Ethernet 
Determinations) [2014] CAT 14, at para. 64.  
203 British Telecommunications PLC (Termination Charges: 080 calls) v Office of Communications [2011] CAT 24.  
204 Para 261: […] Mobile network operators are, therefore, free to price as they will; but it does not follow from that that 
such freedom should inhibit BT in its freedom to price. 
205 See, para. 442: “[…] None of the parties to the dispute were subject to regulatory control as regards the prices for 080, 
0845 or 0870 calls nor as regards the prices for terminating such calls”. 
206 Para. 395.  
207 Ibid.  
208 Para. 379.  
209 Para. 396.  
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(2) Alternatively, to allow change despite the uncertainty, even though there is a risk that the change may 
result in a disbenefit to consumers, recognising that an undue fetter on commercial freedom is itself a 
disbenefit to consumers. 
Although Ofcom opted for preventing the change even if the welfare test yielded an inconclusive 
result, the CAT considers that this course of action “places undue importance on Ofcom's policy 
preference, at the expense of the two other relevant factors that we have identified as forming a part 
of Principle 2 […] and BT’s private law rights”.210 Further, the Judgment explicitly recognizes that 
even though there are circumstances that may alter the legal rights of the parties by giving way to 
regulation over private law (e.g. regulatory obligations over players with Significant Market Power 
and the dispute resolution process itself), “private law rights are relevant factors to take into 
account”.211 
The outcome from the CAT’s ruling is therefore that, in principle, contractual changes are 
allowed unless regulatory principles are clearly breached. Yet, the Court still draws attention to the 
role of Ofcom when deciding disputes, in particular, when balancing its statutory obligations 
against the freedom of undertakings to negotiate the terms and conditions. To this end, the CAT 
invokes the Judgment given in the T-Mobile case212 where it held that Ofcom failed in exercising 
its discretion as regards the manner in which it resolves disputes. In the CAT’s view, the starting 
point of Ofcom when deciding a dispute is the existence of ex ante obligations applicable to the 
parties in a attempt to ensure that the parties’ “freedom to determine their price is curtailed only 
insofar as necessary and proportionate to fulfill the objectives of such obligations”, by considering 
“whether there are any overriding policy objectives which should be taken into account”.213 In 
particular, the Tribunal considered that: 
“[…] This approach represented, in the Tribunal’s judgment, a fundamental error as to the task facing Ofcom 
in determining these disputes. Ofcom failed to recognize that dispute resolution is itself a third potential 
regulatory restraint that operates in addition to other ex ante obligations and ex post competition law”. 
Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that, Ofcom should apply a test under which it can first 
“determine what are reasonable terms and conditions as between the parties”.214 Here the Tribunal 
asks about what is to be understood by reasonable. In dispute resolution, “reasonable” would entail 
“a fair balance to be struck between the interests of the parties to the connectivity agreement”. It 
would therefore call for the same kind of adjudication that any privately appointed arbitrator by the 
parties could undertake. However, given that Ofcom is a regulator bound by its statutory duties and 
the EU regulatory requirements it is also required to achieve a “reasonable” balance that ensures 
that those objectives and requirements are achieved.215 
 
                                                          
210 Para. 447.  
211 Para. 444.  
212  Judgment T-Mobile(UK) Ltd v Office of Communications [2008] CAT 12.  
213 CAT on the T-Mobile case, at. Para. 87.  
214 Para. 101. Emphasis added.  
215 Ibid.  
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The role of the Court of Appeal 
The decision by the CAT was appealed to the Court of Appeal, which restored the decision reached 
by Ofcom.216 Lloyd LJ (leading judgment) rejected outright the CAT’s starting hypothesis as to the 
mistake in considering a prima facie BT’s right to change its prices. He considered that if there are 
matters to be decided under a dispute resolution procedure, these are subordinated to Ofcom’s 
determination. Lloyd LJ also held that it is wrong to find that a restraint of BT’s freedom to vary 
prices would distort competition. Finally, he argued that the CAT was not correct when it took the 
view that ex ante control of prices only applies in circumstances where undertakings hold 
Significant Market Powers on a relevant market. In line with Ofcom’s reasoning, it is for BT to 
justify its charges to be “fair and reasonable”.  
In the view of the Court of Appeal, it is also relevant to scrutinize the nature of the function of 
Ofcom with regard to dispute resolution.217 In this regard, Lloyd LJ notes that  
“ […] The purpose of dispute resolution is to provide a solution where a deadlock is reached in commercial 
negotiations between parties. Ofcom’s task, where it undertakes the resolution of the dispute, is to impose a 
solution that meets the public policy objectives of the CRF, as set out in article 8 of the Framework Directive, 
and therefore goes beyond deciding disputes on the basis of the parties’ respective contractual rights. Dispute 
resolution is a form of regulation in its own right […]”.218  
Dispute resolution by Ofcom is viewed as a regulatory function. This was widely recognized.219 
However, the Supreme Court draws the attention on the description of dispute resolution by the 
Court of Appeal as “a form of regulation in its own right”. The Court considers that it requires 
some analysis.220 The Supreme Court discusses such a function (below).  
From the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the relevant question is what the rights of BT under 
the Interconnection Agreement are and how disputes resolution impacts on such rights. Lloyd LJ 
holds that any change that takes place can be overridden (or not) by Ofcom’s dispute resolution 
jurisdiction.221 This has since led to the Supreme Court to draw the conclusion that in the view of 
the Court of Appeal, “the terms of the Interconnection Agreement were of little if any relevance 
because their effect was that any new charges introduced by BT were liable to be overridden by 
Ofcom in the exercise of its regulatory powers”.222 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal considered 
interconnection charges as regulatory in nature.223 
 
 
                                                          
216 Judgment on case Telefonica O2 UK Limited and others v British Telecommunications PLC [2012] EWCA Civ 1002.  
217 See paras. 58ff.  
218 Para. 63. Emphasis added. 
219 Also by the CAT in Judgment T-Mobile(UK) Ltd v Office of Communications [2008] CAT 12.  
220 UKSC, para. 31.  
221 See paras. 68-70.  
222 Supreme Court at Para. 30. Emphasis added.  
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The role of the UK Supreme Court/ reasoning of the court 
From a pure private law perspective, the role of the UKSC is to determine whether BT’s proposed 
charges exceed the limits of its contractual discretion.  
In this particular case, British Telecommunications does not hold position of Significant 
Market Power, but yet its capacity (i.e. freedom) to vary prices is limited by the English Law of 
contract and, in addition, by the EU regulatory framework for telecommunications. 224 
Consequently, BT was obliged to act: 
a. “in good faith and not arbitrarily or capriciously”; 
b. “consistently with its contractual purpose”; and 
c. “within limits which are fixed by the objectives of Article 8 of the Framework Directive.” 
 
For the UK Supreme Court, the starting hypothesis is that the Ofcom is “bound to start from the 
parties’ contractual rights” and that it “may override them only if that is required by Article 8 of the 
Framework Directive”.225  
As to the welfare test, the reasoning of the Supreme Court coincides with that of the 
CAT.226 The Court holds that the EU regulatory framework for telecoms is “market-oriented and 
essentially permissive”. Thus, it concludes that it is inconsistent to apply “an extreme form of the 
precautionary principle to a dynamic and competitive market”. Yet Ofcom should not refrain “from 
blocking a price variation which on a balance of probabilities was unlikely to be adverse, but which 
if things went wrong could be catastrophic”.227 However, the Supreme Court considers that the 
application of the three principles and the welfare test was inconclusive, so Ofcom should in fact 
have permitted the price variation proposed by BT.  
 
ii. The impact of EU law (EU Regulatory framework for Electronic Communications) in 
the resolution of national disputes 
 “Interconnection agreements are made in a regulated environment”.228 This statement presupposes 
that any change in the regulatory framework affects the contractual relationship. In the view of the 
Supreme Court, this configuration also assumes that the intention of the parties is to comply with 
the regulatory scheme and that it “necessarily informs the scope and operation of any contractual 
discretion”. Hence, the discretion conferred by virtue of Clause 12 of the Standard Interconnection 
Agreement is restricted by the regulatory principles contained in Article 8 of the Framework 
Directive so that, contractually, BT’s power to change the already existing charges scheme will be 
framed within the limits delineated by the regulatory objectives.229  
                                                          
224 Recall Case C-192/08 TeliaSonera Finland Oyj v iMEZ Ab, ECR [2009] I-10717; para. 62.  
225 UKSC para. 38.  
226 Paras. 42 and 43.  
227 Para 44.  
228 Lord Sumption in UKSC at para. 37.  
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According to this interpretation, the principles contained in Article 8 of the Framework 
Directive act as a guideline for solving disputes but also as a limit to the freedom of contract. Thus, 
for example, the UK CAT permits contractual changes as long as “principles” (understood as the 
objectives set out in Article 8) are respected.  
On the other hand, Article 7(1) of the Framework Directive (‘Consolidating the internal 
market for electronic communications’) prescribes that: 
1. In carrying out their tasks under this Directive and the Specific Directives, national regulatory authorities 
shall take the utmost account of the objectives set out in Article 8, including in so far as they relate to the 
functioning of the internal market.230 
Despite the fact that there is no definition of what “utmost account” should be taken to mean or 
what is its legal effect is, it is in any case clear that the policy objectives and regulatory principles 
contained in Article 8 of the Framework Directive act as a guideline for the NRAs performance, 
also when resolving disputes between undertakings. This is a requirement also of Article 8 itself,231 
and Article 5 Access Directives reinforces and concretize such a mandate.232 From the reading of 
the regulatory principles and objectives and the reading of Article 1 of the Access Directive, which 
harmonizes the regulation of access and interconnection for the relationships between 
telecommunications operators, the Court understands that the “key element” of the system for 
achieving the policy goals of the regulatory framework is the “legal relationship” between 
telecommunications providers. 233  The Court acknowledges that the rationale of the designed 
framework is “embodied in the interconnection terms” agreed between the parties.234 It emphasizes 
that the achievement of Article 8 principles and objectives takes place via the terms contained in 
the interconnection contracts.235 Yet parties enjoy a certain margin to negotiate the interconnection 
agreements in good faith under the principle of minimum regulatory interference, provided that 
these terms are consistent with the regulatory obligations imposed, which include the obligation to 
secure Article 8 policy objectives.236  Under this interpretation, Lord Sumption found that this 
requirement for interconnection terms to be compliant with the Article 8 objectives is a condition 
that “must be available to any electronic communications operator which asks from them”.237 
The application of the price control restriction where there is Significant Market Power 
(SMP) is also relevant. The Supreme Court clarifies an important difference between, firstly, the 
exercise of a regulatory power to impose price control on SMP operators or, secondly, the 
                                                          
230 Emphasis added.  
231 Para 1: “[…]national regulatory authorities take all reasonable measures which are aimed at achieving the objectives 
set out in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 […]”.  
232 New paragraph 3 as amended by Directive 2009/140/EC: “Member States shall ensure that the national regulatory 
authority is empowered to intervene at its own initiative where justified in order to secure the policy objectives of Article 
8 of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), in accordance with the provisions of this Directive and the procedures 
referred to in Articles 6 and 7, 20 and 21 of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive)”. 
233 UKSC 42 at para. 8.  
234 Ibid.  
235 Ibid. at para. 10.  
236 Ibid. and Article 5(4) Access Directive.  
237 Ibid. This is in line with the interpretation provided by the CJEU in the Case C-192/08 TeliaSonera Finland Oyj, ECR 
[2009] I-10717 where it maintains a flexible interpretation of the regulatory obligations by extending the application -
regulatory principles not only to SMP operators but to any operator (Para. 55).  
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determination of whether a particular price variation yields benefits to consumers as conditions 
upon which the right to vary the prices can be endorsed.238 This said, the Supreme Court does not 
regard the lack of SMP condition upon the operator as a justification for disregarding the relevance 
of Article 8 objectives.239  
An important finding regarding the application of EU policy objectives and the 
configuration of Article 8 as a guideline, as well as the framework under which the contractual 
discretion may operate, also act as catalysts for the harmonization of (regulatory) contract law at 
EU level. Thus, by way of this enforcement system subordinated to the mandate of Article 8, 
regulatory goals entail a tangible encroachment of the EU rules into the different contract laws of 
the Member States.240    
iii. Conclusions 
From a purely private law perspective it is remarkable that Ofcom, in its reasoning, does not 
identify an actual and concrete harm for consumers derived from the contractual modification 
introduced by BT:241 
Given the uncertainty which we have identified as to whether BT’s NCCNs would result in a net benefit or 
net harm to consumers, and in light of our overriding statutory duties to further the interests of consumers, we 
consider it is appropriate for us to place greater weight on this potential risk to consumers from NCCNs 985 
and 986. 
Rather, it invokes higher interests than those of the parties to entitle Ofcom, upon the condition that 
it as acting as guardian of the interest of citizens and consumers,242 to override freedom of contract. 
Thus, this Determination provides evidence that, when in doubt, for the NRA, regulatory principles 
take priority over contract law principles.    
The Supreme Court itself recognizes the complexity of the case.243 It is unlikely that the 
national (civil) judge has the appropriate knowledge and expertise to rule on a highly technical 
sector.244  
                                                          
238 Para. 48.  
239 Ibid. para. 48.  
240 Para 35 UKSC: “The contractual effect of the interconnection terms will of course depend on their proper law, and in 
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the careful analysis of the CAT on a matter lying very much within its expertise […]”). Emphasis added.  
244  “In the UK, courts are not excluded, but civil law judges are surely not familiar with the Telecommuucations 
Regulatory Framework”. Adam Scott (CAT), Speech at the Seminar ‘The role of the National Judiciary in the Single 
Market for Telecoms’, organized by the Florence School of Regulation (EUI) and DG Connect (EU Commission), 20 
November 2014, Brussels.  
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The overall conclusion to be drawn from this case-study is that institutional design in the 
enforcement of telecommunications regulation via regulatory dispute resolution is significant for 
private law matters. Evidence of this is that even though the NRA and the appeal bodies act in the 
light of the regulatory objectives contained in Article 8 of the Framework Directive, they reach 
different positions as to private and contract law. From the analysis, it follows that the different 
bodies have different understandings about the extent to which BT is entitled to vary prices within 
its contractual discretion and the impact of such use of contractual rights over the competitiveness 
of the market and consumer welfare.  
These conclusions go together with an important caveat: one has to exercise caution, 
particularly in the enforcement of the substantive rules. For instance, it is important to draw a 
distinction between the setting of tariffs in wholesale markets following a review of a market that 
results in a situation of SMP (regulation) and tariffs that have been set as part of a dispute 
resolution process (adjudication). This differentiation is important in order to determine the scope 
of such tariffs in a litigation process and how the application of such tariffs operate with regard to 
the parties involved in a dispute resolution process. This question arises particularly in the context 
of appeals against the setting of tariffs by the regulator and the outcome will be different depending 
on whether it arises in the frame of ex ante regulatory decisions or in the determination of the 
regulator in dispute resolution. This becomes particularly important with regard to reversing the 
effects of the challenged decision. Thus, whereas within the framework of regulatory obligations, it 
is considered an ex ante intervention and therefore the consequences of what happened between the 
setting of an incorrect tariff by the NRA and its correction cannot be corrected by the appellate 
body (at least in the UK),245 in the context of dispute resolution, the court may –at its discretion– 
render a decision through which some adjustments are made in order to palliate the effects of the 
contested measure. 
4.2 Retail market: ADR as the standard form of consumer redress? Alassini 
case 
As examined above, the Italian legislation establishes a mandatory attempt to settle the dispute as a 
requirement prior to bring a judicial action. To this end, the Italian NRA (AGCOM) has provided 
for a system of decentralized enforcement by setting up regional delegated authorities (Co.Re.Com) 
responsible for ensuring the provision of the procedure for extrajudicial settlement.  
 
Background of the dispute 
The system of mandatory conciliation attempt for matters concerning public utilities has existed in 
Italy since 1995 by virtue of Law no. 481/1995 establishing the Regulatory Authorities utilities and, 
in the telecommunications sector since 1997 by way of Law no. 249/1997 Institution of the 
Communications Authority (AGCOM).246 Article 1, paragraph 11 of the said Law no. 249/1997 
                                                          
245 See Hutchison [2010] EWCA Civ 391.  
246 Legge 31 luglio 1997, n. 249, Istituzione dell'Autorita' per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni e norme sui sistemi delle 
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provides, before being able to seize the jurisdiction, the mandatory settlement before the NRA. 
This activity has been largely delegated to Co.Re.Com. In line with the constitutional interpretation 
proposed by numerous judgments and orders of the Constitutional Court intervening on the 
subject, 247  the mandatory settlement is confirmed by the Decree of August 1st 2003 n. 259 
(Electronic Communications Code) that implements the Universal Service Directive into the Italian 
legal landscape.248  
Italian legislation provides that disputes between telecommunications operators and users 
cannot be brought in front of judicial courts until a compulsory conciliation attempt has taken 
place. Such conciliation has to be completed within days 30 from the submission of the complaint 
to the Authority. To this end, the deadlines for action in the courts are suspended until the expiry of 
the deadline for the conclusion of the conciliation process.249 After this period, the parties are free 
to apply to the judicial authority even if the settlement procedure has not yet concluded.  
In the cases concerned, which related to an alleged breach of contract by the telecoms 
operator, the Co.Re.Com had not yet been set up in the region of Campania. This meant that the 
mandatory settlement procedure had to be brought before other bodies, namely those referred to in 
Article 13 of the dispute settlement rules, i.e. via Chambers of Commerce or Conciliazione 
Paritetica.  
Against this background, the Magistrates Court from Ischia (Giudice di Pace di Ischia) 
referred the case to the CJEU via the preliminary reference procedure.250 The questions referred 
asked the CJEU to verify whether those bodies providing out-of-court dispute settlement were in 
accordance with the principles set out in Recommendation 2001/310 and, in particular, the costs for 
the consumers in such procedure were to be considered at an appropriate level. In addition, it 
concerned the question of whether these alternative mechanisms were easy to use and properly 
advertised.251 Nonetheless, the referring court casts doubts on the compliance of the mandatory 
nature of the settlement procedure provided by the Italian legislation with EU Law, insofar as it 
considers that it could impede end-users from exercising their rights. Accordingly, it poses the 
question of whether the transposition of Article 34 of the Universal Service Directive into Italian 
law has been carried out in compliance with EU Law, in particular with Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (right to fair hearing), Universal Service Directive, Framework 
Directive and EU Recommendations 2001/310 and 98/257. Specifically, it aims at clarifying 
whether these rules:252 
                                                          
247 Italian Constitutional Court, Judgment 272, 6 December 2012. 
248  Marzocco, A.M. (2012), Le controversie in materia di comunicazioni elettroniche. Contributo allo studio della 
giurisdizione condizionata, Dike Giuridica Editrice.  
249 Ibid., Article 1(11).  
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Califano v Wind SpA, Lucia Anna Giorgia Iacono v T elecom Italia SpA and Multiservice Srl v T elecom Italia SpA, 
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[H]ave direct effect and must they be interpreted as meaning that disputes “in the area of electronic 
communications between end-users and operators concerning non-compliance with the rules on Universal 
Service and on the rights of end-users, as laid down in legislation, decisions of the Regulatory Authority, 
contractual terms and service charters” (the disputes contemplated by Article 2 of [the regulation annexed 
to] Decision No 173/07/CONS of the Regulatory Authority) must not be made subject to a mandatory 
attempt to settle the dispute without which proceedings in that regard may not be brought before the 
courts, thus taking precedence over the rule laid down in Article 3(1) of [the regulation annexed to] 
Decision No 173/07/CONS?’ 
 
Reasoning of the Court 
After finding the question to be admissible, the Court identified the relevant Community legislation. 
Notwithstanding that the Recommendations are not binding, but are also not entirely without legal 
effect,253 the courts excluded the applicability of EU Recommendation 2001/310/EC concerning 
the procedures as they are simply an attempt to reunite the parties to convince them to find an 
amicable solution. In the opinion of the Court, the conciliation attempt provided for by Decision 
173/07/CONS falls within those procedures that lead to the resolution of the dispute through the 
active intervention of a third party who proposes or imposes a solution. It therefore considered only 
the Recommendation 1998/257/EC is applicable to the case.254 The Recommendation 1998/257/EC 
subjects extrajudicial procedures for the settlement of disputes to the principles of independence, 
transparency, adversariness, effectiveness, legality, liberty and representation. In addition, in the 
present case Article 34 of the Universal Service Directive that calls on States to ensure transparent, 
simple and inexpensive extrajudicial procedures to enable a fair and timely resolution of disputes 
was also deemed applicable.255  
In addition, the court must examine the legality of the mandatory settlement in the light of 
the principles of equivalence and effectiveness on the one hand, and the principle of effective 
judicial protection on the other. The discretion of the Member States in the use of the national 
procedural principle is limited only by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.256 In this 
regard, the CJEU has held that the establishment of a mandatory process of dispute settlement prior 
to bringing a judicial action before the court, does not infringe the principles of equivalence, 
effectiveness and the principle of effective judicial protection. Particularly, the court states, the 
procedure put in place does not “make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise 
the rights which individuals derive from [the Universal Service Directive].257  Here, the Court 
reasoning –following the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott258– was that the procedure at stake 
does not result in a decision which is binding on the parties, that it does not cause a substantial 
delay for the purposes of bringing legal proceedings, that it suspends the period for the time-
barring of claims and that it does not give rise to costs – or gives rise to very low costs – for the 
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258 Ibid. Opinion delivered in November 19, 2009. Paras. 36 and 57. 
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parties, and only if electronic means is not the only means by which the settlement procedure 
may be accessed and interim measures are possible in exceptional cases where the urgency of 
the situation so requires.259   
Accordingly, Member States are not limited in establishing mandatory out-of-court procedures for 
the settlement of disputes as a requirement for judicial redress, on condition that this does not affect 
the effectiveness of the Universal Service Directive.260 Rather –the court continues–, in view of 
previous CJEU decisions, the designed scheme contributes to strengthening the effectiveness of the 
Universal Service Directive.261 
As to the principle of fundamental judicial protection, the Court acknowledges that 
fundamental rights may be restricted, provided that the restrictions respond to further objectives of 
general interest and comply with the principle of proportionality, i.e. they do not involve a 
“disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringes upon the very substance of the rights 
guaranteed”.262  
In the light of these considerations, the Court concludes that a mandatory settlement 
procedure is proportionate considering that a merely optional procedure would not be as efficient to 
achieve legitimate objectives in the general interest.263  
Comment 
The analysis of the case at issue requires attention to be paid to three particular issues.  
The first is the scope of the procedural principles contained in the Recommendations. The 
reasoning of the court follows the logic that the Recommendation 2001/310/EC does not apply to 
the case concerned because, in the view of the court, the mandatory scheme involves the active 
intervention of a third party proposing a solution, due to the Universal Service Directive. 
Accordingly, by the time the dispute took place, only the principles contained in the 
Recommendation 1998/257/EC were applicable. In this regard, it is interesting to note that, when it 
comes to the principle of legality, the scope of the Recommendation 1998/257/EC was broader 
than the principle of legality afforded by the Directive on Consumer ADR.264 Following the court’s 
reasoning, such a principle as enshrined in the 1998 Recommendation is applicable to the 
procedure at issue.265  
The second issue concerns the effectiveness of the Universal Service Directive. In the 
court’s view, the systematic resort to of out-of-court procedures for the settlement of disputes 
strengthens the effectiveness of the legislation to be enforced.266 Regrettably, the court does not 
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develop the argument further, so it cannot be ascertained whether it refers only to the procedures at 
stake or also to the substance of the provisions contained in the Universal Service Directive.  
Last, but not least, it is important to emphasize the role of the objectives in the general 
interest. The court considers that the establishment of a mandatory out-of-court attempt at 
settlement like the one at issue entails a “lightening of the burden on the court system, and they 
thus pursue legitimate objectives in the general interest”.267 This can be read as that the court 
equating the lessening of the court load to an objective of legitimately restricting a fundamental 
right, such as the right to effective judicial protection. Accordingly, this interpretation goes beyond 
the mere nature of the procedure itself and questions whether its design could be considered 
effective for the resolution of consumer-related disputes, but also the collateral effects that it 
encompasses for the judicial system. By so doing, the CJEU is backing the preemption of collective 
interests over individual ones as a preferable solution in the access to justice debate.  
The established setting reveals an undertone that therefore needs consideration: the 
institutional design of the out-of-court dispute settlement mechanisms. The national institutional 
design of the mandatory attempt at conciliation procedure under a sort of “national ADR network” 
in which the Co.Re.Com (regional level) and even the main operators participate, allowing an 
effective procedure that enables a (somehow) satisfactory consumer redress.  
Therefore, by way of the ruling given in Alassini, the CJEU is contributing to this 
movement towards out-of-court dispute settlement based on the grounds of effectiveness and 
efficiency. This matter is relevant for the self-sufficiency hypothesis because through the 
movement towards administrative enforcement, the enforcement of the EU rules comes to fall 
within the EU shadow as long as it becomes part of the enforcement network. This could also be 
considered a manifestation of an emerging “judicial activism”268 coming from the CJEU, because 
this ruling has implied a tipping point in the case law concerning access to justice which aims to fill 
the remaining gaps in EU law in relation to its implementation within the national private legal 
orders. 
The EU push for ADR - The return of private law? 
One year after the Alassini ruling came to light, the European Commission launched a proposal for 
a Directive on Consumer ADR and a Regulation on Consumer ODR. These proposals were 
adopted in 2013.269  
                                                          
267 Para. 64.  
268  Expression used by Micklitz, H.-W. (2009), “The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law--The 
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amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, OJ EU 2013, L 165/65; and Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation 
(EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, OJ EU 2013, L 165/1. 
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While it is true that the establishment of a European network of ADR for multi-sectoral 
consumer disputes has little to do with the nature of the issue at stake, i.e. the mandatory nature of 
the procedure put in place as a condition for accessing “judicial justice”, the judgment given in 
Alassini has meant an step towards potential objections that may arise in the context of the 
implementation of the provisions contained in the ADR Directive concerning the procedures to be 
set up by the Member States under the national procedural autonomy principle. Hence, the 
establishment of mandatory ADR schemes might be appealing for those Member States that are 
seeking to lessen the load of their national judicial systems. The fact that the Directive establishes 
that the set up of the schemes must comply with certain requirements270 opens the possibility to the 
emergence of private providers of consumer redress. 
Against this background, ADR can emerge as a new layer for the enforcement of consumer 
rights. However, this shift from judicial to (non-statutorily) extrajudicial settlement, together with 
the possibility to establish mandatory out-of-court schemes as a pre-condition for access to the 
court, might mean a delegation to private parties to solve disputes themselves. Under this (private) 
scheme, the scrutiny of the principle of legality when it comes to the enforcement of consumer 
becomes a difficult task if we take the view that ADR does not seek a “strict application of the 
law”.271 The application of the principle of legality would be a requirement only for those ADR 
schemes designed so that they impose a solution on the consumer.272 Accordingly, those cases 
where the parties find a consensual resolution of the dispute would be functioning in a quasi-legal 
limbo where the application of whatever rules concerned might effectively yield a different 
outcome than which would be reached if the case had reached the court.  
Be that as it may, one cannot envisage or assess at this moment whether the 
implementation of the ADR Directive will have an actual positive impact or not, but it can be 
considered as a very important step towards the facilitation of consumer redress as long as it does 
not preclude the possibility of going to court to get judicial redress. Further, a proper institutional 
setting would benefit “all kinds of consumers” including those who unfortunately cannot afford 
access to justice (e.g. those consumers that cannot afford judicial fees). Of course, it might be 
neither the fairest nor the most optimal of the models, but at least consumers can “still” find some 
sort of redress. In the end, we cannot equate ADR procedures to judicial proceedings before courts. 
This means that we cannot demand from ADR procedures the same level playing field that we 
expect from judicial courts in terms of fairness. This situation might be the result of the low-cost 
mindset; i.e. if one has to pay less, not only in terms of money but also in terms of time, to get a –
more or less– satisfactory (and effective) solution, what he or she gets in return can be labeled as 
low-cost justice. 
Accordingly, we should know where to draw the line in main aim of ADR: does it pursue 
the regulation and prevention of certain commercial practices or does it only seek the achievement 
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of justice between two private parties? In the telecoms sector, we have seen how companies try to 
achieve compromised individual solutions via in-house customer care (e.g. Deutsche Telekom) 
until a particular case reaches the court, usually via the consumer association, so then the judge can 
curtail such practice. Therefore, we cannot conclude whether consumer ADR functions as a 
deterrent.273 Nonetheless, the lack of motivation on the part of consumers to go to court for smalls 
claims gives leeway for undertakings not to fight against their misleading (unfair commercial 
practices),274 although the data record of complaints collected by ADR may serve the purpose of 
setting precedents.275 Therefore, the data collected may contribute as a deterrent in the market with 
regard to certain practices, and when it comes to consumer redress extrajudicial mechanisms imply 
an intermediary step before reaching the court that do not undermine the protection afforded by the 
principle of legality, even in those cases where such principle is not applicable. This is due to the 
fact that the design pattern contained in the ADR Directive and the envisaged procedural principles 
provide for the possibility for a consumer to go the court and require a “proper” application of the 
law if he or she is not satisfied with the result achieved by extrajudicial means.  
Certainly, all these conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the telecoms sector, 
however they might not serve to every sort of product or service offered in the market. The next 
step would be then to examine whether we could extend such view to products and services offered 
in different sectors of the market and whether the EU procedural fairness rationale that is found 
behind the market efficiency mindset actually undermines the fundamental procedural guarantees 
for consumers.276 
5. Conclusions. The transformation of private law enforcement 
 
The previous chapters have focused on the making and substance of European telecommunications, 
and how this has impacted national private law. This chapter has sought to identify the 
transformation(s) of private law operations as a result of the enforcement design of EU telecoms 
rules. The analysis of the European approaches towards enforcement and of the different national 
adaptions reveals a shift from judicial to administrative (and soft) enforcement and extrajudicial 
means for the resolution of contract-related disputes. Accordingly, it can be argued that the 
transformation of private law also implies that traditional private law adjudication of disputes is 
moving away from courts to extra-judicial enforcement, giving a significant role to Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and even administrative enforcement. But can it also be argued that ADR is 
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private law enforcement alone? As a matter of fact, settlement in the wholesale market may be 
considered as a regulatory measure. So, again, the procedures involved entail a combined approach 
of public and private means. In addition to this, the normative grounds for such approach respond 
to the imperative of efficiency and the effectiveness rationales of the functioning of the market in 
that industry.  
The movement towards ADR and regulatory adjudication respond to the European 
requirements for national enforcement given that enforcement by civil judges on grounds of 
national contract law would give rise to divergent solutions. So, by allocating sectorial dispute 
resolution, the system guarantees the uniform application and achievement of the sector-specific 
goals for electronic communications. Accordingly, it can be argued that the sector-specific 
legislation relies and draws at the same time on sectorial schemes for dispute resolution in order to 
achieve a consistent enforcement of EU regulatory framework for telecommunications via dispute 
resolution. By doing so, the EU is bypassing the enforcement deficit that stems from the national 
procedural autonomy principle.  
The enforcement of the rights and obligations contained in the Regulatory Framework for 
Electronic Communications can emerge from a wide range of institutions. Yet, we can observe that 
these multiple institutions are at odds with each other. As demonstrated, the substantial outcomes 
under the sector-specific design (i.e. dispute resolution via the NRA) can be radically different than 
those achieved hrough traditional civil courts. It might also happen that the results obtained via the 
judiciary are eventually influenced by the understanding and rationales of alternative institutional 
designs. This spillover effect is –to a certain degree– certainly influencing the way in which 
contractual rights are enforced, and particularly the outcomes achieved, within regulated sectors 
such as telecommunications.  
Given the detailed nature of regulation, its expertise level, technical considerations, the 
existence of sector-related schemes, etc. it is expected that NRAs are entitled to intervene in the 
resolution of disputes (particularly in the wholesale market) at the expense of the application of 
contract law principles, like good faith,277 i.e. at the expense of private law justice.  Furthermore, 
this regulatory intervention impacts on the role of contract law and autonomy at the time of 
resolving a dispute when parties have been forced to settle the dispute, be it by state or non-state 
bodies. It is about settlement as a way not to resolve the dispute via a settlement, but as a way to 
avoid litigation.  
Extending Cappelletti's view on the civil procedure278 to the telecoms sector, the design of 
the enforcement machinery determines the outcome of the settlement and constraints the behavior 
of the parties involved in the dispute in an attempt to implement (or rater integrate) the public 
policies at stake (mainly the policy aims contained in Article 8 of the Framework Directive). The 
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allocation of adjudication powers to actors beyond the courts (NRAs as state bodies or delegated 
institutions) represents an institutional choice aimed at safeguarding the effective enforcement of 
the EU regulatory goals for telecommunications. The extent to which private law and private 
autonomy still plays a role depends very much on the internal procedures designed for dispute 
resolution and the leeway left to parties within this process. From this perspective, negotiation 
solutions even assisted negotiations and modes of third party mediation that are not very intrusive– 
represent the return of private law given that private parties can reach private solutions without 
interfering with the achievement of the regulatory goals. At the opposite end of the spectrum we 
can see mechanisms of adjudication, in particular those performed by state actors (NRAS), insofar 
as the rules governing the procedure are intrinsically public as are the principles that guide their 
decisions and, where appropriate, there is public regulation of the procedure of judicial review. 
Whether the intervention of courts is aimed at protecting individual rights or, on the contrary, at 
safeguarding public (regulatory) policies will have to be proven on a case-by-case basis. The 
examples from the UK shows that even if private law and freedom of contract are at the core of the 
dispute, regulatory principles play a prominent role in the interpretation of the autonomy and the 
rights of the parties to freely govern their relationships via the contract. There are higher objectives 
beyond private autonomy that overshadow the role of the contract giving rise to the dispute, which 
becomes subordinated to the achievement of public policy aims.  
Accordingly, it can be concluded that the EU is setting up a detailed system for the 
enforcement of EU rules via requirements on national procedural schemes outside the judiciary. 
This is giving rise to different layers of enforcement outside of the judiciary that are aimed at 
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PART III – CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 6 – TOWARDS THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF EUROPEAN 





If “the European Union is odd”,1 and EU Private Law is something different,2 what are we talking 
about?  
Taking into consideration that European Private law largely deviates from the traditional 
notion of private and contract law, and that the new regulatory structures governing the provision 
of Services of General Economic Interest are built according to novel legal patterns, and that legal 
values are –one way or another– imbuing the main sectors of the economy, one might want to 
wonder: Is (traditional) contract law dead in Europe?3  
This dissertation has sought to provide answers to those questions by analysing the 
transformations of private law as a consequence of the (potential) self-sufficiency according to 
which sector-related regimes operate. Because self-sufficiency operates from cradle to grave, this 
research has traced the impact of telecommunications regulation in private relationships by 
scrutinizing telecoms regulation from its making to its enforcement, in an attempt to contribute to 
an overall project for the reshuffle of European Private Law: European Regulatory Private Law. 
All things considered, this thesis proposes a model of private law to be found within 
telecommunications regulation, which yields and relies on different patterns to those belonging to 
the conventional private law contained in the private law codifications. In order to test the 
hypotheses, the structure of the thesis corresponds to the aims of the argument to systematize 
private law under the assumption of a transformation largely led by the self-sufficiency of 
telecommunications regulation. Chapter 1 and 2 set the scene for such an argument. Whilst Chapter 
1 sketches the content of the thesis, and introduces the postulates, its aims and the reasons to 
validate the assumptions, Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework upon which the main 
hypotheses are based. This works as an introductory and theoretical contribution. It presents the 
self-sufficiency idea, its drivers and the consequences for the conventional and normative 
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understanding of the traditional functions of private law. It also identifies the different 
transformations of private law and their impact not only in the legal world, but also for the role and 
function of the State itself. The transformation is manifested in three different layers –making, 
substance and enforcement– whose main features are also displayed in Chapter 2. To conclude, the 
chapter asks whether, under those assumptions, one can conclude the validation of self-sufficiency 
as evidence of intrusion and substitution of European Regulatory Private Law contained in 
regulated sectors. This introductory and theoretical framework serves as the foundations for the 
core part of the dissertation, which has been featured in Part II.  
The substantive part of the research (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) has been undertaken under a 
single methodology for the three chapters. These chapters have provided a descriptive account of 
the regulatory and institutional structures put in place when it comes to the regulation, functioning 
and application of the telecommunications regulatory framework. To simplify the analysis, and 
taking into account that this dissertation looks at the transformations operated in the regulation of 
business-to-business operations (B2B) and business-to-consumers (B2C) interactions, most parts of 
the thesis contain a differentiated treatment according to whether they concern wholesale or retail 
markets. The functioning is, in practice, reconstructed via empirical research and case-studies. 
Accordingly, whereas the descriptive parts analyse black-letter law, the substantial chapters have 
examined the main problems encountered in the real practice of telecommunications. These issues 
are usually reflected in the examination of the presented case-studies that concern relevant and 
timely issues for discussion.  
Chapter 3 explored (law)making in telecommunications regulation. As regards private law, 
it portrays how the shift in the regulatory powers has entailed a transformation not only in the way 
private law is created, but also implemented and enforced by way of tracing the actors and 
procedures involved in law-making. This chapter thereby discloses the implications of new 
governance and experimentalist governance in the process of private law rule-making via sector-
specific regulation.  
In Chapter 4 this dissertation has treated the substantive provisions of telecommunications 
regulation that affect the interaction of private parties at both levels, wholesale and retail. By 
drawing on the different parameters introduced in the regulatory framework for telecoms with 
particular relevance for private law concerns, this chapter touches upon the different approaches of 
the legislator in the configuration of the substantive core of telecommunications regulation.  
If Chapter 4 contains the regulatory solutions to sector-related problems, Chapter 5 
describes the framework provided for the resolution of disputes arising from those problems. Given 
that there seems to be a contrast between the objectives of the regulatory framework and those 
corresponding to the traditional functions of private law, this chapter evidences the establishment 
of a parallel system of enforcement –via sector-specific extrajudicial means of dispute resolution– 
of the private law provisions contained in telecommunications regulation. To this end, given that 
institutional design is important in the enforcement of telecommunications regulation, Chapter 5 
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incorporates the mapping and performance of the competent actors who interfere in the procedure 
for the resolution of the dispute, be it the regulator or the judiciary by judicial review of regulatory 
decisions. The empirical evidence reveals a differentiated treatment of core principles of private 
law, such as freedom of contract, depending on who performs the role of adjudicator. Beyond this 
institutional structure, the shift towards more administrative and extrajudicial (administrative) 
structures and enforcement reflect a transformation in the pattern of the traditional enforcement of 
private law. 
A detailed analysis of the conclusions of each of the chapters is the subject of the present 
chapter. As the title implies, this dissertation has sought to advance the argument that the sector-
specific rules concerning private relationships in telecommunications operate in a self-sufficient 
manner. The conclusions of the thesis (Chapter 6) summarize the findings of the previous chapters 
and conclude with an answer to the research questions that motivates the dissertation: to what 
extent has EU telecommunications regulation impacted on private relationships and, if it has, does 
it give rise to a process of transformation of private law by yielding a self-sufficient understanding 
that does not require (traditionally) national structures for its operation? 
2. Self-sufficiency as the epitome of a top-down Transformation (and 
Europeanization) of Private Law 
Much has been already said about self-sufficiency in this dissertation. Yet, before concluding 
whether the self-sufficiency hypothesis is substantiated or invalidated, it is necessary to examine 
the transformations on the different layers in order to assess the accuracy of its postulates. 
Particularly, it condenses the findings that provide an answer to the question as to what forces are 
transforming private law and to what extent.  
2.1. The transformation via telecommunications regulation in “the making” of 
private law  
The liberalization of the sector has entailed a shift from national regulation to supranational law-
making of former public utilities. In the European Union, once liberalization occurred, the 
regulation of Services of General Economic Interest (SGEIs) has been conducted mainly under the 
Internal Market competence (Article 114 TFEU, former Article 95 EC Treaty). Further, it has been 
accomplished according to a sector-related approach, which has given rise to the emergence of 
different vertical sectors. Because the EU took the lead in the liberalization process, the 
harmonization of these services within the Internal Market is the guiding light in the legislative 
development of telecoms regulation.  
The strategic importance of the regulated networked industries, its complexity and 
technicality, explain the State-internal redistribution of power.  Thus, the oversight functions lead 
to the delegation (outsourcing) of functions from the Congress to specialized agencies and to the 
private sector. A (decentralized) delegated implementation system is explained by the lack of 
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information and expertise on the part of legislatures, which gives rise to a “perplexingly diffuse 
administrative state”.4 In telecommunications –as in the energy sector– the Internal Market project 
and the level of technical complexity of the sector has implied the establishment of National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) to oversee the regulatory process at national level. Accordingly, 
NRAs were established as a way of securing liberalization via institutional design. This is the trend 
followed in Europe with the emergence of different generations of sector-specific regulation once 
the liberalization of the market has been attained. Competition law has not yet taken over entirely 
but also (sector-specific) regulatory goals are shifting from liberalization to broader goals like the 
achievement of a Digital Single Market for Europe. 
Additional supervisory mechanisms at the EU level were put in place. This time, not with 
the aim of overseeing the liberalization process, but with the aim of achieving what turned out to be 
one of the overarching aims of the regulatory framework: the development of the Internal Market. 
To this end, the sector has developed towards the establishment of a network for cooperation in 
regulatory affairs. This network operates at both the national and the European level. The 
supranational dimension operates via networks of regulators. This network has reached its most 
advanced stage so far with the establishment of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic 
Communications (BEREC) in 2009. The BEREC is the outcome of the path dependency of a set of 
practices that was followed in the previous years, which first emerged as an informal cooperation 
(the birth of the Independent Regulators Groups) and that later was institutionalized under a formal 
organization fostered by the European Commission (European Regulators Group). While it is true 
that the BEREC was originally meant to be a European agency and that its current structure is the 
result of political fragmentation, the reality is that the BEREC, as a forum of regulators, together 
with other supervisory mechanisms (Article 7 Framework Directive) represents a high level of 
regulatory convergence bypassing complex political commitments such as those associated with 
the establishment of a European Agency and the complex task of endowing it with competences.5 
Furthermore, the empirical research conducted in the preparation of this chapter has demonstrated 
this claim, even though the governance strategy followed in telecoms depends on the idea of 
cooperation. In the interplay between the EU and its Member States via the national regulators, 
there is a kind of shallow interdependence insofar as the EU is actually the leading voice in this 
cooperative relationship, usually with Internal Market purposes.  
The Internal Market-building project has been reinforced by the establishment of 
procedures to ensure the proper and consistent application of the Regulatory Framework at the 
national level: Article 7 and 7a of the Framework Directive procedures. The decision to establish a 
decentralized structure to monitor the proper implementation of the EU rules via NRAs responds to 
flexibility and efficiency motivations. In fact, national specialized agencies are potentially more 
efficient and flexible as opposed to the European Commission. In general, these authorities possess 
the necessary expertise and knowledge concerning local particularities. These distinctive features 
                                                          
4 As Somek has put it. Somek, A. (2014), The Cosmopolitan Constitution, Oxford University Press. 
5 By way of example, the conferring of powers to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which gave 
rise to the Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 January 2014 (ESMA case), also C-217/04, ENISA.  
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enable NRAs to better respond to intricate and incipient problems. 6  Under Article 7 and 7a 
procedures, NRAs are required to notify the Commission of the adoption of regulatory measures or 
the imposition of regulatory remedies when they concern the development of the Internal Market. 
The analysis of a real case on the effects of a conflict between the national regulatory decision and 
a Commission’s Recommendation reveals the pervasive nature and the practical implications of the 
mandate contained in Article 7a of the Framework Directive. In addition to this governance conflict, 
this case also evidences a jurisdictional (and hierarchical) conflict between the regulator and the 
national judiciary. In particular, the main conflict is between the regulator applying EU (soft)law 
vis-à-vis the national judiciary applying national law, which will be ultimately decided by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Should the CJEU rule in favor of the legal impossibility 
to deviate from the Commission’s Recommendation, it would be a landmark in the role and effect 
of EU soft-law. Yet, such interpretation would also reinforce the assumptions exhibited above 
based on the grounds of empirical research. 
An additional major finding arising from the preliminary findings of this research is that, at 
least in telecoms, there is no clear distinction between decision-making, implementation and 
enforcement of its provisions. In particular, this is the result of the designed system for the 
implementation telecommunications rules, where the transposition of the EU rules in the national 
system gets blurred with enforcement. This is particularly true when it comes to the supervisory 
powers of the Commission and the role of NRAs as decision-makers, which must try to give shape 
not only to the implementation of the measures adopted at EU level, but also to their consistent 
application. 
To conclude, these transformations in the governance of telecommunications, largely as 
result of the sector-related approach and linked to the technical complexity of the sector, have 
implied the emergence of new methods and actors in the regulatory process of private law. The 
legal basis and its implications for private law as for pricing regulation vis-à-vis the subsidiarity 
principle have been discussed in the analysis of the Vodafone case. Thus, from the research 
conducted we conclude that, from a private law perspective, in the telecoms sectors the traditional 
law-making process for private law has been displaced. We are far removed from the traditional 
approach where the legislator was the main –and only– actor in the legislative process.  
The power shift from the legislator to the sector-specific authority and, most importantly, 
from the national level to the supranational EU level has not taken place via explicit legal 
delegation, rather it has occurred via heterarchical forms of accountability and legitimation as a 
result of the emergence of global administrative law as Ladeur has theorized it would/does.7 Yet, 
                                                          
6  Interview with NRA expert. In the same vein, concerning competition law, see Svetiev, Y. (2010), ‘Networked 
Competition Governance in the EU: Delegation, Decentralization or Experimentalist Architecture?’ in Sabel, C. F., & 
Zeitlin, J. (Eds.), Experimentalist governance in the European Union: towards a new architecture. Oxford University 
Press; and Svetiev, Y. (2015), ‘Scaling experimentalism: from convergence to informed divergence in transnational 
competition policy, in Zeitlin, J. (ed.), Extending Experimentalist Governance?: The European Union and Transnational 
Regulation, 169. 
7 Ladeur, K.-H.(2010), “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law and the Evolution of General Administrative 
Law”. 
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evidence suggests that the actual implications are comparable to those resulting from a genuine 
principal-actor delegation. 
2.2. The substantial shift: from traditional to sector-specific and functionally 
oriented contract law  
In telecommunications regulation, private law seems to be used for economic regulation under a 
public interest rationale (universal access and end-to-end connectivity). In Chapter 4, we have seen 
that, as a result of the dual approach pursued by the legislator, the regulation of telecommunication 
services has influenced contracts in two ways. On the one hand, the Internal Market approach has 
developed contractual elements oriented to the empowerment of the consumer. On the other hand, 
the Universal Service approach has strived for the protection of the most vulnerable consumers 
(economically and geographically vulnerable). Under this process, the pertinent question is how 
many transformations have private law experienced? While in contract law mandatory rules should 
be the exception, in the telecommunications sector it appears they have become the rule.  
Given that there is a disparity between the objectives of the Regulatory Framework and 
those of traditional private law, the private law provisions concerning telecoms regulation unveil, at 
least, three different transformations:  
1. A shift in the regulatory paradigm: from the contract law rules contained in national civil 
codes or common law to sector-related regimes governing private relationships.  
2. A move from freedom of contract to regulated autonomy: from autonomy to mandated 
(B2B) and universal (B2C) access as a result of a market-building project.  
3. The transformation from civil law compensation to sector-related penalties. 
The Internal Market has been the driving force behind European private law and contracts have 
become an instrument of higher policy (and regulatory) objectives. Contract law becomes 
competitive contract law.8  
As for the contractual relationships between operators, the different aims and goals of the 
EU Regulatory Framework for telecoms are embodied in the way these contractual relationships 
have been configured. Thus, even though these relationships take their form from private contract, 
they are interpreted according to public law considerations (contracts as regulatory tools). Because 
the sector-specific rationalities create tensions between the public and the private domain (public 
vis-à-vis private principles), the lines between public and private law are blurred. Consequently, 
when addressing telecoms substantial provisions, both approaches should be seen “as a whole”, or 
new regulatory devices (hybrid nature), which escape the traditional public/private dichotomy.  
As for consumer protection, the dual approach (autonomy/social) in telecoms is relevant 
because it epitomizes the movement towards the self-sufficiency of European Regulatory Private 
                                                          
8 Competitive contract law implies that “the contract law rules are shape so as to allow effective competition between 
suppliers in the Internal Market” Micklitz, H.-W., (2005) “The Concept of Competitive Contract Law”, Penn State 
International Law Review, 23(3) 549-586; see p. 555.  
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Law.9 On the one hand, the Internal Market approach yields new elements for private law. A clear 
example is the right to switch of provider. On the other hand, the Universal Service approach is far 
removed from traditional private law, where the freedom of contract is the ultimate rationale. Quite 
to the contrary, the Universal Service approach strives for the maintenance of a provider of last 
resort by imposing obligations to contract as a safety net for vulnerable consumers. There is room 
for social policy elements within the European Private Law, in contrast to the private law contained 
in the 19th Century Codes. Accordingly, in regulated markets, contract law provisions are isolated 
from consumer law and although they further certain redistributive goals, contract law provisions in 
regulated markets are a lex specialis.  
One may inquire as to the permanent nature of sector-specific regulation. Whether sector-
specific regulation is aimed at enduring or rather simply a constitutive regulatory approach can be 
observe in the character of its provisions. Thus, whereas the competition law approach ‒number 
portability, information, etc. – may eventually exclude the need for sector-specific regulation in 
favor of competition law or, in the field of private law, a broader contract law (e.g. Unfair Contract 
Terms and general consumer law); interconnection, access and price regulation in 
telecommunications indicate more embedded forms of special regulation.10  
Further, while the “private law regime” contained within telecommunications regulation 
does not provide for European remedies, it is true that the introduction of the possibility to switch 
for free would serve as a basis for (intrusion) new remedies in the light of the European regulatory 
goals of sector-specific regulation replacing (substitution) national civil remedies; e.g. switching 
operators at zero cost as a sector-related remedy. Evidence towards this movement can be 
perceived from the latest Draft Regulation on telecommunications that proposed the possibility of 
enabling sector-specific regulators to impose compensation remedies in line with the Mifid II 
Directive.11 
The self-sufficiency idea is based on, thus, the assumption that the provisions concerning 
consumer contract in this vertical sectors also diverge from traditional private law insofar as 
measures such as obligation to contract to preserve access conditions are not found anywhere 
within traditional private law, which is contained within the different national private legal regimes 
and because General contract law seems to be insufficient to fulfill the regulatory role of contracts 
in the telecoms sector. Indeed, private and civil law regimes remain applicable to 
telecommunications contracts even by traditional judicial schemes of enforcement. Yet, different 
approaches yield different outcomes, because they are built according to different rationales. It is 
also evident that new (specialized) bodies have emerged for the enforcement of the sector-related 
provisions, especially for the resolution of B2B and B2C disputes arising in connection to the 
provision of telecommunications services.  
                                                          
9 Micklitz, H.-W. and Svetiev, Y. (eds.) (2012), “A Self-Sufficient European Private Law - A Viable Concept?”, EUI 
Working Papers Law No. 2012/31.  
10 Möschel, W. (2009). The Future Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications: General Competition Law instead of 
Sector-Specific Regulation–A German Perspective. European Business Organization Law Review, 10(1)149-163. 
11 Draft Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures concerning the European single 
market for electronic communications and to achieve a Connected Continent - COM(2013) 627, Article 30(8).  
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2.3. Enforcement via telecoms-related dispute resolution 
This thesis has demonstrated a shift from judicial to administrative (and soft) enforcement and 
extrajudicial means for dispute resolution The vast amount of telecoms-related disputes are 
resolved via extrajudicial mechanisms, be it via regulatory adjudication or via procedures of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in both market levels, wholesale (B2B disputes) and retail 
(B2C disputes). As exposed in Chapter 5, and partially due to the principle of national procedural 
autonomy, there is a wide array of available mechanisms for dispute resolution.  
Apart from regulatory adjudication, regulators are also engaged in providing other non-
adjudicative methods for dispute settlement. Thus, telecommunication regulators provide a wide 
range of instruments aimed at facilitating the extrajudicial settlement of disputes. These 
instruments vary from the simple provision of the regulator’s premises to a more elaborated scheme 
where the regulator adjudicates disputes or simply fosters ‒as we have seen in some instances, even 
compulsorily– the meeting of the parties to find a satisfactory solution. To this end, NRAs enjoy 
significant freedom to design these schemes ranging from the use of horizontal public/private rules, 
to the design of specific rules and codes of practice containing the specific procedural rules and 
even standardized remedies and compensations. In any case, what is clear from the analysis is that 
either within a process of regulatory adjudication or as part of the judicial review of regulatory 
decisions, in resolving B2B disputes, Article 8 of the Framework Directive and the regulatory goals 
contained therein override the terms of the private contract between the parties.  
The promotion of ADR for consumer-related problems might well function as a parallel 
system of adjudication, although thus far it seems to be used as one of the many others political 
strategies to advance the Internal Market-building processes.12 It will remain to be seen, therefore, 
if it really enhances consumer confidence (and protection) in the market. 
On the other hand, much debates has occurred as to whether the increasing availability of 
ADR mechanisms has really implied an important step in terms of access to justice for consumers. 
At the retail market level, the design of an effective system of enforcement represent an important 
challenge for striking a balance in the project of achieving a broader (and better) access to justice 
for consumers while, at the same time, reducing the workload of civil courts. Whereas the 
marginalization of judicial decisions entails a relaxation of the rule of law (where is the law? and 
the return of private law (section 4.2 of Chapter 5), this is not incompatible with the possibility to 
reach "satisfactory" solutions. This situation raises the question as to what extent access to justice 
can still be read as  "(...) the most basic requirement – the most basic ‘human right’ – of a modern, 
egalitarian legal system which purports to guarantee, and not merely proclaim, the legal rights of 
all.”13 or whether the concept of justice needs to be re-shaped, at least in the field of utilities, or 
even replaced by a new understanding more in line with standards of expeditious, and satisfactory 
solutions provided via a set of mechanisms that provide neutral, easy (but also alternative) and 
                                                          
12 ADR as one of the levers to boost and strengthen the Internal Market, See COM (2011) 206 final, p. 9-10.  
13 Cappelletti, M. and Garth, B. (1987), Chapter 1: Introduction – Policies, Trends and Ideas in Civil Procedure, in: 
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. XVI: Civil Procedure, edited by Mauro Cappelletti. 
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more efficient solutions as opposed to judicial adjudication only in those cases in which a third 
party adjudicates the dispute, but not where the parties reach a solution by themselves.  
Justice in the field in telecoms, and not only with regard to the (alternative) understanding 
of justice by the EU (the concept of justice in the ADR Directive) for consumer matters may 
implying justice is no longer considered a public good but rather a satisfactory solution. If 
establishing a system of civil justice to deal with small claims is expensive: are we trading-off 
intrinsic values of justice for new values. Is the fairness (the principle of fairness) found in contract 
law sacrificed to the neo-liberal policies that were predominant in the UK during the Thatcher 
era? 14  Does this entailing the beginning of "another story"? 15  Can ADR means for dispute 
resolution be seen as alternative to the problem of the lack of resources of the judiciary to solve its 
deficiencies? The answer seems to be no.16 Extrajudicial mechanism for dispute settlement should 
not be the alternative but the complement to judicial responses.17 I conclude that it is not a bad 
thing, as it were, but is desirable, that is, to have alternative –yet not exclusionary– mechanisms 
available for the resolution of disputes involving small sums of money. Consequently, a cheap (low 
cost) mechanism for dispute resolution means cheap (low cost) justice. In fact, the reality is that in 
the end the majority of the population is not aware of the rights that assist them as consumers. It 
has been demonstrated that the decisive factor in the assessment of the satisfactory nature of 
alternative methods of law enforcement is their perceive fairness, over the costs involved, potential 
delays and even the result of the case.18 In addition, individual are more enthusiastic about settling 
the dispute without entering into an adversarial legal procedure.19 In any case, the establishment of 
monitoring measures can enhance the advantages of ADR and quality requirements aimed at 
minimizing the divergences in the perceived fairness of the procedure. To that end, the ADR 
Directive goes in the direction of standardizing (Europeanize) the procedural requirements. Yet, 
what is problematic is that the Member States are required to establish a networked structure of 
ADR mechanisms that require, to be sure, an investment (public cost) that has to be undertaken to 
solve sector-related problems.20  
As regards class actions as the alternative to the shortcomings of associated with ADR, in 
the EU there are not many known cases in which affected consumers have taken part of a class 
action to solve recurrent issues. Rather, when they have taken place (usually with regard to issues 
unrelated to the sector, but involving problems of interpretation of more horizontal rules, Invitel 
and RWE), the solutions reached involve a negotiated solution between the parties, the undertaking 
and the consumer organization, dismissing and setting aside judiciary intervention in the end 
                                                          
14 See Mattei, U. (2007), “Access to Justice. A Renewed Global Issue”, Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 11. 
15 Caponi, R. (2015), "Just Settlement" or Just About Settlement? Mediated Agreements: A comparative Overview of the 
Basics”, Rabels zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales privatrecht, 79(1), 117-141. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18  Lind, E., MacCoun, R. J., Ebener, P. A., Felstiner, W. L., Hensler, D. R., Resnik, J., & Tyler, T. (1989). The 
Perception of Justice. RAND Institute for civil justice.  
19 Macaulay, S. (1963, “Non-contractual relations in business: A preliminary study”, American sociological review, 28, 
pp. 55-67, at 61.  
20 These are already long-standing problems. See, for instance, Zander, M. (1997), ‘Access to Justice – Towards the 21st 
Century’, in Rawlings, R. (ed.), Law, Society and Economy, Clarendon Press.  
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(Invitel). Be that as it may, issues reaching the court do not, usually, concern the enforcement of 
sector-specific rules. Judicial redress remains as a safety valve for problems related imbalances of 
power between the parties entailing a breach of the framework of consumer protection beyond its 
basic standards according to the normal provision of the service.  
Nor do substantive law provisions seem to be sufficient to put an end to the issue of 
increasing litigation in the field of utilities. It is disputed whether the setting up of a system of 
sector-related disputes by providing extrajudicial schemes for disputes resolution is wholly self-
sufficient because the functioning of those mechanisms requires the embrace of judicial 
intervention in the enforcement of the solutions reached via out-of-court means (New York 
convention) or within a process of judicial review. Yet, given the nature of most of the disputes at 
stake (mainly small claims) this justifies the use of out-of-court procedures.  
Be that as it may, the examination of the use of ADR for telecommunications-related 
problems could serve as an illustration of a process of de-judicialization 21 , insofar as the 
enforcement of the EU law is moving towards softer solutions coming from public bodies apart 
from courts. In fact, the vast amount of cases is no longer found in court. Accordingly, the new 
mechanisms of soft-enforcement and self-enforcement has fostered a shift in traditional litigation 
strategies and forums.  
3. The limits and variations of Self-Sufficiency 
The self-sufficiency hypothesis expands throughout substance and procedures. This dissertation has 
shown that self-sufficiency is a phenomenon that seems to follow similar patterns in the different 
Member States. As a matter of fact, the telecommunications-related problems experienced in one 
national market can be replicated in a broadly similar way in a different Member State.  
Platforms of self-sufficiency: European and local self-sufficiency 
Self-sufficiency in the interaction of European Regulatory Private Law operates in different 
platforms.22 One platform is represented by the relation EU vis-à-vis the Members States. A second 
platform of self-sufficiency makes reference to the relationship as between vertical orders, whereas 
the other is more related to sector-specific regulation as opposed to more general branches of law, 
such as contract law or consumer law when it comes to private law interactions.  
As to the first level, the EU has developed a mechanism of self-enforcement by tightening 
the leeway of National Regulatory Authorities by setting regulatory constraints on the national 
procedural autonomy principle –by way of narrow mandates–23 together with the establishment of 
                                                          
21 Micklitz, H.-W. (2009), “The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law--The Transformation of European 
Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation”, Yearbook of European Law, 28(1) 3-59. 
22  Svetiev discusses the dimensions of self-sufficiency (Svetiev, Y. (2013), "Dimensions of Self-sufficiency", EUI 
Working Papers Law No. 2013/05 (ECR-ERPL 05)). I would rather describe them as platforms, as they can interact with 
each other in the different stages of a single process.  
23 Ibid.   
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sector-related supervisory mechanisms aimed at achieving the consistent application of the EU 
regulatory framework for the Internal Market. As a matter of fact, the institutionalization of the 
implementation mechanism of Article 7 of the Framework Directive epitomizes the formalization 
of these self-enforcement techniques under new modes of regulatory governance.24  
The second platform is that one upon which self-sufficiency finds its raison d’etre. It is the 
rationale of self-sufficiency. The individual purposes or functions to be achieved via sector-specific 
legislation have favoured a sectorial approach that endows each regulated market with sector-
related contract rules (silo effect).25 Be that as it may, the emergence of the telecoms silo is not an 
alternative to publicly (statutorily) provided law, per Bernstein’s example.26 Rather, the dynamics 
of the market itself have led to the creation of a sector-related understanding of an industry 
functioning under its own rationale.27 
As set out in Chapter 2, by adopting Teubner’s postulates as to legal autopoiesis, 28 this 
thesis has sought to verify the occurrence of the following features in order to validate the self-
sufficiency hypothesis: i) closure of the system; ii) enforcement closes the gap from the perspective 
of market players; iii) from the perspective of rule and decision-makers, it would have to be the 
evidence by the existence of (self-referential) sector-specific supervisory mechanisms. From this 
point of view, Articles 7 and 8 of the Framework Directive stand as the key provisions that 
underpin these assumptions. On the one hand, by putting in place a sector-specific system for the 
monitoring of the implementation of regulatory obligations at national level, Article 7 bridges the 
gap between the European and national levels when it comes to implementing EU rules. On the 
other hand, Article 8 tops off the system by providing the guiding principles according to which the 
private law provisions contained in sector-specific regulation are interpreted, to the extent of 
constraining private autonomy and overriding contractual terms between private parties in order to 
achieve other interests, namely the regulatory goals enshrined in Article 8. In sum, an important 
finding of the thesis is that while Article 7 closes the gap institutionally and procedurally, Article 8 
reinforces, substantively, the closure of the system.  
4. Normative Analysis: A (un)desirable transformation of Private Law?  
The holistic approach upon which this thesis is based calls for an evaluation of its normative 
assumptions. Self-sufficiency, as it has been portrayed throughout the dissertation, implicitly 
denotes the coherence of a legal order. Under such approach, it would entail that the legal order has 
to produce coherent decisions in the application of the EU rules concerning private law in the 
                                                          
24 See Chapter 3.  
25 Svetiev supra n 22.  
26 Bernstein, L. (2001), “Private commercial law in the cotton industry: Creating cooperation through rules, norms, and 
institutions”. U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper, (133). 
27 Teubner, G., and Fischer-Lescano, A. (2004), “Regime-collisions: the vain search for legal unity in the fragmentation 
of global law”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 25(4), 999-1046. 
28 Translating Teubner’s autopoiesis, Teubner, G. (1993). Law as an autopoietic system, Blackwell Publishers. 
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provision of telecommunications services. In order to identify such legal coherence, it needs to 
occur in three different dimensions:    
- Substantive (norms and legal principles) 
- Institutional (Institutions, actors, interactions) 
- Argumentative (Justification, Reasoning) 
The first two have been already subject to scrutiny in the preceding chapters. Therefore, it remains 
to explore the argumentative foundations of the proposed normative model. Such argumentation 
calls for 1) an empirical formulation –what are the consequences/effects of the law; 2) a 
philosophical enquiry –what is law, when is it valid and how it develops; and 3) a normative 
justification –what is the final aspiration of such formulation (e.g. legal certainty).  
Private law is not the main focus of the EU Regulatory framework for telecommunications. 
Private law is just a “side effect” of the Digital Single Market construction project. Here, private 
law is not only aimed at protecting the weakest parties or at establishing a system of remedies 
under a traditional private law understanding. Rather, private law here is used as haphazard element 
that happens to be present at the core of free movement inasmuch as, in the end, free movement is 
about enabling pan-European contractual transactions. In so doing, the EU does not place private 
autonomy at the core of the contractual dimension. It has been replaced by a transformed framed 
autonomy that only allows the pursuit of different degrees of efficiency (economic efficiency), 
since it empowers private parties to operate efficiently in the market and under assumptions of 
market access. Thus, we cannot talk about private autonomy in the traditional sense. In this new 
setting, private autonomy has been taken away from the parties in order to fulfil the objectives of 
the sector.  
My view is that the driver of the transformation of private law in the telecoms sector is the 
Internal Market project, understood as that telecommunications regulation has to serve to the 
purposes of the fundamental freedoms.29 The EU has “extended private autonomy across national 
borders”.30 The paradox here is that while the EU has employed Internal Market harmonization to 
justify (legal basis) the regulation, a single market for telecoms has not been achieved to date.  
Against this background(s), the desirability of the transformation of private law should be 
(optimistically) assessed in the way Tuori looks at the hybrids forms of transnational law. We have 
to break our mental boxes and open our minds to new categories boosted by the emergence of new 
social realities that the law have to accommodate and where traditional classifications are 
intermingled giving rise to new scenarios, chaotic for our understanding but somehow consistent. 
The traditional conception of (idealistic) legal unity is not valid anymore. As society has evolved, 
the law has changed too, and with it, its structures. Hence, the existence of new paradigms has 
                                                          
29 In line with Ladeur (in ‘The State in International Law’), Globalization has triggered the entire transformation process.  
30 Müller-Graff, P. C. (2001). ‘Basic freedoms–Extending party autonomy across borders’ in S. Grundmann, W. Kerber 
and S. Weatherill, (eds.), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market, Walter de Gruyter, 133-
156. 
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generated certain mismatch within our mental maps as lawyers, which must be re-configured, re-
designed, in order to accommodate them to the novel landscape.31 
5. Conclusions: Towards self-sufficiency?  
Apart from the transformations operated in the substance of contract law, as a result of the 
experimental governance evidenced in the regulation of telecommunications services, three 
institutional and procedural transformations have also taken place:32i) a substantial policy change 
(the goals of the regulatory framework has shifted from liberalization to the harmonization of the 
Internal Market); ii) a procedural shift (the European Commission enjoys greater powers as a result 
of the consultation mechanisms); and iii) a process of mutual learning among the Member States 
(the “network approach” encourages harmonized solutions).  
These shifts trigger a tension between private and public law. In particular, this is due to 
the fact that the “strategic comprehensive decision-making” 33  results in NRAs expected to 
understand, although not necessarily to apply, the impact of private law principles to disputes 
arising from interconnection agreements, for instance. Yet, in the event of a civil court adjudicating 
such dispute, it has to take into consideration not only private law, but public and policy options, 
beside highly technical economic issues. And −needless to say− the regulatory principles enshrined 
in the EU regulatory framework for telecommunications are considerably different to those guiding 
contract law; e.g. good faith and reasonableness.34  
Notwithstanding these observations, and as a result of the findings yielded as a 
consequence of the research conducted, we should keep a dual understanding of self-sufficiency.  
A dual interpretation of self-sufficiency 
At this stage, it is necessary to conclude that the present research has delivered two different 
interpretations. On the one hand, a superficial descriptive analysis would have concluded that there 
is no evidence of self-sufficiency as long as the functioning of the private law rules contained in the 
sectorial regimes requires its articulation within the (national) legal system. This assumption leads 
to a misguided conception of the actual functioning of the sector. Yet, on the other hand, the 
examination of the sector by way of empirical analysis seems to revert such assumption, to the 
extent that it can be concluded that self-sufficiency is a reality. This thesis has provided evidence of 
self-sufficiency in the functioning of the telecommunications sector.  
                                                          
31 The quotation that summarizes the message of the paper is that of Luhmman that Touri quotes through Teubner’s and 
Fischer-Lescano’s: “The sin of differentiation cannot be undone. Paradise is lost”, Tuori, K. (2014), “On legal hybrids 
and Perspectivism” in n Maduro, M., Tuori, K. and Sunkari, S. (eds.), Transnational Law: Rethinking European Law and 
Legal Thinking, Cambridge University Press, at p. 36. 
32Drawing on Zeitlin, J. (2011), ‘Is the Open Method of Coordination an Alternative to the Community Method?’, in R. 
Dehousse, The   Community Method: Obstinate or Obsolete?, Palgrave Macmillan.  
33 Ladeur, K.-H. (2010), “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law and the Evolution of General Administrative 
Law”. 
34 Gijrath, S. (2006), Interconnection Regulation and Contract Law, dLex, at p. 5.  
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Self-sufficiency seems to be empirically supported. Hirhteto, even though self-sufficiency 
is taking place is some areas, it is still not fully operative in others. In fact, the institutional and 
procedural design of telecommunications regulation favours the existence of a set of rules 
particularly relevant for private actors. Yet, in the normal functioning of the sector the main 
problems are also related to more horizontal regimes of a cross-sectorial nature, which means that 
even though the private law rules embedded in the sector operate more or less independently –i.e. 
not requiring other rules or the involvement of national actors to a great extent– ERPL cannot (yet) 
be considered entirely self-sufficient. Thus far, self-sufficiency is not entirely intruding and 
substituting national private legal orders. However, this does not mean that we can deny prima 
facie, as it were, that we are moving towards the self-sufficiency of European Regulatory Private 
Law. Hence, should the self-sufficiency hypothesis be observed in other regulated sectors (energy 
and financial services), 35  we might conclude that private law is experiencing a process of 
transformation via the operating self-sufficiency upon which these legal regimes are based.   
For all these reasons I argue that, when it comes to private law, by the introduction of 
provisions concerning contract law, sector-specific rules replace36 general provisions of contract 
law and consumer protection, yielding a new outlook for contracts between undertakings and a 
particular status for telecoms users. Thus, the particularities of the whole market for electronic 
communications and the separate status of its players seem to imply a transformation in the 
national and European private law by a highly defined sector whose process –I claim–  is hardly 
reversible.  
  
                                                          
35 Micklitz, H.‐W. and Svetiev, Y. and Comparato, G. (eds.), European Regulatory Private Law – The Paradigms Tested, 
European Regulatory Private Law Project (ERC-ERPL - 07); EUI Working Paper Series LAW No. 2014/04. 
36 Please note that in the prevous version the manuscript read as “taking over”.   
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